BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and December 1999 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 14, 1999
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I
INTRODUCTION
II
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The Kosovo post-conflict developments
2. The
Post-war rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
4. FRYOMacedonia
5. Romania
IV
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Multilateral Relations
V
THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
VI
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United Nations
2. EU
3. China
4. Russia
5. NATO
VII
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION:CONCLUSIONS
The last
month of 1999 sent two clear messages to the people and states of South-East
Europe, as well as to the rest of the world.
First, the post-conflict hardships in one of the post-Yugoslav
territories – Kosovo – and the inefficiency of the Yugoslav opposition against
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic remain significant features of a
dramatically changing European region at the end of the decade. Second, despite the first message the
destiny of South-East Europe is predominantly determined by the changes taking
place in the four countries of the peninsula that have already established,
including during December 1999, a clear and prospective status within the
European Union (EU): Greece, a
long-time full member; Turkey, whichh has assumed "candidacy status",
and Bulgaria and Romania, new starters of negotiations for accession to the EU.
The evolving future membership in the EU of Bulgaria and Romania, along with
Greece and Turkey, will influence, in many ways, the thinking and the mood of
Serbian society. Europeanisation of the
Balkan peninsula is no longer a dream of the indefinite future but a complex,
everyday practice of two of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's neighbouring
countries and their societies. For
months, official Belgrade has been hiding answers to questions from Serbs on
the topic of nationalism. A new set of
unanswerable questions has evolved: why
and for how long should we stay out of the integrating European nations? The
prospects of a similar benign future for the Serbian people, their eventual
integration into the European mainstream, is a welcome subject for a depressed
anti-Milosevic opposition, too. The
neighbours of the FRY wish to have this country's people on board the European
train as soon as possible in an effort to capture the opportunities of the next
century and millennium in Europe whole and free.
was the focus of security developments in the region in December.
Cowardly attacks against innocent and unarmed civilians, mostly
Serbs, have preserved an environment of tension and uncertainty in Kosovo. Some 450 people have been killed since KFOR
entered the province. The atmosphere of
managing a complicated inter-ethnic relationship remains very unfriendly. The
real trends in the field that need to be wisely confronted are a de facto
cantonisation of Serbs and a growing feeling among Albanians that everything
that takes place is just a prelude to a free and independent Kosovo.
These developments are a sad continuation of a previous record that
was disclosed on December 9 by the Second State Department Report on Ethnic
Cleansing in Kosovo. It provided the
most current data on the scale and the intensity of human rights and
humanitarian law violations that had occurred in Kosovo during the past
year. The report focuses on 10 broad
categories of human rights violations:
forced expulsions, looting, burning, detentions, use of human shields,
systematic and organised rape, summary executions, exhumation of mass graves,
violations of medical neutrality, and a new type of ethnic cleansing – identity
cleansing.
KFOR continued to maintain an effective military presence. The multinational forces preserved a
readiness to respond to any external threat to Kosovo's security, provided
security at borders and internal boundaries, provided a secure environment to
the inhabitants of the province, continued to combat illegal arms and continued
to support the various UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) missions. Unfortunately, an
American and a Polish servicemen were killed by mines in two separate
incidents.
On December 15, in Pristina,
Kosovar Albanian political leaders signed an agreement for sharing the
provisional management of Kosovo with UNMIK within an interim administration
structure. This will become operational
by January 31, 2000, and will consist of eight members – three Kosovo Albanian leaders,
one Kosovo Serb (yet unnamed) and four UNMIK members. The main tasks of the structure is to bring to a close the
activities of parallel structures in Kosovo and to involve the people of the
province directly in their own affairs.
The Kosovo Transitional Council – the highest-level advisory body of
Kosovo’s representatives to UNMIK – will maintain its consultative role. At the signing ceremony Serb representatives
were not present, but their seats have been reserved. The agreement for a joint structure to share the administration
of Kosovo between representatives of the province and UNMIK is a significant
step towards the goal of determining their own future.
In a
special briefing at the Defence Department on
December 9 General Wesley Clark, SACEUR, acknowledged that public
security problems still exist in Bosnia despite police reform. He confirmed that the troop level of SFOR
will drop from the current 30,000 to around 20,000 by spring next year.
On
December 14 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague issued a 40-year jail sentence to Bosnian Serb war criminal
Goran Jelisic – "The Serbian Adolf" – who was responsible for the
massacre of tens of innocent civilians in Brcko in 1992.
At the
invitation of ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte, the Prime Minister of the
Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, visited the tribunal on December 16. Republika Srpska, one of the entities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is cooperating more with the ICTY than in the past.
A
comprehensive security cooperation programme between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) and Bosnia and Herzegovina is planned for 2000.
On
December 10 Bulgaria obtained a new political quality after the EU summit in
Helsinki decided to start accession negotiations with this country. The special European meaning of this act was
that the continent will not be whole and free without Bulgaria’s integration
into the EU. The specific regional
reading of this decision, apart from the recognition of the country’s
stabilising role in the peninsula, was the fact that the decision was drafted
and approved with the participation of Greece, a Balkan country and a full EU
member. This sent a clear message to
every other country in the region that this act will inevitably be repeated
when the level of relations of the would-be contenders begin to match the
Bulgarian-Greek relationship. The
national consequences for Bulgaria were a higher level of national pride,
satisfaction and a big cabinet reshuffle – 10 of the 16 ministers left the
government after it was functionally restructured in preparation for the
accession negotiation process with the EU early next year.
On
December 11 Croatian President Franjo Tudjman died of cancer.
"The
forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be crucial
for its future," the final communiquŽ of NATO foreign ministers said on
December 15. "We hope that the
entire Croatian leadership will seize the chance to re-vitalise implementation
of the Dayton Peace Accords and demonstrate their commitment to democratic
elections and due constitutional process.
There is an opportunity for the next Croatian government to move towards
a closer relationship with Euro-Atlantic institutions."
The
parliamentary elections are scheduled for January 3, 2000. Free, fair and democratic elections would
mean they are transparent for the international community; all Croatians,
including refugees, are enfranchised; voter registries are made public; and
domestic monitors are given unlimited access to voting and tabulation centres
at all times. Croatia may turn into a
very significant factor for the progress of the Balkan region, if it manages to
cope with its own democratisation.
On
December 9 Serbian army troops drove trucks on to the runway of Podgorica
airport, Montenegro, and temporarily shut down the airport. After the Montenegrin parliament passed a
law saying it would run the airports and the ports of the country, and would
hence collect the revenues, Belgrade decided to send a message to Montenegro
telling it to refrain from moving towards greater independence.
Last
month the regime in Belgrade sent a cocktail of informative messages about
itself, including a harsh attack against UNMIK chief in Kosovo Bernard
Kouchner, accusing him of committing crimes against the customs regime of the
FRY; it fired three judges from the constitutional, high and city Belgrade
courts for activities opposing Milosevic’s power; it accused the Doctors
Without Frontiers NGO of espionage against the FRY. At the same time the country’s elite prepared for a luxurious New
Year’s party, while on December 26 an electricity black-out regime was
introduced in the country.
The
issue of the early elections finally brought the contending fractions of the
democratic opposition of Serbia together on December 28. The failure of street demonstrations to
topple Milosevic from power motivated the dispersed opposition groupings to
join forces in bringing their case to the Serbian parliament and call early
elections. Earlier this month Vuk
Drascovic sent a message to Russia, saying that if people do not vote in
peaceful elections chaos and civil disorder may follow. If early elections are to be called, clear
guarantees must be introduced against violations of the free and democratic
vote of the Serbian people.
International institutions like the OSCE, the EU and the CE may play an
active and positive role.
After
the final cast of some 10 per cent of the votes on December 5, the newly
elected president of the FYROMacedonia, Boris Trajkovski, pledged to lobby
intensively for his country’s integration in NATO and the EU. Another ambition of his is to ensure that
spare cash from the international agencies ends up in Skopje rather than in
Pristina. The 43-year-old president has
also promised to give ethnic Albanians better education and more jobs in the
civil service.
On
December 27 the parliament of the FYROMacedonia approved the new government of
Prime Minister Liubcho Georgievski after he had introduced certain changes
following the presidential elections earlier this month. The two coalition partners of his own party
– the Democratic Alternative of Vassil Topurkovski and the Democratic Party of
the Albanians of Arben Xhaferi – elected their representatives for deputy prime
ministers.
On
December 21 Romania’s parliament voted on a new government and its programme
outlined by prime minister designate Mugur Isarescu. On December 17 President Emil Constantinescu designated central
bank governor Isarescu as premier to end a political crisis after the dismissal
of former prime minister Radu Vassile, who was toppled by his own Christian
Democratic Party and by popular discontent over low living standards. The new prime minister’s major tasks are to
get the economy in shape for accession negotiations with the EU and to speed up
delayed Romanian reforms, including industrial privatisation.
On
December 10 the EU summit in Helsinki, for fundamental political reasons,
invited Romania, Bulgaria and some other countries to start accession
negotiations for full membership in the EU.
Romania and Bulgaria are strong contenders for the next round of NATO
enlargement, expected to be launched in early 2002.
a) Romania-Bulgaria
On December 6 the Bulgarian defence minister
met his Romanian counterpart and discussed a broad range of bilateral defence
issues. The talks dealt with the
preparation of a bilateral declaration for the development of military
cooperation, joint Air Force and Navy military exercises, etc. They also signed a joint document that
establishes a direct line of communication between the two defence
ministries. A set of documents
regulating the cooperation in the fields of air force, air defence, mutual
protection of information and other issues was also discussed in the process of
their preparation.
b) Turkey-Bulgaria
On December 7 the ministers of the interior of
these two countries met in Ankara and agreed to suggest that the other
countries of South-East Europe meet and join forces in fighting criminality
during an official visit of the Bulgarian minister. Exchange of operational information between Sofia and Ankara,
including through automated communication systems, and joint fighting of
organised criminality, smuggling and drugs traffic were the points of
discussions. The two ministers agreed
to prevent the activity of terrorist organisations, illegal traffic of drugs
and workers and car thefts. The border
security services will cooperate, and joint police education will take place at
the Ankara police academy.
1)
Cooperation of the heads of states of Bulgaria, the FYROMacedonia, Greece and
Montenegro
At the
initiative of President of the FYROMacedonia Boris Trajkovski, a summit meeting
of these four countries will be convened in January 2000. Concrete steps to utilise the opportunities
in recovering the region within the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe
will be the main topic of the discussions.
2)
Trilateral Cooperation of Albania, Bulgaria and the FYROMacedonia
The
prime minister of the FYROMacedonia suggested, on December 28, an activation of
the trilateral cooperation within the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe
and the implementation of the various projects that have already been drafted
between the three countries.
On
December 14, at the meeting of the Danubian Commission, the proposals of
Hungary and Austria to fund part of the activity for clearing the debris from
the Danube were approved. The technical
aspects of the project were also discussed.
A
far-sighted decision of the EU summit in Helsinki on December 10 to grant
"candidacy status" to Turkey and to launch the accession negotiations
with Bulgaria and Romania, largely motivated by political reasons, will have
fundamental economic repercussions for the region. First, a major regional conflict – between Turkey and Greece – is
expected to begin to diminish in tension and to gradually give way to large
regional economic projects with bilateral initiative from and cooperation
between the two countries that are presently experienceing the highest economic
output and living standards in the Balkans.
Furthermore, an expected rapprochement on the Cyprus issue is expected
to lead to a breakthrough in the deadlocked situation of that country’s
accession to the EU.
Bulgaria
and Romania are expected to finally stabilise their economies and to begin to
increase their economic outputs. An
improved economic area covering the Eastern and the Southern Balkans will
significantly determine the political and the economic future of the Western
Balkans. The Black
Sea-Caucasian-Caspian Sea neighbourhood of the EU will begin to receive more
direct and positive impulses through their relationships with the Black Sea
countries of the western coast – Bulgaria and Romania – and of the southern
coast – Turkey. The geoeconomic
opportunities for the EU definitely compensate and outweigh the calculated risk
of the past month’s decision of the EU towards the countries of South-East
Europe.
On
December 3-16, at the UN Headquarters in New York, bilateral open-ended
proximity talks between Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktash were held without preconditions, with Alvaro de Soto, the
UN secretary-general’s special adviser on Cyprus, as mediator. The negotiations are confidential; this
avoids public exchanges between the two sides and thus prevents affecting the
constructive spirit in which the talks should take place. However, Denktash made a statement in which
he called for a stop in the process of Cyprus accessing to the EU. Meantime, the Greek Cypriot side suggested
the start of a historic rapprochement between the two communities of Cyprus.
The
purpose of the talks is to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations
leading to a comprehensive settlement.
The decision by the EU and Turkey’s acceptance of the EU’s offer of
candidate status to the EU are other positive factors to the direct environment
of the launched negotiation process.
(1) The EU implemented its plans to ship fuel
for humanitarian purposes to the Serbian cities of Nis and Pirot. This EU programme intends to provide heating
oil and to stimulate the democratic local governments of the
municipalities. (2) The EU summit decision in Helsinki on December 10 was that Turkey become a
candidate destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria applied to
other candidate states. Thus Turkey
makes a big step to the historic objective of becoming an equal in the European
family of nations, and the EU achieves a new and deep Eastern outreach. (3)
The start of the accession negotiations with the EU by Bulgaria and
Romania – a decision taken by the EU summit in Helsinki on December 10 – marks
a new era in the evolution of the whole South-East Europe region. Bulgaria and Romania – two European nations
throughout their history – are back in the mainstream of the continental
developments, both as contributors and as consumers of the relationship. Nine days before the Helsinki summit the two
countries, which are also Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
members, supported the EU position on trade liberalisation at the WTO meeting
at Seattle.
On
December 26-27 the foreign minister of the FRY, Jivadin Jovanovic, visited
Beijing and met with his Chinese counterpart.
The Chinese Government promised huge support for the economic revival of
the country. China has already allowed
a credit for rebuilding the oil refinery at Panchevo, near Belgrade. According to Serbian analysts, the amount of
the Chinese donation to date is about $300 million and is aimed at subsidising
the import of electric power, reconstructing the roads of the ruined country
and rebuilding the communication system.
Part of this money is to be used by the government for funding its
pre-election campaign for the regular parliamentary and the local elections
next year.
It is
clear that China is trying to profit from the Balkan conjuncture and to
establish itself as another big-power player in the region. Several months earlier, the government of
the FYROMacedonia established full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Three Chinese civil servants were killed and
27 other were injured during a wrongly targeted bombing at the beginning of May
1999 at the Chinese Embassy building in Belgrade, when the NATO strike against
Yugoslavia was mounting pressure on Milosevic to concede.
(1) Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov shared
his view with one of the leaders of the Serbian opposition, Vuk Draskovic,
during the latter’s visit to Moscow at the beginning of December, that the
re-integration of the FRY in international organisations and the lifting of the
sanctions against this country will automatically improve the disposition of
the political forces that are at present in opposition. A visit by Russian Defence Minister Igor
Sergeev on December 23 to Belgrade and the agreement to provide the Yugoslav
army with modern air-defence systems and sophisticated fighters show that
Russia is also caring for the prolongation of the present regime of Yugoslavia. What really matters for Russia today is to
keep at least one pro-Russian stronghold in the Balkans, whatever the
consequences for the respective Balkan nation.
This logic holds true only within a "zero-sum-game" framework
of thinking – a thinking that has been discarded by the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) philosophy and by the other nations of South-East Europe.
(2) Upon his arrival in Belgrade on December 23,
Russian Minister of Defence Marshal Igor Sergeev told the press that Russia
would strongly oppose the efforts of NATO to station its bases in Bulgaria.
In the
process of Bulgaria’s preparation for full NATO membership, the Bulgarian
president has shared the country’s readiness to provide the alliance with the
possibility of establishing bases on Bulgarian soil.
NATO
Secretary-General Lord George Robertson has said on FYROMacedonian television
that the alliance will not change the mandate of its contingent in the
republic. It is placed to serve as an
augmentation force for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. This operation is both successful for the
alliance and profitable for the people of the FYROMacedonia in bringing
financial compensations and a new attitude of foreign investors towards Skopje. Ultimately, the presence of allied troops in
this country is a contribution to the regional security, the secretary-general
said.
1. The Serbian opposition fractions have agreed
to join forces in insisting on democratic, free and fair early general
elections. The de facto cantonisation
of Serbs, a persistent Albanian hatred that drives any non-Albanian ethnic
group from the province and the modest launch of an interim administration
structure in support of UNMIK’s efforts were the main features of the Kosovo
post-conflict landscape. KFOR is stable
enough in providing the security of the area.
A
further stabilising situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees the
implementation of a cut of one third of SFOR early next spring.
The
Russian activism in providing new weapons to Milosevic's regime hardly
contributes to a benign image of this great country in the conflict-torn
Balkans.
UN-sponsored
talks on Cyprus add a positive political potential to this complicated issue.
2. The Helsinki EU summit's decision to start
accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania and the accepted offer of
"candidacy status" to Turkey fundamentally reshape the geopolitical
and the geoeconomic situation in the Balkans:
these three countries, along with Greece – already a full member of the
union – form a powerful alignment of interests within the mutually overlapping
EU and NATO philosophies that will significantly shape the future of the
Western Balkans and the Black Sea basin neighbourhood of the union.
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Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
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Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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