BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and March 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 3, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I
INTRODUCTION
II
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The
post-conflict situation in Kosovo
2. The
Post-war rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
4. FRYOMacedonia
5. Greece
6. Romania
IV
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Trilateral Initiatives
3. Regional Initiatives
V
THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
VI
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia
2. NATO
3. USA
4. NATO
5. EU
VII
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
One year after the
start of NATO’s "Allied Force" operation against the FRY, many Serbs
celebrated the loss of the war in Kosovo.
Other Serbs did not join, because they saw no reason to celebrate. Many of the latter Serbs belong to the
democratic opposition or to that part of the population which has kept alive
the image of Serbs as one of many European peoples without a particular
political affiliation.
Whatever the psychological
repercussions of the 1999 war over Kosovo in the Serbian national mindset, the
more riveting questions world-wide are about achievements, the balance-sheet
for those who engaged actively in the conflict. The balance is not positive in terms of final goals
achieved: a normal functioning
democratic multi-ethnic society in Kosovo within the market economy system of the Balkans and Europe. The results till now would be positive in
comparison to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and Southeastern Europe
(SEE) in spring of 1999. Yes, there are
reasons for anger and indignation:
fanning ethnic violence continues with both Serbian and Albanian
participation; the drift from the past
madness is so slow that outsiders hardly understand why Albanians ¾ the victims one year ago ¾ are now practicing ethnic
cleansing against Serbs in Kosovo.
Furthermore, the fury of many intensifies because the volatility of the
Balkans remains directly proportional to the preservation of power by Belgrade
strong-man Slobodan Milosevic.
However, neither
prophets of doom and gloom nor frantic analysts ¾ not even ‘objective’ balance-sheet
drafters ¾ should be counseling
decision-makers: there is too
much panic in their thinking, displayed or hidden. One year after the last war in the western Balkans, the
fundamental problems in perceiving the Balkans continue to be at the knowledge
and concept level. What is still not
understood is that the war about Kosovo is between the Balkans’ past,
identified with hatreds, atrocities, and revenge between different ethnic
groups, and the peninsula’s potential future, identified with the objectives
and deeds of KFOR, UNMIK, and the positive tendency of region-building in the
larger part of SEE.
Why is it so difficult to heal
the ill and isolated Western Balkans and integrate them into the progressing
remainder of SEE? Why is it so hard to
convince the Albanians that one ethnic cleansing is no better than
another? Why is the democratic Serbian
opposition gaining ground so slowly in the repressed society? Each answer to these questions has certain
specific contents. For example, the need to fight the evil (especially
extremism) inside each ethnic group, the slow process of historic
reconciliation and rapprochement, problems with individual leaders, the
intentionally destructive policy of official Belgrade which promotes
confrontation and tries to undermine prospects for ethnic co-existence, etc.
However, one common
denominator applies for all answers:
belated engagement by the international community in modernizing social,
economic, and political relations in the SEE region, especially with those
islands of hope that provided seeds of the peninsula’s democratic and
prosperous future. One year ago, and
today as well, a Serbian opposition leader can hardly show a clear positive
example for both democratic and prosperous existence in a neighboring Slavic
(or non-Slavic) country, an individual standard of living that dramatically
differs from the well-being of the Serb who underwent the strikes of massive
bombardments. On the other hand,
Milosevic can prove that Chinese and Indian money came faster to reconstruct Serbia’s infrastructure than SEE’s Pact for
Stability money for upgrading Serbia’s neighbors that supported the NATO
campaign. The financial donors’
slowness and lack of unified strategic
thinking on how to distribute the promised resources prevented the creation of
a compelling environment during the past year.
This would have provided a real catalyst to support the Serbian
opposition and UNMIK. It would also
have stimulated dilution and gradual change in purpose of the stubborn ethnic
hatreds between Albanians and Serbs.
So one year later Kosovo – its
economy and the making of an integrated, democratic, and fair society – remains
a challenge. Another challenge is the
assimilation of the truth that lasting
peace will occur only through persistence, long-term commitment, and step by
step. The key to most of these issues –
democratization of Serbia – can be guaranteed only through the power of example
that those who live in neighboring democratic societies have qualitatively
better living standards. Furthermore,
KFOR must continue to exercise and preserve security hardware within the province and the broader
zone. And UNMIK should be supported in
its efforts to build up the province’s police force and judicial system as well
as to prepare for general elections
this autumn.
The present
conflict situation in the Western Balkans is characterized by:
1) Tensions in southern Serbia. A self-proclaimed Albanian ”army” to
liberate Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedsa provokes the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and
police forces. VJ and police reactions
may cause a refugee wave of Serbs and Albanians to move from southern Serbia to
FYROMacedonia. This may destabilize the internal situation in
FYROM. A clash could occur between the
KFOR and this self-proclaimed army.
2) Tensions in Montenegro-Serbian relations. Provocation of a conflict in Montenegro by
Belgrade will inevitably worsen the security situation, and it would be logical
to expect outside support for the democratic government of Podgoriza against
Serbia.
3) Tensions in Kosovska Mitrovica. The similarity of the situation in this town to
Brcko in Bosnia-Herzegovina leads to many associations of what might evolve
from the tense ethnic relationships.
Clearly the provocations are driven by Albanian and Serbian extremists
(including those in Belgrade).
4) Rising antagonism between the Milosevic
regime and the democratic opposition. The pressure of Milosevic's forces is rising on the opposition,
especially in light of possible elections.
If this atmosphere and attitude prevails when the opposition starts its
rallies, it may easily ignite the fire of civil war. Declarations by some opposition leaders, mainly from Vojvodina,
that Serbia might be carved into six independent pieces could fuel internal
tension and create a new dimension of the struggle between the opposition and
the government.
The post-conflict
situation in Kosovo remained tense in March 2000. The security situation was further worsened by the new ”Albanian
army for the liberation of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedsa” in neighboring
southern Serbia with its 70'000-80'000 Albanians. The involvement of official Belgrade in disrupting activities
within the region is another major factor in the present unfavorable
situation. In light of ethnic clashes
in Mitrovica, the KFOR command decided to reinforce its units there with an
additional contingent of 1'100 French and Italian troops. The US KFOR contingent of 350 raided command
posts, staging areas, and arms caches of ethnic Albanian militias in Kosovo on
15 March. They acted on specific
information and found in many locations caches of weapons and ammunitions
supplies. Any activity that threatens
the activity of KFOR to maintain a secure environment in Kosovo should not be
tolerated in the future either, regardless of whether an Albanian or a Serb
group is involved.
The EU High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Lord George Robertson, and SACEUR's
General Wesley Clark visited Kosovo on 24 March. A NATO ”Dynamic Response”
exercise took place on 19 March-10 April in Kosovo with a contingent of 2'000
under the tactical command of KFOR commander General Klaus Reinhardt. It will test NATO’s ability for strategic
reinforcement by the KFOR strategic reserve composed of forces from Argentina,
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the US.
Hard-liners on both sides of the Kosovo post-conflict tensions should
assess this exercise correctly. It demonstrates the will of NATO and its
partners that the province’s security will be guarded with no hesitation. There
are plans for a long-term presence in the province to complete this task.
Apart from the
military, additional police and diplomatic pressure must be exerted to create
peaceful co-existence for those living in Kosovo. In analyzing the post-conflict situation in Kosovo, two
conceptual stand-points deserve attention:
first, most people there are not extremists. They do not try to
undermine what is going on positively.
However, there should be an increased demand from these people to work
effectively within their own ethnic groups to ensure the groups do not undo all
the work accomplished so far. Second, one year after the start of the air
campaign against FRY, the next major step should be made in Kosovo: to begin work on civilian society problems,
on building justice and order, and on solving basic political issues. All of them are important pre-conditions of
organizing elections and creating Kosovo-wide institutions. Visits to the province during March by NATO
officials, US State Department spokesman James Rubin, the Bulgarian prime
minister, and his meeting with leaders of the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs
offered proof of on-going diplomatic engagement. Preparations for the September or October elections in Kosovo
must stress the sense of responsibility expected from leaders of the ethnic
communities when they undertake jobs as
leaders elected by their constituents.
There are real
practical issues facing UNMIK:
rebuilding and reconstruction, especially of such necessities as housing
and utilities, social infrastructure – mainly education and the judiciary. Rule of law may gain ground only if Bernard
Kouchner’s appeal for international judges and prosecutors in addition to
civilian police is responded to positively.
Still only 2'400 of a planned 4'800 are now in Kosovo – a number
inadequate to cope with various contingencies of specialized police forces.
In addition to
pledges from the Pact of Stability for SEE, the donors’ conference in Brussels
of 29-30 March had to cope with a new situation created by the US
Congress: it insists that the American
military and financial contributions be limited to no more than one-seventh of
the total international effort. The EU
needs to prove in Kosovo that it can conduct an effective common foreign and
security policy - and not at the
expense of other pledges to upgrade the Balkans in general financially. Nevertheless, the EU continues to be the
biggest donor to the Balkans, with € 9 billion since 1991. Some 36'000 troops from European countries
are now stationed in the Balkans.
The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed the detention of Dragoljub
Prcac by SFOR on 5 March. He was
indicted on 2 June 1992 for crimes committed at the Omarska prison camp in northwestern
Bosnia. The trial of Serb army former commander Radislav Krstic
began on 13 March at the ICTY in the Hague.
He was charged with genocide, extermination, persecution and
deportation, following accusations of planning, ordering, aiding, and abetting
the murder of Bosnian men and boys after the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in
July 1995 – both as the individual responsible and in his capacity as army
commander of the Republika Srpska’s
Drina Corps. The ICTY ”rape trial” –
the first case before the tribunal to treat sexual enslavement as a crime
against humanity - started in the
Hague on 20 March. Three Bosnian Serbs
– Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic - were specifically accused of
rape, torture, enslavement, outrage upon personal dignity, and plunder of
private property. They were charged with crimes against humanity and violations
of the laws and customs of war.
During her visit in Bosnia and
Herzegovina on 8-9 March, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright signed a
Defense Assistance Transparency Agreement between the United States, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina represented by the three federation’s joint
presidents. According to the agreement,
the US and Croatia will transmit all requests for and approvals of security
assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Standing Committee on Military
Matters. The agreement aims at encouraging transparency about military spending
and transfers, strengthening the nation’s central institutions, and creating a
model for others who provide security and assistance to any part of this
country to follow.
At the meeting of the US
secretary of state with the prime minister of Republika Srpska (RS), Milorad
Dodik, Albright emphasised that if the RS continues its present direction, new
opportunities for its citizens will arise and valuable partnerships with Europe
and America will be forged. The
economic reforms, political pluralism, and RS support for tolerance motivated
the US Government to provide the RS $ 7 million in budget support this
year. RS leaders believe that the
republic’s people will integrate with Europe through the Stability Pact. Dodik declared that FRY is in its present
situation due to Milosevic, and, for this
reason, he must disappear from the political scene. According to Dodik, Milosevic’s political influence in the RS is
almost insignificant.
A multi-ethnic police force
was inaugurated in the Brcko district during March, and there were developments
on a State Border Service. Yet
obstruction and resistance have emerged to establishment of joint police forces
in Central Bosnia - particularly in
Mostar.
Since the end of the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, achievements of the federation include a single currency, a
customs regime, passport, and flag, and joint institutions. The return of 600'000 displaced persons - 80'000 of them to areas in
which they are part of an ethnic minority - is the other part of the
success story. Elections have also been
held at every level of government, and the Constitutional Court is functioning
and has issued significant rulings.
Ecological degradation
Ecological degradation was
caused in March by the effects of the February cyanide spill in the Tisza
River, a repetition of the disaster, this time with lead and zinc compounds,
and by the effects of the 31'000 rounds of depleted uranium ammunition used by
NATO throughout Kosovo in more than 100 flying missions during spring 1999.
(1) The greatest risk to the redrafted governmental program ”2001” is
a possible new war at the country’s borders, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov told
the Bulgarian Parliament on 24 March.
Compensation for the risk is a reliable and stable policy of economic
growth and low inflation, he said.
(2) UNMIK decorated 49 Bulgarian
policemen with UN medals on 5 March.
The Bulgarian police contingent consists of 60 men and women.
(1) The ICTY at the Hague on 3 March sentenced Tihomir Blaskic, a
general in the Croatian Defense Council, to 45 years in prison for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. Blaskic bore responsibility in 1993 for the
killing, wounding, and/or raping of Bosnian Muslims in the Lasva Valley on 13
April 1993. (2) Mladen Nalelitic (Tuta) was transported from
Zagreb into custody of the ICTY on 21 March.
The accusations against him are for systemic torture of Bosnian Muslim
prisoners and using them as human shields in performance of dangerous military
tasks benefiting the Croatian Defense Council and the army of the Republic of
Croatia.
Recent elections in Croatia
represent a significant turning point in the republic’s internal
developments. The return of refugees
and introduction of long overdue legal, commercial, and economic reforms are
immediate tasks of the new democratic government.
(1) Unable to negotiate agreeable terms of co-existence in the
federation, Belgrade imposed its power on bilateral commerce with Montenegro,
trying to prevent speculation with federally regulated prices of goods. FRY militiamen blocked the border between
Serbia and Montenegro on 4-5 March and allowed no more than 100 trucks to
continue on their journey. (2) The EU and the US agreed to a lift the ban
for flights for one reason alone: due to a request by opposition leaders. There is no way to present this development
as a success of the Milosevic regime’s policy.
(3) An anti-Milosevic
demonstration in Serbia was organized by the opposition on 14 April. Democratic opposition unity is the best
guarantee for its efficiency. The EU
decided on 27 March to increase its support for NGOs, media representatives,
and religious institutions in their efforts to create a democratic society in
Serbia. The major objective of the
opposition and outside support for it remains the call for early free and fair
elections.
President Boris Trajkovski appointed Deputy Interior
Minister Dragan Grozdanovsky on 1 March as the republic’s new head of
intelligence. Infiltration of FYROM
with Serbian spies remains very high.
The opposition contender for president of FYROM, T. Petkovsky, was once
an officer in the Serbian counter-intelligence service.
Greece effectively joined the
Schengen regime within the EU on 26 March and became the 10th member of the
agreement.
Romanian Minister of Defense
Victor Babiuk resigned on 10 March after being accused by the present
government coalition partners from the Democratic Party of blocking Defense
Ministry activities. The resignation is
a symptom of friction within the governing coalition during recent weeks.
a) Bulgaria-Romania
Prime Ministers Isarescu of
Romania and Kostov of Bulgaria signed an agreement in Bucharest on 27 March on
construction of the bridge at Vidin-Kalafat.
Bodo Hombach, coordinator for the Pact of Stability for SEE, attended
the ceremony. The prime ministers also
agreed to join efforts by improving their electricity systems, also applying
for funding support from the Pact of Stability. The new Romanian Defense Minister, Sorin Frunzaverde, met in
Sofia with his Bulgarian counterpart, Boyko Noev, on 29 March. They discussed issues of cooperating to
reach NATO standards and preparing for the joint military exercise ”Blue
Danube”.
b) FRY-FYROM
After stories in the FYROM
press that the Belgrade’s Ambassador to Skopje, Zoran Janackovic, had been
added to the EU’s ”black list” for high-level FRY officials, the Foreign
Ministry of FYROM expects that FRY will pull out its ambassador. Janackovic is a former chief of Yugoslav
foreign intelligence.
c) Turkey-Bulgaria
Bulgarian Defense Minister
Noev visited Ankara on 7-8 March and met with Turkey’s president, prime
minister, and the defense minister of Turkey.
He discussed military-technical cooperation options with his
counterpart, Sabahattin
Cakmakoglu.
d) Bulgaria-FRY
(1) Prime Minister Kostov met in Sofia on 8 March with two Kosovo
Serbian leaders, Momchilo Trajkovic and Archbishop Rashko-Prizrenski Artemje.
Trajkovic said Kosovo issues may be resolved only in the context of a
democratic Serbia and FRY. They now
consider it impossible for Serbs to participate in autumn elections in Kosovo
because there is no freedom and democracy – Serbs cannot move freely or speak
their own language. The Bulgarian prime
minister assured the Serbian representatives that Bulgaria does not want a
change of FRY borders in this volatile situation. (2) Kostov sent a letter
to Kosovar Albanian leader Hacim Taci on 15 March due to rising tensions in the
southern Serbian region of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedsa. The letter has been given to FYROM Albanian
leader Arben Xafferi, who presented it to Taci. Kostov asked for Taci’s support to deter the militancy of armed
Albanian groups in southern Serbia.
(3) Kostov visited Kosovo with a
Bulgarian military helicopter. He met
and discussed the tense situation with Albanian leaders Taci and Rugova,
Serbian leaders Trajkovic and Archbishop Artemje, as well as with UNMIK leader
Kouchner and KFOR commander Gen Reinhardt.
There was an agreement with the KFOR command that Bulgaria would
increase its engineering contingent in the province as well as the number of
civilian policemen, also intensifying intelligence and information exchange
contacts.
e) Turkey-Greece
The upcoming parliamentary
elections in Greece and presidential elections later this year in Turkey
naturally pose the question of how positive momentum can be preserved when the
politicians, engaged with the first major steps of improving relations, are
engaged in domestic politics. A
stimulus could become the idea of involving the historic reconciliation issue
in the domestic political debates.
Greece and Turkey are leading Balkan countries, and their developing
relationship is reflected very positively in the general security, political,
and economic situation of the broader peninsula.
f) Bulgaria-FYROM
(1) The Bulgarian Constitutional Court banned a political party, ”Ilinden” – Pirin (OMO),
on 1 March. Arguments in the court’s
decision were openly separatist activity and endangering the territorial
integrity of Bulgaria in the region neighboring FYROM. This party’s followers have been linked
since its inception with FRY’s secret services. The tolerance of the Bulgarian legal institutions had been
exploited until the Constitutional Court decided to resolve this legal
issue. In recent months the separatist
organization’s activity had been intensified with a clear purpose – to worsen
developing inter-state relations between Sofia and Skopje. The pro-Serbian opposition in FYROM
fervently supports the separatist organization in Bulgaria. (2)
The FYROM Defense Ministry suggested free transfer of a few patrol boats
for Lake Ohrid at the Albania border.
Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff General Miha Mihov said publicly
last September that there was a possibility of delivering some border-patrol
boats to Skopje.
(a) Bulgaria-Greece-Turkey.
For the first time since the end of World War I the foreign ministers of
the three countries met on 5 March. The
joint meeting and tour of Plovdiv (Bulgaria), Edrine (Turkey), and Oreste
(Greece) came at the initiative of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nadezhda
Mihailova. Together with foreign
ministers George Papandreou of Greece and Ismaihl Cem of Turkey, they sent the
message that the peninsula has the will to live in peace and cooperation. The Greek and Turkish foreign ministers
assured their Bulgarian colleague that they firmly supported Bulgaria’s
candidacy for NATO membership. The two
NATO southern neighbors of Bulgaria had the opportunity to discuss issues of
common interest. Bulgaria’s
expectations are for similar trilateral meetings involving the ministers of
energy, transport, interior, defense, culture, etc.
(b) Greece-FYROM-Albania. Foreign ministers of the three neighboring
Balkan countries (Papandreou, Aleksander Dimitrov, and Paskal Milo) met on 9
March in Ohrid, FYROM, and finished their meeting in Korcha, Albania. They confirmed the idea of stabilizing a
multi-ethnic Kosovo.
(c) Albania-FYROM-Bulgaria. Foreign ministers
of the three countries (Milo, Dimitrov, and Nadezhda Mihailova) met in Tirana
for their second meeting on 24 March.
They agreed to support three projects jointly within the Pact of
Stability for SEE: the Sofia-Skopje
railway; merging of the three countries’ energy systems; and the construction
of roads linking Duras, Albania, with FYROM and Bulgaria. Finance ministers of the three countries met
in Tirana on 25 March to discuss the financial aspects of the projects. The projects were presented at the Donors’
Conference in Brussels on 29-30 March.
a. Second Informal Meeting of Prime Ministers of the Neighbors of
FRY
Prime ministers of countries
neighboring FRY – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, FYROM, Hungary, and Romania - with Dr. Javier
Solana, Lord Robertson, and Hombach - met for the second
time in two months in Budapest. The
first meeting was in January in Hissarya, Bulgaria. The issues of peace and stability in the region and restoration
of transport on the Danube were among the discussion topics. Messages of the meeting were that (1) there
is no danger of a new war in the region, (2) Milosevic should lift the blockade
of Montenegro, (3) sanctions against Serbia must be continued, despite losses
suffered by all, and (4) there are already € 1.54 billion for Pact of Stability
projects. During the brain-storming
meeting the Bulgarian prime minister brought up the idea of a party leader from
the opposition in Vojvodina to divide Serbia into six parts. Sofia has not changed its position on the
inviolability of FRY’s borders, but the birth of such ideas within Serbia are
symptomatic of the inefficiency of the Milosevic regime in coping with the
domestic stability situation and shows the direction in which strife in FRY may
develop – with all the consequences for the broader region.
b. The Pact of Stability for SEE
The Donors’ Conference in
Brussels (29-30 March) dealt with projects within the Pact for Stability worth
$ 1'329 billion, provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EIB will cover $ 1.1 billion for
infrastructure projects. The EBRD was
attracted by projects in the private sector and investment of some $ 290 million.
c. The ”Sofia Process” of Cooperation
A meeting of the SEE ministers of the
environment was convened in Skopie on 15-16 March. They discussed a regional program for environmental
rehabilitation of the Balkans within the framework of the Pact for Stability
for SEE.
The Group met in Paris on 28
March at the ambassadorial level and did not go beyond UN Resolution 1244 in
tackling the present tense situation in Kosovo. Parties of the Group are the US, the UK, France, Russia, Italy,
and Germany.
(1) SACEUR commander Gen Clark visited Sofia and met with the
president as well as the foreign and defense ministers. He had two lectures – at the Atlantic Club
and the Military Academy. (2) Bulgarian Defense Minister Noev visited NATO
Headquarters in Brussels on 20-22 March.
He briefed the organization leaders, including permanent
representatives, about the Bulgarian prime minister's visit to Kosovo. Noev met also in Brussels with his Belgian
counterpart.
(1) US Under-Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering visited Bucharest
on 3 March and discussed bilateral cooperation. (2) The US Trade and
Development Agency (TDA) opened a joint office with the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) in Zagreb, Croatia, on 3 March. (3)
At a meeting with Montenegrin President Milo Jukanovic on 9 March
Secretary of State Albright warned of US support for Montenegro, if Serbia
attacks the small republic. (4) In Washington, Ambassador Larry Napper, the
State Department coordinator for East European assistance, told the House
International Relations Committee on 9 March that both the Support for East
European Democracies (SEED) and peacekeeping funds are essential to support
UNMIK efforts to establish public order, assure protection of human rights, and
begin the process of economic recovery of Kosovo. Napper outlined President Clinton’s budget request for $ 610
million in SEED funds for fiscal year 2001 as well as a request for $ 609
million in supplemental funding for SEE for fiscal year 2000. (5)
The US special presidential emissary for Cyprus, Alfred Moses, visited
the island on 7-11 March and talked with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders in
order to try to make further progress towards a comprehensive settlement. He thinks that the present economic
disparity between the two parts of the island will disappear quite
rapidly. (6) Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mihailova visited Washington, DC, on
10-12 March and spoke at a conference about democracy and the rule of law in
the transforming world. She also met
with First Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and discussed the Balkan
regional situation. (7) US Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Marc Grossman said in a 13 March speech to the Middle East Forum in
Philadelphia that the US commitment to Turkey’s success is part of the larger
goal to have a US-European partnership for the 21st century. He also said that Turkey’s success is
essential to a Europe united, free, and at peace, which explains why US-Turkish
relations focus on security, prosperity, and democracy. (8)
The OPIC announced on 16 March that it had received 17 proposals in
response to its call for proposals to manage a private equity investment fund
or funds of up to $ 150 million to be invested in SEE (Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey).
(1) The Russian Duma adopted two documents on 17 March, recommending
to the government to help FRY overcome consequences of the NATO strikes a year
ago. (2) The Greek foreign minister visited Moscow on 21 March and
discussed with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov bilateral relations, Kosovo,
Chechnya, and Cyprus. This visit
coincided with raising criticism in Russia against Milosevic. Bilateral Russian-Greek relations may be
strengthened if agreement is reached on assessing the regime in Belgrade. Russia may seek to enlarge its influence in
the Balkans by lifting its support for the strong-man in Belgrade, who is quite
isolated internationally and not trusted by his people as he was a year ago.
EC Commissioner Christopher
Patten said at the Donors’ Conference in Brussels on 29 March that Bulgaria and
Romania would receive € 6 billion from the union. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and FYROM would get €
5.5 billion. A fund of € 2.3 billion would be created in advance to help
Serbia after the Milosevic regime falls, according to a commission
recommendation.
1. The security flash-points of the last month continued to be in
FRY: Southern Serbia, Montenegro,
Kosovska Mitrovica, and the oppressed Serbian opposition. In addition to the dangers of civil war,
ethnic clashes, and international involvement if the situation worsens, the
broader Balkan regional security situation was negatively influenced by side
effects of tensions in the Western Balkans:
ethnic and religious hatreds, further degradation of the economic
situation in the region’s countries, and the consequence of the latter –
criminality, catalyzed by international sanctions. Local regional efforts to balance the negative tendencies increased
during March in harmony with KFOR and UNMIK activity.
2. Follow-ups of the Donors’ Conference in Brussels within the Pact
for Stability still need to be verified.
Popular expectations were about larger sums to cover the huge economic
and ecological losses of the strike against FRY. The philosophy of spending the donors’ funds – implementing
projects and tight control of the money - needs to be enlarged by
providing investments to boost the economies of the FRY neighbors, especially
the would-be EU members. This strategy
ensures sustainable motives for the Serbian opposition to shift the tides
within Serbian society and get rid of Milosevic and his regime.
|
EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
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Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
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Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
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Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
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Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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