BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and March 2001 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 3, 2001
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I. INTRODUCTION
II.
CONFLICT
AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
The Conflict in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and the Post-Conflict Situation in
Kosovo
2. Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III.
THE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.
Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. FRY
IV.
THE
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATION IN THE BALKANS
1.
Bilateral Relations
2. Multilateral Relations: Trilateral Cooperation among Bulgaria, Greece and
Turkey
V.
THE
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1.
Turkey
2. Bulgaria
VI.
THE
INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United States
2. NATO
3. EU
4. Russia
VII.
THE
SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The tense post-conflict
situation in Kosovo and the conflict in Southern Serbia escalated in March and
has deepened the extent of Albanian dissent in the region covering the northern
and northwestern regions of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
Ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and
in Macedonia have initiated a new and well-planned separatist struggle inside
Macedonia and have formed a new organization – the Army of National Liberation
(ANL) – as an instrument to do so. Pictures of well-armed uniformed Albanian
militants from Southern Serbia and Macedonia, resembling the KLA forces during
the NATO strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, have been the cause of some
disappointment among the international community. The international community
has been determined to see an end to the Albanian struggle once the Albanian
people have been given the chance to reconstruct Kosovo on a democratic basis,
especially after the power in Belgrade has been turned over to a democratic
government. It has become evident
for the people around Europe and the world that the goal of the Albanian
“freedom fighters” during NATO's anti-Milosevic air campaign was not the
creation of a democratic society, but rather the secession of territories with
Albanian populations and the merging of these into one entity.
The recent wave of violent provocations aims at the destabilization of
Macedonia, a key state within the regional security which might have expected a
certain degree of rapport with Albanians after its courageous support for more
than 400'000 Albanian refugees on Macedonian territory in 1999. However, this bulletin
has and has continued to stress the complex nature of the Albanian and the
Serbian questions, and the fundamental need of balance and tolerance, since the
dissolution of the federal Yugoslav state at the beginning of the 1990s. It
would be simplistic to portray the Albanians as solely responsible for regional
unrest, and we have avoided any misrepresentation of the Serbs as the
“rogue” ethnicity of Southeastern Europe in 1999. The
crucial issues are those of democracy and state-building as usefully or
improperly applied social tools for placing the different Balkan peoples on the
track of modernization in all spheres of life and of European and Euro-Atlantic
integration.
Despite the disturbing
developments in a country that has often named itself the “oasis of
stability” and an “example of a multi-ethnic model” during the past
decade, the reaction to the new conflict in Southeastern Europe by the rest of
the Balkan states shows adequacy and maturity in deterring further regional
destabilization as well as full support to the Macedonian government. The
reaction of the EU and NATO, though initially slow, has been politically
targeted in an effective way and has already resulted in powerful pressure on
extremists and militants in Macedonia, Kosovo and Southern Serbia. The official
Russian comparisons of Macedonia with Chechnya are new examples of the strenuous
efforts of Moscow to exploit international political developments for domestic
purposes – moves that are far removed from true great-power behavior in a
critical situation.
II.
CONFLICT
AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
The Conflict in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and the Post-Conflict Situation in
Kosovo
The Albanian extremists of
the so-called Army for National Liberation (ANL) occupied the village of Tanusevci at the beginning of March, killing
Macedonian soldiers and police officers. A permeable border with Kosovo allowed
Kosovar Albanians to deploy forces and armaments and stage provocations. The
Macedonian government reacted in a resolute manner by reinforcing its police and
army personnel in the mountainous area. After being defeated in Tanusevci, the
ANL turned its attention to the mostly Albanian populated town of Tetovo. The
tactics of involving civilians in the conflict were clearly aimed at polarizing
the internal social relations and inciting hatred of Macedonians against each
other on ethnic grounds. After introducing regular armed forces with tanks and
armored combat vehicles (ACVs) to the Tetovo area, and pressing further with
infantry forces, the Macedonian army achieved a new victory. The flexible and
highly mobile Albanian forces managed to go into hiding for the time being, and
have presumably taken up new positions. There is a strong possibility that the
military operations may escalate into guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism. The
success of the Macedonian armed forces was largely due to the improved KFOR
performance on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, the closure of the
outlets for the ANL to Southern Serbia by the Serb armed forces and the
military-technical help delivered to Skopje from Bulgaria, Greece and elsewhere.
The present violent
inter-ethnic relations are not new developments in Macedonia. Albanians
boycotted the referendum for independence and the census in 1991; the Albanian
parliamentary fraction boycotted the adoption of the new constitution in 1991;
in 1992, the Albanians organized an illegal referendum, in which 90 per cent of
them supported independence from the Macedonian state; in 1994, Albanian
representatives declared an autonomous "Republic Illiryda" in Western
Macedonia. In November 1993, the police arrested a group of Albanians, including
a deputy defense minister, and accused them of attempting to form a paramilitary
force. Logically, the next steps would have been the use of this force to
support a secession of Illiryda and its unification with an independent Kosovo
and Albania.
The trigger that activated
the Albanian militancy were developments that made plans for a united and
ethnically pure fatherland of the Albanians redundant: the switch of power to a
democratically elected government in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
and Serbia; the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between the FRY and Macedonia,
formally settling the disputed border delimitation issue and securing stable
inter-state borders of the two countries, whose destabilization would serve the
interests of the Albanian separatists; and the steps taken by NATO and KFOR to
reduce the buffer zone along the border between Kosovo and Serbia and allowing
Yugoslav army to expel the Albanian guerrillas from the Army for the Liberation
of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (ALPBM). The pressure applied to the ALPBM
and the Kosovo political leaders by NATO and the EU led to the cease-fire
agreement in southern Serbia, ending months of clashes with Yugoslav forces.
The Albanian militants are
in all likelihood well prepared against efforts to stem the further
destabilization of Kosovo and Southern Serbia. The recent terrorist activity in
Macedonia has been aimed at a further deterioration of inter-ethnic relations
between Macedonian citizens of Slavic and non-Slavic origin – Albanians,
Turks, and others. The strategy of the Albanian extremists has been to instigate
a chain of events that will lead to a general destabilization of the regional
security situation in a region encompassing more than one state. This strategy
of violent attitude strongly resembles former Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic's “ethnic cleansing”
policy, aimed at destabilizing in a chain-reaction at least three neighboring
states and tipping the security balance in the Balkans in favor of Belgrade.
Considering Macedonia's current unemployment rate of 40 per cent, such an
approach is not unlikely to succeed.
However, the most that
Albanian separatism can hope to achieve is street fighting in Skopje, Ohrid and
other bigger Macedonian cities. The political arm representing the militants’
claims – the recently founded National Democratic Party (NDP), whose political
objective is the ethnic and religious polarization of Albanian and non-Albanian
Macedonian citizens – has had little effect both internally and
internationally. In fact, the lack of political support for the Albanian
extremist revolt in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and, in past weeks, in Macedonia,
makes the extremists' strategy seem unlikely to succeed. The verbal declarations
of Albanian political leaders in Pristina, Tirana and Skopje, condemning the
violent methods of the ANL, have for practical purposes isolated the ANL and the
NDP and their political causes.
The political pressure on
the ANL extremists increased after the Macedonian parliament, government and
president unanimously rejected efforts to break up the young state. The
challenge for the armed forces of Macedonia was to prove they are a reliable
institution of the state, which is planning to apply for NATO membership. The
readiness to utilize artillery and tanks donated by Bulgaria a year ago proved
to be the turning point in the military fight against the Albanian extremists.
The international pressure
on the Albanian extremists began immediately after their provocation in
Tanusevci: the Macedonian state leadership had asked Bulgarian President Petar
Stoyanov and the Bulgarian government for military support in coping with the
dangerous situation. During a two-day visit to Skopje on 9-10 March, Bulgarian
Prime Minister Ivan Kostov pledged to, and on the next day delivered, military
supplies worth DM16 million (US$7.3 million). After receiving the full and
unanimous support of the Bulgarian government, president and parliament, the
Macedonian leadership appealed to the UN Security Council to deal urgently with
the increasing threat. Subsequently, Greece promised to extend its
military-technical aid to Skopje as well. Soon after, intensive personal and
telephone communications were initiated by the prime ministers, presidents and
foreign ministers of the Process for Cooperation and Security in Southeastern
Europe, comprising all states from the region. The unanimous political
condemnation of the Albanian terrorism in Macedonia by the leaders of the Balkan
states and the full support for the Macedonian government and official
institutions proved to be a major test of the rising maturity of the
region-building efforts in the Balkans in the area of security. Furthermore, the
Balkan leaders, especially the Bulgarian ones, did not hesitate to label the
organized and planned terrorist activities as a mixture of gangsterism,
drug-trafficking scheming and a dose of Albanian nationalism and irredentism.
The visit of the US FBI director to Sofia during the Macedonian crisis brought
additional evidence that drug dealers suffer huge losses in the stable and areas
of Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia where the rule of law prevails.
Condemnation of the
terrorist activity was the reaction of the EU, NATO, the UN Security Council,
Russia and the US from the very start of the crisis. The US State Department
condemned the extremists' actions as
seeking to undermine the stability in Macedonia, Kosovo and the region on 6
March. Earlier, US Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed the US commitment
to the stability of the Balkans through NATO and KFOR. US troops from the KFOR
contingent have shot and wounded two rebel fighters in Kosovo near the border
with Macedonia. NATO and EU observers entered the buffer zone on 14 March,
occupied with KFOR permission by Yugoslav forces without heavy weaponry. The
observers began monitoring the cease-fire, as agreed with the ALPBM. EU
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana urged all ethnic
Albanians to isolate the extremists in a statement he made on 6 March. On 19
March, Macedonian Foreign Minister Srdjan Kerim met in Brussels with both Solana
and Lord George Robertson, the Secretary-General of NATO. Lord Robertson urged
NATO member countries to reinforce their troops in Kosovo to provide KFOR with
more flexibility. On 27 March, both Solana and Lord Robertson visited Skopje and
met with the Macedonian leaders, reaffirming their support for Macedonia and
urging the rebel leaders to lay down their arms and start political life. Both
the European Union and NATO are encouraging the Macedonian government to focus
on political dialogue and address the grievances of the Albanian minority. Lord
Robertson commended the Macedonian government for showing restraint and firmness
in forcing the rebels back into Kosovo.
During the coming weeks, we
can expect the Macedonian army to complete the expulsion of the armed rebels of
the ANL. Escalation of Albanian terror by the militants in their ranks may be
expected in the towns and cities of Macedonia. Bombings, ambushes, arson, and
impeding normal economic activity in the country should be met by the Macedonian
police and internal security forces.
The dangers of a prolonged
internal instability in Macedonia are real, especially if the tensions start to
resemble the Kosovo type of Serb-Albanian hatred and antagonism. The government
and all other institutions in Macedonia, supported by the international
community, especially the neighboring countries, EU and NATO, should call on all
Albanian political leaders and parties in Tirana, Pristina and Skopje to
pressure militant Albanian representatives to give up violent means of struggle
for additional rights, unless they wish to be isolated and gain the ill-fame of
Milosevic.
At the same time, Belgrade
and Skopje should be called upon to refrain from using excessive military force
in restoring order in southern Serbia and in northern and northwestern
Macedonia. The thrust of the political efforts by both Belgrade and Skopje on
the political and civil society level should be reconciliation, rapprochement,
and an end to laying the political blame for all regional difficulties on the
Albanian population exclusively. It is commendable that the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is investigating the
organizers of the terrorist activity in northern Macedonia for incitement of
ethnic hatred. After fair and transparent trials, indicted criminals should
serve their sentences. The most important part of the political activity that
should follow the military stage of the crisis is the initiation of political
negotiations with the ruling and the opposition Albanian ethnic political
parties, but not with the ANL and the NDP. The appropriate forum for holding
talks within a democratic country like Macedonia is the national parliament.
Imaginative constitutional and legislative improvements to meet the legitimate
concerns of the Albanians in Macedonia are obviously necessary, too. The vast
majority of Albanians are peaceful people who are opposed to the violence that
has erupted and who hope for equal rights and just treatment. At the same time
the situation is ripe to bring to the minds of the Albanians that any separatist
activity in Macedonia, FRY or Greece would be unacceptable and should be
differentiated from the struggle for more ethnic group rights. Plans to
re-adjust existing frontiers and to create a Greater Albania are unacceptable.
Regarding other external
factors that have an influence on the internal developments in Macedonia, it is
high time to engage in ambitious projects to build a modern infrastructure in
the Balkans, to initiate economic projects within the Pact of Stability that
will focus the interests of all ethnic groups, and to provide a different
perspective of the common future of all people living together in the Balkans. A
persistent policy of discouraging militant Albanians in the Balkans is expected
of Tirana and would be encouraged by Albania's partners in the region.
2.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1) The Croat National
Assembly, led by the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) created a so-called
interim Croat self-government in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 3 March. The High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Wolfgang Petritsch, responded by
dismissing the Croat member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, Ante Jelavic,
from office. Petritsch dismissed and banned from public office three other
Bosnian Croats. The Croat nationalists announced plans to break out of the
post-war federation with Bosnia’s Muslims in a row over new election rules,
believed to weaken the power of the Croats. The international community was
given an ultimatum by Jelavic to change the rules within 15 days or face a Croat
breakaway.
Bosnia’s political
structures were set up in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the long
ethnic war and established a state that included a Serb republic and a
Muslim-Croat federation. One representative of each of the three communities is
delegated to the presidency. The high representative has the authority to remove
any official who obstructs the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords or
violates the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The actions of Jelavic and
his party were anti-constitutional. The reaction of the high representative was
aimed at the extremists in the Croat ranks and not against the Croat people. The
election of the new moderate government in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 22 February
is an important step on the country’s long road to peace and reconciliation.
For the first time in 10 years, the new government is composed of
representatives of parties committed to building a healthy multi-ethnic society
rather than perpetuating a bitter and divided past. The moderate Alliance for
Peace coalition that leads the new government is expected to pass laws and
strengthen the institutions, thus accelerating the peace process and taking the
country closer to the European mainstream. (2) On 15 March the Pentagon
confirmed plans to withdraw more than 1'000 troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
reducing its military presence there by about a quarter. Apache helicopters and
heavy armored units, considered to exceed the US and SFOR requirements in
carrying out their mission, will also be withdrawn.
III.
THE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.
Bulgaria
(1) The Bulgarian Ministry
of Defense announced its readiness on 1 March to accelerate its reduction of
armaments. According to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Bulgaria
may have 1'475 tanks. However, the government plans to lower the number of tanks
to 790 by 2004. (2) Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov decided on 29 March to
fix 17 June as the date for this year’s general elections. The major
contenders for the 39th People’s Assembly (the parliament) are all pro-EU and
pro-NATO parties.
2.
Croatia
At the beginning of March a
former Croatian general, Marco Norac, 33, and four others were accused of
ordering and taking part in the killings of at least 24 Serbs in the central
Croatian city of Gospic in October 1991. For the first time, the Croatia is
trying members of its own armed forces for war crimes. Many atrocities were
committed by Croats and Serbs during the 1991-1995 war of independence from
Yugoslavia. In February nearly 100'000 people demonstrated in the city of Split
against the investigation into General Norac’s wartime activities.
3.
FRY
(1) An amnesty law brought
pardon to about 30'000 people accused of anti-state crimes during the rule of
former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic. The law does not apply to the
Kosovo Albanians charged with terrorism. (2) During investigations on 7 March of
Rade Markovic, the chief of the state security service of the regime of
Milosevic, the opposition leader Vuk Draskovic testified that he believed
Milosevic had instigated an assassination attempt against him in October 1999.
(3) On 27 March eight close associates of Milosevic and his wife were arrested
in Belgrade. They face allegations of abuse of power and fraud. The authorities
are, obviously, in search of evidence against Milosevic that would provide them
with arguments to detain him for economic and political crimes.
IV.
THE
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATION IN THE BALKANS
1.
Bilateral Relations
a)
Bulgaria-FRY. (1) On 8-9 March the speaker of the Yugoslav parliament, Dragoljub
Micunovic, visited Sofia and held talks with Jordan Sokolov (his counterpart of
the Bulgarian parliament), Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, President Petar
Stoyanov and Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova. This was the first high-level
visit of the democratic leadership in Yugoslavia and Serbia since the fall of
the Milosevic regime. (2) Yugoslav Defense Minister Slobodan Krapovic visited
Bulgaria on 12-13 March and met with his Bulgarian counterpart, Boyko Noev, and
the Chief of General Staff of the armed forces, General Miho Mihov. The defense
ministers discussed the regional security situation and the future of regional
cooperation in the defense area.
b)
Albania-Bulgaria. (1) On 12 March Bulgarian Defense Minister Boyko Noev
visited Tirana and met with Albanian Defense Minister Ismail Lesi. His short
visit aimed at seeking ways of peaceful solution to the issues in the region and
to its stabilization. (2) On 29 March in Sofia representatives of the Ministries
of the Interior of the two countries signed a re-admission agreement that will
facilitate the visa regime between the two countries after Bulgaria joins the
Schengen visa regime zone on 10 April.
c)
FYROM-Bulgaria. (1) The Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov made a
long-planned visit to Macedonia on 8-9 March, which coincided with the
escalating tensions in the republic and the delivery from Sofia of military
supplies and ammunitions for its armed forces . Kostov met with Macedonian
officials as well as with the Albanian leader Arben Xhaferi. The unanimous
position of the Bulgarian government, president and parliament was presented to
all political leaders and the public in Macedonia – condemnation of the
violence, full support for the Macedonian state, its integrity and government,
and insistence on refraining from excessive force in dealing with the rebels and
finding a lasting political solution to the pending problems in the inter-ethnic
relations in the country. (2) On 12 March Noev paid a brief visit to Skopje and
discussed with Macedonian Defense Minister Liuben Paunovsky the situation at the
border with Kosovo and the ways the two countries can cooperate in dealing with
the dangerous situation.
2.
Multilateral Relations: Trilateral Cooperation among Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey
A disaster relief exercise
of fire brigades from Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey started on 30 March near the
southern Bulgarian town of Svilengrad. Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov
attended the opening ceremony.
V.
THE
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1.
Turkey. Turkey and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have agreed
on a new economic program aimed at reviving the confidence of foreign
investors following the financial crisis in February. The IMF has backed the
program after talks with representatives of the G-7 and with Turkish Economy
Minister Kemal Dervis and is ready to bring forward US$6.25 billion of scheduled
loans to Turkey. Dervis has said that he would push on with the economic
restructuring, including reforms to the banking sector and faster privatization.
2.
Bulgaria. (1) The problems created with the non-signing of a re-admission
agreement between Bulgaria and the Russian Federation will be overcome for the
upcoming tourist season after the Bulgarian authorities decided to preserve the
non-visa arrangement for tourists from Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.
This arrangement will remain in effect until 1 October 2001. Traveling
with vouchers for pre-paid services will be enough to cross the border, said
sources from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry on 20 March. (2) The export of
electricity from Bulgaria in 2001 will be enlarged and will include Italy as
well as Turkey, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece. (3) Greece will donate
€54.3 million to Bulgaria for the realization of Bulgarian projects as part of
the Greek plan for reconstructing the Balkans for the period 2001-2005. By May,
Bulgaria will sign the framework treaty on the principles of utilizing the
funds. The projects will be approved by a bilateral expert commission. The money
will be invested in the areas of infrastructure, services and production. The
Greek plan provides €51 million for Albania, €46.8 million for Macedonia,
€75.5 million for Kosovo, €72.5 million for Romania and €241 million for
FRY.
VI.
THE
INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United States
US-Bulgaria.
(1) On 19-20 March FBI Director Louis Freeh visited Sofia and met with the
Bulgarian state leaders and with the heads of intelligence and
counter-intelligence services of the country. This is the first visit of a US
FBI chief to the country. Freeh said Bulgaria is a key strategic partner of the
US in the fields of security and economics. The opening of an FBI desk in Sofia
has been discussed. Freeh praised the country's stability and the reform in the
judicial system and in fighting heavy crimes. Before and after his visit to
Bulgaria, he had meetings with US Vice-President Dick Cheney, with the US
Secretary of State Colin Powell and with US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. (2) On 29 March in Washington, DC, Bulgarian Defense
Minister Boyko Noev met with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
US-FRY.
On 20-21 March Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic visited Washington, DC, and
discussed US financial support for his country, if by 31 March former Yugoslav
president Slobodan Milosevic is handed over to the ICTY in The Hague.
2.
NATO
NATO-Bulgaria.
(1) The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense disclosed its intentions to create the
Active Forces that will include the Rapid Reaction Forces and part of the forces
for territorial defense of the country, thus changing the Plan 2004 for the
defense reform. (2) The visit of Assistant Secretary-General of NATO on Planning
and Defense Edgar Buckley ended on 1 March. Buckley and other experts of NATO
and the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense reviewed Bulgaria's preparation for NATO
membership. (3) After long and careful negotiations between NATO and Bulgaria,
NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson and Bulgarian Defense Minister
Boyko Noev signed a memorandum in Brussels on 21 March for providing land, water
and airspace transit for NATO troops passing through. The memorandum is limited
to five years, can be automatically prolonged and is the first of its kind
between NATO and a membership candidate. The memorandum can be enlarged and
include new clauses, if negotiated, for stationing NATO troops and bases in
Bulgaria. The parliamentary commissions on foreign policy and on national
security approved the agreement on 29 March, and it awaits ratification in early
April. The memorandum provides for a temporary stationing of troops, armaments,
equipment, ships and aircraft in Bulgaria. The permission will require a two-day
advance notification and will not require confirmation by the parliament. No
taxes will be paid by NATO for using the country's infrastructure, naval
facilities, air space and air bases. (4) A delegation of the opposition left
coalition visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels on 30 March and confirmed
its support for NATO membership and pledged to maintain this support if it wins
the elections in June this year.
3. EU
EU-Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The
EU agreed on 1 March to lift restrictions on imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina
with immediate effect. The decision was approved by the Council of Ministers at
the end of February.
EU-Bulgaria.
(1) After confirming an earlier decision by the EU Council of Home Affairs and
Justice Ministers for lifting the visa restrictions for Bulgarians, the EU
Parliament passed the issue for finalization on 1 March by the same EU Council.
The home and justice ministers confirmed their position on 15 March, and a week
later the official newspaper of the EU published the decision. It becomes
applicable 20 days later on 10 April. (2) On 22-23 March, European
Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen visited Sofia. He
reiterated his position that if Bulgaria preserves its economic and political
stability and rate of accession negotiations with the EU, it can successfully
complete them by the end of 2004.
EU-Turkey.
On 27 March Verheugen cautiously welcomed Turkey’s plans to prepare for
membership of the EU with a wide range of political and economic reforms. After
talks in Brussels with Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Verheugen said the
package of proposed reforms was an important landmark in Turkey’s preparation
for EU membership and the first stage in a far reaching program of political
reform. It was, he added, a starting point for the fundamental transformation of
Turkey into a modern democracy. However, there is no timetable for abolishing
the death penalty in Turkey; neither is a clearer picture emerging of how the
state will deal with the ethnic and minority rights issue in the country.
EU-FYROM.
On 9 April in Luxembourg the EU and Macedonia will sign a Stability and
Association Agreement. The EU has demanded as a precondition a change in
Macedonia's constitution that will better reflect the concerns and the role of
the Albanian minority in public life.
4.
Russia
Russia-Western
Balkans. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Skopje, Pristina, Belgrade
and Tirana from 18-24 March in an effort to confirm the key role of the Russian
Federation in dealing with the conflicts in this area. He proposed to disarm the
Albanian terrorist groups, to increase the activity of both KFOR and of the
Yugoslav army, and the signing of a document by the Balkan countries that will
oblige them to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states
in the region and not to use force against the neighboring countries.
Ivanov's visit took place
against the background of an earlier assessment by Russian President Vladimir
Putin, which was repeated by Ivanov: that in the analogous situation in
Chechnya, Russia was forced to use its military power. The public opinion and
the government of Bulgaria has observed a lack of consistency in the comparison
between Macedonia and Chechnya and considers it wishful thinking: first, the
essence of the issue at stake is perceived as a different one; the ethnic
tension requires a different approach from that in Chechnya and could be better
alleviated through political negotiations, reconciliation and rapprochement in
meeting the legitimate concerns of the parties involved. The massive use of
military power, characteristic of the Russian pattern of coping with such
issues, and a perspective that takes in only the military aspects of the problem
is doomed to failure, at least as far as the Balkan region is concerned.
Bulgaria’s experience in tolerant treatment and coming to terms with its
ethnic minorities, their political and cultural integration in society and state
activity proves that this is the right way to solve a complicated historic and
social issue. The integration into the European mainstream and into the
Euro-Atlantic institutions, when set as priority political objectives, may
fundamentally re-motivate the instigators of ethnic hatreds and intolerance,
too, or at least marginalize the political leaders of militant trends in the
inter-ethnic relationships.
Russia-Bulgaria.
A spy scandal between the two countries in March led to the expulsion of three
Russian diplomats from Bulgaria and to the reciprocal step on the Russian side,
which expelled three Bulgarians from the embassy in Moscow.
VII.
THE
SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
The conflict situation in
Macedonia, Southern Serbia and Kosovo remains complicated. Any lasting solution
can be based only on political negotiations and agreements. The solidarity of
the Balkan governments for such a formula of solving the crisis and the
catalytic support of the EU and NATO are indispensable in closing the chapter of
violent relationships in the Western Balkans. A more intensive implementation of
the Stability Pact projects may also prove to be constructive factor to the
longer-term solutions of the ethnic animosities in the conflict regions of
former Yugoslavia.
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Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
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Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
|
Dr. Todor Tagarev |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |