BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and June 2001 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 6, 2001
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I.
Introduction
II.
Conflicts,
Security Threats and Post-Conflict Developments in the Balkans
1.
The Conflict in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and the Post-Conflict Situation in
Kosovo
2.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III.
The National Perspectives of the Balkan
Countries: Specific Issues
1. Albania
2. Bulgaria
3. FRY
4. Turkey
IV.
The
Bilateral and Multilateral Relations in the Balkans. The State of the Regional
Initiatives.
1. Bilateral
Relations
2.
Multilateral Relations: the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial
3.
Regional Initiatives: The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe
V.
The Economic Situation of the Balkan
Countries and the Region
1. Bulgaria-Russia
2.
FRY
3.
Bulgaria-USA
4. Free Trade
Zone in the Balkans
VI.
The Process of Differentiated
Integration of South-Eastern Europe in the EU and in NATO
1.
EU/US – Southeastern Europe
2. EU-Albania
3. EU-Croatia
4. EU-Bulgaria
5. NATO-Bulgaria
VII.
The Influence of Other External Factors
on the Region: National Great Powers and International Institutions
1.
The USA
2.
Russia
3. PRChina:
China-FYROMacedonia
VIII.
Conclusions: The Security Situation and the Evolution of Region-Building
The inter-ethnic conflict that has polarized Macedonians
and Albanians in the FYROMacedonia since February this year continued to
escalate in June. The fluctuating developments in the small Balkan country
reflected various permanent factors of the crisis:
First, the low level of negotiation culture of the
participating domestic actors.
Second, the inability of the democratic institutions of
FYROMacedonia, which have been established for nine years, to deal effectively
with the Albanian extremists.
Third, the Albanians’ insistence on solving the problems
of the 21st century – the Albanian national question within a globalized world
and integrating European continent – with the tools of terrorist intimidation
and armed struggle.
Fourth, an over-estimation on the side of the EU and NATO
of the Macedonian capability of handling these difficulties and of joining the
European integration, in combination with a lack of American leadership.
The period from February to June, however, saw the
emergence of a firm anti-terrorist stance of the international community. The
Albanian political and military leaders are seen to carry part of the blame
after they missed the opportunity to reach their legitimate goals through the
democratic institutions and procedures they themselves are part of.
Unfortunately, Albanian-Macedonian polarisation led to the hardening of
Macedonian Slavs' ethnic hatred against Albanians – a situation that can only
be dealt with in the long term and that involves political, social and
psychological factors.
The extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to Scheveningen near
The Hague marked a significant shift in the domestic developments in Serbia and
a new chance for the people in the Balkans to come to terms with their past
after justice is dealt to the last decade's warmongers. This is a hard test for
democracy in Serbia and the an analysis of the consequences for society will
have to wait until the situation has further unfolded. A similar problem is
facing the democratic government in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Putting the war criminals in jail after a just trial is indispensable for the
future reconciliation of the peoples in the Balkans. The upcoming elections in
Kosovo this autumn will be another difficult test for the stability of the
democratic society of Serbia and of the maturity of the Albanian parties in the
province to prove they are ready to join the democratic ranks of Europe.
The general elections in Albania showed that the democratic
procedures were assimilated slower than the situation in the region requires.
The parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, though producing a tremendous political
shift, were just a factual expression of the mature democratic process in the
country. The country’s domestic stability remains a crucial factor for the
general stability in the region of Southeastern Europe and a symbol of progress
in the Balkans, despite the outbreak of a fifth Balkan war in FYROMacedonia.
The strategic
situation in FYROMacedonia developed as a confrontation between
anti-government Albanian terrorist and separatist forces and the armed and
police forces of the state in an effort not to solve claims of people deprived
of their human rights, but to bargain a territorial division or cantonization
along ethnic boundaries and a federation of the Albanian and the Macedonian Slav
entities. The violence in FYROMacedonia was initially thought to be a
coordinated aggression emanating from Kosovo, but in June assumed the features
of an organised Albanian uprising without, however, a strong political
motivation and backing.
The political
situation shifted significantly in June compared to the previous period.
Though the legitimate Albanian parties take part in the political process in the
country, and continue to be partners in that process, some supporters of the
democratic procedures have lost faith during the last month in the ethnic
Albanians' ability to solve complex social issues. The latter are adopting the
political tactics of the outlawed Army for National Liberation (ANL). The
demands of the Albanian parliamentary party leaders have been increasing, from a
cosmetic change of the preamble of the constitution to guaranteeing pensions for
the ANL fighters, which would make the latter equal participants in the
political dialogue and would make it near-impossible to find a local,
“Macedonian” solution to the problems. Instead, the strategy pursued by
ethnic Albanians seems to be aimed at involving the international community at
any price. The intimidation of the legitimate institutions through the ANL's
threats to attack Skopje, the Albanians' demonstration of strength by claiming
the ability to form a military contingent of 50'000 combatants overnight and
even their threats to create a similar situation in north-eastern Greece with
its Albanian minority – all of these are aimed at introducing external
international actors to the process of conflict resolution, who it is hoped
would be more readily inclined to view the conflicting sides as equal parties
and to find an eventual “fair” (and easier) solution by creating a
cantonized republic of ethnically purified territories for Albanians and
Macedonians. The Albanian extremists achieved their goals of provoking
Macedonian hatred and militancy against the Albanians for the world to see: the
riots in Bitola against Albanian craftsmen and shop-owners, the assault on the
Macedonian parliament by 5'000 furious Macedonians and Serbs on the night of
25-26 June, and the announcement by extremist Macedonian Slavs, organized in
paramilitary units, of ethnic cleansing to rid the country of Albanians, fuelled
the political tensions to a point where the involvement of the international
community became necessary for sorting out the country's disputes. The
cease-fire of 8 June was violated and by using human shields the Albanian
extremists kept some villages around Skopje under their control, including the
strategically important village of Aracinovo.
The Albanian violence provoked an emotional Macedonian
reaction: the riots against peaceful Albanians, the formation of paramilitary
forces (Macedonian terrorism has long traditions going back to the beginning of
the 20th century), sniper fire at the President’s office building and at the
Macedonian parliament on June 6, coming from a Macedonian citizen infuriated at
the killing of five Macedonian soldiers by Albanian terrorists, the attack on
the parliament building during the night of 25 June in protest against the
government’s inefficiency in fighting the rebels, etc.
The confusion in the ranks of the government was rising
during the month, following the formation of a broad coalition cabinet. It
declared mobilisation, then called it off and even later retracted their earlier
retraction. The head of the Macedonian Armed Forces General Staff, Jovan
Andreevsky, resigned on 12 June. He was succeeded by his deputy, General Pande
Petrovsky. In an effort to limit the financial burden of the war (amounting to
US$135 million since February), the government decided to introduce a
“military tax” for the next six months beginning 1 July, in coordination
with the IMF; the measure is expected to raise close to US$35 million for the
budget.
The humanitarian
situation remained difficult due to continuing fighting and the use of
human shields against the government troops’ attacks at the rebels’
strongholds. Aracinovo, a village near Skopje, and its inhabitants were a
special victim of the war situation. The withdrawal of the armed insurgents from
the village (facilitated by NATO) was a priority for the government. The US
forces there put together a convoy including about 20 vehicles, mostly buses,
but also some armoured vehicles armed with machine guns, and a total of 101 US
personnel. The convoy entered the village with the full consent of all parties
concerned and transferred about 350 people (100 ANL fighters and 250 civilians)
to a location 11 miles from the village. This allowed the Macedonian government
to reassert control over Aracinovo and defuse the situation. It was after this
operation on 25 June that extremist Macedonians, mostly police reservists,
attacked the parliament building, dissatisfied with the handling of the
situation in Aracinovo. They demanded the ANL force in the village should be
attacked and killed.
The government in Skopje has long insisted on the isolation
of the terrorists by the USA, NATO and the EU. This request was not met, but the
recent developments and military activity of the ANL pose a potential threat to
NATO supply lines. Apart from the negative effects on the political reform
process in the young state and the harm it caused the true interests of ethnic
Albanians in FYROMacedonia and throughout the region, the armed activity of the
terrorists has already passed a “sacred” boundary, namely the direct
interests of NATO. US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 20 June that the US was in intense consultations with the
Allies and with the EU on how the US and NATO could best support a political
solution in FYROMacedonia and protect FYROMacedonia’s territorial integrity.
Earlier, on 5 June during his visit to FYROMacedonia, US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld repeated the strong US support for FYROMacedonia and its
national unity government. In a decisive, and hopefully not too late move, Bush
issued an Executive Order on 27 June in an effort to face down extremists in the
Balkans. The Executive Order was in response to the evidence of ethnic Albanian
extremists raising money not only in America, but also in Europe. This money was
used to destabilize the democratically elected government of FYROMacedonia. The
Executive Order prohibits US citizens from supporting persons involved in
violent and disruptive actions, and blocks the assets of such people or groups,
who are identified in an annex to the Order. Others may be added to this list in
the future. Among those named is ANL leader Ali Ahmeti.
NATO and the EU strongly advocated a lasting political
solution of the conflict during June. NATO Secretary General George Robertson
and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier
Solana, visited Skopje on 14 June, along with the US Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, Jim Swigert. By the end of June a special EU envoy, the former French
defense minister Francois Leotard, and the US European Bureau’s Special
Adviser for Southeast Europe, Ambassador James Pardew, tried to defuse the
tensions. Furthermore, together with the French constitutional lawyer Robert
Badinter and the Macedonian government, they are looking for a long-term
solution. NATO has already assured its permanent representation in Skopje.
The peace plan as suggested by Macedonian President Boris
Trajkovski provides for the participation of 3'000 to 5'000 NATO troops in
disarming the Albanian fighters. Robertson made it clear on 21 June in
Washington that NATO forces will not be involved in any internal policing
activities. Whatever form NATO involvement in FYROMacedonia will take, it will
be under British command with the help of other NATO allies. British Foreign
Office representative John McGregor fully discarded the mental exercises of
former British Foreign Secretary and UN envoy to the Balkans Lord David Owen of
re-drawing the maps of the Balkans on 7 June. McGregor said in Sofia that the
Foreign Office had not participated in discussions on re-charting the maps of
the Balkans.
Trajkovski made an official visit to Bulgaria at the
invitation of President Petar Stoyanov on 4 and 5 June. Bulgaria demonstrated
its full support to the official Macedonian institutions in the context of the
ongoing crisis and signed two agreements on the re-admission of citizens and on
the mutual recognition of academic degrees. Bulgaria followed this line during
the Gothenburg EU summit and at the Salzburg Economic Forum in June.
On 5 June, the FRY signed an agreement with FYROMacedonia
on military support in defeating the ethnic Albanian rebels. The protocol
regulates military and intelligence cooperation between the armed forces of the
two countries. The Defense Ministers of the FRY and FYROMacedonia, Slobodan
Krapovic and Vlado Buckovsky, said they would work together to increase security
along their borders.
Preparations are continuing for the general elections in
Kosovo, which will be one of the main tasks facing UNMIK and the OSCE in the
province. It remains to be seen whether the Serbs will participate in the
elections, for which they are required to register. The roles of the Kosovar
Serb leaders, and of Belgrade respectively, are crucial in that aspect.
During his Balkan visit, Putin stopped over at the Russian
military base in Kosovo. His visit took place soon after the meeting with Bush
in Ljubliana on 16 June. Putin said during his Kosovo visit that any plans of
re-drafting the map of the Balkans were extremely dangerous. Putin also
reiterated Russia’s strong opposition to the November elections and the
self-government in the province, which he called the main source of religious
extremism and terrorism in the Balkans. Putin reminded his audience that more
than 300'000 non-Albanians have been expelled from the province and said
eventual elections would only confirm the ethnic cleansing of the province.
The UN Security Council unanimously extended the mandate of
the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 12 months on 21 June,
simultaneously authorizing the NATO-led SFOR to continue to operate in the
country during the same period. The resolution reminds the parties of their
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY in The Hague. The resolution also extended
the mandate of the International Police Task Force (IPTF).
(1) Regular general elections were held in Albania on 24
June, with the ruling Socialist Party winning the first round. The second round
of the elections will be held on 8 July. The OSCE representatives declared that
the elections marked progress towards international standards. The Albanian
parliament has 140 seats; after the first round of voting, the Socialists had
won 45 seats, while the opposition Democratic Party of former President Berisha
held only 17 mandates. The second round will be conducted in 37 constituencies
where no clear winner was declared. The turnout of the elections was at about 60
per cent. (2) Representatives of 500 families gathered on 6 June in the northern
Albanian town of Buka to discuss putting an end to the centuries-old tradition
of family vendetta. Blood feuds are part of the traditions of the
"kanun", a medieval collection of rules governing life in the
mountains which is still applied in the northern parts of the country.
On 17 June, the Bulgarians held their regular parliamentary
elections. More than 30 parties competed for the votes of the Bulgarian
citizens; election turnout was 66.7 per cent. The winner, with 42.74 per cent of
the vote (120 seats), was the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS), headed
by the former Bulgarian king who has lived in Madrid, Spain for most of his
life. The formerly ruling Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) received just
18.18 per cent (51 seats in parliament). Their loss was caused by the harsh
consequences of very successful macro-economic reform for the average Bulgarian.
The political reasons are the loss of hope and confidence in the UDF and its
leadership, the party's patronage system that rebuffed more than 1.4 million
previous voters, and the general disagreement in Bulgarian society with the
policy of the UDF. The third political force in the elections was the
“Coalition for Bulgaria” – a coalition of most of the left parties and
movements in Bulgaria that won 17.15 per cent (48 seats in parliament). It will
be in opposition. The fourth political force was the Movement for Rights and
Freedom – Liberal Union – EuroRoma, a coalition of the ethnic Turks,
Bulgarians and Roma, with 7.45 per cent (21 seats). The common political
denominator of all parliamentary parties is the priority objective of joining
the EU and NATO. The winners in the elections have promised to crush corruption,
poverty and to give new meaning to the moral norms in society and in politics.
The former Serbian leader and present leader of the Serbian
Socialist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, was extradited to The Hague on 28 June to
face justice for the crimes he was accused of having perpetrated during the
Kosovo crisis in 1999. This arrest opens the way for other extraditions of war
criminals from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The extradition brings
the real issues within the federation structure between Serbia and Montenegro
into focus. This act of the Serbian government, which contravened the federal
Constitutional Court's decision not to deliver Milosevic to The Hague, created
an opportunity for Serbia to receive large-scale financial support from the
Donors’ Conference on 29 June in Brussels –funding which has been contingent
on the extradition of Milosevic to the ICTY in The Hague.
Finally, the extradition of Milosevic was a moral boost to
the fight against dictators and war criminals worldwide.
The Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the country’s
pro-Islamic Virtue Party, the third largest in the Turkish Parliament, on June
22. The party of former Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan was accused of
anti-secular and illegal continuation of the outlawed Welfare Party. The Virtue
Party has 102 members in the 550-seat parliament.
a. Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian President Stipe Mesic visited Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 31 May to 1 June. He met the country’s tripartite presidency
and its Catholic cardinal, as well as Bosnian cultural organizations. The
tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a non-nationalist Bosnian
Croat as one of its members, and Mesic supported him against nationalist plans
to form a mini-state within Bosnia. The president and the government are opposed
to the Greater Croatia policy of the late former president Franjo Tudjman, who
backed the Bosnian Croats with money and weapons during the Bosnian war. The
main Bosnian Croat nationalist party, the HDZ, is presently isolated and has
called on the Croatian government not to meddle in Bosnian affairs.
b. FRY-Croatia
The presidents of the FRY and Croatia, Vojislav Kostunica
and Stipe Mesic, issued a joint statement on 10 June during a Central European
Initiative (CEI) forum in Italy that specified the basic principles that should
guide the normalization of relations between their two nations. They agreed on
the need to cooperate on fundamental and important issues, like refugee returns,
war crimes prosecutions and support for the implementation of the Dayton
accords. This act of rapprochement is highly valued by the other Balkan nations
as a major contribution to peace and stability in the wider region.
c. Turkey-Bulgaria
At the end of June, the Turkish Government announced a 17
May decision to allow a non-visa regime, beginning from 1 July, for Bulgarian
tourists who plan to stay in the country for less than three months.
On 6 June the Ministers of Defense of Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Italy, the FYROMacedonia, Romania and Turkey gathered for their third
informal meeting. Representatives of the US, Croatia and Slovenia acted as
observers of the meeting. US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld participated in the
event. The meeting discussed the readiness of the Multinational Peace Force for
South-East Europe (MPFSEE) to be employed in Balkan contingencies and the
criteria of involving the FRY in the Defense Ministerial. The headquarters of
MPFSEE declared operational readiness on 1 May, but the US are still critical of
the formal launch of the battalion.
The Steering Committee for Refugee Matters adopted the
Agenda for Regional Action for Refugees and Displaced People at its 7th meeting
on 11 June in Paris. The Agenda was officially presented and launched on 27 June
in Brussels, followed by the endorsement by all Stability Pact participants
during the Regional Table meeting on 28 June. The Agenda recommends the
following key initiatives to promote and implement solutions for refugees: a
reconstruction program that can provide grants for at least 52'700 housing
units; construction of at least 60'000 social housing units in the next five
years; the expansion and development of individual housing loan schemes for
initially 50'000 beneficiaries; the development of a collective initiative to
identify and implement solutions for 60'000 residents in the region; area-based
integrated programs in the FRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia providing
linkages to economic recovery and social development activities in a cross-table
approach; facilitating bilateral and multilateral border transit and the right
of return as required by international standards; promotion of bilateral and
multilateral contacts to deal with refugee issues, culminating in the conclusion
of relevant agreements and regular exchange of information and data, as well as
the adjustment and enactment of property legislation and improvements over
existing legislation where needed.
The democratic changes in the FRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Croatia have created the opportunity to honor the refugees' and displaced
persons' right of return , to closely cooperate with governments, donors and
civil society in the region, and for refugees to choose to return or stay and
integrate where they currently reside.
Close to 1.25 million people remain displaced within the
countries of former Yugoslavia, of whom 490'000 are refugees and 760'000 are
internally displaced persons. Most of the refugees and displaced persons are in
the FRY and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A diplomat attached to the Russian Embassy in Sofia told
the Bulgarian-Russian Trade and Industrial Chamber that the bilateral
Bulgarian-Russian Commission for Economic and Scientific and Technical
Cooperation is schedule to meet in the autumn of this year. This commission has
functioned very inefficiently in the last few years, during which time
Bulgaria's trade deficit with Russia was about US$1.3 billion per year.
The price of the electricity rose by 40 per cent on 2 June.
Earlier in April, the price had already risen by 60 per cent. Post office
service prices rose by 32 per cent. In June, 50 per cent of the active
population in the FRY were unemployed. The average monthly salary is US$100,
while the minimum monthly cost of living for one family is US$200.
(1) On 5 June, the President of the US Albanian, Macedonian
and Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) Corporation, Edward Ferguson, discussed a project for
constructing an oil pipeline through Burgas, Skopje and Vlora with Bulgarian
government officials. The pipeline can be constructed within 3 years and the
profits accruing to Bulgaria from the port taxes at Burgas alone may reach US$70
million per year. It will cost US$1.13 billion to build the pipeline. (2) The US
Atlantic Council presented its analysis of the status and development potential
of the Bulgarian arms industry on 15 June. The experts of the Atlantic Council
consider the industry viable. Its major task is to adapt to NATO standards.
Currently, 25'000 Bulgarians are working in the arms industry.
The governments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the FRY, FYROMacedonia and Romania signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation on 27 June in
Brussels. The initiative is part of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.
The MoU allows for a six-year transition period. Bilateral negotiations are to
proceed from this document. The initial idea of the Stability Pact was to create
a single tariff zone on the basis of a multilateral document of the seven
countries. Bulgaria opposed the idea and a loose version, which was acceptable
to the WTO and the European Commission, was adopted in January of this year in
Geneva.
Leaders of the US and the EU issued a joint statement on 14
June in Gothenburg reaffirming their historic partnership and agreement on
issues concerning Southeastern Europe. They stated their commitment to resolving
the crisis in FYROMacedonia through political dialogue and urged the people of
Kosovo to condemn the use of violence and to isolate extremists. They reaffirmed
their support for the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and called on the
governments of the region to cooperate with the ICTY in bringing war criminals
to justice.
A European Commission (EC) report (COM 2001 300)
recommended at the end of June to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement with Albania. The Gothenburg summit requested that
negotiating directives be presented by the Commission, by the end of this year
if possible.
It is expected that the finalized text of the Stabilization
Agreement of the EU with Croatia will be published by July of this year.
Bulgaria concluded the tenth chapter of its accession
negotiations with the European Union on 11 June. Negotiations were initiated
concerning the next two chapters (the 17th and 18th chapters out of 31 in the
process of these negotiations), namely “Transport Policy” and “ Customs
Union”.
General Joseph Ralston, the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe (SACEUR) and Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov visited the MPFSEE’s
headquarters in Plovdiv. The SACEUR emphasized that Bulgaria has an excellent
plan of preparation for integrating in NATO. Ralston also met with Bulgarian
President Stoyanov. After the meeting, the Bulgarian General Staff organized the
delivery of drinking water for the town of Kumanovo, where water supplies had
been cut off by Albanian terrorists.
a.
USA-Bulgaria
US Congressman Doug
Bereuter, visiting Sofia as the head of a US Congress delegation to Bulgaria
said on 1 June that Bulgaria has chances of being invited to join NATO next year
together with Slovenia. He promised to support the Bulgarian application by
interceding on their behalf with the US government.
b. USA-Greece
(1) Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos and his US
colleague Donald Rumsfeld met and discussed various issues in Thessaloniki,
Greece, on 6 June, including the Balkans, European defense and security policy,
Cyprus, and bilateral relations. (2) Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou
and his US counterpart Colin Powell signed the US-Greek Comprehensive Technical
Agreement (CTA) in Washington on 13 June. Negotiations started in March 1999 and
ended recently. The intent of the agreement is to modernize and strengthen the
US-Greece defense cooperation and lay the basis for a 21st century defense
partnership. The CTA addresses the status of US forces in Greece as well as that
of Greek personnel in the US on official duty.
c. USA-Croatia
US Secretary of State Powell and the Croatian Foreign
Minister met in Washington, D. C. on 8 June and discussed the situation in the
Balkans, the relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperation with
the ICTY in The Hague, and bilateral relations.
a. Russia-FRY
Putin visited Belgrade on 17 June and met with Yugoslav
President Vojislav Kostunica. This was the first visit by a Russian president to
Belgrade since the demise of the USSR. Russia’s special relationship with the
FRY in the Balkans was demonstrated when Putin agreed to supply oil and gas
without insisting on immediate payment. Russia was invited to participate in
investment projects in the FRY. A free trade zone will be established between
the two countries at the beginning of July. The presidents of the two countries
agreed to initiate a Balkan conference that would confirm the inviolability of
the state borders in the region. However, the goals of such a conference, apart
from the efforts to prove that terrorism in Chechnya is the same as terrorism in
the Balkans, have already been established by the OSCE since 1975, as well as by
the UN Charter.
b. Russia-Bulgaria
The Prosecutors-General of Russia and Bulgaria, Vladimir
Ustinov and Nikola Filchev, met in Moscow from 24-29 June. They discussed
avenues of cooperation between the two institutions in fighting crime and in the
extradition of criminals. Filchev delivered a letter from Putin to the new
Bulgarian prime minister, Simeon Saxkoburggotsky.
FYROMacedonia formally restored its diplomatic relations
with Beijing on 18 June during a visit of Macedonian Foreign Minister Srdjan
Kerim to the Chinese capital. Skopje established diplomatic links with the
Republic of China (ROC) in 1999, but this worsened the international security
standing of the young state. In the meantime, FYROMacedonia has received
substantial financial aid from Taiwan.
1. During the period under consideration, the crisis in
FYROMacedonia escalated and ethnic hatred prevailed among the country's
citizens. The demands of the terrorists and of their political supporters in the
broad coalition government were also increased. The official Macedonian
institutions could not deal with the situation on their own, and special envoys
from the US, the EU and NATO are already directly supporting the parties in
finding a way to avoid the looming civil war. It is high time the ICTY rules
were applied to the terrorists in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and FYROMacedonia. The
political representatives of the Albanian ethnic groups in the Balkans should
receive a clear message that they will never be accepted to the EU and NATO
unless they stop their armed intimidation of individual states and the region.
At the same time, all states whose population includes ethnic Albanians should
guarantee their human rights and integrate them as equals. The transfer of
Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague shows that democracy can win in the Balkans.
2. The differentiated accession of the Balkan countries to
the EU and NATO is a practical instrument of stabilising the region, as can be
seen in the way the EU's relations with Albania, Croatia and Bulgaria have
developed during the past month.
|
EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
|
Dr. Todor Tagarev |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |