BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and October 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 10, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I.
INTRODUCTION
II. CONFLICT AND
POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
The Post-Conflict Situation in Kosovo
2. The Post-Conflict
Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Acts of Terrorism
III. THE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1.
Albania
2. Bulgaria
3. FRY
4. Slovenia
IV. BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATE OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVES
1.
Bilateral Relations
2. Regional Initiatives
V.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE BALKAN
COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1.
Bulgaria
2. FRY
3. Turkey-Bulgaria
4. The European Investment Bank
(EIB): Bulgaria-Romania
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF
EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United States
2. NATO
3. EU
4. Russia
VII. THE SECURITY SITUATION
AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
The
municipal elections in Albania, the parliamentary elections in Slovenia and the
municipal elections in Kosovo dominated political attention in the Balkan region
during October. However, the
people’s revolt in Serbia that toppled the dictatorial regime of former
Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic represents the major change of the
situation in Southeastern Europe during the last month.
The situation is novel for two reasons: first, because of better
opportunities for the social, political and economic homogenizing of the region
in general; and second, the dramatic improvements to the constitutional future
of Kosovo and Montenegro. The key
to both of these issues continues to be the internal democratic development of
Serbia, with a new culture of ethnic tolerance and cooperation.
The democratization of Serbian society is dependent on several factors:
the formation of democratic institutions and the adoption of democratic laws;
the peaceful resolution of the constitutional problems of Kosovo and Montenegro;
the introduction of democratic civilian control over the armed forces and all
other security institutions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); and the
restructuring of the mafia-type economy of the country after ten years of
external isolation and internal criminalization by the Milosevic regime.
There
is a list of tasks that must be performed before the country will be
reintegrated into the international community.
Each of the neighbors of the FRY has its own agenda, with bilateral
issues of a contentious character that need to be solved through negotiations in
good faith by both sides. The FRY
is expected to join the regional processes of security and cooperation, and
start behaving according to rules that were shaped over the past decade mostly
in the absence of the FRY, but never against the FRY and its peoples.
The international community is eager to see the FRY embark on a
persistent democratic path and is ready to support the country in its efforts.
The
long-expected event of the Kosovo municipal elections occurred on 28 October. The organization of the elections was carried out by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Many problems with voter registration, political violence between ethnic
Serbs and Albanians, and the unwillingness of most Serbs to participate in the
elections (even though they participated in the Serbian parliamentary and
presidential elections in September, mostly favoring Milosevic and his party)
illustrate the difficulties faced by the international community in Kosovo.
The preparation of the elections met the standards of credibility,
according to OSCE estimates. The
OSCE expects difficulties in the post-election period, both in implementing the
election results and on the issue of the councils in the Serb-dominated northern
municipalities. The main problems
stem from the expectation of some elected mayors of getting an independent
Kosovo state, which may make them unwilling to perform their tasks.
Nineteen political parties, three civil unions and fifteen independent
candidates ran election campaigns. Thirty
local councils with a two-year mandate will be elected from 5’500 candidates.
The major contenders are the party of moderate Albanian leader Ibrahim
Rugova, and the parties of the previous military leaders of the UCK (the Kosovo
Liberation Army). Even Rugova
himself called for an independent Kosovo at a big rally of his party on 25
October. The Albanian people in
Kosovo also have unrealistically high expectations of radical improvements to
the social, political and economic situations in the province. The election day passed calmly, and only the 1'464 Albanian
national flags flying over the polling stations introduced an element of concern
for the coming days. The landslide
victory of Rugova’s party makes no change to the thinking of the Albanian
population on the next step: the necessity for parliamentary elections.
The UN
mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has
suggested organizing separate elections for the Serbian population that
boycotted the vote on 28 October, but this would not redirect the ethnic hatred
and pro-independence trends in the Albanian part of the Kosovo society.
The
problems increased after declarations by the new Yugoslav president that Kosovo
is an inseparable part of Serbia, and that small contingents of the Yugoslav
army (VJ) and the police will return to the province by the end of the year. Although this is a provision of UN Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 1244, the eventual confrontation of VJ troops and ethnic Albanians
would destabilize the province and create difficulties for the Kosovo
Force (KFOR).
There remain problems with the return of all refugees and there are
concerns that 2'100 Albanian families from southern Serbia may migrate to
Kosovo, since they cannot survive in tents.
70'000 Albanians in Southern Serbia may be pulled into confrontation with
the Serbs by militant Albanian formations.
The boundary between Kosovo and the former
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
is still guarded ineffectively. The
most traumatic issue of the existing inter-ethnic hatred and intolerance will
continue to harm the build-up of democratic relations, institutions and rules.
Alia
Izetbegovic, chairman of the Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency, stepped down
this month and left the post to Jivko Radisic.
To
demonstrate his support for the ethnic brethren in the neighboring country and
to counterbalance his first voyage abroad as president to the European Union
(EU) meeting in Biarritz, the new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, made
his second diplomatic trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constituent state
Republika Srpska. This visit hardly
qualifies as an act of recognition of the neighboring state and its borders; an
act that was demonstrated in a clear fashion by Croatia after the visit of
Foreign Minister Tonino Picula to Sarajevo.
The continuing economic support of Belgrade for the Serb nationalists in
Bosnia increases the complexity of the security situation in that country.
The return of refugees of non-Serb origin to areas dominated by Serbs
continues to be very dependent on the political attitude in Belgrade.
A constructive approach by Kostunica may improve the Serbian refugee
situation in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo.
A
major problem for the post-conflict reconstruction process in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the persistent refusal of Kostunica to recognize the legitimacy
of the war-crimes tribunal in The Hague; this represents a new stumbling block
to the implementation of the 1995 Dayton peace accords.
a.
Turkey. A
powerful bomb was detonated in the Officers’ Club in downtown Istanbul on 5
October. Either a kamikaze action
or an accidental pre-detonation was most probably the reason for the terrorist
act, which ended only in the death of the terrorist himself – a 28-year-old
former member of an illegal left-wing extremist party close to the outlawed PKK
(the Kurdish Workers’ Party).
b.
Greece.
On 12 October a small anarchist group, “The Last Generation”,
accepted responsibility for bombing the car of a civil servant that caused
property damage only. Dozens of
small illegal groups act permanently in Athens, and they have made more than one
hundred similar attacks this year alone. Cars
of civil servants and foreign diplomats are the usual targets of these terrorist
acts.
On
the eve of the municipal elections in Albania on 1 October, the US, Norway and
Germany signed with Albania a memorandum of understanding for the destruction of
over 130'000 small arms and light weapons in that country.
In a 1999 declaration on small arms and light weapons, Albania – along
with nine other countries of Southeastern Europe – committed itself to the
destruction of collected illicit weapons and surplus military stocks.
Thus Albania became an example for other countries in the region in
dealing with the problem of small arms. On
1 October around 2.3 million Albanians participated in the local elections for
65 mayors and 300 other local authority representatives.
Despite some irregularities in the voting, the overall electoral process
met OSCE standards. This experience
has laid an important and positive foundation for the next summer’s national
elections.
(1)
Obsessed by panic from the growing political isolation of the ruling
Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF), its Head Secretary Christo Bisserov,
chairman of the National Security Commission of the Bulgarian parliament,
together with a member of the leading political body of the UDF (the National
Executive Council), Jordan Conev, chairman of the Budget Parliamentary
Commission, demanded on 25 October the resignation of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov
who is also the chairman of the UDF. The
accusation against Kostov was that he was separating the UDF from many of its
political allies. Bulgarian
President Petar Stoyanov, the influential mayor of Sofia (Stefan Sofiansky), the
Council of Ministers and the large majority of the MPs as well as the national
structures of the UDF backed the prime minister some nine months before the
upcoming general elections, which are followed in late 2001 by the presidential
elections. Getting virtually no
support from their own ranks, Bisserov and Conev resigned from their party and
parliamentary positions. According
to local analysts, this power struggle is motivated by the desire for economic
gains in the privatization process. While
the government of Kostov reduced hyperinflation in 1997 to levels better than
the EU average, it could not improve the low living standards of the Bulgarians,
causing a powerful drift to the political left.
(2)
The government approved the 1999 Defense Report on 26 October.
The stated priorities of the armed forces are modernization of air
defense systems and raising the motivation of military servicemen and women.
The
election fraud that occurred in September before, during and especially after
voting led the FRY to the brink of civil war.
Pressure from the supporters of Kostunica, who claimed a clear election
victory over Milosevic, reached the level of a peoples' uprising on 5-6 October.
The VJ, interior troops and the police decided to stay independent of the
political battles and did not employ their power to support the Milosevic
regime. The Constitutional Court,
which had previously decided to nullify the victory of Kostunica, stated on 10
October that Milosevic and Kostunica had received 37.15 per cent and 50.24 per
cent of the votes, respectively. This
change of position of the Constitutional Court was motivated by the
nullification of the results in two election districts due to fraud.
On the basis of these results, the Constitutional Court proclaimed
Kostunica as the legal president of the FRY.
The
new situation in the FRY has various effects on the security situation in
Southeastern Europe. The process of
democratization in the FRY is expected to be applied to ongoing democratization
in the rest of the peninsula, but this will be a gradual process.
The anti-NATO, anti-Montenegrin, anti-Kosovar Albanian pre-election
campaign of Kostunica will largely determine the way that the new democratic
institutions and laws of the FRY are shaped.
The very way that the so-called revolution took place – with the
agreement of the General Staff of the VJ, the police and the Serbian Socialist
Party of Milosevic – portends a long process of painful compromises in
achieving democracy in the country. Milomir
Minic, the new prime minister of Serbia and a close associate of Milosevic
(though more moderate in his views), is a typical example of this tendency.
Tens of thousands of "Milosevic people" are and will remain in
powerful positions for a long time. Eventually,
early republican elections for parliament, president and local authorities may
lead to some changes to the direction of development.
Democratic control over the armed forces and the security institutions
will surely be a major test for the Yugoslav society on its path to democracy.
Still, the situation is between revolution and democracy, said Kostunica
recently, and is the one to be arrested.
The
neutralization of mafia-type economics is another challenge.
According to Serbian expert sources, 70 per cent of economic transactions
take place in the “grey zone”, free from regulation and taxation.
However, the nearest security consequences may come from how the
constitutional status of Yugoslavia will be defined.
The future of Kosovo and Montenegro may become serious stumbling blocks
to democracy in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Roughly
700 imprisoned Albanians from Kosovo are still in Serbian jails, and Kostunica
is committed to sending VJ into Kosovo by the end of the year.
One cannot doubt that the Albanians will counteract and that the whole
situation will become a new burden for UNMIK and KFOR.
Although
Kostunica finally met the president of Montenegro, the pro-Western Milo
Djukanovic, in Podgorica on 17 October, Djukanovic declined to participate in
the new Yugoslav government. According
to a senior advisor of Djukanovic (Miodrag Vukovic), the present federation
cannot be saved. Instead, the new
system is expected to be something between a union and confederation.
Kostunica may seek a way out of the constitutional impasse through
referendums in Montenegro and Serbia. Serbia
will probably not use force to find the constitutional formula with Montenegro.
But independent Montenegro, having some 25–40 per cent of the
population in favor of preserving the present federation despite the degraded
status of Montenegro, may participate in internal clashes.
Considering the arming of pro-Serbian Montenegrins by the VJ, one may
expect the worse-case scenario of an escalation to a civil war.
During
his visit to Moscow on 27 October, the new Yugoslav president stated that he
viewed the Balkans as a terrain in which the US, the EU and Russia should
preserve a balanced influence, otherwise the situation would become very
unfavorable for the local countries. Thinking
of Southeastern Europe as a playground for balance-of-power exercises by the
great centers of world power is unacceptable and contradicts the tendencies of
the last ten years of regional evolution, in which the FRY did not participate
because it was focused on the creation of greater Serbia.
Any great power or institution must accept the choices of the people of
the region, and the majority favors EU and NATO integration whilst keeping
friendly relations with Russia. Moscow
and President Vladimir Putin risk being dragged in a way that is similar to how
they were dragged by Milosevic into power balancing that definitely led to a
diminished influence of Russia. More
correctly, this is the next, post-Milosevic effort of utilizing Russia’s
policy and Russia’s interests by Belgrade, by blinding the Russians with
various signs of civilization, religious and cultural toys from Huntington’s
toolbox. This is the modern
expression of the nationalism of Kostunica – trying to play different
influential powers against each other at their own expense, at the expense of
the other peoples and states in the Balkans, but always in favor of Serbia.
Less than two years ago Milosevic began this same game, balancing and
even trying to turn Russia against NATO, the US and the EU, whilst moving
delicately between the great power interrelationships.
Later Milosevic applied for membership in the Russia-Belarus union.
Kostunica discarded this official application on 27 October, but
preserved the “divided great powers” mode of thinking: within a divided
Europe and a divided EU-US relationship. The
next logical step is applying this to a divided Balkans, so that finally the
balancer – if not the power broker – will be Serbia and Yugoslavia.
While most of Serbia's neighbors are not going to be fooled into a new
Serbian international mismatch, there are concerns that Russia may misread the
new Yugoslav president’s experiments in diplomacy and fail to perceive that
behind the Slavonic brotherhood overtures and the requests for Russian gas lie
grander schemes to confront Russia with the EU, NATO and the US on the Balkan
terrain.
After
the elections in Slovenia on 15 October, the longest-serving prime minister in
Europe, Janez Drnovsek, will form the next government coalition after several
months break during which Andrej Bajuk served as Slovenia’s prime minister.
a.
Bulgaria-FRY.
On 6 October all parliamentary parties in Sofia recognized the victory of
the new Yugoslav president, and the majority of the Bulgarian MPs adopted a
declaration on the changes in the neighboring country.
The ruling UDF insisted on including in the declaration the principal
Bulgarian position during the Kosovo crisis in support of the alliance and the
international community, while the opposition Socialist Party declined to go
back to the past. Despite these
nuances there exists a generally positive attitude in the whole Bulgarian
political spectrum on involving the neighboring state in a constructive
region-building activity in the Balkans following the isolation of the FRY over
the last ten years.
Bulgarian
Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova visited Belgrade on 23-24 October, and met
with leaders of the democratic opposition of Serbia: Goran Svilanovic and Vladan
Batic. She had talks with the mayor
of Belgrade, Milan Protic, and with the new Yugoslav president. Before these meetings Bulgaria had negotiated the export to
the FRY of one billion kWh of electrical energy, worth US$ 30-35 million per
year. The import of this energy has
a critical meaning for the FRY over the coming cold Balkan winter.
The Bulgarian president met with Kostunica in Skopje on 25 October, at
the meeting of regional leaders. This
was the only bilateral talk of the new Yugoslav president, except for the
meeting with Dr Javier Solana, the high representative for the common
foreign and security policy of the
EU, in Skopje. Though Bulgaria has
clearly formulated its claims for improvement of the treatment of the Bulgarian
national minority by Belgrade, and for the erasing from Serbian school books of
the statement that Bulgarians are the eternal enemies of the Serbs, Stoyanov did
not disclose these contentious issues during the bilateral talks.
Instead they discussed short-term economic projects of common interest to
the two countries, including the construction of the Nis-Sofia part of European
Transport Corridor No 10 within the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.
However, unless these issues that are harming the bilateral relations are
not solved, the regional atmosphere of trust and reconciliation risks being
degraded.
b.
FYROM-FRY.
The presidents of the two countries, Boris Traikovsky and Kostunica, met
briefly in Skopje on 25 October and agreed to resolve their border
disagreements.
c.
Bulgaria-Croatia.
Croatian President Stippe Mesic made an official visit to Sofia on 2-3
October, and met with the Bulgarian president and prime minister, and other
Bulgarian leaders. They discussed a broad range of bilateral relations,
including the national minorities and the joint work for EU integration,
regional stability and cooperation. The
two presidents adopted a joint declaration in support of the new Yugoslav
president. Mesic shared with the
Bulgarian media his concerns regarding the FRY’s non-cooperation with
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague,
as well as the danger of provoking by Milosevic and his supporters of an
eventual split of Montenegro, and blaming the new leadership for the break-up of
the federation.
d.
Greece-Turkey.
A NATO-induced effort for a confidence-building measure between Greek and
Turkish armed forces within the “Destined Glory” military exercise failed
after Greece announced on 22 October that it has cancelled its participation.
The exercise was generally a successful one, including the first arrival
of Greek troops on Turkish soil for 78 years.
It was a very good counterpart to the earlier NATO exercise “Dynamic
Mix”, which took place in the summer and involved Turkish troops on Greek
soil. The reason for Greece's
withdrawal from the exercise was unsatisfactory regulation of the way that Greek
aircraft would overfly the Greek islands of Limnos and Ikaria – an issue for
which the Turkish side has major objections. The rapprochement between the two countries that was started
more than a year ago, however, did not end with the dispute of the two
countries’ air forces. Despite a
harsh declaration by the Greek defense minister, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, that
Turkey is a destabilizing factor and any tolerance by Greece would be dangerous,
on the following day (25 October) in Skopje the prime ministers of the two
states, Costas Simitis and Bülent Ecevit, continued the bilateral political
dialogue in the interest of the two countries and of the region.
e.
Bulgaria-Turkey.
The new, temporary general consul of Turkey in Burgas, Southeastern
Bulgaria, began his service on 9 October. The
mandate of the previous Turkish consul was terminated, and she was called back
by Ankara after protests by the Bulgarian government.
A large group of leading Turkish and Bulgarian businessmen met near
Varna, Bulgaria, on 21-22 October for discussions aimed at intensifying their
business transactions. The
presidents of the two countries sent greetings to the participants of the
meeting.
f.
FYROM-Bulgaria.
The leader of the Democratic Party of the Albanians, Arben Xafferi, the
coalition partner of the ruling party in Skopje, visited Sofia on 20 October and
met with Bulgarian MPs. He stated
that he understood that the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia has not yet
ended, and repeated his support for an independent Kosovo.
The
new defense minister of FYROM, Liuben Paunovsky, visited Sofia on 24 October and
met with his counterpart, Boyko Noev. Paunovsky
presented a list detailing the armaments, equipment and spare parts required by
the armed forces of his country. The
two ministers signed an agreement for the training of military personnel from
Skopje in the Bulgarian defense college “Rakovsky”.
They also concluded agreements for cooperation in civil defense,
military-technical issues and military intelligence. They also reached an agreement for the joint training of
paratroops and divers. Bulgaria
provided a major help to Skopje during the Kosovo crisis, by sustaining one of
the bigger refugee camps. Bulgaria
also provided a donation to the young armed forces of 94 T-55 tanks, 108 M-30
artillery pieces, 14 reconstruction machines, 60 packages of tank shells and 90
guns. Skopje has asked for two
patrol boats for the Ohridsko and Prespansko lakes.
The Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff declared that Bulgaria can, if
agreed, provide air-defense armaments and military airplanes.
FYROM has not yet kept its pledge to take care of the 471 unknown graves
of Bulgarian soldiers. 180'000 Bulgarians have been killed between 1903 and 1944 in
the territory of FYROM, in the uprisings, the liberation wars, World War I and
World War II.
The
presidents of the two countries met in Skopje on 25 October and discussed new
perspectives on cooperation after the changes in the FRY.
They also discussed cooperation within the multinational peacekeeping
contingent based in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.
a.
The Pact of Stability for
Southeastern Europe.
(1)
The forum within the Pact of Stability that discussed cooperation in
fighting organized crime in the region ended in Sofia on 6 October.
Bodo Hombach, the coordinator of the Pact, was acquainted with the
Bulgarian project of turning Sofia into a coordinating center for fighting
terrorism. A working group within
the Pact will be headed by Bulgaria. Bulgaria
has been successful at fighting drugs trafficking and illegal migration.
(2)
Hombach told the fifth Defense Ministerial in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 9
October that the Pact will fund a MPFSEE project (the multinational peacekeeping
force) for the construction of a field command communication and information
system. Norway is expected to be a
major contributor to this project.
(3)
The regular Economic Forum for southeastern Europe, as a part of activity
within the Pact of Stability, was convened in Sofia on 16 October.
Hombach defined Sofia, Zagreb and Belgrade as the potential new
“economic tigers” of the region.
(4)
The FRY was accepted as a member of the Pact in Bucharest on 26 October.
This membership will be profitable for the FRY in the reconstruction of
its damaged infrastructure and in developing cooperative relations with its
neighboring states by working on joint projects.
b.
The Danube Commission.
It became clear on 16 October that the eleven-nation Danube Commission,
based in Budapest, has agreed with the Yugoslav authorities to begin cleaning
the river of debris from the war of 1999. It
is expected that the operation, which is headed by an experienced French
engineer, will be completed by February or March of next year.
c.
South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).
The SECI anti-crime center opened in Bucharest on 2 October. Sharing of information and law enforcement efforts may help
authorities develop a case that will lead to the arrest and prosecution – and
conviction – of figures in the world of organized crime.
The Romanian government provided a site for the center on the 10th floor
of the Romanian parliament.
d.
Southeastern European Defense Ministerial
(SEDM).
The fifth SEDM was convened in Thessaloniki on 9 October.
In its four years of existence this forum has assumed the features of an
organization and has made an enormous contribution to stability and security
throughout the region by creating a multinational force that recently held a
successful exercise in Bulgaria. The
force will be ready for deployment within the next two months.
At the meeting in Thessaloniki the Bulgarian proposal of involving the
MPFSEE in engineering reconstruction activities in Kosovo was accepted.
It is highly probable that by the end of December the Chiefs of the
General Staffs of the armed forces of the participating countries will meet in
Sofia to discuss practical issues regarding the decisions of the defense
ministers. Croatia participated in the SEDM for the first time.
The Bulgarian and Greek defense ministers and the US Secretary of Defense
launched the idea of involving the new democratic Yugoslavia in the work of the
SEDM.
e.
Process of Stability and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe (the
"Sofia Process").
The fourth summit meeting within the Process of Stability and Cooperation
was convened in Skopje on 25 October. This
is a bottom-up regional effort, initiated in Sofia in July 1996, with the
objective that the countries of the region take more responsibility in reaching
stable and cooperative relationships in southeastern Europe, to develop
good-neighborly relations and the economies of the countries and of the region,
deal with international crime and improve cultural, humanitarian and social
cooperation. The previous summit
meetings were held as follows: on the island of Crete, Greece, in 1997; in
Antalya, Turkey, in the autumn of 1998; and in Bucharest in the spring of
(without Yugoslav participation, after an agreement between the participating
countries not to invite representatives of the Milosevic regime). The new Yugoslav president participated in the Skopje forum,
together with the Albanian president, Rexep Meidani, the Romanian president,
Emil Konstantinescu, the Bulgarian, Greek and Turkish presidents, and the
president of the hosting country. Goran
Granic, the Croatian deputy prime minister, and Jivko Radisic, the chairman of
the Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency, were observers at the forum.
The US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, paid due respect to this
summit, where he met with Kostunica, Dr Solana and Hombach.
This was the first meeting of Balkan leaders at which there was a
homogenized sharing of values: democracy, human rights, the market economy and
the rule of law. From this meeting
there is the clear opportunity for completing the construction of a Balkan
community of nations that will never again resort to violent means in solving
their disputes. The launch of
common infrastructure projects was seen is a pragmatic way of knitting the
economies of the Balkan countries together.
Although there is a long road ahead, the prospects for the region have
never been brighter following the end of the dictatorial regime in Belgrade.
The
draft budget for 2001 predicts an increase of 13.38 per cent in the defense
budget to US$ 627 million, an increase of 2.69 per cent in the education budget
to US$ 191 million, a decrease of 0.53 per cent in the culture budget to US$
18.9 million, an increase of 0.96 per cent in the healthcare budget to US$ 210
million, and no change in the budget of the municipalities at US$ 219 million.
The inflation for 2001 is expected to be 6 per cent, down from 9.5 per
cent in 2000.
While
much of the attention in Yugoslavia is concentrated on the drive to rid industry
of Milosevic’s managers, urgent economic needs are associated with the coming
winter. Yugoslavia is aiming to
raise about US$ 500 million from international donors to help finance imports of
fuel over the winter months. No
less important is the rate at which aid can be delivered.
(1)
The Russian gas company Gasprom agreed to increase its delivery of
natural gas for Turkey through Bulgaria. In
the autumn of 2001, the "Blue Stream” gas pipeline under the Black Sea is
expected to become functional, and the structure of Russian transit deliveries
to Turkey are going to be reconsidered.
(2)
Turkey increased by 20 per cent the licenses for Bulgarian trucks, to a
total of 6'000.
(3)
Turkey also displayed interest in recycling passenger train carriages in
a Bulgarian plant.
The
EIB will provide 50 per cent of the money needed for the construction of a
second bridge over the Danube. Under
consideration are two projects for the construction of the bridge.
The main financial contribution is from the Bulgarian budget; Romania is
expected to invest just €
30 million (US$ 26 million). The bridge will also be used for the transportation of gas
between Vidin (in Bulgaria) and Kalafat (in Romania).
US-Bulgaria.
(1)
Army General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
US armed forces, visited Sofia on 9 October.
His main message at his meetings with the prime minister, the minister of
defense and the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian armed forces, as well as with
the Bulgarian public was that the US perceives Bulgaria as the most likely
candidate for NATO membership in Southeastern Europe. He praised the ambitious program of the Bulgarian armed
forces to meet 82 practical requirements for joining the alliance.
General Shelton also praised the Bulgarian participation in SFOR and in
KFOR.
(2)
US Assistant Secretary of State James Dobbins visited Sofia on 23
October. He had meetings with the
president, the deputy prime minister and the deputy minister of foreign affairs.
Dobbins discussed the new opportunities of the Pact of Stability after
the changes in the FRY, and joint measures in fighting organized crime and drugs
trafficking. He shared the US
assessments of the role of the country as a stabilizing factor in the region,
and believes that after the eventual shifts in the US administration following
the presidential elections in November, the US policy towards the Balkans will
not be changed.
US-FRY.
(1)
After discussing the political impasse in the FRY that followed the
elections with her European counterparts, US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright said on 2 October that the US will continue to make the case that
Milosevic lost and that he ought to step down.
(2)
On 6 October, US President Clinton hailed the election of Kostunica in
Serbia as an extraordinary victory for the people of the former Yugoslavia.
He added that now is the time to build the economic and civil
institutions that will allow democracy to endure, reconciliation and cooperation
to develop, and the economy to grow.
(3)
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen told the press in Thessaloniki on 8
October that Milosevic should be tried for war crimes, but that a delay in
turning him over to the ICT in The Hague will not stop the US from working with
the new Yugoslav president.
(4)
On 12 October, Clinton directed the Department of the Treasury and the
State Department to begin lifting trade and financial sanctions immediately,
including the oil embargo that was imposed against Serbia in 1998.
He left in place those sanctions that were targeted against members of
the former regime, including a ban on travel to the US.
The US will also review its restrictions on Serbia’s participation in
international financial institutions as Serbia makes its transition to democracy
and meets its international obligations.
(5)
The US Special Envoy for Democracy in the Balkans, Jim O’Brien, had a
warm and positive one-and-a-half-hour-long discussion with Kostunica and his
senior political team on 12 October. They
discussed Bosnia, Kosovo, consolidation of democracy in the FRY and the future
of Milosevic. O’Brien delivered a
letter from the US president congratulating Kostunica and looking forward to the
re-establishment of normal relations. Kostunica pledged to honor the Dayton peace accords and UNSC
Resolution 1244. For the time being
the US will maintain a small presence in Belgrade, headed by Ambassador William
Montgomery. Reopening the US
Embassy with a larger number of staff will take some time, due to security and
other considerations.
(6)
Holbrooke met Kostunica in Skopje on 25 October – the highest-ranking
US official to meet the new Yugoslav leader.
The membership of the FRY in the UN was discussed.
Soon after the meeting the Montenegrin reaction was that the process of
including the FRY in the UN should first consider the way that the two
constituent republics are going to solve their fundamental constitutional
problems.
(7)
The US Congress approved an aid package to Serbia on 25 October, in the
form of a "Foreign Operations Bill" that also includes funds.
The conditions attached to the aid package include a five-month waiting
period before the conditions take effect, which will allow for the continuing
consolidation of the new democratic government under Kostunica.
The US administration also values highly the roles of the Stability Pact,
the neighboring countries of the FRY and the EU, who also support the process of
keeping the positive changes going in Belgrade.
US-Greece.
The Chief of Staff of the US air force, General Ryan, met with the chief
of the Greek air force, General Dimitris Lintzerakos, in Washington DC on 10
October. Lintzerakos met also with
the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers.
The discussions between the two sides included the Greek government’s
decision to purchase the Block-50 F-16s, training issues and other topics of
interest for the US and Hellenic air forces.
US-Turkey.
Clinton sent a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on
19 October, urging him in the strongest terms not to bring Resolution 596 (the
"Armenian Genocide” Bill) to the floor of the House for debate and
consideration. Speaker J. Dennis
Hastert withdrew the resolution shortly before the full House was due to vote on
it. According to the president’s
letter, the consideration of House Resolution 596 at this time could have
far-reaching negative consequences for the United States, in terms of containing
the threat posed by Sadam Hussein, of working for peace and stability in the
Middle East and Central Asia, of stabilizing the Balkans and of developing new
sources of energy. The resolution
may also undermine efforts to encourage improved relations between Armenia and
Turkey, which is the very goal that the Resolution’s sponsors seek to advance.
NATO-Bulgaria.
(1)
The assistant Secretary General of NATO on political issues, Dr
Klaus-Peter Kleiber, visited Sofia on 1-2 October and met with the prime
minister, the foreign minister and the minister of defense of Bulgaria, and the
deputy minister of defense for defense policy.
Dr Kleiber discussed the preparation of the country for NATO membership
and visited the MPFSEE in Plovdiv.
(2)
A French and an Italian battalion arrived in Bulgaria on 9 October for
training at the exercise grounds in Koren and Novo selo.
The specific type of terrain makes these grounds attractive to the two
NATO countries’ armed forces.
(3)
Lord George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, met in Sofia on 12-13
October with the ministers of defense of the nine countries applying for NATO
membership, together with the three new members of the alliance: Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Lord
Robertson told the ministers that becoming a member of NATO is not a political
reward, and he also told the Bulgarian prime minister that KFOR will not
decrease in size.
(4)
After Lord Robertson's visit, the Chiefs of Staff of the army, air force
and navy initiated an acceleration of the implementation of Plan 2004 for the
reform of the Bulgarian armed forces. All
changes have been re-scheduled with a new deadline of 2002.
(5)
A meeting of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs and of defense,
Vassiliy Takev and Velizar Shalamanov, was convened in Brussels on 26 October in
the 19+1 format. Bulgaria will
present the North
Atlantic Council with a report on
the implementation of the military reform in January 2001, which will be
followed by a visit by NATO representatives to check the state of affairs.
EU-FRY.
(1)
In Luxembourg, on 9 October, the EU foreign ministers voted unanimously
to start lifting the international sanctions against the FRY. This included
removing a blockade on oil deliveries and a ban on commercial air travel to
Yugoslavia; a freeze on state assets and a selective ban on visas remain in
force. The European Commission (EC)
president, Romano Prodi, disclosed to the German “Bild” newspaper that the
EU will provide €
2 billion (US$ 1.7 billion) urgent
help to the FRY.
(2)
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrin visited Belgrade and met with
Kostunica on 10 October, on behalf of the presidency of the EU.
They discussed the range of needs of the FRY.
(3)
Kostunica attended a meeting with the EU heads of governments on 13
October to discussed the aid that the FRY needs over the upcoming months.
EU-Bulgaria.
(1)
At a conference dealing with Bulgaria’s EU integration in Sofia on 27
October, the Bulgarian prime minister strongly denounced the EC Commissioner Günter
Verheugen’s statement – made during a pre-recorded video presentation –
that Bulgaria does not have a market economy.
Kostov retorted that the conditions are in place in Bulgaria for economic
growth, and that the EC Commissioner obviously has problems with the way that he
expresses himself. Further, Kostov
said that the EC Commissioner does not need to repeat constantly that Bulgaria
will not be among the group of countries that will join the EU in 2005, since
the Bulgarian government has itself stated clearly its scheduled activity and
negotiation stages that will enable it to join the EU by the end of 2006.
(2)
In a telephone conversation with the Bulgarian prime minister on 27
October, Prodi promised to do his best to resolve the Bulgarian visa issue with
the EU Council.
Russia-Bulgaria.
(1)
After a meeting in Moscow on 11 October between Russian Prime Minister
Mikhail Kassyanov and Gueorgy Parvanov, the leader of the biggest parliamentary
opposition party (the Bulgarian Socialist Party), both sides agreed that their
bilateral relations are unsatisfactory. The
Russian PM said that developing trading relations might be very profitable for
Bulgaria. Russia is interested in
developing nuclear energy and the transportation of gas to and through Bulgaria.
Parvanov proposed cooperation in defense industrial production.
(2)
The speaker of the Russian ministry of atomic energy, Yuriy Bespalko,
told the Russian press agency ITAR-TASS on 24 October that Russia will no longer
store the radioactive waste of the Bulgarian nuclear plant at Kozloduy.
Instead, the used fuel will be processed and returned to Bulgaria.
This new development may have grave environmental consequences in
Bulgaria.
Russia-FRY.
(1)
After initial hesitation, dubious declarations and acts of guaranteeing a
political role for Milosevic in Yugoslavia, Russia recognized the election
victory of the new Yugoslav president.
(2)
The president of the FRY visited Moscow and met with President Putin on
27 October. The two sides reached
an agreement to resume gas deliveries to Yugoslavia by Gasprom.
Belgrade has a US$ 400 million debt to the Russian gas company.
Although no details of the deal are yet known, a consequence will be the
stabilization of the political position of Kostunica in his troubled country.
During the visit of the Yugoslav president, Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov said that Belgrade is the closest partner of Moscow in the Balkans.
(1)
After initiating four wars in the former Yugoslavia, Milosevic was
removed from power. A complex and
uneasy process of democratic changes was started, and expectations are that it
will not be a short one. The
changes in the FRY did not upset the stability of the security situation in the
Balkans. Yugoslavia is at the
beginning of the process of adapting to existing formats of regional
cooperation, from which it was alienated by the Milosevic regime. However, difficult problems remain in the area of security,
with the pending constitutional problems in Kosovo and Montenegro.
The way that civil-military relations are going to be shaped in the FRY
is also a potential source of tensions and instability.
Most importantly, the way the Yugoslav society will be rehabilitated by
democracy will highlight many other security problems in the region.
A troubling aspect of the new Yugoslav foreign policy is the tendency to
conceive the Balkans as the terrain for balancing interests of external powers
and not, as a region, for expanding democratic and security space.
This thinking is absolutely unacceptable to the neighbors of the FRY and
portends new, post-Milosevic efforts for power brokering in the region by
Belgrade itself.
(2)
The start – and eventual success – of the democratic transition of
the FRY may lead to a more homogeneous economic, political, social, security and
humanitarian space in the Balkans; this is an important prerequisite for the
region-building evolution of southeastern Europe. The opening of the Pact of Stability for the FRY is an
opportunity to bring the people of this country into both the regional and the
European mainstream.
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CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
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Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
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Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
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Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
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Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
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Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
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Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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