BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and November 2000 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 11, 2000
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I.
INTRODUCTION
II. CONFLICT AND
POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The Post-Conflict Situation in Kosovo
2. The Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III. THE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Bulgaria
2. Greece
3. FRY
4. Romania
IV. BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATE OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVES
1. Bilateral Relations
2. Multilateral Relations
3. Regional Initiatives
V.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE BALKAN
COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1.
Bulgaria
2. FRY
3. Turkey-Bulgaria
4. The
European Investment Bank (EIB): Bulgaria-Romania
5. Bulgaria-FYROM-Albania
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF
EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
1.
The United States
2. NATO
3. EU
4. Russia
VII. THE SECURITY SITUATION
AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
November 2000 was
marked by reactions to a series of elections in the region: municipal elections
in Kosovo, federal presidential and parliamentary elections in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), federal and local elections in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, presidential elections in the constituent Republika Srpska,
and parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania.
The post-election
period in Kosovo brought some of the worst acts of terrorism in recent
months. Security in neighbouring
Southern Serbia, whose population includes a big Albanian minority, worsened
after intensified activity by militant forces against Serbian authorities and
the Serbian response to these acts. The
momentum towards independence following the elections in Kosovo was the main
factor behind these destabilising activities.
The drive for
independence in Montenegro significantly affects politics and security in the
Balkans. Perceived in the West as proof
of the democratic changes in FRY, the call for independence is rapidly becoming
an article of faith for the Montenegrins, who see it as a natural outcome of
their courage in opposing the former dictatorial regime.
Five years to the
month after Dayton, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still divided three ways and lacks
effective central institutions, including armed forces. The fact that indicted war criminals remain
openly at liberty constitutes a major obstacle to integration in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
FRY continued to
re-establish itself in the international community. With a new and democratic government, Serbia now needs to make a
greater contribution to the efforts to stabilize trouble spots in the former
Yugoslavia. This would require, of
course, more resolute internal political acts, including the restriction of the
influence of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and the stimulation
of democracy. It would also require
from Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica a defusing of the persistent hatred
directed at those who backed NATO's steps to curtail the devastation of two
million Albanians and the suppression of democracy in Serbia. Willingly or not, Kostunica has inherited
the consequences of the NATO campaign against the oppressive regime of
Milosevic. Any attempt to demonize
NATO's Kosovo campaign for domestic or – worse – external advantage runs the
risk of obstructing social, economic and political evolution in Serbia.
The new political
situation in Serbia and the path to democracy it has undertaken have motivated
Bulgaria to reconsider the balance between regional and EU involvement in favor
of the latter, since it considers that the rebuilding of the region can best be
carried out in a European context.
While remaining a staunch example of stability to the long-troubled
region, Bulgaria insists on assuming its responsibilities as a prospective EU
member, since it regards membership as the most effective means of ensuring
ongoing progress in Bulgaria and in Southeastern Europe generally. Experts at the Brussels-based Centre for
European Political Studies (CEPS) have correctly noted Bulgaria's unwillingness
to accept the Pact of Stability for Southeast Europe as a kind of substitute
for membership of the EU.
The successful
municipal elections in Kosovo opened the way to the next step in the
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 – the
establishment of Kosovo-wide institutions.
However, tension and violence will not easily disappear from
Kosovo. On 22 November a bomb ripped
through the residence of senior FRY representative in Kosovo Stanimir
Vukicevic. He was not harmed, but one
Serb was killed and three others were wounded in the early morning blast. The terrorist act was a professional one,
according to Kosovo Force (KFOR) sources.
Tensions
escalated further after Jemmail Mustafa, a close associate of the moderate
Albanian Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, was assassinated in front of his home
on 23 November. Rugova's party won the
municipal elections in Kosovo on 28 October.
Since 21 November
the Army for the Liberation of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (ALPBM) in
Southern Serbia has intensified its movements to and from Kosovo. Serbian sources have reported the killing of
four policemen by 400 armed Albanians in Southern Serbia. Serbian police stationed in the
demilitarized zone between Serbia and Kosovo are preparing for a strike against
ALPBM. They await orders from national
and international authorities. On 24
November Kostunica insisted that KFOR restore order in the buffer zone between
Kosovo and Serbia within 72 hours. The
Yugoslav authorities want Kosovo to be hermetically sealed as a prerequisite
for peace in the province. FRY Foreign
Minister Goran Svilanovic told Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov on 24
November that the international community should determine the status of Kosovo
and that neighboring Bulgaria, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), along with FRY, should become the guarantors of this status. In the meantime, FYROM armed forces
intensified their activities along the border with Kosovo. Admiral Guido Venturoni, head of the NATO
Military Committee, said during a visit to Bulgaria on 23 November that KFOR is
in full control of the buffer zone along the Kosovo-Serbian border. On 28 November Serbian authorities and
representatives of ALPBM agreed to scale down hostilities. Kostunica said that war should not be expected
because of the refugee flows from Southern Serbia to Kosovo, but some police
enforcement would be needed to restore order.
KFOR representatives have been instrumental in mediating the agreement
between the Serbs and the Albanians of ALPBM. However, the agreement is
scheduled to expire on 1 December.
Furthermore, KFOR troops from the US contingent actively patrol the
buffer zone between Kosovo and Southern Serbia.
The 11 November
elections for government representatives at various levels were the latest of
five successful elections since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sixty-three per cent of eligible voters
participated, and the elections were monitored by 700 international supervisors
from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The election process was orderly and
peaceful. There is an obvious trend
toward greater political pluralism. At
the same time, the victory of hard-line nationalist or separatist parties in
the elections may be considered a setback, especially in Republika Srpska,
where Mirko Sarovic was elected president with 50.1 per cent of the vote. The establishment of a multi-ethnic state
based on freedom and tolerance, the ongoing return of refugees, and the
privatization of the economy in Bosnia can be achieved only when the central
political structure has been strengthened and those indicted by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have been
brought to justice. If the newly
elected authorities do not cooperate in the fulfillment of these tasks, the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) will be in position to remove
uncooperative officials, according to the Dayton accord. The newly elected representatives on the
governing bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina have the political and moral obligation
to match the political progress in neighboring Croatia and Serbia.
On 21 November
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community marked the fifth
anniversary of the signing in Paris of the peace accord worked out in Dayton,
Ohio. Five years after Dayton put an
end to the systematic killing in Bosnia, analysts can enumerate at least six
big issues that remain to be addressed in the coming years. The first is the need to strengthen the
presidency and the other central authorities of the federation; the
establishment of an effective military force is a priority. The second issue is the need to accelerate
the return of refugees; by mid-November 35'063 Muslims and 3'170 Croats had
returned since the end of the war, most in the last two years, but that is just
a fraction of those who were driven from their homes during the war. The third issue is the need to deal with
corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability; privatization and
economic reform will remain impossible if attention is not paid to these
problems. Fourth, there is the need to
weaken and eliminate extremist political parties. Fifth, new laws need to be adopted to protect the freedom of the press
– a vital component of a free society.
Finally, the search for and the apprehension of indicted war criminals
must continue. On 17 November Richard
Holbrooke, speaking on the fifth anniversary of the Dayton accord, of which he
is the architect, said that the continued presence at large of Karadzic, Mladic
and Milosevic is “a symbol of defiance against the international community ...
and it undermines the efforts to implement Dayton”.
The Bulgarian
political parties are trying to define winning coalitions for the general
elections to be held in June-July 2001.
These will be the first elections in which the major contenders from the
Right and the Left will not diverge on fundamental issues related to national
security and foreign policy: they agree
on the need for integration with both the EU and NATO.
The Greek
Ministry of Defense has decided that the size of the armed forces will decrease
and they will become more professional.
The document names Turkey as a potential security threat and recommends
a strategic build-up to face threats from the East. However, NATO remains the bedrock of Greek national defense. Turkey is a member of that Alliance too.
On 1 November the
UN General Assembly's acceptance of Yugoslavia's application for membership was
accompanied by acclamation, speeches, an escort to conduct the FRY delegation
to its seat in the assembly hall, and a flag-raising ceremony. The UN's priorities for Yugoslavia continue to
be the release of political prisoners, cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague,
and clarification of the relations between Serbia and Montenegro.
On 4 November a
new federal government was chosen by the Yugoslav Parliament (Skupstina). Forty-nine-year-old Zoran Zizic,
Vice-Chairman of the Socialist Party of Montenegro, is the new prime
minister. Nine of the 16 cabinet
members are from the democratic opposition of Serbia, supporting
Kostunica. Immediate economic issues,
next year's budget and the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations are
prominent on the agenda of the new cabinet.
While FRY's new foreign minister declared that his country will
establish diplomatic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina and will strengthen its
relations with neighboring FYROM, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Hungary, there
is still a need to clarify relations with Kosovo (formally a Serbian province),
with Montenegro and with Albania. It is
important that Serbia, which occupies a central position in the Balkans, is active
in promoting stable relations among the countries of Southeastern Europe.
On 24 November,
during the international EU-Western Balkans conference in Zagreb, Montenegrin
President Milo Jukanovic said that the referendum on independence for his
country would take place in the first half of 2001. The US and the West have generally not supported independence for
Montenegro. Instead they have called for transparent democratic discussions
between Montenegro and Serbia that would lead eventually to mutually satisfactory
arrangements between the two republics.
However, there is already evidence that discussions between their
leaders on a full range of issues of mutual concern have not produced the
results expected by the US and the West.
The drive for independence in Montenegro is gathering momentum, and a
democratic solution to this uneasy situation needs to be agreed between
Jukanovic and Kostunica to prevent conflict.
Present threats of conflict between the two countries need to be
prevented by utilizing the democratic potential that is gathering momentum in
Belgrade and is already strong in Podgoriza.
The June local elections revealed a north-south split and a de facto
internal border within Montenegro; moves to heal this schism must form part of
the joint political effort of the two leaders and deserve international
support.
Preparation for
the general elections in Serbia on 23 December have provoked new waves of
activity from the Socialist Party of Serbia, headed by Milosevic, who was
re-elected unopposed as leader by the party congress on 25 November. His version of the events of the first week
of October is that a coup d'état removed him from power, though earlier in
October he conceded victory to Kostunica in the presidential elections. He also cites traitors – paid spies of the
West – as a principal cause of the dramatic change in his fortunes. His wife, the influential Mira Markovic, has
directly accused the generals within the police and the armed forces who failed
to use force against the opposition in September-October this year. A few days later, on 28 November, she joined
the newly elected Yugoslav parliament as an MP representing the hard-line
leftist party that she leads. As Peter
Maas wrote recently in The New York Times, “If history is any guide, Serbia's
rendezvous with truth is years away.”
Patience and time will be needed to face the truth about the past decade
that destroyed so much in the Balkans and about the part played not only by the
politicians of FRY, but also by its people.
The parliamentary
and presidential elections in Romania on 26 November brought the former
Communists back to power. Ion Iliescu,
the Party of Social Democracy (PSD) leader who served as president in 1990-96,
won 36.7 per cent of the vote, while the candidate from the nationalist Greater
Romania party came second with 28.4 per cent.
The two candidates will contest a second round of elections on 10
December. The parliament will contain
representatives of the PSD, which won 37 per cent of the vote, the Greater
Romania party with 20 per cent, as well as the National Liberal party led by
Mircha Ionescu-Kintus and the Democratic Party representing the Hungarians in
Romania. The ruling center-right
coalition could not pass the 10 per cent entry threshold set for
coalitions. There is consensus among
the Romanian people and politicians regarding the country's eventual membership
of both the EU and NATO. However, huge
economic and administrative reforms are needed to reach both goals. The turn towards populism and nationalism
will not provide the best political context in which to solve the huge tasks of
economic and social improvement.
a. Greece-Bulgaria. On 13 November Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Petar Zhotev and
Greek Minister of Economics Yanos Papandoniou met in Sofia to discuss Greece's
investment of US$ 60 million in Bulgarian projects. This is part of a bigger Greek plan for reconstruction in the
Balkans. The projects should be
completed by 2004. Papandoniou also met
Prime Minister Ivan Kostov. Trade
between the two countries in 1999 was US$ 648 million. Of the ten European transport corridors five
cross Bulgaria and three cross Greece.
b. Bulgaria-Croatia. On 25 November in Budapest Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov
and Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan agreed that Racan should visit Sofia
for talks by the end of December.
c. FYROM-Greece. Lubomir Frchkovsky, the former interior and foreign minister of
FYROM, wrote on 28 November in the independent newspaper Dnevnik that Greek
influence on the evolving political processes in FYROM had become too
aggressive. By 1 December the ruling
coalition in Skopje will face a no-confidence vote after the Democratic
Alternative party left the government of Prime Minister Liubcho
Georgievsky. The center-right
government of Georgievsky inherited 50 per cent unemployment from the Social
Democratic Union (the former pro-Milosevic Communists), but managed to cope
with the refugee crisis in 1999 and to secure peace with the Albanian minority,
partly by engaging it in the government of the country. This month the government of Georgievsky
managed to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.
d. Bulgaria-Turkey. Nadezhda Mihailova, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, and Ismail
Cem, his counterpart from Turkey, met on 27 November during the OSCE meeting in
Vienna. They confirmed the stability of
their bilateral relations and their countries' important role in ensuring
stability in the Balkan region.
Post-Yugoslav
Relations: FRY, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Slovenia. The division of
the former Yugoslav federation's wealth started this month in Sarajevo. Forty-six tons of gold are to be divided
among the former constituent republics.
According to a scheme proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
FRY would get 36.52 per cent, Croatia 28.49 per cent, Slovenia 16.39 per cent,
Bosnia-Herzegovina 13.2 per cent and FYROM 5.4 per cent. Final approval is expected in Belgrade in
the first week of December.
(1) A Pact of
Stability meeting under the title “Consultative Forum with the Yugoslav
Authorities” was convened on 13-14 November in Belgrade. Bodo Hombach, the pact's coordinator,
attended the forum, as did the Hungarian foreign minister, the president of
FRY, a representative of the Bulgarian foreign ministry and representatives of
60 municipalities from Europe and North America. The aim was to transform the so-called “Seged process”, which
supported 120 towns run by the Serbian opposition, into a wider ranging process
in support of Yugoslav municipalities.
(2) On 20
November Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov met with EC President Romano
Prodi. Part of their agenda dealt with
Bulgaria's evolving attitudes to its engagements with the current plethora of
regional initiatives vis-ŕ-vis its larger efforts to achieve entry into the EU. Bulgaria strongly disagrees with the Serbian
view that integration into the EU is a matter for the region as a whole, rather
than for the individual countries of Southeastern Europe. The strategy of differentiated accession to
the EU is the one the EU is expected to follow in Southeastern Europe. However, Bulgaria's reluctance to invest its
entire political energy in the multitude of regional initiatives – the “Sofia
process”, SECI, the Pact of Stability – should not be seen as a refusal to
contribute to the production of stability in the region. Bulgaria is destined to remain the symbol of
stability in Southeastern Europe, but it hopes to fulfill this role in a
context that will provide greater possibilities for concentration on its
pre-accession obligations to the EU.
Bulgaria is satisfied with the results of its regional activity
throughout the 1990s, and now, with Milosevic already gone from power in
Belgrade and FRY looking to be more actively involved in improving the
stability of regional relations, Sofia conceives its region-building policy as
more closely linked to the integration of individual countries into the
EU. Being in the forefront of this
initiative along with Slovenia, it may serve to promote the attractiveness of
Southeastern Europe to the expanding EU by proving the viability of individual
national cases in the region. Europe
and European-ness will thus become an integral part of the ethos of the
Balkans, as it is in Greece.
The Albanian
Government has imposed limitations on the supply of electricity. The worst drought in 30 years, coupled with
the fact that only half the population regularly pays for the consumption of
electricity, has caused use to be restricted to just five hours per day.
(1) According to
the National Statistics Institute, inflation for the first 10 months of this
year in Bulgaria was 10.1 per cent. The
inflation in 1998 was only 1 per cent, and in 1999 6.2 per cent. The inflation planned for 2000 by the government
was 2.8 per cent, and this figure was corrected three times during the year –
to 3.5, 6.3 and 9.5 per cent.
(2) Bulgaria has
received only US$ 24 million of the US$ 200 million promised by the EU to pay
for the closure of the country's first two nuclear plant reactors, in Kozloduy,
by 2002. On 13 November the prime
minister declared that if the EU is not ready to provide financial and
technical support, the two parties should reconsider the terms of the closure.
The Currency Council
of Montenegro has decided to ban transactions in Yugoslav dinars in the
republic from 13 November. The only
legal currency remains the German mark, introduced a year ago in parallel with
the dinar.
On 13-14 November
in Belgrade, Yugoslav and Bulgarian construction firms agreed to sign a
protocol of intent for the joint construction of the Sofia-Nis highway. They face the problem of clarifying the
financial scheme for implementing the project.
The highway is part of the Bulgarian National Plan of Regional
Development for 2001 and may attract Bulgarian subsidies along with funding
from external sources. The construction
of gas pipelines from Bulgaria to Serbia was also on the agenda for bilateral
cooperation between the two countries.
The three
countries are preparing a trilateral memorandum for cooperation in the
construction of the oil pipeline from Bourgas (Bulgaria) to Vlora (Albania)
through FYROM. The US AMBO Corporation
has evaluated the project costs at US$ 1.13 billion, and on 28 November head of
AMBO Ted Ferguson told Bulgarian Minister for Construction Evgeniy Chachev in
Sofia that AMBO will invest in the project, which will take four years to
complete. By March 2001 Exxon, Texaco
and Chevron will also decide the extent of their participation in the
project. The oil pipeline is expected
to become functional by 2005-06. The
three countries are expected to adopt identical tax legislation in this area
shortly.
US-Bulgaria. (1) On 2 November in Washington, DC, the two
countries signed a Preliminary Cultural Preservation Agreement. At the signing ceremony Department of
Treasury deputy secretary Richard Eizenstat said that preservation of the
cultural heritage of nations goes beyond buildings, historic places and sacred
sites to the teaching, learning and cultural values that make up the soul of a
country.
(2) US Ambassador
to Sofia Richard Miles said on 14 November that the validity of US visas for
Bulgarians will soon be extended from three months to several years.
US-FRY. (1) The US has established formal diplomatic
relations with FRY, effective from 17 November. In a statement on 18 November, US President Bill Clinton
explained the decision as a demonstration of support for a historic democratic
transition that he said was far from over.
The US provides US$ 45 million in emergency food aid for the people of
Serbia. This month FRY re-established
both its membership of the UN and the OSCE and its diplomatic relations with
other Western states.
(2) At a briefing
by officials of the ICTY on 21 November, Ambassador James B. Cunningham, US
deputy permanent representative to the UN, said all major figures indicted by
the tribunal, including Milosevic, must end up in court. He said major political and military figures
indicted and still at large, some in leadership positions in the Republika
Srpska, impeded the full implementation of the Dayton accord and prevented
refugees from returning to their homes.
NATO-Bulgaria. (1) Bulgaria will withdraw its transport
platoon from the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 15 January
next year, according to a Council of Ministers decision on 16 November. The decision needs to be approved by the
parliament. The reason is the expected
doubling of the country's participation in the KFOR missions in Kosovo.
(2) On 23
November head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Guido Venturoni visited
Bulgaria and met the president, the prime minister, the minister of defense and
other military leaders.
(3) On 30
November Deputy Secretary-General of NATO Sergio Balanzino visited Sofia and
met the president, the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs and
defense. The talks focused on
Bulgaria's preparation for NATO membership.
NATO-FRY. (1) On 20 November the NATO-Ukraine
Commission, in a meeting at ambassadorial level, welcomed the democratic
changes in FRY and reaffirmed its commitment to the full implementation of UNSC
Resolution 1244 and to the establishment of a multi-ethnic and democratic
Kosovo within FRY.
(2) In a speech
in Dayton, Ohio, on 18 November marking the fifth anniversary of the peace
accord that ended the war in Bosnia, US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow
called for a reorientation of NATO's relationships with Bosnia, Kosovo and FRY
away from confrontation and toward cooperation and integration. Vershbow said that only when NATO air power
was harnessed to the assertive diplomacy of the US, which reached its climax in
Dayton, was the US able to put an end to the Bosnian war. In Kosovo NATO applied the same logic. Through the air campaign and KFOR's
deployment to Kosovo, NATO made clear that genocide and the politics of hatred
and conquest are not acceptable in the modern world.
EU-Bulgaria. (1) The regular EC report for 2000 on the
country's progress towards accession gives a favorable assessment of Bulgaria's
reforms and fulfillment of the accession criteria, especially as compared with
other candidate countries from the region.
However, the level of corruption and the state of the administrative,
judicial and banking systems are not yet acceptable to the commission. More also needs to be done in terms of
economic growth.
(2) The meeting
of the EU Council of Ministers (of the Interior and Justice) from 30 November
to 1 December will deal with the lifting of the visa regime for Bulgaria in
accordance with the motion passed by the General Affairs Council and the
Committee of the Permanent Representatives on 22 November. Bulgarian society and its official
institutions agree on the need to lift the Schengen visa regime. The resolution of this issue by the EU will
have a substantial effect on how the country's integration and its regional and
foreign policy develop.
EU-Western Balkans. On 24 November in Zagreb, foreign
ministers of the 15 EU member states and Balkan leaders from Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, FRY and Slovenia attended a summit that
declared a new era of cooperation between the EU and this part of the region
that has been so troubled over the last 10 years. Croatia and the EU presidency co-hosted the event. Bernard Kouchner, head of the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), represented Kosovo at the
meeting. It would be unrealistic to
expect too much of this conference, but it gave a good start to the settling of
relations among the post-Yugoslav sovereign states after a decade of war,
hatred and ethnic intolerance. The
western part of the Balkans owes much to the general stability of the region,
and the countries originating from the former Yugoslav federation need to work
hard to cancel this debt. A special
effort is needed to improve Serb-Albanian relations for the good of the Balkans
and Europe. The participation of
Kostunica was one of the highlights of the summit. However, concerning the relations of FRY with the powers external
to the region – the EU, the US and Russia – one can hardly agree with
Kostunica's views. According to his
conception, Europe together with Russia would serve (in the interests of
Serbia) as a counter-balance to the US.
Such a configuration would excessively entrench these influential power
centers of modern international relations in the region, and thus provide a
recipe for disagreements, contradictions and clashes – a development clearly at
odds with the interests of the region, which needs their benign involvement and
not a balancing of their powers. This
outdated approach to policy in the Balkans logically contradicts Kostunica's
vision of integration into the EU on a regional rather than an individual
country basis. What would integration
mean according to his logic – uniting together against the might of the
Americans? Obviously this thinking and
its outcomes favor neither bilateral links between individual Balkan countries
and the US nor the EU's interest in cooperating with Washington to cope with
hard issues of security in various corners of the world. Moreover, it is time to put an end to the
Yugoslav policy of involving the Russians against the EU and the US in the
Balkans.
EU-FYROM. On 24 November the EU and FYROM signed the
Agreement of Stabilization and Association, which will pave the way for the
future accession of Skopje into the EU.
EU-Turkey. (1) On 8 November, following a declaration
by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz that his country will be ready to
start accession negotiations with the EU in 2001, the EU published a list of
the short- and medium-term reforms that Ankara will need to undertake in the
meantime. The commission's document
includes the following recommendations:
continuing Turkey's moratorium on the death penalty pending its
abolition; allowing all citizens equal rights in terms of culture, education
and broadcasting; lifting restrictions on freedom of expression and ending
torture; and curbing the influence exercised by the military in politics by
virtue of their presence on the National Security Council, whose
secretary-general is a top-ranking military officer.
(2) On 23
November Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stressed Turkey's dissatisfaction
with the EU's suggestions about the involvement of non-EU NATO members in the
formation and activity of the future EU rapid reaction force. Ecevit said that Turkey would not
automatically allow NATO troops, equipment and bases in its territory to be
used by the EU, unless Turkey was allowed to take part in the decision-making
process of the EU-led operations.
Russia-FYROM. Russia requested permission from both NATO
and Skopje to station six to seven officers in FYROM to provide logistical
support to the Russian KFOR contingent in Kosovo. Russia also requires a base for the technical maintenance of its
machines and equipment in Kosovo.
Russia-Bulgaria. On 24 November the Bulgarian Minister for
Emergency Situations signed an agreement in Moscow with his Russian counterpart
for mutual help in handling cases of emergency.
1. The tensions in southern Serbia and the
killing of four Serbian policemen by Albanian extremists, despite the
cease-fire agreement, augur difficult relations between the 70'000 Albanians
living there and the Serb authorities.
The intervention of KFOR preserves the stability of the situation, but
the unresolved Albanian question as well as the pending Serbian question in the
western Balkans will need to be handled by more courageous and openly
democratic means than the traditional use of kalashnikovs on the Albanian side
and tanks on the Serbian side – a scenario all too familiar from Kosovo. Albanian leaders (in Kosovo, southern
Serbia, western FYROM and Albania) as well as the new president in Belgrade
need to think and act along the lines discussed at the EU-Western Balkans
summit in Zagreb this month.
Montenegro's drift towards independence continues without any clear and
open discussion by the international community. The rise of nationalist forces in Republika Srpska (in
Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in Romania represents a negative factor in the evolving
political situation of the Balkans.
2. Efforts to rebuild the Balkans are at a
turning point after the elections in Romania and the signals towards Brussels
from Sofia during the last month. The
EU needs finally to step in decisively in Southeastern Europe with an
encompassing strategy designed to benefit not just one state, but all its
future borderlands.
|
EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |
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Dr. Dinko Dinkov |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
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