BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and February 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 2, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I
INTRODUCTION
II
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The
post-conflict situation in Kosovo
2. The
Post-war rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
4. FRYOMacedonia
5. Greece
6. Romania
IV
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Trilateral Initiatives
3. Regional Initiatives
V
THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
VI
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United Nations
2. EU
3. USA
4. NATO
VII
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
While in February 2000 Romania and Bulgaria formally started their negotiations
for accession to the EU, Yugoslav armed forces (VJ) began their concentration
in the Southern province of Serbia, neighboring Kosovo, where 80,000 Albanians
live. Resolutions of the ruling
Socialist Party forum in Belgrade this month are directed toward raising tensions
by declaring intent to re-establish control over Kosovo. The Milosevic regime became nervous after
the murder of Defense Minister
Bulatovic – a close personal friend of Milosevic. It followed thorough
transformations in neighboring Croatia since parliamentary and presidential
elections and after the Balkan nations’ new demonstration of regional
solidarity during the Bucharest summit meeting and their ambition to prove that
their future as countries from Southeastern Europe (SEE) is not linked to the
present repressive FRY leadership and its policy.
The escalation of the ethnic hostilities in the Kosovo town of
Mitrovica, the death of Albanians, Serbs, and the wounding of KFOR soldiers
reminded observers why the international peace-keepers are there and how grave
the problems are. There are good
reasons to think that official Belgrade is behind tensions in Kosovo as well as
in governmental difficulties in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused by the Bosnian
Serbs’ party. However, analysts should
not overlook the fact that during marches from Pristina to Mitrovica Albanians carried
banners of the officially non-existentt KLA (UCK) alongside the Albanian
national flag.
Nonetheless, normalization proceeds apace. Kosovo remains under the firm control of KFOR. Even in Bosnia it is still unthinkable to
let the SFOR peace-keepers go. As for
Kosovo, the Belgrade’s refusal to support the build-up of a multiethnic society
multiplied by continuing dreams in some Albanian circles for a “Greater
Albania” in the Balkans shows Kosovska Mitrovica’s results and reminds us of
the NATO and EU pledges of long-term
engagement with the region in general.
Positive tendencies in bottom-up SEE relations in February were solidly
supported by the Pact of Stability and the South-East Cooperative Initiative,
as well as by visits by the Secretary
General of NATO and the US Secretary of State to the region. They reiterated that any move to build
“greater states” like “Greater Albania”, “Greater Serbia” or “Greater Croatia”
is absolutely unacceptable.
The
post-conflict situation in Kosovo in February reached the highest tensions since June
last year, mainly in the predominantly Serb town of Mitrovica. The killing of two innocent Serbian
civilians on 2 February was followed by exchange of brutal murders of Albanians
and Serbs and displacement of Albanians from the predominantly Serb north side
of Mitrovica for their safety in the south of the city. Old hatreds and the spirit of vengeance
still prevents the emergence of a peaceful Kosovo.
The new wave of violence was condemned by the UN
Secretary General, the High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy of the EU, the NATO Secretary General, and the US
Secretary of State. Dr. Javier Solana
confirmed that the EU supports a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo. Mrs. Madeleine Albright reminded Albania’s
leaders during her visit in Tirana on 19 February that the ambition to build a
“Greater Albania” would only lead to conflicts. She also noticed the existence of particular Albanian elements
whose acts destabilize the security situation.
At the close of the fourth congress of the FRY Socialist
Party, Yugoslav President Milosevic called on both KFOR and UNMIK to leave
Kosovo “after their complete fiasco”. Restoration
of sovereign control over its own territory would be absolutely legitimate,
according to Mr. Milosevic. The Serbian
opposition adopted a document about Kosovo on 17 February, calling for creation
of appropriate conditions for life for all the province’s ethnic communities. The opposition required creation of
self-governing institutions in Kosovo on ethnic principle. The chief of the department for
international cooperation at the Russian Defense Ministry, General Leonid
Ivashov, told the press on 14 February that NATO is now paying for mistakes it
made in FRY, especially the underestimation of the Albanian ambition to
establish a mono-ethnic Albanian state in Kosovo. Violence in Kosovo continues to nourish ideas of partitioning the
province in the thinking of West European and North American analytical circles
in addition to Albanian chauvinists living there.
Why should Kosovo not be partitioned? Because it would satisfy only those outside
the region who seek a quick and easy solution regardless of its consequences and
because it would vindicate Milosevic and the Albanian separatists and
chauvinists. The end result would be a
worse security situation for the Balkans compared to the situation before the
Kosovo crisis and even before the war in Bosnia. The Balkans would again be “ripe” for conflicts and state
dismemberment.
Despite a multitude of problems, the 44,000 KFOR troops
in Kosovo have succeeded in two of their military missions: overseeing complete withdrawal of Serb
forces from the province and transformation of the KLA into the KPC (the Kosovo
protection corps). The latter has only
prescribed humanitarian and disaster-relief functions. A major issue remains unresolved: KFOR
soldiers, who are trained to fight wars, work as police officers. This was not the job they were trained for
before coming to the region, and they should not be asked to perform this job (as
in the case of Mitrovica) indefinitely.
Nevertheless, in the tense situation in Mitrovica, NATO and KFOR reacted
quickly to reiterate that it is KFOR that maintains control of Kosovo and will
deal with any attempts to renew unrest in a similar decisive manner. The leadership of NATO decided on 25
February to bolster the 30,000 NATO troops in Kosovo with an additional 2,000
(three battalions). A stabilization
plan for Mitrovica was announced by Gen. Reinhardt: greater security for the Serb enclave: eliminating the city’s
dividing line; isolating the northern part so that it cannot be manipulated by
Belgrade, and control over access of ethnic Albanians coming from southern
Kosovo.
Another issue is the international police force needed
in Kosovo – about 4,700 and now a little over 2,000. This hampers functioning of both KFOR and UNMIK.
People should also be reminded that UNMIK carries out
a dual and complex mission – as a transitional administration and as an agent
of establishing institutions for peaceful and normal life for all residents of
the province. Amid all the difficulties
of the last month, the Kosovo Transitional Council, the local “mini-parliament”
with advisory powers to UNMIK, was inaugurated on 9 February . The 12-member Council has been increased to
35 members, drawn from the various political, religious, and ethnic communities
of Kosovo. The Serb community is not
yet actively participating in the Council, though two members of this community
joined its work. Furthermore, the
Kosovo Interim Administrative Council is already discussing regulations for
voter registration, compilation of voters’ lists, and organisation of political
parties in preparation for elections to be held later this year. The same issues were also discussed by the
Kosovo Transitional Council on 16 February.
UNMIK succeeded to avert a humanitarian catastrophe during this severe
first post-war winter. However, more
funding is needed, since funds available for Kosovo’s consolidated budget for
2000 would be exhausted by early March.
Though slowly, progress in Kosovo is made. And the need of KFOR is great for providing
a secure environment for the UNMIK activity.
The latter is expected to draft the long-term formulae for a lasting
peace in Kosovo.
The downsizing of SFOR will continue beyond present plans and will reach
20,000 from the present 60,000. Yet,
the presence of SFOR will still be needed for civilian progress. For the common people SFOR symbolizes
stability and a safeguard against the return of extremist forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The presence of SFOR is
even more important for those who want to return to their homes or doubt the correctness
of this decision. However, requirements
of the Dayton Agreement call for substantial media reform, arrest and trial of indicted
war criminals; improved police activity, judicial reform, and a new way to structure
the country’s armed forces, with Croats and Muslims integrated into military
institutions. The thriving of central
institutions remains the key to success in the country.
A positive trend in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the activity of NGOs,
especially of humanitarian ones dealing with the issue of demining. Demining assistance to Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the USA alone has been worth $41.2 million since 1996.
An ecological disaster was
caused in February by the cyanide-contaminated waters of a Romanian golden ore
mine when they poured into the Tisa river, crossing into Hungary and FRY to reach
the Danube, Bulgaria, and back into Romania.
The Black Sea will be the last water basin recipient. Millions of dead fish and birds -
especially in Romania and Hungary but also in all the
other countries down the Danube from FRY -
endangered spring sources for drinking water and led
to qualification of this catastrophe as a “second Chernobyl” for Europe. Restoration of some fish and bird species is
considered impossible. Much of the
Danube water is also used to irrigate crops.
The 11th regular national conference of the ruling UDF was convened in
Sofia on 26-27 February. While
confirming the country’s foreign, regional, and security policy, the conference
addressed tough national problems such as poverty, corruption, and UDF organizational
deficiency with no great success.
Despite strong appeals coming from the President since last autumn, no
corrupt UDF leaders have been identified and tried. The conference was largely an effort to start preparations on
time for next year’s general elections.
Stjepan (Stippe) Mesic won the second round of Presidential elections on
7 February. Together with the
multiparty government of Ivica Racan, he is expected to deal with an
unfavourable financial and foreign trade legacy. The other major challenge is discarding ultranationalistic policies
once and for all. Many world and
regional leaders attended his inauguration in Zagreb on 19 February. Croatia’s model is expected to send a strong
political signal to the Serbian opposition, adding to those from neighboring
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.
General Dragoljub
Ojdanic, former chief
of staff of the FRY armed forces was appointed minister of defense by President
Milosevic on 14 February. His
predecessor, Pavle Bulatovic, was assassinated on 12 February. Ojdanic has
been charged for military crimes by the International Court Tribunal on Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. Colonel General
Neboisha Pavkovic replaced the new minister as chief of the General Staff. He was commander of Third Army in Pristina
during the NATO campaign against FRY.
He is also charged by the ICTY for crimes against humanity.
The government of Montenegro was granted $7 million by the USAID to
support the country’s budget for payment of its pension obligations. The difficulties arose after pressure from
Belgrade, which obstructed trade, and from the flow of refugees. Montenegro is also expected to serve as a
model of democracy and good governance in the FRY.
On 12 February President Boris Traikovski appointed Colonel-General
Jovan Andreevsky chief of the General Staff, replacing retired Trajce Krastevsky.
On 7 February the Greek Parliament re-elected
Constantinos Stefanopoulos as the President of Greece. He received the support of both the ruling
and opposition parties.
President Emil Konstantinescu appointed Major-General Mirca Celaru chief
of the General Staff of the armed forces.
He is 50 years and a career officer.
His predecessor, Konstantin Dedzheratu, 52, became defense adviser to
the Romanian President.
a) Bulgaria-FRY
Another group of 11 Bulgarian policemen left for Kosovo on 7 February as
part of the international police force in the troubled province. The Bulgarian police contingent now numbers 60
men and women.
Prime-Minister Kostov announced on 4 February that after the visit of
Hacim Taci, the Albanian Kosovo leader, he expects the visit of Serbian Kosovo
leaders too, and they have already been invited to come to Sofia. He also said that he has not accepted the
invitation of Mr. Taci to visit
Pristina. He qualified his meeting with
Mr. Taci as “a political contact under the brand of preventive diplomacy”. The strategic location of Bulgaria requires
contacts with key political figures in the Balkans. Mr. Kostov and the chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Policy
Commission Assen Agov were sharply criticized
by the opposition for Mr. Taci’s visit in Sofia that provided a platform to
raise claims for an independent Kosovo – later denied by Mr. Taci himself. According to Serbian opposition leaders Mr. Taci
should have been arrested during his Sofia visit and brought to justice as an
international outlaw.
b) FRY-FYROMacedonia
On 9 February Belgrade banned import of oil, alcoholic drinks,
cigarettes, and coffee from FYROMacedonia.
The ban also includes export of any food to Skopje. This was a serious blow to the economy of
FYROMacedonia, because FRY was its
second largest trade partner.
c) Romania-Bulgaria
After a successful mediating role of the EU and of the Pact of Stability
authorities, the two countries agreed on 7 February to start construction of a
second bridge over the Danube at Vidin-Kalafat. The issue has long spoiled bilateral relations. Bulgaria considers the Danube bridge at this
location a major national security requirement as well as an important economic
interest. Romania has disputed this
location and has never agreed on the need of a second bridge. The coincidence of Bulgaria’s suggestion
with European transport corridor No 4, the logistic problems that loomed after
KFOR participants began to transport their contingents through Romania and
Bulgaria to FYROM, and the clear Bulgarian pledge to subsidize construction of
the bridge proved the case to the EU authorities. Their decisive mediation after the two countries were invited to
start accession negotiations in December 1999 led effectively to the agreement,
signed by Romanian, Bulgarian, EC, and Pact of Stability officials. This case proved that the region-building
process in SEE still depends a great deal on ‘benign’ involvement from outside
the region by great powers and institutions.
During the third week of February the editors-in-chief of major
Bulgarian and Romanian newspapers met to discuss their specific role during the
countries’ important processes of integration into the EU and NATO. This dialogue will continue in June this
year in Sofia.
d) Turkey-Bulgaria
The Bulgarian government recommended on 24 February that Parliament ratify
a bilateral de-mining agreement with Turkey.
It is considered very important, due to the fact that Turkey is not a party
to the International Convention for the Ban of Land Mines.
The prime ministers of Albania, FYROMacedonia, and Greece met on 3
February in FYROM and decided to launch a project to create a Balkan park in
the Prespan Lake region (Prespansko ezero).
a. South-East European Initiative (SECI)/Pact of
Stability for SEE
The World Bank announced on 10 February that together with six SEE
countries – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROMacedonia, and
Romania - it has signed an agreement, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to
implement a three-year $68 million loan program to improve customs facilities
and services in the region. The goal is
to reduce smuggling and corruption at border crossings. This is expected to improve the climate for
investment. The agreement promotes in a
significant way regional cooperation through SECI and is one of the first
large-scale efforts under the Stability Pact.
b. The Pact of
Stability for SEE
The second working meeting of Working Table 3 met 15-16 February in
Sarajevo to discuss security issues within the Pact of Stability for SEE. The purpose of the Working Table is to catalyze and stimulate existing
forms of cooperation on security, defense, judicial, and interior issues. It should also coordinate various
initiatives and suggest the funding of concrete projects that would lead to
increasing stability and security in the region. Participants in the meeting were the 26 countries of the Pact and
so-called “supporting” countries as well as representatives of international
organizations. Regional cooperation in drafting
of defense budgets, control in arms trade, and support in the process of social
adaptation of the military from reduced armed forces were special accents in
the work of the meeting. Prioritizing
the more than 70 projects and ways to fund themwere also discussed.
c. The
Regional Process of Security and Cooperation (‘The Sofia Process’)
The third summit meeting of the prime ministers of six Balkan countries
– Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Greece, Romania, and Turkey (after Crete 1997 and
Antalia 1998) -
took place in Bucharest on 12
February. The Romanian host did not
invite the FRY because the situation in
this country has not yet normalized.
The foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia participated as ‘observers’.
The summit was also attended by Bodo Hombach, the special coordinator of
the Pact of Stability for the SEE area.
Leaders from the region signed a charter of good-neighborliness,
stability, security, and cooperation in SEE.
Mr. Hombach explained the importance of the Pact’s upcoming March donor
conference this year – the ‘hour of
truth’. The future host, Macedonian
Prime Minister Georgievsky, said that if democratic elections are held in FRY, its
leader may attend the meeting.
Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov recommended better targeting of sanctions
against the Belgrade regime and not against the farmer or common citizen. Many bilateral meetings of the prime ministers
added to the success of this summit. A
Bulgarian proposal to the Romanian prime minister to integrate the two
countries’ energy systems within the EU energy network was well-received. A Turkish-Greek meeting before the start of
the summit sent a clear signal about the improved level of relations between
these two leading Balkan countries.
Due to the formal start of accession negotiations to the EU, a special
accent in this month’s analysis is made on the Romanian and the Bulgarian
economic situations.
Unfavorable macroeconomic performance and structural problems have been
worsened by difficulties of the severe winter.
A slowdown of industrial output has been registered in Romania and
Bulgaria. The official rate of unemployment tends to rise above 15 - 18% due to
ongoing closure of enterprises and restructuring of the real economy. For some depressed economic areas in the two
countries the real unemployment rate has reached nearly 30% of the working
population, thus constituting a major social-policy problem. The private sector’s activity has stagnated
as part of the overall economic slowdown.
The public sector’s unfavorable financial results have contributed to
the rigidity of tax policies in Bulgaria and Romania which must decrease the
deficit of state budgets and sustain the servicing of their state debts (both
domestic and foreign). Tax collection,
as pending for the first quarter of 2000, is expected to contribute further to
the declining rate of domestic aggregate demand and stagnation of the private
sector’s short-term activities. Accession
to the EU is often perceived as a
problem of the transition to catch-up strategies requiring economic adjustment
of the Bulgarian and Romanian domestic economies to the EU level of development.
In Romania the difficulties
of state-owned mining, chemical, and metallurgical industries continued because
of the lack of financial resources and ongoing restructuring measures. Servicing of foreign debt obligations has
put the Romanian economy under strain.
The credibility of the new Romanian government’s policy is still to
become instrumental in putting the inflation under control and achieving
financial stabilization. Structural
reform must enable reduction of the size and impact of the quasi deficit (arrears, bad debts, underperforming credits, etc.)
in addition to the state deficit, oscillating around 2.5%. Unemployment has become chronic, and the
need of social benefits is growing. One
third of the unemployed are young, and almost half of those who receive
unemployment benefits must be considered long-term unemployed. For the rest of this year Romania will
probably remain on the austerity track with falling or stagnating GDP and
medium-term inflation.
The Bulgarian government presented
Parliament an analysis of its program’s success in February, and new goals have
been set especially stressing medium-term sources and policy instruments for
accelerating economic growth.
Perseverance in implementing the currency-board’s stabilization strategy
should preserve confidence in its policies and contributes to the attractiveness
of foreign support. Remaining problems are
the worsening trade deficit, the low level of domestic aggregate demand, the
decline in competitiveness of Bulgarian foreign economic activities, and the
pending necessity to service foreign debt to continue fulfilling the IMF agreement.
Inherent structural weaknesses in the Bulgarian economy cause
uncertainties about the economic forecast for 2000. Any revival of investment activities depends on improved
aggregate demand and revival in the industrial and agricultural sectors as well
as services. Deterioration of the
industrial production in the first two months of 2000 is attributed to low
domestic demand, the high real cost of credit, poor corporate governance, the
impact of the foreign environment, and ongoing structural reform in the
country. Inflation has been rising by
1.8% per month since January 2000 due to the increased price of oil,
electricity, and food staples.
Unemployment is expected to increase to 15% in 2000. New jobs have opened mainly in the private
sector, while unemployment continues to rise in the public sector with ongoing
privatization and cuts in the armed forces.
Incomes and wages remain a controversial issue for both the private and
public sectors. Stagnation of the
minimum wage has been reconfirmed by the last review of the three-years
agreement with the IMF on the grounds that any growth in the minimum and the
real wage should be based on increased labor productivity and better economic-growth
results this year.
Both Bulgaria and Romania now face a difficult foreign environment. The general situation in neighboring FRY
remains uncertain and causes unfavorable consequences for economic activities
in all sectors including existing pressures for shadow
economic business. Trading partner
countries’ demand is growing more slowly than originally assumed, prices for key
exports continue to fall, and international investors remain cautious. The consequences of the war in Kosovo
further exacerbated the risks and uncertainty of the foreign environment in the
SEE area. To mitigate this burden,
especially in light of an adverse foreign environment, policy adjustments may
be needed to ensure that economic stabilization programs remain on track.
Future prospects of economic growth will depend on opportunities for
recovery and reconstruction of the Balkan region - especially under Pact of Stability guarantees for the
SEE area. Some uncertainty over acceleration
of the initiatives related to regional restructuring may have an adverse
political impact on the situation in all Balkan countries.
a) UN-Cyprus: The UN Secretary-General’s invitation to resume proximity talks between
the two Cypriot parties was accepted and will take place on 23 May in New York.
b) UN-FRY: UNEP-Habitat Balkans Task Force started work
on environmental clean-up feasibility studies at four Serbian “hot spots” on 13
February. Pollution already detected at
Pancevo, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, and Bor poses serious threat to human
health. Studies are required before the
actual clean-up can begin.
(1) Formal EU accession
negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania started on 15 February in Brussels. The first working round of negotiations is
expected at the end of March. In an
article for the Bulgarian daily “Trud”
(“Labor”) of 17 February, British Foreign Minister Robin Cook wrote that the UK
also has an interest of EU enlargement.
It supports it not only because this presents opportunities for British exporters and investors but also because it
is the best way to guarantee the SEE area’s security and stability. (2) The
EU foreign ministers decided to lift the ban on flights to FRY for the next six
months. This also affected this
country’s air company. At the same time
the EU intensified financial sanctions to prevent transactions of big sums
through foreign banks by Yugoslav authorities.
(1) US Undersecretary of State
Thomas R. Pickering visited Albania, Slovenia, FYROMacedonia, and Greece during
the first week of February. He talked
with governmental officials of these countries about the Stability Pact, about
their vision of the region’s future, and about bilateral issues. In Greece he discussed naval, police, and
trade cooperation. The undersecretary
acknowledged the leading role Greece plays in regional affairs, including as an
economic locomotive and an example for democratic, open-market development.
(2) US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright met with Croatia’s Prime Minister Ivica Racan on 2 February. A letter from President Clinton, which she
delivered to the prime minister, made clear that the USA will look forward to
Croatia being one of the USA’s strategic partners in the region. PfP, the Dayton Peace Accord, the economic
reform, and other issues were also discussed.
Mrs. Albright travelled again to Zagreb on 18 February, leading the US
delegation attending the inauguration of Croatian President-elect Mesic. She also congratulated the Croatian people
for choosing the path of economic and political reform necessary to reintegrate
Croatia into the rest of Europe.
(3) Secretary Albright visited
Tirana, Albania, on 19 February and met with President Meidani and Prime Minister
Meta. She recognized the crucial role
played by the Albanian people during the Kosovo crisis, especially in solving
the refugee issue. Reminding them of
the role Albania plays in regional stability and the country’s prospects for
greater prosperity, she stressed how counterproductive plans for “Greater
Albania” would be.
(4) Mrs. Albright and British
Foreign Secretary Cook agreed on 9 February in Washington on the need to
continue to isolate the Milosevic regime, to support the democratic opposition,
and to promote an early transition to democracy in Serbia. The USA declared it is prepared to consider temporary
suspension of the ban on flights by European carriers into FRY as long as
sanctions that target the Milosevic regime are strengthened.
(5) President Clinton sent the
Senate on 3 February a treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between
the USA and Romania, signed in Washington on 26 May 1999, and he recommended
its ratification.
(6) At a meeting on 1 February
between Prime Minister Kostov of Bulgaria and the US Ambassador in Sofia, the
Bulgarian side confirmed its position on non-partition of Kosovo.
A US military delegation headed by Major General Joseph Garret visited
Sofia in mid-February. He met with Minister
of Defence Boyko Noev, Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Velizar Shalamanov,
and representatives of the general staff of the Bulgarian armed forces. They discussed on-going military reform, its
problems, and prospects for cooperation in the process of preparing for NATO
membership.
During the last week of February the US command in Germany granted
medical facilities and materials worth $585,000.
Lord George Robertson, secretary-general of NATO, visited Bulgaria on
9-10 February 2000. He met with the president,
prime-minister, and foreign and defense
ministers and addressed the Parliament in session. He underlined how important it is for a country like Bulgaria that
its politicians take a consensus approach to defense issues.
The secretary-general also made an official visit to Romania and Moldova.
Soon after these visits Lord Robertson visited Moscow and met with the
Russian leadership.
1. Tensions in Kosovska
Mitrovica between Albanians and Serbs reflected both local hatreds and outside
influences from Belgrade and Pristina.
KFOR reacted quickly and resolutely to keep the situation under
control. There is a growing need to
build up an effective and large enough police force and prevent risking the
life of KFOR soldiers in conflict situations for which they are not best
prepared. Furthermore, the tasks of maintaining
general military stability in Kosovo are responsible enough to keep the KFOR
busy. Efforts of the Milosevic regime
to undermine the security situation in Kosovo and in Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina
are desperate reactions by him to the unfavourable regional environment –
democratic leadership in Croatia; rising Balkan solidarity in denying the regime’s
policy while supporting the democratic opposition, etc. Efforts to dilute the concentration of
attention on Serbia also stems from the internal criminalization of Serbian
society – a reflection of similar tendencies within the state itself. Obviously the pressure exerted from the USA,
NATO, and the EU is an important reason for Belgrade to try to divert their
attention to other hot issues, especially in Kosovo. In the meantime, the international community should not blind
itself to the Albanian chauvinists’ opportunism – KLA flags are again visible;
former KLA fighters and present KPC guardians shoot at police officers. The long-term counter-pressure to reduce ethnic
tensions requires patience and impartiality by the two major opposing ethnic
groups. Events in Mitrovica also remind
us of the need for donor organisations and states to keep their pledges and
provide the budget needed by UNMIK which will be completed by the beginning of
March. The ecological disaster of Tisa
and the Danube offered a reminder of the dangers human activity poses on the
very life of humanity and other living species. Environmental tragedies do not differentiate between war-troubled
or peaceful areas.
2. The month’s major democracy
and region-building milestones were the start of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
official EU accession negotiations, the democratic presidential elections in
Croatia and its turn to Euro-Atlantic integration, the bilateral, trilateral,
and regional initiatives - mainly the process for cooperation and security in the SEE area, the
Pact for Stability and SECI, as well as the visits of the US secretary of state
and the NATO secretary-general to the region.
Difficulties in the economic recovery of Bulgaria and Romania do not
make them very fit for the accession process.
However, it is also clear that the general regional situation may be
improved if region-based initiatives within the Pact of Stability are turned
into reality. This will be positively
reflected on the regional countries that negotiate for EU membership.
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EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
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Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
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Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
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Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
|
Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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|
Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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