BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and April 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 4, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I
INTRODUCTION
II
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The
post-conflict situation in Kosovo
2. The
Post-war rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.Bulgaria
2. Federation of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
3. FRYOMacedonia
IV
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Regional Initiatives
V
THE ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE REGION
VI
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United Nations
2. The OSCE
3. NATO
4. USA
5. Russia
VII
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
Two
centres of gravity continued to characterise
South-East European (SEE) developments in April 2000: the clash with President of Yugoslavia
Slobodan Milosevic, who is hiding in Belgrade with no consistent mid- and
long-term strategies, and the slow, difficult, and yet promising EU integration
movement of all countries from the region but Serbia for now.
The
clash with Milosevic took place on five post-Yugoslav and two international
“fronts”: in Serbia,; Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo; the neighbouring post-Yugoslav countries, the
non-Western Balkan SEE countries, and international institutions like the
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Council of
Europe (CE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation In Europe (OSCE),
etc. Highlights in SEE's political and
security area in April were the 14 April rally of the united Serbian opposition
in Belgrade; municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Eurocorps
headquarters assumption of command over the international force in Kosovo
(under NATO command and with NATO troops); the arrest of a Bosnian Serb leader,
Momcilo Krajisnik, who faces charges of military crimes at the Hague-based
ICTY; the involvement of Kosovo Serb leaders in the governing structures of the
province; and a variety of KFOR activities to preserve a secure and stable
environment in the province.
The most
persisting aspect of the complex security situation in the broader Balkan
region continues to be the zero-sum claims and ambitions of the Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs, reflecting similar behaviour of Albanians and Serbs in the
western Balkans in general. The key challenge
in transforming the present security situation is to find ways of breaking the
vicious circle of hatred, conflict, and revenge between Serbs and
Albanians. One way may be recognition
by the Serbs that they had inflicted injustices against Albanians that should
be reciprocated by the Albanians by starting to differentiate between Serbian
criminals and other Serbs who also strive for peace and calm. For their part, Serbs should join the
international governing effort and act to improve the state of Kosovo province,
refraining from accusations that Serbs who do that commit acts of treason. Next, Serbs must understand they are not
obliged to respond to calls from extremists, even leaders, that all Serbian people are drawn into a life-and-death
war with the Albanians. Albanians,
including their leaders like Ibrahim Rugova, must forget the 19th-century dream
of a Greater Albania in a 21st-century Europe.
This is a goal utterly unacceptable to Europeans , including the rest of
the Balkan peoples.
Another
major challenge would be finding the right answer to the future status of
Kosovo. However, before engaging in
this task, all those involved should press for developing a record of tolerant
inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo.
in April 2000
was predominantly shaped by KFOR
security stabilisation activities and UNMIK reconstruction efforts.
The USA
increased its forces in the KFOR Multinational Brigade East with 125
reconnaissance troops – a long-range survey team that will help monitor
Kosovo’s boundary with southern Serbia.
They were deployed from the V Corps in Germany and are expected to stay
at the border between Kosovo and the Presevo Valley – an adjoining area in
Serbia – for the next six months. A
company of the First Armoured Division, already in FYROMacedonia, will be
equipped with 14 tanks and six Paladin artillery pieces. US soldiers in FYROMacedonia have lacked
this armour support since January 2000.
The tanks will improve the force protection for Task Force Able Sentry
in the republic neighbouring Kosovo and will
deter any provocation along the FYROMacedonia borders.
A major
issue of concern for KFOR remains any violation of the ground security zone in
the Presevo Valley by Kosovar Albanians or Serbs. KFOR is watching if the Kosovar Albanians deliver on their
promise to hand in their uniforms and disarm forces operating in the Serb area
outside Kosovo in the Presevo Valley.
However, KFOR troops remain vulnerable to acts of violence: 12 American soldiers were wounded during an
incident that arose from a routine weapons search by KFOR – one of many
searches carried out regularly as part of the mission to maintain a secure
environment. This includes the
confiscation of weapons concealed illegally by those who might commit acts of
violence, obviously an activity disliked by extremists on both side of the
ethnic divide.
KFOR
completed Exercise Dynamic Response 2000 by mid-April according to plan. The design was to ensure that the strategic
reserve force deployed for both Kosovo and Bosnia reinforcement can get into
action quickly. The reserve force
performed its tasks, and the effort came out as planned.
On 18
April a change in the KFOR command took place:
the German General Klaus Reinhardt turned leadership of the NATO-led
force over to General Juan Ortuno of Spain.
Gen Ortuno serves as commanding general of Eurocorps. His assumption of command marked the first
time that Eurocorps, rather than an individual NATO member nation, has held the
top KFOR post. The outgoing SACEUR, Gen
Wesley Clark, presided over the change of command.
On 2
April the Serb National Council of Gracanica decided to participate with
observers in sessions of the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) and the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). This
was a courageous step by Kosovo Serb representatives that may bring the goal of
creating a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo closer. The task is not easy: on
the next day tensions appeared within the Serb community in Kosovo. Some Serbs demonstrated against that
decision, and there were even clashes with KFOR soldiers guarding the Gracanica
Monastery.
The
Austrian-led OSCE Presidency appealed to all OSCE member states to contribute
more police trainers in order to allow the Police School to double its teaching
capacity. With violence continuing
throughout Kosovo, and KFOR’s peacekeepers and the UN civilian police
stretched, the value of producing more trained Kosovar police is obvious.
The
special representative of the UN Secretary General, Bernard Kouchner, the EU,
and members of the IAC and KTC issued a joint statement against violence in the
province on 19 April in Pristina.
French-led
NATO troops arrested Momcilo Krajisnik, a former Bosnian Serb leader, on 3
April. He was indicted by the ICTY this
year for a list of atrocities committed between 1 July 1991 and 31 December
1992: the expulsion of hundreds of
thousands of Muslims and Croats from some 40 villages and towns; the massacre
of hundreds of civilians; and criminal activities at 11 prison camps where
Muslims and Croats were tortured and executed on his orders. He is the highest ranking wartime leader
brought to the tribunal. During the war
he was the second most powerful political leader on the Bosnian Serb side,
subordinate only to President Radovan Karadzic. Krajisnik was charged both as an individual and as a responsible
commander. It is remarkable that his
arrest aroused little reaction among the Serbs in Bosnia itself, where he had
represented them in Bosnia’s three-man presidency. Krajisnik pleaded “not guilty” before the ICTY in the Hague on 7
April to nine counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
Krajisnik is the 41st suspect brought to trial before the tribunal.
The
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted fair and peaceful municipal
elections on 8 April. These took place
in a safe and secure environment with only a few reports of isolated security
incidents. The elections marked a step
forward in mobilising the people’s energy to govern their own country.
General
Ratko Mladic, who led the atrocities in Srebrenica during June 1995, hides in
Belgrade, according to Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative of the
international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The arrest of the alleged war criminal would mark a major peace-building
move in the republic.
Bulgaria
plunged into a deep moral and political crisis, provoked by the high level of
poverty and corruption among the ruling elite.
The trigger was provided by the former minister of the interior, Bogomil
Bonev, who was dismissed in December 1999, despite his highest rating among the
cabinet ministers. He informed the
public of corruption cases involving high-level officials. He informed the
prime minister, who remained passive.
The attack against the government may escalate to the introduction of a
vote of no confidence by the leading opposition party, the Bulgarian Socialist
Party, to be discussed in early May.
The leadership of the governing United Democratic Forces (UDF)
introduced a counter-proposal for a change in the constitution that would allow
lifting the immunity of MPs and judicial magistrates. Opposition representatives and the public interpreted this move
as a drift towards repression of differing opinions.
There is
growing evidence that Milosevic is becoming desperate: he is closing down newspapers and
threatening local mayors. He probably
understands how isolated he is – at home and internationally. In a state increasingly prone to mafia-like
activities, another close friend of Milosevic, the chief of the national flying
company JAT was shot dead at the entrance of his home on 26 April.
More
than 100,000 Serbs from all over the country took part in a massive opposition
rally in Belgrade on 14 April. They
demonstrated against the undemocratic regime of Milosevic, as speeches by opposition
leaders and protest slogans showed. The
demonstrators condemned efforts of the ruling regime to silence the media by
intimidation and brutal repression.
FRY
joined the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 (CWC) on 21 April. The accession document was presented to the
secretary general of the UN.
The
former prime minister of FYROM and opposition leader, Branko Crvenkovski,
declared a platform to unite all opposition forces against the ruling coalition
in Skopje. Crvenkovski's Social-Democratic
Union of Macedonia (SDUM) will organise “the biggest rally in the history of
the country” on 18 May. It is expected
to call for early elections. In the
meantime, the government of Skopje is reorganising the work of the country’s
intelligence agency after recent allegations that it intervened in the
political activity of the young state.
It Is alleged that the agency leaked information that usually reached
the country’s opposition, closely linked with the regime in Belgrade.
The Greek
legislative elections of 9 April led the ruling PASOK to a victory with a very
small margin, yet enough to provide it with 158 seats in the 300-member Greek
Parliament. The opposition New
Democracy party received 125 seats.
Platforms of the two major contending parties demonstrated a broad
consensus on the course Greece has chosen regarding European Monetary Union
issues, improvement in relations with Turkey, and an active Greek role in
building stability in the Balkans. This
policy contrasts with the decision to supply 250 new battle tanks for the Greek
army. Given the country’s friendly
relations with its Balkan neighbours and the recent rapprochement with Turkey,
there are doubts about the reason to protect the northern borders with the new
Challenger-2E battle tank, made by Vickers of the UK.
The
minority government of Janez Drnovsek lost the confidence vote it asked for on
8 April after the dismissal of 10 cabinet ministers from the partner Slovenian
People’s Party. Parliament must choose
a new prime minister within 30 days or re-elect the former one. The alternative would be early general
elections.
a) Bulgaria-Romania
A joint
letter of the prime ministers of Bulgaria and Romania was addressed to
ambassadors of the governments of the EU and NATO countries in Sofia. The letter appeals for support in cleaning
debris from the Danube river and restoration of transportation. Costs for the cleaning are estimated at €24 million.
The Black Sea Navy exercise that took
place during the second week of April near the Bulgarian coast involved joint
operation of submarines during a simulated ‘embargo operation’ and air defence
activity with Romanian and Bulgarian participation.
b) Croatia-Bulgaria
A
Bulgarian delegation of the Constitutional Court visited their colleagues in
Zagreb on 12-14 April and met with President Stipe Mesic of Croatia. Though launched at about the same time, the
two institutions differ in their authority and functions.
c) FYROMacedonia-Bulgaria
Bulgarian
Defence Minister Boyko Noev visited Skopje on 19-20 April and met with his
counterpart, Nikola Kliusev, Foreign Minister Alexander Dimitrov, Prime
Minister Liubcho Georgievsky, and President Boris Trajkovsky. Bilateral military cooperation and SEE
security were central topics of the meetings.
Purchase of Bulgarian armaments by the neighbouring state's armed forces
was also discussed during the visit.
Bulgarian
President Petar Stoyanov is expected to
visit FYROMacedonia during the second half of May.
The Pact of Stability for South-East Europe
At the
SEE regional funding conference in Brussels on 29-30 March, the region's
countries within the Pact of Stability pledged $2.3 billion for projects out of
a broader 2000 "total assistance to SEE" package estimated at over $6
billion. Over 85 per cent of this
assistance is to be provided by European countries and institutions. More than $2.4 billion have been committed
by the donors, including for a “quick-start” package. The projects are aimed at developing infrastructure, promoting
private sector development, supporting policy and institutional reforms, and
encouraging democratisation, reconciliation, and security.
The Stability Pact for SEE operates under
the auspices of the OSCE, with the EU playing a lead coordinating role. Major achievements of the Stability Pact
include: advancing economic
development, fighting corruption, promoting democratisation, human rights and
refugee returns, building regional security cooperation, and promoting regional
cooperation in general. A quick-start
package of measures was funded to support regional efforts in demining, arms
control verification, and fighting organised crime. Regional security cooperation includes controlling small arms and
light weapons, implementing weapons of mass destruction commitments,
controlling arms exports, and re-training retired military officers in Bulgaria
and Romania.
The
number of unemployed in Bulgaria has reached 717,000 or near 19 per cent of the
country's workforce. In certain regions
unemployment is more than 50 per cent.
Bulgaria's
foreign debt had reached $8.878 billion by early April, $43 million less than
at the end of February. During the same
period internal debt reached $2.54 billion, $35 million more than the previous
month.
Bulgaria
rates 111th in the list of the US trading partners. The US Department of Commerce assesses the customs procedures in
Bulgaria as heavy and inconsistent.
Excessive documentation and corruption worsen the situation. There are some improvements in legalising
the software and film business in Bulgaria, according to the US Department of
Commerce report.
Croatia
is soon to start negotiations on a new loan from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The eventual deal would
signal the beginning of a more open and liberal economic policy. The EU has already set up a joint consultative
task force. The end of summer 2000 is
expected to mark the beginning of talks on stabilisation and association
agreement with the Union.
FYROMacedonia
introduced value added tax (VAT) on 1 April.
It is 19%, but 5% for a limited number of items.
The EU
will provide €30 million to Bulgaria to rehabilitate the Vidin-Sofia road by
the end of 2001. This money is part of
funds approved by the Stability Pact donors’ conference and is linked to
construction of a second bridge over the Danube at Vidin-Kalafat.
Bulgaria
has not violated UN sanctions against rebels in Angola by trading with arms,
Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov said on 7 April. Bulgaria exercises a very
severe control regime for weapons
delivery, and there have been no contacts with UNITA guerrillas. Kostov disclosed these results of the
investigation to the MPs, following allegations by high UN officials of selling
arms to UNITA rebels in Angola earlier this year.
The OSCE
High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van der Stool, visited Skopje on
20 April. He received complaints about
the treatment of Macedonians in neighbouring Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and FRY
by the Minister of Emigrants of FYROM, Martin Trenevski. The Ministry of Emigrants will be soon
closed as unnecessary, according to sources from the republic. The minister himself served in the Yugoslav
military intelligence service till 1982.
The
outgoing SACEUR, Gen Wesley Clark, visited Turkey on 8 April and met with
Deputy Prime Minister Yozkan and the Chief of General Staff of the Turkish
armed forces, Gen Kavrakoglou.
(1) US
Secretary of Commerce William Daley addressed the American-Turkish Council on
30 March in Washington, DC, and reported good news regarding progress on a
variety of US-Turkish commercial ventures, particularly in the energy sector. Much of the progress was attributed to
measures taken by the Turkish government to improve the climate for foreign
investment in that country. (2) US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with eight municipal leaders from
Serbia who were visiting the United States at the invitation of Freedom
House. They told her that the Milosevic
regime had obstructed their governments by cutting their funding, disrupting
municipal services, closing down local media outlets, threatening opponents,
and raising ungrounded charges against them and other political leaders. Mrs Albright promised to support them with
practical humanitarian projects for democratic municipalities. Humanitarian and environmental concerns may
also be addressed by the USA's Stability Pact partners. (3)
Ambassador Alfred Moses, US President Bill Clinton’s special emissary
for Cyprus, met In Ankara on 12 April with Dr. O. Faruk Logoglu, under
secretary of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They discussed the next round on Cyprus, scheduled for 23 May in
New York.
On 17-20
April former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Sofia to present
to the public the Bulgarian translation of his book “Years in the Big Policy”. He also met with the prime minister of
Bulgaria, Foreign Minister Mihailova, and representatives of non-governmental
organisations. Primakov reminded the
Bulgarian public of various dangers to security in the Balkans, conveying a
perception of the invariant nature of Balkan conflicts – a notion strongly
doubted by many Bulgarian analysts.
Russia, an old-time player in the region including during the Primakov
government, could not perform a policy different from participation in conflict
management. The big challenge for the
present big powers is their involvement in conflict-prevention and
post-conflict reconstruction activities – political know-how that Russian
policy still needs to learn about. The
Balkans have for years exerted region-building efforts parallel to
conflict-resolution activities. Russia
still needs to find its place in this format of the evolving Balkan history at
the end of the 20th century and start of the 21st. The visit of the scholarly Primakov proved that need.
Stabilisation
of the security situation in Kosovo and in neighbouring Southern Serbia was at
the centre of KFOR activity. The
multinational force controls the situation and provides a stable environment
for reconstruction efforts. Predictions
of the last year for a long-term and sustained engagement by the international
community turned into reality after the clashes in Mitrovica in February and
March. Real contributions to the civil
police are needed.
The SEE
security situation largely depends on internal developments in each of the
region's countries. April marked major
internal political events in Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia, and Turkey. Stability of the regime in Belgrade is not
the only security factor, though It remains an important one. Internal progress of all the non-Western
Balkan countries towards European integration determines the
"hardware" of the region's stability. The practical launch of projects within the Stability Pact
requires stable governments in countries adjacent to the post-Yugoslav territory,
especially to FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
That is why the Greek success in adapting to the Euro-zone, the success
of Bulgaria in fighting the corrupt bureaucracy and improving its citizens'
living conditions, and overcoming political problems in Slovenia and Turkey
would most significantly add to solving SEE security problems. The Balkan security situation remains
intertwined with the region-building progress of individual countries and the
region.
|
EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
|
Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
|
|
Dr. Todor Tagarev |
|