BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:

THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

(A Background and April 2003 Issue in Brief)

© Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia

Research Study 48, 2002

Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240

AN I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL

I. INTRODUCTION
Power politics in the war in Iraq had a considerable impact on the Balkan region in April. Several factors strengthened the case of those who took the side of the coalition forces, rejected several weeks ago by the UN, NATO, and the EU: the military victory of the US-UK led coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq and initial signals of links between the regime of Saddam and Al Qaida and other terrorist activists; the intensified search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the first signs of a society recovering from the war. Not only the military victory, but also the original reason for fighting dictatorial regime – its links to terrorism and the violation of the WMD non-proliferation regime – highlighted the courageous and risky political position taken by small and dependent European players from the Balkans such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Their consistent position was proved by the pledge to send peacekeeping forces to preserve security and stability in post-war Iraq. Even France sent the signal to the White House that it would not oppose NATO peacekeeping involvement in Iraq, a clear indication of what good forecasting and principles have meant in world politics in past months. This official signal was made hours after it became evident that France had been providing Saddam with diplomatic and intelligence information of the US position on Iraq before the war. The developments of the Iraqi crisis also created a new geopolitical reality for Turkey, which seriously damaged its strategic importance by its bargaining and obstruction attitude towards its most significant ally, the United States. Turkey’s geostrategic position proved to be politically less important than the Turkish government had thought, despite the 50-year experience to the contrary. Turkey’s key geopolitical position is no longer a guarantee of billions of US dollars. The Iraq crisis also proved that its position could not be traded for EU membership. Turkey’s present government faces a new situation, requiring rethinking of fundamental factors of what it considers to be the successful Turkish policy that will guarantee Turkey’s position in the 21st century.

The various influences of the leaders of the anti-Iraq coalition on the countries of Southeast Europe were consistent with the various perceptions and interpretations of the Balkan states regarding the fight against terrorism and the fight against WMD proliferation. This is important, as the traditional view has been that Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania have merely tried to please a superpower in exchange for benefits. By contrast, for these countries EU and NATO memberships were no less important than the preservation of good relations with Washington and London. At times of conflicting interests, political values drive countries towards a particular choice. For these countries, terrorism and WMD proliferation were the relevant factors; the regime change in Iraq also mattered, but mostly because it was a means for cutting the links of a dictatorial state to terrorist organizations and to possession of WMD. In short, these countries had fewer economic interests in the Iraq war than other established Western, Central, and Eastern European states. Rather, the Balkan countries demonstrated values and priorities in security matters that were exemplary.

These developments were paralleled this month by a continuing convergence of interests of global centers of power regarding Balkan stability – for the good of the people in the region and in Europe. The European Union undertook two unprecedented actions, both with a strong Balkan connection: First, the EU launched a military operation, Operation Concordia, that replaces the NATO peacekeeping contingent in the troubled Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Second, the EU made the historic decision to admit a former Communist, former Yugoslav state in Southeast Europe – Slovenia. Both events demonstrate that the EU is making its way slowly towards the Balkans. One might anticipate what further progress might have been made in Southeast Europe since 1990, if Brussels had thought more strategically. It should also be noted that a Balkan state, namely Greece, was the presiding country when these two actions were taken. Unfortunately, by the beginning of May, the Greek Presidency had not been able to provide the conditions allowing Bulgaria to complete its chapters that are open for negotiations or to open the few remaining ones. Bulgaria has not experienced such an interruption in its negotiation process since the launch of the accession talks in 2000, and it is ready to do its part of the job. One would hope that this is not a consequence of the country’s choice to support the US in the war against Saddam Hussein or a deliberate move to decelerate Bulgaria’s progress towards EU membership.

Another positive achievement this month for the Balkans was the continuation of the ratification process by NATO countries. The US Administration presented the issue to the US Senate for consideration and eventual ratification with a positive proposal. Canada and Norway have already completed the ratification process. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia have already ratified their accession protocols.

The only differing attitude to the Balkans this month came from Russia. The Russian General Staff started implementing its decision to withdraw its peacekeepers from SFOR and KFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo respectively. Russia has its reasons for making this decision, including the change of mood after Iraq, when UN’s mandate to apply force was not sought. The UN is not the mandating authority of either SFOR or KFOR, and Russia’s move indicates its refusal to be politically dependent on NATO’s decisions. There are financial factors, too, but Russia has lost its positions in Serbia and is no longer motivated to provide military contingents to a region that has lost its strategic attraction. At the same time the US mounted its support to the government in Belgrade, encouraging the democratic reforms in post-Milosevic Serbia.

The persisting conflicts in FYROM, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to influence the Western Balkans’ state of security and transformation to modernity. They remain a long-term problem for the countries of the region and for all those involved in Southeast Europe. Parallel to the continuing political, military, financial, and economic effort of the international community in these areas, the instruments of bilateral ties and regional initiatives also contributed this month to the general improvement of the situation in these conflicting zones. It is worth noting that the international financial institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO) also intensified their activities in Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, and FYROM. An interesting development, following the fruitful political and military cooperation between the US and Bulgaria, was that the US declared its intention to intensify its investment activity in Bulgaria, with the aim of matching Bulgaria’s case to those of Poland and Hungary in the 1990s. In national developments, Serbia’s authorities lifted the state of emergency after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March 2003. The authorities in Belgrade also announced that they have accused former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic of plotting the murder of Ivan Stambolic, his contender in the 2000 presidential elections.

II. SECURITY THREATS, CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS

1. Security Threats: Terrorism, Threat of Iraq’s Possession of WMDs, Casualties, and Links to Terrorism

a) Turkey. (1) On 16 April, SACEUR General James L. Jones ordered the gradual withdrawal from Turkey of AWACS surveillance aircraft and crews, Patriot missile units, and other support personnel deployed in February to face a potential threat from neighboring Iraq. NATO’s Defense Planning Committee decided that the mission, Operation Display Deterrence, had met its objectives. The decision was taken on the basis of NATO military and other assessments and advice, and Turkish views. (2) On 25 April, US troops of the 173rd airborne brigade in Northern Iraq arrested 12 Turkish special forces troops and 11 support personnel. The Turkish soldiers entered Iraq secretly on 23 April with the aim of preparing riots in Kirkuk, the oil-rich area of Northern Iraq, and of thus triggering the intrusion of large Turkish forces. Ankara wishes to put the oil-rich region under its control and to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. After the incident, the Turkish armed forces at the border with Iraq pulled back deeper into Turkish territory. The US and Iraqi Kurd leaders’ plan is to provide autonomy to the Kurds within a federative state.

b) NATO-ISAF. On 16 April, NATO agreed to provide more logistical and troop-management support to ISAF – a 4’600-strong military contingent that patrols Kabul under a UN mandate. From August, NATO will run the headquarters, coordinate operational planning, appoint the contingent’s commander, and supervise the troops’ contribution to the peacekeeping mission, which draws on 29 nations, including non-NATO countries. The US has also asked NATO to consider a post-war involvement in Iraq – a demand considered positively by NATO’s political and military command – and since 27 April by France also.

c) Bulgaria. On 15 April, the US asked Bulgaria to contribute a peacekeeping force to post-war Iraq. On 25 April, the Bulgarian General Staff announced that 170 Bulgarian peacekeepers would fly to Iraq on 26 May. Regular personnel of the Karlovo-based 61st Stremska Brigade will form the peacekeeping unit. The Bulgarian troops will have protection, logistic and, if needed, combat functions.

d) Romania. On 18 April, the Romanian Ministry of Defense responded positively to the US request and will send troops for the protection and stabilization of Iraq. The troops will include an engineer squad, military police, and medical personnel. Bucharest has already sent a chemical and biological protection contingent to Iraq. On 15 April, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe Erhard Busek said that Romania, as a US ally and partner, would benefit from participating in Iraq’s reconstruction. The Romanian government has already drafted a list of more than 30 companies willing to participate in Iraq’s reconstruction.

e) Albania. On 12 April, Albania formally commissioned a small unit of 65 soldiers for non-combat peacekeeping operations in post-war Iraq. Albania has already sent five officers to Kuwait to prepare for the deployment of the rest of the unit, which left on 15 April. The Albanian contingent will serve under US command in Kuwait and use US equipment. Albania’s army is already involved in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and in Afghanistan.

2. The Post-Conflict Issues in FYROM, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina

a) FYROM. On 31 March, the EU launched its first military operation, Operation Concordia, in FYROM, taking over NATO’s small peacekeeping mission there. A French general will be in charge of 300 lightly armed peacekeepers from 27 countries, including present and future EU member countries. The main tasks of the operation are to monitor the situation and maintain a visible international presence there. However, the EU’s Operation Concordia would not have been possible without NATO support. The operation is expected to boost the EU military element and to strengthen NATO.

b) Kosovo. Gunmen opened fire on a Kosovo Albanian family on 14 April. The family was traveling by car, and two family members were killed. One of them was a prosecution witness in a recent trial against former KLA guerrillas. Kosovo’s security, social, and economic reconstruction today is far from the expectations set in June 1999. Life is still far from normal. Restoring order is still an uncompleted task. As well as the long-term commitment of the international community to help Kosovo build a decent form of life and government, greater efficiency and better morale are required by the international civil service staff in the province.

c) Bosnia and Herzegovina. (1) Mirko Sarovic, Bosnia’s Serb chairman of the country’s three-member multiethnic presidency, resigned on 2 April after being implicated in a local company’s violation of the UN arms embargo against Iraq. Sarovic knew about the violation but failed to stop the illegal export of refurbished engines for Iraq’s military aircraft, according to a team of international investigators. The powers of the three-member presidency are limited, but it has the authority to define Bosnia’s foreign policy and to propose the country’s prime minister. Ultimate power rests with the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown. Each of the ethnic groups – Serbs, Muslims, and Croats – is represented in the presidency through direct elections. (2) On 11 April, a Bosnian Muslim wartime commander was arrested by SFOR in Bosnia and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague to face trial on war crimes charges. Naser Oric was charged with six counts of war crimes in 1992 and 1993, including murder and cruel treatment of Bosnian Serbs detained at a police station in the enclave of Srebrenica while it was under Muslim control. Oric is regarded as a hero by many Bosnian Muslims.

III. THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Serbia and Montenegro
(1) On 7 April, Serbia and Montenegro became the 45th member of the Council of Europe. Apart from joining the organization, the federation also signed the European Convention on Human Rights. (2) On 22 April, acting president of Serbia Natasa Micic lifted the state of emergency in the country that was declared after the assassination on 12 March of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The proposal to Micic was made by the government of Serbia. (3) On 25 April, Serbian authorities reported that former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic had been formally accused of plotting the murder of Ivan Stambolic, contender in the autumn 2000 presidential elections. Milosevic’s wife Mira Markovic has also been accused of participating in the plot. Milosevic is undergoing a trial at the ICTY for crimes against humanity and war crimes.

2. Albania
On 7 April, the Albanian Parliament approved the Law on Military Service in Albania. The military service is a year long and applies to 19- to 27-year-olds. The reservists will serve 4-7 days a year till 50 years of age. The alternative service will be held in civil institutions or in the armed forces without use of weapons.

IV. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATE OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVES

1. Bilateral Relations

a) Greece-Bulgaria. On 8 April, Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov made a one-day working visit to Athens. He met with Greek President Costas Stefanopoulos, Prime Minister Costats Simitis, and Foreign Minister George Papandrou. The two parties discussed EU integration, accession negotiations of Bulgaria to the EU, and the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.

b) Croatia-Serbia and Montenegro. On 13 April, Croatian Deputy Finance Minister Damir Kustrak said in Washington, DC, that Zagreb intended to block US$225 million of the former Yugoslav federation in US banks. Croatia says the funds may be unblocked after the post-Yugoslav republics have solved the questions of the former federation’s heritage.

c) Bulgaria-Romania. On 14-15 April, Romanian President Ion Iliescu visited Bulgaria and met with Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov. The two leaders confirmed the launch of the construction of the bridge over the Danube at Vidin-Kalafat in 2004. There are no political problems between the two neighboring states, the presidents concluded. However, the noted the low turnout of goods for only US$300 million a year. The presidents of the two countries pledged to work towards the reconstruction of Iraq. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to host new US military bases – air and naval – in Europe. The two presidents urged Western powers to ignore a recent split over Iraq when assessing applicants for the EU and NATO.

d) FYROM-Bulgaria. On 18-20 April, Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxkoburggotsky made an official visit to FYROM and met with Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Cervenkovsky, President Boris Traikovsky, former prime minister and opposition leader Liubcho Georgievsky, former president Kiro Gligorov, and leaders of the three Albanian factions in the parliament – Ali Ahmeti of the Democratic Union for Integration, Arben Xhaferi of the Democratic Party of the Albanians, and Abdurahman Aliti of the Party for Democratic Prosperity. During Saxkoburggotsky’s visit, Cervenkovsky officially acknowledged for the first time the existence of Bulgarian national minority in FYROM and the right of the Bulgarians to national self-identification. This declaration dismayed the Skopje media, formed by the Serbian propaganda matrix of communist Yugoslavia. However, for FYROM to be recognized as a serious contender for NATO and EU membership, it must come to terms with its past and its neighbors. In effect, Sofia is expected to be Skopje’s advocate on the way to both memberships. This step is also perceived by the ruling party in Skopje as a guarantee that Albanian separatists will not be allowed to turn FYROM into a federal state or divide it among the neighboring countries. Since 1992, when it was the first country to recognize the FYROM independence, Bulgaria has been the staunchest supporter of the sovereignty and independence of the young state. Bulgarian society expects that the authorities in Skopje will care and respect Bulgarian military cemeteries, cultural and historic monuments, and the associations of Bulgarians in FYROM. During Saxkoburggotsky’s visit, the two parties signed an agreement for the opening of cultural centers of the two countries in Skopje and in Sofia.

2. State of the Regional Inititatives

a) Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The Sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of Southeast European Cooperation Process was convened on 9 April in Belgrade, Serbia. The presidents or prime ministers of nine Balkan countries were joined by European Commission President Romano Prodi. All participants agreed in their final joint declaration to work together towards NATO and EU membership of all and to fight crime together. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin participated in the SEECP summit. Many bilateral meetings were also held during the summit.

b) Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. On 16 April in Brussels, the Committee for Local Democracy and Transborder Cooperation in the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was created. Forty-four donors, mayors, and regional leaders participated in the convention. Stability Pact for SEE Coordinator Erhard Busek will chair the new committee. Practical projects, including on media cooperation, were discussed at the meeting.

V. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION

1. WTO-FYROM
On 4 April, FYROM acceded to the WTO, becoming the 146th member. Skopje started its accession negotiations in 1994. The accession package was approved by the WTO’s General Council on 15 October 2002. On 5 March 2003, FYROM’s Parliament ratified the Protocol of Accession.

2. MF-Serbia and Montenegro
On 16 April in Washington, DC, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had approved a US$137 million credit disbursement to Serbia and Montenegro, following the completion of its first review under the Extended Arrangement agreed upon on 14 May 2002. IMF acting chair Anne Krueger commended Serbia and Montenegro for the progress in stabilization and reform in 2002, the advance of the structural reform, and the renewed commitment to reform after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March.

3. World Bank (WB)-Serbia and Montenegro
(1) On 17 April in Washington, DC, the WB and Serbia and Montenegro signed a legal agreement for a US$11 million credit to facilitate private sector-led economic growth in the Republic of Serbia. The project supports the restructuring and privatization of several state-owned enterprises and the ongoing implementation of a comprehensive restructuring of Serbia’s banking sector. (2) On 22 April, the WB approved a US$80 million credit for social sector reform in Serbia. The funds will help social programs to be fiscally more sustainable while continuing benefits and services, especially to the most vulnerable members of the population.

4. IMF-Turkey
On 18 April, the IMF gave its approval for Turkey to draw US$701 million from its 2002 stand-by-agreement with the financial institution. Turkey has already drawn US$14 billion from the original total of US$18 billion. Acting IMF chair Anne Krueger welcomed the Turkish government’s strong commitment to stabilization and economic reform and commended the central bank for prudent conduct of monetary policy. She added that recent policy slippages had been costly and noted, in particular, the need for the government to rebuild its credibility in financial markets. Krueger urged fiscal restraint and called on Ankara to cut unproductive spending, restructure state enterprises, and strengthen tax administration. It is essential for the government, she said, to continue to refrain from interfering in the commercial decisions of state-owned banks.

5. Bulgaria-FYROM
On 25 April, representatives of the national electric companies of the two countries signed an agreement in Skopje for the import by Macedonia from Bulgaria of 400 million kilowatt hours of electricity. The contract period is June 2003 to April 2004. On 21 April, Turkey unilaterally withdrew from a contract for the import of 4 billion kWh from Bulgaria, which strained bilateral relations. Sofia will try to solve the issue through bilateral governmental negotiations or through court.

6. US-Bulgaria
On 25 April, US Ambassador to Sofia James Pardew told the press that since 1989 Washington had made private investments in Hungary of US$7 billion and in Poland of US$9 billion, while in Bulgaria it had made only US$290 million. Now the US wants to change this situation. Washington is ready to invest in Bulgarian defense; to cooperate with Sofia in the reconstruction of Iraq; to study the broad spectrum of potential investment opportunities, including in agriculture; and to complete ongoing projects. A US Department of Trade delegation will visit Sofia mid-July. At the beginning of September, agricultural investors will go to Sofia. In June US military experts will visit Bulgaria. Bulgaria is expected to become as attractive to US investors as Poland and Hungary, the ambassador concluded.

VI. THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN EU AND IN NATO

1. EU Enlargement
On 16 April in Athens, the EU decided to integrate ten new candidate countries from Eastern, Central and Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean. Slovenia and Cyprus will become full EU members by 2004. Bulgaria and Romania received confirmation of their target dates – January 2007. The EU is in a dramatic political divide on the issue of the war in Iraq and on its transatlantic relations. Britain and Spain, together with many other EU member states, as well as all the newly accepted members and those from Central, Eastern, and Southeast Europe contending for membership, favor the preservation of a strong link with the US. Germany, France, and Belgium insist on a Europe-centered position, perceived as anti-American by the new democracies of Europe.

2. EU-Bulgaria
On 23 April in Brussels, the 16th Joint Parliamentary Committee Meeting of the EU and Bulgaria was convened. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy and Minister for European Affairs Meglena Kuneva insisted on the definition of a clear financial perspective for Bulgaria by the European Commission. The completion of the negotiation chapters on agriculture, the environment, and regional policy depend exclusively on the EU financial package. Brussels is not ready with its position on these topics for this particular reason. Sofia has demonstrated readiness to complete the negotiations on these particular chapters. Bulgarian experts and the public are aware that since Greece took over the presidency of the EU, not a single step forward has been made in Bulgaria’s accession policy. There has been no negotiation round, and no new chapters of the remaining seven have been opened between January and the beginning of May.

3. NATO Enlargement
On 10 April, US President George Bush asked the US Senate to approve the accession of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, and the other four countries invited into NATO. The Protocols for Accession were opened on 26 March in Brussels and signed on that day by the candidates and the parties to the North Atlantic Council. Canada and Norway have already ratified the protocols, as have the candidate states.

4. NATO Enlargement: “Coalition for Ratification”
On 5 April in Snagov, Romania, the leaders of state or government of the seven countries invited to join NATO (the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs attended) met to discuss ways of accelerating their membership in NATO through cooperation. Romanian President Ion Iliescu called the gathering “the meeting of the coalition for ratification”. In autumn 2003 the same group of will meet again in Varna, Bulgaria, to formalize the seven states grouping. In March 2004 the meeting of the seven will be in Bratislava, Slovakia.

5. NATO-Bulgaria
On 22 April in Graf Ignatievo, near Plovdiv, a new radar system built according to NATO standards was launched. The equipment is worth over US$30 million and was produced by ITT. The installation was carried out by Canadian company Intelcan. The first Bulgarian NATO base was inaugurated by Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov and by Prime Minister Simeon Saxkoburggotsky.

6. NATO-Croatia
NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson visited Zagreb on 31 March. He told Croatian leaders that Croatia’s prospects of entering NATO were very good, if Zagreb persisted with reforms and other potential candidates did not slow it down. Lord Robertson said he could not specify the timetable for Croatia’s accession. Key requirements for Croatia’s accession to NATO included cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague, reform of the judiciary, combating crime and corruption, security of data secrecy, the reform of the armed forces and refugee returns. Continuation of regional cooperation was also expected, Lord Robertson said.

VII. THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

1. US: US-Serbia and Montenegro.
On 2 April, US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Belgrade for talks on local and regional issues. He expressed US support for the new government in continuing the country’s reforms and in its cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague. Powell also said that by reforming its military and the security sector, Serbia and Montenegro improved its chances of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Powell expressed in person his condolences to the widow of slain Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

2. Russia

a) Russia-Bulgaria. On 12-16 April, Speaker of the Bulgarian Parliament Ognyan Gerdzhikov visited Russia. He met in St. Peterburg with local leaders and in Moscow with his counterpart, Speaker of the Duma Genadiy Selezniov, and also with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Alexey Kudrin and with Moscow’s Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

b) Russia-Southeast Europe. In mid-April, Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Anatoliy Kvashnin ordered Russian peacekeepers in SFOR and KFOR to leave the Balkans in the next two months. He said there were no more military tasks in the region, and there would be none in the near future. Russia has invested US$26 million a year for its peacekeeping contingent in the Balkans and has been considering this cut in the past few months. The absence of a UN mandate for the Iraq freedom operation of the US added to the feeling that Russia was acting under the political guidance of NATO and the US in the Balkans and that Russia was not their equal. Further, Serbia is no longer the staunch pillar of Russian influence in the Balkans. Russia also does not want to participate in Kosovo statehood in the presence of KFOR. Finally, Russia has its own problems in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and Transdniester that require also a military and financial effort. Thus, Russia is leaving for itself the only significant leverage on the Balkans that Moscow once fully dominated – the energy (oil and gas) supplies.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In April the military victory over Iraq by the coalition forces gave additional opportunities to the Balkan countries, which participated on the side of the winners to join the peacekeeping and reconstruction projects. The EU and NATO enlargement processes made important steps forward in Southeast Europe in the past month, while Russia decided to leave the region militarily. The cooperation efforts on a bilateral and regional level continued and proved how important it is for the individual countries’ progress. It became clear that no Balkan country is left out of the integration perspective of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area.