BALKAN
REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY
SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and March 2003 Issue in Brief)
Research
Study 47, 2003
Hard copy:
ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN I
S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I.
INTRODUCTION
Two
groups of factors influenced the developments in the security area and
the region-building efforts of Southeast Europe in March: the international
environment and national events and processes.
The first group of factors
includes a variety of interacting influences. The individual Balkan countries
have been directly or indirectly “attracted” to the big powers’ global
tug-of-war between a multi-polar world vision and a unilateral world vision.
It is a real challenge for the foreign-political systems of the individual
countries to decide how to react and to adapt to the evolving developments,
so that they keep various institutional options (EU, NATO) open, while
at the same time demonstrating that they are responsible and engaged in
the global fight on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.
Each of the countries from the region has also to be careful how their
decisions relating to the global powers’ rivalry game will reflect on
the region and its stability. These factors are currently informing the
individual Balkan countries’ behavior and regional developments in Southeast
Europe.
Certain Balkan countries –
Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
Romania, and Turkey – have become part of the Coalition for the Immediate
Disarmament of Iraq. Others – Croatia and Slovenia – are supportive of
the coalition. Yet other Southeast European countries may provide free
air-space passage, air bases, and in some cases military units (Romania,
Bulgaria), as well as post-conflict peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction
efforts.
The war on Iraq is expected
to intensify terrorist pressure, and some observers expect more suicide
terrorists in the Middle East and Muslim communities around the world.
Some of these terrorists may try to establish a Balkan connection. Therefore,
Bulgaria and Romania have intensified their counter-terrorism measures.
The danger seems to be the possibility of a connection between international
terrorists and local organized crime, or Albanian extremists and separatists.
For years national and trans-border efforts have been adopted to prevent
such a link. Additional counter-terrorist measures have been taken to
protect airfields used by the US in Bulgaria and Romania, especially after
the calls of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Muslim clergy around the
Middle East for jihad (holy war) – in its militant interpretation.
On 26 March in Brussels, government
representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia signed the accession
protocols with NATO, documents that will be confirmed later by government
and state leaders. While there are few concerns about the forthcoming
membership in NATO, certain doubts have arisen that Bulgaria’s and Romania’s
membership in the Coalition for Immediate Disarmament of Iraq may become
an obstacle for their joining the EU in 2007. Accession in 2007 already
represents a three-year delay, compared to the rest of the EU candidates.
There are indications that EU accession negotiations may be slowed down,
not by Bulgaria but by Brussels. The French President last month “promised”
Bulgaria and Romania that European public opinion would have a negative
effect on the EU’s decision on the accession of Romania and Bulgaria after
they had supported the US-UK-led coalition against Iraq and thus defied
the French-Russian resistance to the coalition.
These trans-Atlantic disputes
could have a negative effect on the regional stability and regional reconstruction
of Southeast Europe. If the EU punishes Bulgaria and Romania by slowing
down or postponing those countries’ accession to EU, the activity of the
most consistent factors of Balkan stability in the last decade would be
blocked. Balkan stability has been possible as a result of Bulgaria’s
and Romania’s stopping the spill over effect of the post-Yugoslav conflicts
and by these countries’ consistent process of reform.
At present it is important
that the positive tendencies in the post-Kosovo Balkans are retained.
There are two fundamental regional requirements for preserving security
and building up the region: First, the EU must keep to its pledge to allow
Bulgaria and Romania access to the EU in 2007, and second, the EU must
clearly state that EU membership will be a possibility for all other Southeast
European non-EU countries, applying the strategy of differentiation and
self-differentiation.
The case of Turkey remains
unique after the escalation of the conflict in Iraq. Turkey has already
received an additional requirement by the EU: that it refrain from entering
northern Iraq. No doubt, Brussels needs to assess carefully the complex
regional stability situation that Turkey may face at its southern borders,
despite its difficult decision to cancel support to its traditional strategic
ally, the United States, in the hope of preventing refugee disaster and
state-building claims by the Kurdish ethnic minority.
In this tense global security
situation, Balkan countries are acting with a high level of cooperation,
generated by their interests to improve regional situation. Greek Presidency
of the EU is a lucky coincidence for the Balkan countries, as it allows
for the dissemination within the governing institutions of the EU of an
informed perspective on the West Balkan region and on general regional
developments.
The second group of factors
includes national developments. First, the murder of Serbian Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic is one of the biggest provocations to the post-Milosevic
transformation process in Serbia and Montenegro. It led to the introduction
of a state of emergency. More than 2’600 suspects were arrested, and within
12 days a key suspect was taken into custody. The murder of the leader
of the democratic reform process in Serbia was a blow to the region-building
process and a reminder that stability in Serbia is still fragile. Unfortunately,
a political compromise of October 2000, made during the so-called popular
uprising by the democratic opposition with the military and security services,
proved an inadequate framework for implementing consistent democratic
reforms. Once Zoran Djindjic decided to put Serbia under the rule of law,
he was shot by those who had different plans for Serbia’s future. Hard
times are ahead for Serbian democrats and other Serbs committed to making
Serbia an equal and dignified member of 21st-century Europe and a respected
neighbor in the Balkans.
II.
SECURITY THREATS, CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
Security Threats: Terrorism, Threat of Iraq’s Possession of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Casualties, and Organized Crime
a)
Turkey. Though
Turkey became part of the Coalition for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq,
it prohibited the use of its airspace for Tomahawks launched by coalition
forces from the eastern Mediterranean. Eleven corridors of Turkish airspace
were opened on 21 March for US and coalition aircraft during the next
six months. Several hundred US paratroopers landed in northern Iraq in
preparation for an attack on major cities in the area. Ankara did not
allow 62’000 US troops to open a northern front against Baghdad. Washington
cancelled plans to provide a multi-billion dollar US assistance package
to Turkey. US authorities warned Turkey not to enter Iraqi territory because
the Kurdish population in northern Iraq would be provoked and would engage
in fighting with Turkish troops. Some 60’000 Kurdish fighters are prepared
to join US forces in the north of the country and open a second front
against Baghdad.
Turkish attitudes to the US
war on Iraq so far may lead to an enduring strain in bilateral relations.
However, if Turkey enters Kurdistan, the EU may rethink Ankara’s possible
future membership. Officials from the US and the EU have made declarations
to this effect, reflecting the difficulty of Turkey’s position. Turkish
Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok said on 26 March in Dyarbakir that
Turkey would send extra troops into northern Iraq in coordination with
the US, if forces currently there were unable to cope with security concerns.
Turkey is concerned about possible moves by Iraqi Kurds to assert independence,
a prospect that could re-ignite a separatist Kurdish rebellion in adjoining
southeastern Turkey. General Ozkok underlined the danger perceived by
Turkey across its border, saying: “If things get out of control one day,
I hope our friends will not have to ask us to do what they oppose now”.
b) Greece.
On 3 March Greece started the trial of 19 suspected ’17 November’ terrorists
in Athens. The defeat of the terrorist group ends one grave security threat
for the 2004 Olympic games in Greece.
c) Romania.
The US stationed about 1’000 troops at a Romanian Black Sea airbase to
act as an air bridge for equipment and personnel going to the Gulf, the
US air force said on 13 March. The role of Romania’s Kogalniceanu airbase
and neighboring Bulgaria’s Sarafovo airbase is to forward troops, cargo,
fuel, and vehicles from US bases in Germany.
d) Albania.
(1) Albanian Defense Minister Pandeli Maiko said at the beginning of March
that the Albanian army was ready to send a 70-member special unit in the
case of a strike on Iraq. On 9 March the Council of Ministers approved
this proposal. According to President Alfred Moisiu, war against Iraq
is for peace, as he told British Minister of Defense Geoffrey Hoon on
13 March in London. (2) On 4 March a US State Department report disclosed
that organized criminal groups are using Albania as a transit route for
drugs trafficking and other kinds of smuggling activities. Albania is
a central point on the path of drugs because of its strategic geographic
position, the weak Albanian police and judicial system, and loose border
control. Heroin, cocaine, and marihuana are the drugs most often transported
through Albania.
2. The Post-Conflict
Issues in FYROM, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina
a) FYROM.
On 31 March NATO ended its operation Allied Harmony in FYROM. The EU begins
a successor operation there on 1 April. The NATO mission provided an international
presence to support monitoring groups and ensure stability. It was established
at the request of FYROM President Boris Traikovsky and was terminated
with the full agreement of the authorities in Skopje. NATO remains committed
to helping FYROM become fully integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures and
will maintain a senior civilian representative and a senior military representative
in Skopje. The force commander of the EU-led operation will be co-located
in Skopje with the NATO senior military representative. Deputy SACEUR
will be the operation commander of the EU-led operation and will play
a pivotal role between the EU and NATO.
b) Kosovo.
On 4 March Kosovo Albanian war crimes suspect and prominent politician
Fatmir Limaj was transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. He will face trial after his arrest
in Slovenia last month. Limaj is the highest-ranking suspect in an indictment
list of the ICTY of the former Kosovo Liberation Army. A crackdown on
rebels guilty of crimes is crucial for the process of reconciliation in
Kosovo.
c) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(1) On 7 March Momcilo “Momo” Mandic, Milovan “Cicko” Bjelica, ManCo Oil
Company and Privredna Banka Sarajevo AD were designated under the Western
Balkans Executive Order 13219 of the US Treasury for their financial and
material support of Radovan Karadzic – a person indicted for war crimes
by the ICTY. Their assistance enabled Radovan Karadzic to elude prosecution
by the ICTY, thereby obstructing implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.
(2) On 26 March US authorities arrested Muhamad Shachirbey, former foreign
minister and, till recently, ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
UN. He is accused of misappropriating of US$2.5 million of international
donations. In 2001 Interpol issued an arrest order for Shachirbey.
III.
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.
Serbia and Montenegro
(1) On 7 March Svetozar Marovic (47) was elected with 65 of 126 votes
from the parliament as first president of Serbia and Montenegro. Marovic
is Montenegrin and, according to the constitution of the new state, he
will serve also as prime minister, assisted by a five-member cabinet.
The mandate of the new president is three years, after which Serbs and
Montenegrins will have to decide on their future status relative to the
present federation. (2) On 17 February Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic
told ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte how he would continue the reform
process in his country. Del Ponte later said Djindjic had then unexpectedly
added: “They will kill me”. He did not tell her whom he meant by “they”
but said the planned reforms in the armed forces and police put him at
great risk. On 12 March two sniper shots killed Djindjic in front of the
building of the Council of Ministers. On 18 March Interior Minister Zoran
Zivkovic was elected Serbian prime minister by the Serbian parliament
with 128 members of 250 voting in favor and 100 voting against his election.
A state of emergency’ was introduced in Serbia. On 24 March a suspect
for the murder of Zoran Djindjic was arrested. He is believed to be Zvezdan
“Zvecki” Jovanovic, a former deputy commander of the special police force
the Red Berets. The Serbian government dissolved this special police unit.
Djindjic’s murder is a strong reminder of how much unfinished business
remains for all parties in Europe interested in the stability of Southeast
Europe. (3) On 28 March Serbian police found the body of Ivan Stambolic,
the would-be contender of the president Slobodan Milosevic in the 2000
presidential elections in Serbia. Serbian authorities intend to interrogate
both Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague and his wife, Mira Markovic, in connection
with Stambolic’s murder. Markovic is in hiding and sought by police.
2.
Turkey
On 9 March Head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Recep Tayyip
Erdogan was elected member of parliament in a by-election in Siirt, southeastern
Anatolia. The AKP took the three seats in this constituency. This victory
was a prerequisite for Erdogan to take up the position of prime minister
of Turkey, to which he was appointed on 17 March by Turkish President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer but was unable to take up without also being a member
of parliament. The position of prime minister has been occupied in the
interim by Erdogan’s right-hand man and foreign minister, Abdullah Gül.
IV.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATE OF THE
REGIONAL INITIATIVES
1.
Bilateral Relations
a)
Bulgaria-Serbia and Montenegro. From 28 February to 1 March Foreign
Minister of Serbia and Montenegro Goran Svilanovic visited Sofia for talks
with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy. Svilanovic met also President
Georgy Parvanov and Prime Minister Simeon Saxkoburggotsky. The foreign
ministers of the two countries made a joint declaration in support of
the Sofia-Nis highway project. Svilanovic told the Bulgarian daily newspaper
Trud that Bulgaria was “an example for the decisiveness of the nation
to define its objectives and to reach agreement on the priority topics
for the country”. Svilanovic also said he hoped to achieve the same agreement
in his own country.
b) Turkey-Albania.
On 3 March Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Meta visited Ankara. He met
Prime Minister Gül. During a meeting with Turkish President Ahmet
Sezer, the latter said Turkey would support Albania’s accession to NATO.
c) Albania-Bulgaria.
On 26-27 March Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxkoburggotsky made an
official visit to Albania. He met Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano and
President Alfred Moisiu. The leaders of the two countries discussed the
fight against terrorism, the stability in the Balkan region, and the joint
fight on organized crime. The two countries confirmed their interest in
the construction of transport corridor No. 8 – from Burgas on the Black
Sea to Vlora on the Adriatic Sea via Skopje, FYROM. The oil pipeline between
the two cities is expected to start functioning in 2007.
2. Trilateral
Cooperation: Croatia-Albania-FYROM
On 7 March in Dubrovnik, Croatia, the Croatian Foreign Minister Tonino
Picula, Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Meta, and FYROM Foreign Minister
Ilinka Mitreva adopted a joint declaration, reiterating their determination
to become NATO members, their support of the fight against terrorism,
and the will to strengthen regional cooperation. The three countries consider
their cooperation in preparation for NATO membership significant to this
objective.
V.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
1.
Bulgaria
(1) On 5 March in Sofia the National Electric Company (NEC)
and the Italian Energy Company Enel Produzione signed a memorandum for
modernizing heat electric station Maritza-Iztok III. The deal was for
€ 580 million. The signing ceremony was attended by Italian Foreign Minister
Franco Fratini. (2) On 6 March the National Statistics Institute announced
that Bulgaria had had a US$1.619 billion trade deficit in 2002. This is
the worst trade balance, and its main source is the Bulgarian-Russian
trade balance, though Bulgaria’s trade is mostly with EU countries.
2.
United States-Serbia and Montenegro
On 5 March the US House of Representatives passed a bill that would
extend normal trade relations, known also as most-favored nation status,
to Serbia and Montenegro. This would lead to hundreds of non-controversial
small changes of US trade law. The Senate Finance Committee approved a
similar bill on 27 February, sending it to the Senate for consideration.
Eventually, the US president will have to sign the bill into a law to
restore normal trade relations with Serbia and Montenegro, withdrawn in
1992.
VI.
THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN EU
AND IN NATO
1.
EU-Turkey
On 17 March the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe found that Abdullah
Ocalan, the former leader of the PKK, had not had a fair trial when he
was sentenced to death in June 1999, four months after his arrest. Turkey
appealed this judgment, but the judgment may lead to a revision of the
Kurdish leader’s trial.
2.
EU-Slovenia
Slovenians, in a referendum on 23 March, approved their country’s
entry into the EU with 89.6 per cent of the votes. The turnout was over
60 per cent eligible voters.
3.
NATO -Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia
On 26 March in Brussels, representatives of the three countries signed
pre-accession protocols with NATO. All seven invited countries signed
protocols with NATO, and NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson
attended the ceremony, together with the foreign ministers of the candidate
countries. The ratification process was opened the same day.
Bulgaria, one of the Southeast
European candidates, is contributing to NATO in fighting terrorism, including
in Afghanistan. Sofia has clearly made a contribution to the stabilization
of Southeast Europe and the Black Sea region. The temporary membership
of Bulgaria in the UN Security Council contributes to NATO’s diplomatic
potential. However, Sofia has to complete its reform in the judicial system,
the fight with corruption, the control of arms exports, and the protection
of classified information. More is expected from the government regarding
the integration of the Roma population. On 28 March the Bulgarian parliament
approved the document agreed on by the Bulgarian government and NATO.
The interesting part of the government’s declaration was a clear link
between Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and the support Sofia provides to
the coalition of the willing against the regime in Iraq.
In a referendum on 23 March,
Slovenians approved the country’s entry into NATO. Sixty-six per cent
of those who voted were in favor. The turnout was 60 per cent of eligible
voters.
VII.
THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT
POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
US-Bulgaria, Romania
On 27-28 February, US Commerce Secretary
Don Evans visited Romania and Bulgaria at the request of US President
George Bush to demonstrate US support and appreciation of these countries.
Evans is the first cabinet secretary to visit Bulgaria since Bush took
office. In Sofia Evans said the US acknowledged Bulgaria as a market-based
economy. He said the US would send a business development mission to Sofia
later this year to further expand economic relations. The visit of this
mission would “underscore the maturing relationship between Bulgaria and
the United States”, he told Bulgarian government officials in Sofia.
On 10 March in Washington,
DC, Evans announced that Romania was designated a market-based economy
by the US.
Both Bulgaria and Romania
rely extensively on US Senate support in the ratification process of the
NATO accession protocols. Both Sofia and Bucharest have provided diplomatic
and military support to the US-led war on disarming Iraq from weapons
of mass destruction and in the fight against terrorism.
2. Russia-Bulgaria
On 1-3 March Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Bulgaria to
commemorate Bulgaria’s National Day on 3 March, which this year coincides
with the 125-year jubilee of the end of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878,
in which Russia emerged as victor. Putin is trying to restore a framework
of relations between the two countries. Putin demonstrated his respect
for moderate and constructive Bulgarian nationalism – in strong contrast
to the insulting statements made two weeks earlier by the French president
about Bulgaria.
During his visit to Bulgaria,
Putin launched a new concept of the unity of Europe, of which Russian-Bulgarian
relations are to be a part. The core of this vision was made more visible
at the 5 March meeting in Paris of the foreign ministers of France, Russia,
and Germany, who adopted a joint stance on the upcoming deliberations
in the UN Security Council on Iraq. United Europe, with Russia as a key
actor, is another option Russian foreign policy could pragmatically exploit,
alongside US-Russian and Chinese-Russian strategic partnerships. This
may make sense for Russia and France, and probably also for Germany, but
no small country in Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe can feel comfortable
in a configuration of powers in which directorates of the great powers
will dictate what is right and what is wrong in international relations.
The single leadership of the US is currently succeeding over the mixture
of signals coming from the as yet undefined “single European position”
and “European unity” of EU and Russia.
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS
The first consequences of an obviously longer than expected war in
Iraq – the belief in an established link between the Baghdad regime and
the terrorist network Al-Qaida and its subdivision in northern Iraq –
provides important arguments to those in the Balkans who support the Coalition
for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq. Romania and Bulgaria are providing
military units for support operations in one of Iraq’s neighbor countries.
Both countries are taking very seriously the threat of WMD falling into
the hands of terrorists. The urgency of this danger to security prevails
over any other geo-economic, geo-political, or geo-strategic calculation
when taking a position on Iraq. This tendency will continue to be tested
in the following weeks and months, while the war moves toward its objectives.
Many pros and cons have still to be evaluated and used for the national
and international policy-making processes.
In March Bulgaria, Romania,
and Slovenia made an important step toward NATO membership. Each country
has a specific list of tasks to be finished by the time the ratification
process in the member-countries is completed. The stability of the region
of Southeast Europe will be enhanced, once the three countries are fully
integrated. This will be helpful for stabilizing the situation in countries
like Serbia and FYROM, and for marginalizing organized crime – a real
evil for the region in general.
The evolving situation in
March reminded us that the EU continues to be most significant to the
region’s future – both as a harmonizing and as a developing factor. The
launch of the EU defense operation in FYROM is another factor: the EU
is also seriously needed for hard security reasons. Therefore, any delays
to the integration of Bulgaria and Romania after 2007 or any move that
might shake the confidence of the other, non-EU Balkan countries regarding
their future with the EU may have negative effects on the region’s stability.
The EU has opened a variety of developing processes and tendencies and
is obliged to carry these through to completion. This does not mean that
political conditions are no longer relevant in the EU approach to the
Balkans. In addition, involving Bulgaria and Romania by 2007 has another
significant aspect, namely the fact that integration processes in Southeast
Europe will influence the eastern coast of the Black Sea in South Caucasus.
The integration of Turkey into the EU remains a difficult task. The EU
must overcome its internal divisions as soon as possible and should remember
how many important interests unite the individual members, including their
interests with regard to Southeast European.
EDITORIAL STAFF:
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CONTACT AND REFERENCE
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Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief
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ISSN 1311 – 3240
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Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova
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Address: ISIS, 1618
Sofia,
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Mr. Valeri Rachev, M.
A.
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P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria
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Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M.
A.
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Phone/Fax: ++(359 -
2-) 551 828
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Dr. Todor Tagarev
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E-Mail Address:
isis@cserv.mgu.bg
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