BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and January 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 1, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I
INTRODUCTION
II
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The
post-conflict situation in Kosovo
2. The
Post-war rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
4. Turkey
IV
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Regional Initiatives
V
THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
1. Bulgaria
2. FRYOMacedonia
3. Romania
VI
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United Nations
2. EU
3. USA
4. Russia
5. NATO
VII
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION:CONCLUSIONS
Apart from the
severe, stormy, and polar-cold Balkan winter, January of 2000 was marked by
more efforts towards post-conflict improvements and activity in the area of
bottom-up region-building initiatives.
Despite many criticisms of the almost unnoticed progress in Kosovo and to
some extent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the forces of change and evolution
continue to withstand the opposition of those who would prefer to live with ghosts
of past hatreds and to drive for incessant revenge. Even small progress in that field equals hundreds of years of
gradual evolution on the same subject in other parts of this continent. Both
(KFOR)
and (UNMIK) are major contributors in this
regard by now.
Though the Milosevic
regime is succeeding in reconstructing damaged infrastructure and production
facilities (supported by Chinese, Indian, and even Russian money) and though
this enhances its authority among the Serbian people, 15 opposition groupings
in the former republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) finally
concluded an important agreement to cooperate in insisting on early elections
by this April. Through its example,
Montenegro also continued to exert pressure for change on Belgrade. Croatia made a big step towards reintegrating
in the European family of nations by carrying democratic parliamentary and
presidential elections in which Croatian voters brought pro-European and
pro-democracy forces to power.
The Stability
Pact for South-East Europe received a new impetus by the united political will
of seven nations neighbouring FRY. They
acknowledged the need to accelerate investment activity, to improve individual
national output in the economic area, and to remind the Serbian people that they
are expected to join the regional mainstream towards European integration. Despite unfavorable Russian comment, the
neighboring young democracies of Yugoslavia sent a strong message that they
have waited far too long for peace, democracy, and cooperation towards social
progress with their Serbian partner.
Regional activities will be intensified in a strategy to match similar
top-down involvement of the EU and other active Stability Pact
participants. This is a perfect
environment for the democratic Serbian opposition to mobilize the people of
their country for democratic change.
Ankara and
Athens made another significant psychological and political breakthrough in
their bilateral relations after the January visit of the Greek foreign minister
to Turkey. Rehabilitation of the
Balkans is continuing on the terms of the Pact of Stability for South-East
Europe political culture and norms.
in
January 2000 remains uneasy, with little signs of meaningful progress, yet
under the control of KFOR and UNMIK.
Several
incidents of violent crime targeted against minority groups in the province
took place during the month. A gang of
ethnic Albanians murdered the 47-year-old Serb Rodoliub Gasic on 10 January and
stole his mechanical saw. The level of
brutal murders, arson, and bombings against various minority communities
continues to be unacceptable. This is
why on 18 January 2000 the SGSR Bernard
Kouchner called for more help from the local population and its leadership to
uncover information about the crime wave.
On UNMIK
reported on 4 January that the recently created Interim Administrative Council
met for the fourth time and discussed allocation of the proposed 19 departments,
ranging from Budget and Finance to Justice and Trade and Industry. The Serb community has not yet taken its
seat on the Council. Nor has it ensured
Serb representation in departments co-chaired by representatives of UNMIK and Kosovo. The Kosovo Protection Corps was formally
established on 21 January. All issues
were ironed out in discussion between leaders of UNMIK, KFOR, and the (KPC). Creation of the KPC was an integral part of demobilizing
the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA. Senior
members of the Corps will have no military insignias, and Agim Ceku, the KPC commander,
will have three deputies. One of them
will not be an ethnic Albanian. The
Corps will have 3,000 active members and up to 2,000 reservists. The KPC is expected to become operational by
September 2000.
The
Pristina airport was re-opened for civilian flights on January 2000. It was temporarily closed in November
1999. Reconstruction of Kosovo is
directly linked to the airport remaining open.
The US Secretary of State, Madeleine. Albright, reminded the
international community in Washington, D. C., on 26 January that it has not yet
fulfilled its pledge to provide promised funds for rebuilding the province
after the war.
The
corpses of 2,108 Kosovars killed during the Serbian ethnic- cleansing campaign
had been found by January. However,
only 195 out of 529 ‘scenes of crime’ have been investigated so far.
The
International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague
sentenced five Bosnian Croats on 14 January to terms ranging from six to 25
years. One of the accused was
acquitted. The six accused were charged
in connection with their alleged role in the attack on the village of Ahmici in
Central Bosnia on 16 April 1993 and the massacre of 116 Bosnian Muslim
villagers there. Judge Antonio Cassese
said, “this was not a combat operation.
Rather it was a well-planned and well-organized killing of civilian
members of an ethnic group, the Muslims, by the military of another ethnic
group, the Croats.”
An informal UN
Security Council briefing on Bosnia and Herzegovina displayed “unhappiness” on
12 January about the failure of Bosnia’s joint presidency to implement
commitments made last year to unify specific government operations. US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who presided
over the Council during January, said the three presidents of Bosnia and
Herzegovina have failed to fully implement the New York Declaration of 15
November 1999, which they agreed to at a public Security Council meeting. Though there are signs of progress
everywhere, Holbrooke added, the Joint Presidency, its central institutions,
and many attributes of the single sovereign centrally governed state with two
entities have not yet been fulfilled.
Implementation
is the key to success in Bosnia and elsewhere.
Implementation is in progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is at peace, the economy is
beginning to knit together, and promising events on the ethnic issue side are
taking place: minorities in military
and police academies in each part of Bosnia and Herzegovina are training with
people of different ethnic groups.
Despite signs
of progress everywhere, Security Council is annoyed at delays by the Joint
Presidency and its central institutions in covering attributes
of the single sovereign centrally governed state with all the entities.
The leader of
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), Georgi Parvanov said in Targovishte on 25
January that integration of Bulgaria into the EU and NATO has been a priority
task of his party since 1995. The BSP reaction
against the NATO strike during the Kosovo crisis, he said, should not be
interpreted as a refusal to work on these priorities.
Though this turn-around
in the BSP position towards NATO can hardly be assessed along its leader’s lines
of interpretation, it marks a new change in attitudes of Bulgarian public
opinion in favor of NATO and the country’s membership in the Alliance. BSP, the reform-minded former Communist
Party is considered the most pro-Russian party in Bulgaria.
General
elections in Croatia radically changed the internal political landscape of this
country in the Western Balkans on 3 January.
The winners were the Social Democratic Party in coalition with the
Social Liberals and a centrist coalition.
The loser was the Croatian Democratic Union of the late President
Tudjman. Destructive nationalism in
Croatia has been politically rejected.
More than 78 per cent of the 4.2 million eligible voters turned out, The
international observer mission sent by the OSCE had characterized the conduct
of the elections as professional and as having made significant strides towards
meeting OSCE standards. A priority
objective of the new Croatian government is integrating the country into the
Euro-Atlantic community of democratic nations and institutions.
Presidential
elections in Croatia followed soon – on 24 January. After the first round, two democratic contenders led the contest
– Stippe Mesic and Drazen Budisa. Mr.
Mesic was the last leader who served on the rotation principle of the former
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
The major
Serbian opposition parties convened a meeting on 10 February and discussed
their joint strategy for democratizing Serbia.
They jointly called for early elections, for an end to state terror, and
for abolition of repressive laws. At the end of debate, the opposition
parties and coalitions united on a
common strategy to bring about democratic
elections and made clear their intent to cooperate with each other.
Both the EU
and the USA have declared their firm support for Serbian opposition efforts to oust
the present regime in Belgrade through democratic elections. However, the regime has been keen on using money
donated by China, India, and ¾ to a lesser extent – by Russia to reconstruct damaged
transport and production facilities, thus creating confidence about the
stability of Milosevic’s power.
Meantime, US Secretary of State Albright on 27 January criticized the
donor countries of the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe for their
slowness in providing the money needed to reconstruct Kosovo and the other
Balkan areas which suffered from both the NATO air campaign and sanctions
against Belgrade.
The coalition
government of Turkey decided on 13 January to postpone executing the death
penalty of the Kurdish leader Abdulah Ocelan.
It acknowledged that the decision was influenced by the European Court
for Human Rights. Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit stressed that, if the government has neglected the demand of the Court,
this would have worsened Turkish relations with the EU. The Turkish prime minister also warned the
PKK that, if it used the decision against the state interests of Turkey, Ocelan
would be executed.
a) Bulgaria-FRY
The Bulgarian
Parliament on 28 January approved the mission of an engineering platoon of 44
for 12 months in Kosovo as part of the Dutch KFOR contingent. Sustenance of the Bulgarian unit will be assumed
by the country’s budget. Bulgarian participation is in addition to a
group of 50 policemen who for many months already have supported the troubled
province’s civil administration quite effectively.
The leader of
the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and prime minister of Bulgaria, Ivan
Kostov, met in Sofia on 29 January with the co-chairman of the Interim
Administrative Council of Kosovo, Hacim Taci, and discussed ways to support the
province’s reconstruction. The
Bulgarian prime minister insisted on a more friendly approach by the Kosovo
Albanians to the Bulgarian military and civil police contingents. Mr. Kostov was invited to visit
Pristina. This meeting was not an
anti-Serbian act. It demonstrated a
balanced Bulgarian approach to the complex ethnic issues in this Serbian
province and to issues in FRY in general.
Earlier this month the Bulgarian prime minister insisted on lifting some
sanctions against Serbia – those that negatively affect common Serbian people
and not the regime of President Milosevic.
However, Albanian Kosovar leader Taci used the opportunity of this
meeting in Sofia to tell the media that Kosovo will become an independent state
after a referendum – obviously a position that contradicts Mr. Taci’s status as
a co-chairman of the Interim Administrative Council of Kosovo. Negative reactions from Belgrade to this
visit and the declarations of the Kosovar leader followed within hours. The UDF experiment
regarding the future status of Kosovo, which tested the Kosovar leader’s
positions, confirms how difficult the international community’s task will be in building a tolerant multi-ethnic society
in Kosovo within the constitutional order of present Yugoslavia. It is rather doubtful that a power shift in
Belgrade with the present opposition assuming
FRY leadership would change the thinking of former extremist KLA leaders and current
people leading the Interim Administrative Council and Kosovo Protection Corps –
two institutions touched by UNMIK philosophy and policy. It is far from clear whether a balancing
position and the role of countries like Bulgaria will become even more difficult.
b) Bulgaria-FYROMacedonia
Implementation
of the free-trade zone agreement between the two countries started on 1 January.
Bulgarian Prime
Minister Ivan Kostov, who is also the
UDF leader, met in Sofia on 29 January with the Deputy PrimeMinister of
FYROMacedonia Arben Xhaferi, who is leader of the Democratic Party of the
Albanians.
c) Romania-Bulgaria
Bulgarian minister
of defence Boyko Noev met in Giurgiu, Romania, on 27-28 January with his
Romanian counterpart Victor Babiuk.
They discussed bilateral relations and planned joint air-force and naval
exercises.
A meeting of
the bilateral intergovernmental commission for economic, scientific and
technical cooperation was convened in Sofia on 27 January. Issues that created arguments were defined
by the Romanian minister of transport, Trajan Basescu, as follows: transit of Russian natural gas; eventual
chances of Romania to export electric power to third countries, mainly Turkey
and Greece; transportation of nuclear waste from the Bulgarian nuclear plant in
Kozloduy via Romania to Russia, and construction of a new bridge over the
Danube. The “basket of issues” approach
has been accepted by the Bulgarian side as a needed first step that should be
followed by other acts. Bulgaria and
Romania have joint interests in strengthening the border control and in
fighting illegal migration. Impetus is
expected to be given in Brussels on 7 February on solving the “second bridge” issue and export of electricity via
Bulgaria issue after involvement in bilateral discussion of the EC commissioner
on enlargement, G. Ferheugen, and the
Stability Pact for South-East Europe coordinator, B.
Hombach. A meeting will be convend In mid-February
in either Vidin or Kalafat – the place where the Bulgarian Government and municipalities
of the Bulgarian and the Romanian towns insist on building the second bridge., It
will include the two countries’ deputyministers of transport and participants from the SECI – a regional
initiative, launched by the US Department of State four years ago. There are real expectations of making a
breakthrough on this long contentious bilateral issue.
d) Greece-Bulgaria
Bulgarian
Defence Minister Noev and Greek Defence Minister Akis Tsohatzopolous discussed bilateral
relations on 28-29 January in Thessaloniki, Greece.
e) Turkey-Greece
The Foreign
Ministers of Turkey and Greece, Ismaihl Cem and Papandreou, met in Ankara – the
first official visit of a Greek foreign minister to Turkey in 38 years. They signed five cooperation agreements on tourism,
investment, environment protection; and steps to fight terrorism, money
laundering, and illegal migration. The
Aegean Sea issues and Cyprus were also on the bilateral talks agenda. Turkish
Prime Minister Ecevit invited his Greek counterpart, Costas Simitis, to visit
Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Cem expected to visit Athens on 3 February.
a)
Initiatives within the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe (SEE)
1) Bulgaria proposed establishing a Council for
the Economic and Social Reconstruction of the Balkans during a Council of
Europe conference on social development in Dublin on 18 January. Social and economic recuperation should
become a major accent of the Pact of Stability according to the Bulgarian
Minister of Labor and Social Policy who participated in the conference.
2) The first meeting of the Managing Council of
the European Organisation for the Reconstruction of the Balkans, created by the
Pact of Stability for SEE, was convened 18 January in Thessaloniki. Through this organization alone the Balkans
will receive $240 million for specific reconstruction needs of this region.
3) The Chairman of the Third Working Table on
the issues of the security within the Pact of Stability for SEE, the State
Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Jan Elliasson, met 20-32 January with
the Bulgarian authorities in Sofia to discuss the upcoming Bulgarian
co-chairmanship of this table during June 2000-January 2001. Mr. Elliasson visited the headquarters of
the MPFSEE in Plovdiv on 21 January.
4) An informal meeting (“without ties”) of the
prime ministers of seven countries neighboring FRY was convened on 21-23
January at Hissarya, a Bulgarian mineral water spring health resort. Held in the context of the Pact of Stability
for SEE, it included Ilir Meta of Albania, Harris Silaijic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Ivan Kostov of Bulgaria, Zlatko Matesa of Croatia, Liubcho
Georgievsky of FYROMacedonia, Victor Urban of Hungary, and Mugur Isarescu of
Romania. Dr. Javier Solana, the EU’s HR
for CFSP, and the deputy secretary general of NATO, Sergio Balanzino, also attended
the meeting. Both came to gather
information and test perceptions rather than to take positions and make
assessments.
FRY is not a
member of the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe.
There was no
agenda and no final document of the meeting.
Topics of the discussions were the regional situation, regional
cooperation, and foreign investment in the Balkans. Initiating a broader and more intensive dialogue among regional
neighbors was a main objective of the meeting.
The Bulgarian initiative of lifting some sanctions against FRY was not
generally accepted. The reasons for
this Bulgarian initiative were the inefficiency of some sanctions, the
suffering of common Serbian people rather than representatives of the regime,
and huge losses within the Bulgarian economy – more than $380 million since
March 1999. A common understanding of
the participants in the meeting was that a criminalized economy cannot be the
foundation of peace in the region. A
uniting political purpose for the prime ministers at the meeting was integration
of their countries in the EU. A joint
assessment was also the delayed start of the Pact of Stability for SEE. The regional leaders agreed to cooperate in
strengthening the process of peace-building in Kosovo.
The Bulgarian prime
minister underlined the position of Bulgaria: FRY must not remain a blank spot on the European map. Harris Silaijic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
reminded the gathering where the leader of Belgrade should be – in the Hague
before the ICTY. Liubcho Georgievsky of
FYROMacedonia said the spirit of this conference reflects new attitudes of
South-East Europe after the Kosovo crisis.
His doubts that the Serbian opposition could understand Milosevic’s
mistakes and never repeat them also sounded prophetically. The follow-up meeting will be in April in
Budapest. In the meantime, they will
talk again in Bucharest during February.
b) The Danubian Commission
Meeting
The Danubian Commission decided on 27 January to start
cleaning the debris of the war in FRY from the river and rebuilding the bridges
on 1 July. This late start may endanger
the ecological situation due to freezing of the river and floods that may
follow.
The
unemployment level in Bulgaria reached 16% during January. Economic forecasts for this year predict 4%
economic growth.
The 1999 economic
growth of FYROMacedonia’s GNP was 2.7%, according to the its prime minister. Foreign investments in the country are
growing. Skopje reached an agreement
with the UNMIK in Kosovo to export electric power that will create an added $30
million. 2000 will be a decisive year
for economic reform in the small country.
The launch of negotiations with the EU for stability and association
will be another major stimulus to improve the country’s economy. Change in the Constitution and the reduction
in the state’s administration are expected to provide better conditions for economic
recovery in FYROMacedonia.
After more
than 10 years of economic transformation and three years of heated debates, the
Romanian president signed a law to restore property on agrarian land and woods. Former owners will be in possession of no
more than 50 hectares of agrarian land and 10 hectares of woods. In some cases the owners will be
compensated. 1,6 million Romanians have
claimed ownership of land and woods.
The UN
Secretary General issued the report of the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
to the UN Security Council. The report
covers developments in bilateral negotiations between Croatia and FRY to
resolve the disputed issue of the Prevlaka peninsula since the last report,
published in October 1999. The report
notes some progress in stabilizing and demilitarizing territory patrolled by
the UN. However, the report says, there
is no progress at the political level.
The report recommends continuing negotiations soon after the Croatian
elections and extending the mission’s mandate for a further six months, until
15 July.
(1) One month after the official invitation to
Romania and Bulgaria to start accession negotiations with the EU, EC President
Romano Prodi visited the two countries on 12 and 13 January respectively. He confirmed to their governments the readiness of the Union to start the
negotiation process in February-March.
Romano Prodi was warmly accepted by the Bulgarian Parliament when he
delivered a speech to the MPs and highlighted Bulgaria’s achievements and problems
on its road to EU membership. (2) A long procedure of taking Bulgaria and
Romania off the black visa list started on 26 January, one day after the
European Commission proposed lifting a visa requirement for nationals of
Romania and Bulgaria wishing to visit the 15-nation Union. The final decision lies with the European
Parliament and individual governments and parliaments of member countries. Once admitted, Bulgaria and Romania will
represent part of the Union’s external border and a crossing point to the
former Soviet republics and Turkey.
(1) Army General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff visited US troops in Kosovo on 13 January at Camp
Bondsteel and the surrounding area. He
visited US troops in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 14 January.
(2) A public-private team from the US State
Department, NGOs, and US corporations visited Croatia on 16-22 January to
support the Croatian government’s Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) with its
humanitarian demining program. The team
also assessed ways of developing an action plan to raise funds in the USA for
the Croatian demining effort.
(3) A Bulgarian delegation of the Ministry of
Defense headed by the Deputy Minister for Defense Policy, Dr. Velizar
Shalamanov, visited the USA on 24-30 January.
The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense will coordinate its plans for common
communication links with the Pentagon.
This is perceived by Bulgaria as a significant step to the harmonizing
the logistics and systems of command and control of the Bulgarian Air Force in
the NATO context. The US will send to
Bulgaria teams for training local experts in military communications. Frank Kramer, US Assistant Secretary of
Defense, underlined the key position of Bulgaria in the Balkans and the
readiness of the USA to develop a comprehensive strategy of peace and security
in the region. The Bulgarian delegation
was also received by Vice President Al Gore.
The Russian foreign
ministry attacked Bulgaria on 25 January in connection with the regional
meeting of the seven prime ministers of countries neighboring FRY, joined by
the EU HR for CFSP and by NATO’s deputy secretary general. The Russian side qualified this meeting as
“anti-Yugoslav and an isolationist event”.
Russia has claims on the following issues: first, why representatives of
FRY – a country that is treated as a “sanctioned ghetto” according to Russia ¾
had not been invited; second, why Russia was not invited; third, why
representatives of the OSCE were not invited.
The Bulgarian
Foreign Ministry replied on 28 January in an official protest to the Russian
Foreign Ministry, criticizing the harsh tone of the Russian move. The Russian act is not logically passing to
the positive context of bilateral relations.
The act and its tone are characteristic of the Cold War period, the
protest said, and Bulgaria does not accept such qualifications.
The prime-ministers’
forum in Hissarya was a regional, bottom-up, region-building event of countries that are on one hand part of
the Pact of Stability for SEE and. on the other, FRY neighbors which mostly
suffer from hardships caused by the on-going situation, including the sanctions
regime. While FRY is not part of the
Pact, both EU and NATO are major contributors to stability and rebuilding
efforts in the broader Balkan region. By
taking a petty, zero-sum approach to issues in the Balkan region – an area
known to Russia for more than 200 years ¾
Russia and its foreign ministry are missing chances to join in a constructive effort
to rehabilitate and rebuild the region, one undertaken by all countries in the
region but one – FRY. The FRY opposition
is trying to correct this attitude, as Vuk Drascovic demonstrated a month ago
during his meetings with Russian foreign ministry officials in Moscow. As for the choices of large and influential
powers that the small countries from the region make in their efforts to
involve them in regional developments – this may serve as an indicator of how
Russia rates, and not necessarily because of pressure from the “Western
powers”. Russia is expected in the
Balkans to join as a constructive, cooperative, and benign great power, not as
an imperial one. Otherwise such
interventions will be easily qualified from now on as “Russian interference in
the internal affairs of the region” – a development which is not the best
option for either Russia or the countries of South-East Europe. Furthermore, Moscow should note that all Balkan
countries but one are more or less involved in integration efforts with the EU
and NATO – a policy, supported by the great majority of the population of these
countries.
Lord George
Robertson, secretary general of NATO, is expected to visit Bulgaria on 9-10
February. NATO is providing support toreorganize
the country’s armed forces according to NATO standards and for social
adaptation and economic integration of those who have to leave the army.
1. The Serbian opposition reached agreement on
a joint strategy to insist on early elections this spring. Both KFOR and UNMIK continued their
strenuous efforts to stabilize the situation in Kosovo. The joint presidency in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not performing as planned, and more work is needed to reach the
effectiveness of a single central leadership.
Success of the democratic forces in Croatia decisively changes the
broader regional security situation and portends more stability in the
peninsula as well as new stimuli for the opposition in Serbia. Improving relations between Turkey and
Greece continues to be one of the best news items from the Balkans.
2. The EC proposal to lift visa restrictions on
nationals from Bulgaria and Romania raised the profile of the Union in the
region. US and NATO support in
integrating South-East Europe into the Euro-Atlantic structures contrasted with
the harsh Russian diplomatic attack against Bulgaria for its efforts to boost bottom-up
regional activity to integrate the Balkans in the democratic community of
nations. However, a new spirit haunts
South-East Europe after the Kosovo crisis, and this is the spirit of regional
cooperation and solidarity in making the EU and NATO integration policy more
effective in each of the Balkan countries.
A balanced Bulgarian approach to the Serbian people and the Kosovars
remains an invariant feature of the country’s foreign policy, and Bulgaria has assumed
all the responsibility for this comprehensive approach to the ethnic situation
in the neighboring country. Ethnic
tolerance must be bred, and educated and practical examples are always
needed. However, the task is becoming
even more complicated after Serbia’s slow rate of democratic change and the
stubbornness of the Kosovar Albanian leaders in avoiding involvement in the “ethnic
tolerance” game. The good news would be
that, in addition to the pressure that Montenegro exerts on Belgrade to change
the regime by threatening to separate from the federation, the Kosovar Albanians
are also trying to press Milosevic to give up his hold of power in FRY. This is the optimistic interpretation of the
Kosovo Albanian leadership’s behavior.
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EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
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Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
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Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
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Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
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Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
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Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
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Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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