BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and September 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 9, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I.
INTRODUCTION
I.
CONFLICTS AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
The Post-Conflict Situation in Kosovo
2. The Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Acts of Terrorism in Greece
III.
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Croatia
2. FRY
3. FRY Macedonia
IV.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATUS OF REGIONAL
INITIATIVES
1.
Bilateral Relations
a)
Greece - FYRO Macedonia
b) Greece - FRY
c) Bulgaria - Romania
d) Bulgaria
- Turkey
2. Multilateral Relations: Bulgaria - Romania - FRY
3.
Regional Initiatives: The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)
V.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN BALKAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1.
Romania
2. Slovenia
VI.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United States
2. Japan
3. The United Nations
4. NATO
5. EU
6. ICTY
7. European Court for Human Rights in The Hague (ECHR)
VII.
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
September
was a month of elections – parliamentary, presidential, and municipal in the
former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and municipal in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It
was also a month of preparing municipal elections in Albania, parliamentary
elections in Slovenia, and municipal elections in Kosovo – all to be held in
October. Preparations advanced in September for parliamentary, local,
and cantonal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for presidential elections in
Republika Srpska, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania
– all to be held in November.
No
doubt the focus of September’s Balkan affairs was on Belgrade and the FRY.
Countries from the region took positions on how the situation and
election campaign there was evolving, depending on their varying perceptions.
In a similar way, outside the Southeastern Europe region, powers and
institutions defined their stance on implementing fundamental principles of
democracy and civilisation concerning freedom and fairness
in organising elections. As
24 September approached, it was already clear that the dictator of Serbia,
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, had no intention of playing fair and
giving a free hand to his competitors in the elections.
Stability
in other parts of the Balkans was a significant prerequisite to maintaining
general regional stability, although elections and pre-election campaigns in the
other countries were also linked with specific tensions and problems.
September ended with an escalated conflict situation in FRY, promising a
deepening of the internal Yugoslav crisis, further endangering regional
stability. Fundamental
constitutional issues in FRY, Montenegro, and Kosovo, as well as basic questions
about the future policy of the eventual election winners, determined the main
sources of concern and tension in Southeastern Europe.
The
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Mary Robinson, appointed
Ambassador Henrik Ameneus of Sweden on 1 September as her special envoy on
persons deprived of liberty in connection with the Kosovo crisis in FRY.
Ameneus's main focus will be the quest for a comprehensive solution to
problems of detainees and missing persons in Kosovo and elsewhere in FRY.
Many individuals and families in the area are devastated by this problem,
and democratic evolution in Kosovo and FRY requires a human solution.
Two
police officers from the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), both British nationals,
remained in detention during September after being arrested in Montenegro on 31
July. Four Dutchmen, arrested in
mid-July, and two Canadian nationals arrested at the same time as the UNMIK
policemen, also remained in detention in FRY.
More
than 130 Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops and UNMIK personnel toiled through the night
on 13 September in the fight to contain an acid leak at the Trepca industrial
plant in south Mitrovica. Tons of
lime were brought from all over the province to neutralise the acid.
The UN mission had drawn up contingency plans to deal with emergencies in
the complex.
Most
Serbs in Kosovo participated in the 24 September elections, mostly supporting
Milosevic. With very few exceptions, the Albanian people in the province
did not participate. The
constitutional future of Kosovo after the FRY elections and the 28 October
municipal elections will become a priority issue with which all involved parties
must deal. Separation from FRY and
the assumption of a specific European or UN status are options being discussed
in Albanian-populated parts of Southeastern Europe. The unwillingness of Kosovo Albanians to share a state with
Serbs, and the firm insistence of all
Serbian political leaders never to let Kosovo out of the federation, portend
real issues in the weeks to come.
The
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country’s main
civilian peace implementation agency, announced on 8 September that it had
ordered the removal of 15 public officials who had obstructed implementation of
property laws in the republic. These
officials were banned from running in elections or holding public office.
They were deemed to have ignored, obstructed, or failed to enforce
property laws that they were supposed to implement.
NATO
issued a report in early September on activities of its Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
report describes the situation in Bosnia as calm and stable.
Yet it also notes the possibility of sporadic low-level violence in
connection with the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes.
The
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Jacques Klein, issued a statement on 19 September concerning the arrest of
several individuals suspected of carrying out the assassination in March 1999 of
the Bosnian Federation’s deputy interior minister, Jozo Leutar.
The special representative stressed that political terrorism and
assassination is a crime against all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and will not
be tolerated or ignored.
A
police car was set afire in Athens on 13 September.
Responsibility was claimed by an illegal group, Black Star,
in phone calls to a radio station and a newspaper.
The terrorists insisted on the release of one of their collaborators –
an anarchist detained in jail. A
week earlier the same terrorist group had set fire to several other cars, one of
them belonging to the Iranian Embassy and another to a Greek diplomat.
In June the 17 November, another Greek terrorist group assassinated the
British military attach? in Athens
for his support and active participation in the NATO Allied Force operation
against FRY.
A
wave of arrests on 12 September led to the seizure of 12 people for war crimes.
Only one of them was wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for questioning about events in the 1993-1994 war
between the Muslim-led Bosnia-Herzegovina government and Croatian-backed ethnic
Croats. Most of the other arrests
were in connection with the apparent murder on 28 August of Milan Levar, who had
testified to atrocities by Croatian forces at the start of Croatia’s 1991-1995
war of independence. Democratic
Croatia is resolute that those accountable for war crimes will not live freely
in this Croatia, Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan told the Hina news agency.
The ICTY now wishes to try only senior commanders and politicians and
encourages prosecution by individual states.
2.
FRY
Parliamentary,
presidential, and municipal elections were held in the FRY on 24 September.
The most dramatic part was the contest for FRY president between
Milosevic, leader of the Serbian Socialist Party and FRY president, and Vojislav
Kostunica, lawyer and representative of a coalition of 15 opposition parties.
The election campaign was characterised by Milosevic's preparations to
steal the election, suppression of all independent media, intimidation of
opposition activists throughout Yugoslavia, use of fraudulent ballot boxes,
attempts to skew the count, and a ban on experienced OSCE election monitors.
Milosevic appealed to the armed forces to support him during this
dramatic period. Important
financial support was received from Iraq and its "friendly" imported
oil prices. The most visible
campaign violations, according to the Slovak Democratic Initiative (SDI), a
non-governmental organisation, were: campaign materials circulated during the
period of silence; campaign materials closer than 50 meters to polling stations;
and NGO slogans used by political party campaign events.
Particularly
during the last month, Milosevic was faced a group of opposition parties that
succeeded, especially after opinion polls definitely favoured them, to become a
real set of efficient political forces. Most powerful among these was
Kostunica's Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).
The political opposition was also motivated by a mounting activism of
Serbian NGOs willing to carry on their cause against the regime at any cost.
The influential Serbian Orthodox Church appealed to authorities on the
eve of the elections to refrain from violence.
The election results, according to the Federal Election Commission (FEC),
are: Kostunica, 48.22 per cent;
Milosevic, 40.23 per cent. For this
reason, the FEC called a second round of presidential elections. The FEC included no opposition party members, and there were
no independent observers who could monitor its work. The results, according to the Centre for Free and Democratic
Elections, were: Kostunica, 56.93
per cent; Milosevic, 33.51 per cent. These
results were achieved despite massive irregularities and various kinds of fraud.
According to the DOS, these results made a second round unnecessary, as
Kostunica won outright in the first round by receiving more than 50 per cent of
the vote. The Serbian Radical Party (SRP) of Vojislav Sesel and the
Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) of Vuk Draskovic largely agreed with the figures
of the Centre for Free and Democratic Elections.
DOS announced that it would boycott any second round and called for
public protests and demonstrations against the FEC report.
Important
elements of the Kostunica pre-election campaign were the condemnation of
Milosevic's regime, of NATO raids against FRY in 1999, and of Montenegrin
traitors. Kostunica promised that,
if he won the elections, he would not release Milosevic to the ICTY in the
Hague. He criticized both Russia
for its indecisiveness on events in FRY and the US as a violator of FRY
sovereignty and for using the elections to topple Milosevic.
However, Kostunica overlooked the fact that the Milosevic regime was
drastically weakened due to NATO's Allied Force operation, his indictment as a
war criminal, and the principled position of Montenegro's government.
Russia may have shown inconsistencies in its FRY policy, but the US has
long supported the Yugoslav democratic opposition (even if not necessarily with
funds). Many analysts, especially
in neighbouring FRY countries, underline a clear Kostunica nationalist position
that portends no good for ethnic peace in the region.
One can expect a gradual and mid- to long-term stabilising of Serbian
statehood on a democratic basis. A
broad range of political, economic, and constitutional issues lies ahead, no
matter how the situation evolves after the incomplete election process.
Two
rounds of the second municipal elections In FYROM held in this country since
1991 occurred on 10 and 24 September. After
counting in the two rounds, the ruling coalition won in 70 out of 124
municipalities. There were some
acts of violence and intimidation in the western part of the country, including
one death. But the elections were generally calm in most municipalities. The largest city, Skopje, where one third of the country’s
population lives, re-elected Mayor Risto Penov from the opposition
Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM) by a large margin.
In the other 10 municipalities, where major violations were registered,
elections will be repeated. A
fierce propaganda campaign by the opposition pro-Serbian and pro-Milosevic SDUM
succeeded in reducing the number of voters favouring the ruling party.
A traditional attack against the government criticized its
good-neighbourly relationship with Bulgaria, interpreted as national treason.
The Serbian intelligence services encouraged this view.
Arben Xaferi, leader of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) and
coalition partner in the government, told the Trud daily (the most popular
Bulgarian newspaper) on 25 September that there was "a permanent demonising
of Bulgaria and the Albanian factor – a convenient cover for the Serbian
military and intelligence services, whose structures are still active in
Macedonia."
a.
Greece-FYRO Macedonia Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou visited Skopje
briefly on 6 September and met with his counterpart and the Macedonian prime
minister.
b.
Greece-FRY
Papandreou also visited Belgrade on 6 September and met with his
counterpart, Jivadin Jovanovic, and Milosevic.
This was the first visit to FRY by a senior official of a NATO country.
Papandreou pressured Milosevic to embrace democracy but was rebuffed.
Milosevic used the meeting with Papandreou to air complaints over EU and
US efforts to pressure his country, saying that perpetrators of force and
neo-colonialism were the chief sources of tension and problems in the region.
Some NATO diplomats were taken aback by the meeting for the opportunity
it gave the dictator to boost his own credibility on the eve of the elections.
Papandreou told the press he had informed Milosevic that Europe expected
a fair electoral process in FRY.
c.
Bulgaria-Romania
A joint Bulgarian-Romanian military exercise, The Blue
Danube 2000, was carried out 24-29 September, covering the river's two shores.
Three kinds of Bulgarian armed forces joined the exercise as did civil
defence units, the Military Medical Institute, and Romanian contingents –
1'300 troops in all. The exercise
task was a joint rescue operation in the aftermath of a fire, a natural disaster
(flood and earthquake), and industrial accident.
The defence ministers of Bulgaria and Romania, Boyko Noev and Sorin
Frunzaverde, participated in the exercise.
They agreed that the two countries should enter NATO together.
Noev said that Yugoslav participation would be welcome after the FRY
victory of democracy. The prime
ministers of Bulgaria and Romania, Ivan Kostov and Mugur Isarescu, observed the
rescue and humanitarian exercise.
In
sharp contrast to the excellent bilateral relations was the doctoral thesis of
General Mihay Popescu, chief of the Romanian army's general staff. Popescu he
defended his thesis on 6 September before a Bucharest audience comprising mainly
generals, officers, and representatives of the Romanian security establishment.
The thesis included the charge that Bulgaria was a risk factor for
Romanian national security due to "covered" claims of Bulgaria towards
the Dobrudzha region. The new representative of the research community and an
experienced military officer needs to learn about new methods to improve the
posture of nations and states in international relations in the 21st century,
mainly through improving the technological fundamentals of one's society,
economic efficiency, and the population's living standards. These objectives have nothing to do with territorial
expansion – a tool of reaching national purposes in the 19th and early-20th
centuries. This precedent poses
significant questions about implementing the principle of democratic control of
the military in a country contending for NATO and EU membership.
d.
Bulgaria-Turkey
During the last days of September Bayza Yuntuna, head
of Turkey's consular office in Bourgas, a city on the southern Black Sea coast
of Bulgaria, was recalled to Ankara after an agreement between the two
ministries of foreign affairs. The
press was told that she was recalled for consultations due to participation in
political activity of a Bulgarian party. Yuntuna was not qualified as persona
non grata, and the Bulgarian side did not treat the issue as a political
one.
A
joint communiqu? of a 28 September meeting between the prime ministers of
Bulgaria and Romania, Kostov and Isarescu, stated that the votes of FRY citizens
deprived Milosevic of the claim that he represented them.
The document congratulated the success of the opposition candidate for
president, Vojislav Kostunica, and called on Belgrade officials to listen to the
wishes of their people.
The
foreign ministers of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey met in
New York at a SECI gathering on 12 September in the presence of the US secretary
of state, and participants agreed there was now a European framework and
perspective for their region's states. The
situation in FRY created a hole in the region.
The foreign ministers also addressed the issue of the upcoming FRY
elections. A choice of Yugoslavia
in favour of democracy and Europe would be most welcome by its neighbours.
A peaceful election process was also a common wish of the participants.
The foreign ministers also focused on deterring any action by Milosevic
against Montenegro in an effort to divert attention from his problems at home.
Thus SECI demonstrated how a regional framework can support any entity in
the area that pursues a moderate and prudent political course.
1.
Romania.
The president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
George Mu–oz, urged US businesses to invest in Romania, saying on 11 September
that the country had begun to emerge as an attractive destination for foreign
capital. Mu–oz’s remarks came
after a meeting with former Romanian president Ion Iliescu, who was on a
three-day visit to Washington. He
presently heads the Romanian Social Democracy Party and is a presidential
candidate for the November elections with high chances of winning. Economic forecasts indicate that Romania’s gross domestic
product will exceed the official target for 2000, thanks to stronger than
expected growth in industrial output.
2. Slovenia.
Up to 70 per cent of the Slovenian economy is still directly or
indirectly run by the state. Only
half of the denationalisation process has been completed – that restituting
communist confiscation. Major
state-controlled monopolies remain non-privatised, including the insurance
company Triglav, Telekom Slovenje, and two big state-owned banks.
Slovenian Prime Minister Dr Andrej Bajuk, also an economist, faces a huge
task with general elections on 15 October.
He has pledged to push for reduced state involvement in the economy and
for legislative reforms required for EU accession – both difficult tasks in a
state-oriented environment.
USA-Bulgaria.
Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov visited California in the days
preceding the UN Millennium Summit in New York. An extensive programme provided opportunities to bring the
Bulgarian case closer to the understanding of the Americans.
USA-Croatia.
Some 600 US sailors and marines joined Croatian forces on 25-29 September
in the training exercise Croatian Phiblex 2000, near Split, Croatia, and
offshore islands. The manoeuvres
included an amphibious landing and live fire training.
The exercise was another effort to bring more regional stability and to
practice interoperability between the US and Croatian maritime forces.
USA:
Energy and Transportation Projects for Southeast Europe. The Southeast Europe Energy and Transportation Conference was
convened in Philadelphia on 13 September. The
US Trade and Development Agency (TDA) sponsored it and informed US companies and
energy and transportation ministers from Southeast Europe about energy and
transportation projects moving through financial pipelines at the World Bank and
other financial institutions. A
fundamental premise of the Stability Pact is that democratic transformation in
Southeast Europe must be accompanied by economic revitalisation and integration
of the entire region into European and Atlantic institutions.
USA-FRY.
The US Department of State issued a message on the Yugoslav elections on
20 September. The USA supports EU
policy on the eventual removal of sanctions.
The US has joined with Russian and European colleagues in envisioning a
time when democratic Yugoslavia is a full partner in the new Europe.
USA-Turkey.
Though the Turkish president, prime minister, and deputy prime minister
urged the US government to reject House Resolution 395 on Armenian genocide, the
document moved ahead through the legislative body in September.
The resolution is non-binding and intends to represent the "sense of
the House", but the administration holds that the resolution may complicate
efforts to bring peace and stability to the Caucasus and harm US-Turkish
relations. US ambassador to Turkey
Robert Pearson told reporters in Ankara on 22 September that the administration
strongly opposed this resolution. The
administration thinks the issue should be left to historians, and the focus
should be on steps to resolve regional issues that count – those promoting
better futures for all people involved.
Japan-Romania.
The Romanian government applied on 8 September for a
Japanese loan to build a road and railway network connecting Romania and Hungary
and to construct the Romanian part of the Vidin-Kalafat bridge.
Japan-Bulgaria. Japan declared its interest in building a tyre-reprocessing
plant in Bulgaria, another indicator of intensifying economic cooperation
between the two countries. Big
parliamentary delegations from Japan visited Bulgaria during the first week of
September. Japan is already engaged
in environmental and transportation projects in Bulgaria.
UN-Bulgaria.
The UN Security Council withdrew its claims against Bulgaria for illegal
arms transactions. Earlier this
year accusations that Bulgaria had exported arms to Sierra Leone placed it among
violators of fundamental international agreements on arms non-proliferation.
Bulgarian diplomacy and other official institutions convinced the UN
authorities of the country's innocence.
The
Bulgarian president announced the country’s decision to increase its financial
contribution to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.
Romania
and Slovenia also increased their payments for the UN peacekeeping fund.
UN-Cyprus.
Proximity talks on Cyprus resumed in New York on 12 September between
representatives of the Greek and the Turkish communities under the auspices of
the United Nations.
NATO-Bulgaria.
SACEUR General Joseph Ralston and the commander of the
Alliance Forces for South Europe, Admiral James Ellies, participated along with
the defence ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Greece, Italy, Romania, and
Turkey in the first command-staff and field exercise of the Multinational Peace
Force Southeast Europe (MPFSEE), constituted by contingents of these seven
countries. The 7 Stars 2000
exercise took place on Koren playground near Haskovo, Bulgaria, and continued
from 23-30 September with 1'154 troops from the seven states. The MPFSEE tested seven peacekeeping operations, including
the simulated Kosovo scenario. A
Turkish general commands the MPFSEE, and a Bulgarian officer is the battalion's
chief of staff. The contingent
headquarters is in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.
In
messages to the Serbian people of 19, 25 and 27 September, the EU and its EC
leaders clearly declared their firm support for democratic change in FRY and
promised to lift sanctions if Milosevic is voted out of power.
They also congratulated Kostunica for the opposition victory in the
elections.
ICTY-Bulgaria,
FYROM, Slovenia, Turkey. Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor of the ICTY, visited
Southeast European countries in early September and agreed to offer full support
in bringing to justice all who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.
ECHR-Turkey.
A long postponed trial of Greek Cyprus against Turkey began in the Hague
on 20 September in connection with some 170'000 people displaced from the
so-called Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic.
The main accusations against Turkey are violations of human rights on a
massive scale.
1.
The Serbian opposition's success in the presidential elections have
created great opportunities to improve the general security situation in the
Balkans. The future of the power
and constitutional structure inside Serbia and the status of Kosovo and
Montenegro bear the seeds of new tensions and clashes.
2.
The solidarity of countries from the Southeast European region to support
the democratic transition in FRY and outside help for the Balkans are decisive
factors in consolidating Southeast Europe irreversibly as one of the regular
European regions.
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