BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and January 2001 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 1, 2001
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I. INTRODUCTION
II.
CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1. The Post-Conflict
Situation in Kosovo
2. Post-Conflict
Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Terrorism
4. Ecological Security
III.
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Bulgaria
2. The FRY
3. Romania
IV.
THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE STATE OF
REGIONAL INITIATIVES
1. Bilateral
Relations
2. Regional Initiatives:
the Pact of Stability for Southeastern Europe
V. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
IN THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1. Bulgaria
2. Greece
3. Turkey-Bulgaria
4. FYROM-Bulgaria
5. FRY-World Trade
Organization (WTO)
6. Bulgaria-FRY
7. The Pact of Stability
for Southeastern Europe
VI.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The
United States
2. NATO
3.
EU
4. OSCE
5. Russia
VII. THE SECURITY AND
THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
The beginning of 2001 was
marked by reduced tension in Southern Serbia. But by the end of January a new
rise in tension had occurred, caused by: the international community’s focus
on ecological security in Kosovo related to the depleted uranium (DU) issue,
acts of terrorism in Greece, and the intensified activism of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Other highlights of the month included the election of the new and
democratic government of Serbia and the dynamic start of the new Yugoslav
diplomacy. The new US Administration with its intentions in Southeastern
Europe has already influenced Balkan countries’ policies and relations.
Accelerating Bulgarian preparations for the 2002 NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) summit was another feature of the local regional activities
this month.
1.
The Post-Conflict Situation in Kosovo
The
new representative of the United Nations (UN) secretary-general for Kosovo,
former Danish defence minister Hans Haekkerup, who replaced Dr. Bernard
Kouchner of France, considers creating good and safe voting conditions in
Kosovo more important than early elections.
The safe return of more than 100'000 ethnic Serbs to the province will
not be an easy task. Unless this
failing of UNMIK and of the radical Albanians, seeking revenge for the Serb
atrocities, is not reversed, the elections are unlikely to lead to stability in
the post-election period.
There
has been progress in the tense Kosovo-Southern Serbia area since the beginning
of January, following a verbal agreement by senior NATO officers that was
reached with ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanian leaders.
As a result roadblocks were lifted and civilian traffic was allowed
through the 5-mile-wide buffer zone. In
the last week of January, however, tensions rose again after four Serb policemen
were killed by rebel Albanians.
Speaking
for the last time on the Balkans as the US chief representative to the UN
Security Council (UNSC) on 18 January, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke urged the
international community to focus on “two overriding issues of transcendent
historic importance” in Kosovo: holding Kosovo-wide elections as soon as
possible, and holding talks on the final status of the Serbian province.
This is obviously a suggestion that runs counter to the intentions of the
new UNSC special representative. The
latter is helping the new democratic government in Belgrade to come to terms
with the Albanians from the province, and is giving the Albanians a chance to
work out a cooperative relationship with the Serbs from the depressed situation
of Kosovo.
2.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The
former president of Republika Srpska and a key wartime leader, Biljana Plavsic,
turned herself over to the ICTY in The Hague on 9 January to face war crimes
charges. Plavsic is known as a hard-line nationalist politician, and
was a key aide to the former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.
Plavsic is accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
She is the highest ranking Bosnian Serb official to face ICTY charges.
Plavsic claims that she is innocent, but records provide evidence to the
contrary, including photos taken at the beginning of the 1990s.
On 11 January she pleaded not guilty to all of the nine charges against
her. An official statement from her
party said that Plavsic defends the dignity of the Serbian people and that the
Serb people as a whole cannot be tried for war crimes.
The feeling of victimization is self-generated by the Bosnian Serbs,
supported by Plavsic's party, the Serbian People’s Alliance.
The
international community remains concerned about the continued participation of
extremist parties in the government of Republika Srpska, and also in their
activities in the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The presence of the Serb Democratic Party in the government of Republika
Srpska is a major reason for re-considering the assistance programmes to the
various recipients in Bosnia and Herzegovina, depending on their support for the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
3. Terrorism
The
car belonging to the Turkish trade attaché to Athens was set on fire in the
Greek capital on 6 January. No one was injured in the incident.
Two other cars were also burned in the center of the capital.
No terrorist group has claimed responsibility for these actions.
A
member of the Greek parliament, the deputy leader of the opposition Nea
Demokratia Party, Vassilis Michaloliakos, was injured in an assassination
attempt in Athens on 22 January. He
was seriously wounded by a car bomb outside his home, though his condition is
not critical. The brother of the MP
was also injured slightly, and his daughter sustained no injuries. The “17th November” terrorist group is suspected by the
police.
4.
Ecological Security
a.
The suggested link between DU-tipped weapons and cancer among Balkan
peacekeepers caused wide public and expert discussions throughout Europe and
North America. The World Health
Organization, the European Union (EU), NATO, the Council of Europe, and many
government officials joined the discussion, together with academic and other
specialists. Fact-finding and
testing teams have been sent by national governments, mainly from defense
ministries. The link between cancer
in soldiers who have served in the region and the munitions with DU has not yet
been proven scientifically. A team
of experts from the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has visited the area of
stationing of the Bulgarian contingent and has found no evidence of any existing
danger to the health of the military personnel or the police in Kosovo.
In a show visit the Bulgarian minister of defense, Boyko Noev, brought
his 10-year-old daughter to the Kosovo province on 21 January and met with his
German counterpart, Rudolf Scharping. In
a press conference they disputed a connection between the DU and the health of
the members of KFOR (Kosovo Force) members.
b.
One of the worst cases of cyanide contamination of a Romanian river
caused the death of a large number of fish in the Siret River on 19 January.
Many people were admitted to hospitals suffering from poisoning after
eating fish from the river.
c.
The advance of the Sahara desert into southern parts of Europe was
reported as an imminent danger for Southeastern Europe by scholars at a UN forum
in Germany last month. The water
balance in the region is worsening and additional government measures might be
needed to cope with this problem.
1. Bulgaria
(1)
The leaders of four left-wing parties and movements in Bulgaria – the
Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party, the United
Block of Labor, and the “Social democrats” political movement – signed a
memorandum on establishing the “New Left” political union in Sofia on 7
January . Each of the four parties
preserves its organizational autonomy and ideological identity, but agrees to
form a stable center-left coalition, with the election of the government based
on strong expert participation. The
four parties will have common candidates in the upcoming general, presidential,
and local elections once the forums of the respective coalition partners make
the decision. The new coalition
will apply for “observer” status in the party of the European Socialists.
The new center-left coalition will strive for both EU and NATO
membership.
According
to the International Labor Organization, Bulgaria has an unemployment rate of 20
per cent, whereas the largest Bulgarian trade union organization, the KNSB
considers the number is more like 26 to 27 per cent of the available Bulgarian
workforce.
(2)
Bulgaria had destroyed 881'970 anti-personnel mines (APMs) by the end of
December 2000, as part of the implementation of the APM Convention.
Of these, 13'926 had been in minefields, with the rest coming from
stores. Four thousand APMs have
been kept for training purposes. Bulgaria ratified the Convention in September 1999, and since
then has destroyed 68 minefields. Two
countries that neighbor Bulgaria, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY), are not signatories to the Convention, and their borders with Bulgaria
still have minefields.
2. The
FRY
(1)
The issue of the constitutional future of Montenegro becomes more
complicated with each passing day. A
directorate chief in the Interior Ministry, Darko Raspopovic, who was a close
aide to Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, was killed on 9 January.
The pro-independence ruling party, the Democratic Party of the
Socialists, proposed on 8 January that early elections should be held at the end
of March in order to resolve the government crisis that followed the dissolution
of the “For a Better Life” coalition. The
protests of the coalition partner, the People’s Party, have been aimed at the
government’s proposal to turn the Yugoslav Federation into a loose
constitutional body of two internationally recognized states, which would be
considered a de facto independence. The
opinion of Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica is that any re-definition of
the relationship between the two republics should be made within the federation,
to be consistent with international law. Foreign policy, defense, monetary and economic policy,
transport, communications, and the basic social services would remain areas of
federal responsibility. The EU
foreign ministers sharply rejected the idea of the Djukanovic government for
independence on 22 January, and urged Montenegro to shape its future in a
federation with the Serbs. They
warned against any unilateral action by Podgorica.
The EU foreign ministers associated stability in the FRY with the
preservation of the federation. President
Kostunica stated on 19 January that Belgrade is ready to use all democratic and
legal means to try to prevent the secession of Montenegro.
The prime minister designate, Zoran Djindjic, said on 24 January that he
wants the federation to be maintained for the next three years, after which it
could be dissolved if this was the will of the Montenegrins, with the new
parliament deciding if a referendum is necessary.
Djindjic is concerned about the effects of the independence of Montenegro
on Kosovo, rather than about Montenegro itself.
According to a recent poll of two Montenegrin non-governmental
organizations, almost 50 per cent of the people in Montenegro favor
independence, with almost 40 per cent opposing it.
(2)
President Kostunica met the former leader of the federation, Slobodan
Milosevic, on 14 January. They
discussed the situation in Kosovo, relations between Serbia and Montenegro, and
relations with the ICTY in The Hague. Kostunica
declared after the meeting that for constitutional reasons he will not hand over
his predecessor to the ICTY authorities: the country’s basic laws do not allow
extradition of nationals. Kostunica
added that cooperation with the ICTY would be possible if the national dignity
of the Serbs is not offended. The
initial declaration by Kostunica, that he would not meet ICTY prosecutor Carla
Del Ponte during her visit because she has not been an ambassador, was reversed
on the grounds that he had to ask her questions about the use of DU against
Serbs by NATO. Del Ponte was in
Belgrade on 23-25 January urging the new democratic authorities of Serbia and
the FRY to arrest war-crimes suspects, including Milosevic.
Kostunica accused Del Ponte that the tribunal is a political instrument
against the Serbian people, and that Milosevic will be persecuted by the
judicial authorities in Serbia for allegations of corruption and abuse of power.
A one-hour meeting on 24 January between the Kostunica and Del Ponte
ended in failure. Though
disappointed, Del Ponte said that she is optimistic that Milosevic will be
arrested and put on trial. Meetings
with some of the ministers of the new Serbian government formed a more
productive part of Del Ponte’s visit; but not that held with Zoran Djindjic,
who is of the opinion that judges from The Hague should come to Belgrade to
study the national judicial system there. However,
it seems difficult to justify – from a legal standpoint – that a Serbian
court should take precedence over a UN war-crimes tribunal.
(3)
The first post-Communist parliament of Serbia was convened in Belgrade on
22 January, with 250 MPs participating in the event.
The first post-Milosevic government was elected by more than two-thirds
of the vote, mainly from the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.
The opposition party of Milosevic, the Serbian Socialist Party, has 37
MPs, the nationalist Radical Party has 23 MPs, and the nationalist Party of
Serbian Unity has 24 MPs. Zoran
Djindjic was elected as the new prime minister.
His government must decide on the reform process in Serbia.
A major obstacle will be the compromise reached with the military, the
police, and the security services during the so-called October revolution of the
Serb people, during which bloodshed was prevented.
The price paid by the democratic opposition will be felt during the
reform period, especially in the attitudes to the military and paramilitary
forces of the FRY, including the issue of war criminals.
3. Romania
Radu
Timofte, vice-chairman of the Senate Commission for Foreign Intelligence, was
appointed by the president to be chief of the country’s intelligence services
on 12 January. He awaits confirmation by the parliament, and has promised an
improvement to the legal basis of intelligence activity in Romania. Kostin
Georgescu, his predecessor, was appointed as Romania’s ambassador to Cyprus.
1.
Bilateral Relations
a. Albania-FRY.
The FRY announced on 11 January that it is ready to resume diplomatic
relations with Albania, with the Albanian side replying on 12 January that it is
also ready. Diplomatic ties between
the two neighboring states were cut in April 1999 after the beginning of the
“Allied Force” operation against Yugoslavia.
The Foreign Ministry of Albania expressed its hope that the renewed ties
will serve the interests of both countries, and security and stability in the
region.
b. Bulgaria-FYROM.
(1) At a meeting in
Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, on 12 January, the chiefs of the police services of
Bulgaria and the Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) agreed to a regular
exchange of information in combating, for example, car thefts, illegal
migration, prostitution, and drugs smuggling. Regular personal contact was agreed.
(2)
Branko Crvenkovski, the leader of the main opposition party in the FYROM,
the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia, visited Sofia on 15 January at the
invitation of the leadership of the main Bulgarian opposition party, the
Bulgarian Socialist Party. Crvenkovski
is widely known for his active anti-Bulgarian and pro-Serbian political
behavior. He has agreed with his
Bulgarian counterparts to refrain from cooperation with the Socialist Party of
Milosevic in Belgrade.
(3)
Bulgarian Defense Minister Boyko Noev met with his counterpart from the
FYROM, Ljuben Paunovski, in Skopje on 20 January. The Bulgarian MoD will supply the Macedonian armed forces
with a modern radar communication system (according to the standards of NATO).
A Macedonian delegation will soon visit Sofia to discuss a broader list
of needs for the armed forces of FYROM.
c. Greece-Bulgaria.
Noev met with his Greek counterpart, Akis Tsochatzopoulos, in Athens on
17 January. They discussed the DU
situation in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
They agreed to hold a joint bilateral infantry exercise by April 2001. The Bulgarian defense minister was received by the
vice-chairman of the Greek parliament and by Greek President Constantinos
Stefanopoulos.
d. Bosnia and
Herzegovina-FRY. President
Kostunica of the FRY visited Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 January in a
demonstration of support for the Dayton Agreement.
It is expected that the two countries will soon exchange ambassadors.
e. Croatia-Bulgaria.
The deputy foreign minister of Bulgaria and chief negotiator for the EU
accession talks, Vladimir Kissyov, visited Zagreb on 23 January to discuss with
his Croat counterpart how Croatia could learn from the Bulgarian experience in
their negotiations with the EU. Training
of Croatian experts by Bulgarian colleagues has also been agreed.
Croatia started its Stabilization and Association Talks with the EU in
October 2000.
f. Bulgaria-FRY.
The new Yugoslav foreign minister, Goran Svilanovic, met with his
counterpart, Nadezhda Mihailova, and with the prime minister and the president
of Bulgaria during an official visit to Sofia on 25 January.
The two foreign ministers signed a re-admission agreement that would ease
substantially the bilateral visa arrangements after Bulgaria joins the Schengen
visa regime zone later this Spring.
2. Regional Initiatives:
the Pact of Stability for Southeastern Europe
The
Center for the Development of the Media in Southeastern Europe was launched in
Sofia, Bulgaria, on 25 January, in the context of the Pact of Stability.
Journalists from all countries of Southeastern Europe will be trained in
the Center. A radio studio for
training and a conference hall for 35 will host eight qualification courses in
2001, beginning in February.
1. Bulgaria.
(1) The foreign debt of
Bulgaria rose by US$ 124 million during December 2000, bringing the overall debt
to US$ 8.97 billion. Bulgaria paid
back US$ 877 million in 2000. (2)
The economic team of the present Cabinet of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov
has predicted an annual rise in the GDP of 8 per cent in coming years.
They reported their findings during the Davos Economic Forum in January.
2. Greece.
Greece became the 12th member of the euro currency zone on 1 January.
Seventy per cent of Greeks support this decision by their government,
according to opinion polls in the country.
3. Turkey-Bulgaria.
Following a request from Turkey, Russia will increase the natural gas
supply through Bulgaria by 18 per cent.
4. FYROM-Bulgaria.
The monopolistic electric power company of FYROM,
“Elektrostopanstvo”, has chosen the Bulgarian National Electric Company as
its supplier of electricity for US$ 7.5 million. Bulgaria will supply 200 megawatts to the neighboring country
during daytime, and 80-130 megawatts during the night.
FYROM experiences water shortages that are reflected in the production of
electricity.
5. FRY-World Trade
Organization (WTO). The FRY
took steps to join the WTO in Geneva on 23 January.
Legislative reforms and opening the Yugoslavian market are essential
requirements to joining the Organization. Slovenia
and Croatia are members of the WTO, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM have
already applied for membership.
6. Bulgaria-FRY.
The deputy foreign-economic relations minister of the FRY, Dejan Jovovic,
met with his Bulgarian counterpart, Christo Mikhailovsky, in Sofia on 25
January, and stated that changes to the foreign-trade regime of the FRY will
facilitate bilateral exchanges. The
two sides are discussing the signing of a bilateral agreement for free trade,
and experts will press on the issue in February.
7. The Pact of Stability
for Southeastern Europe. Seven
Balkan states signed an agreement in Geneva on 18 January for the creation of a
free-trade zone. Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the FRY, the FYROM, and Romania agreed to
liberalize their trade relations as a way of improving their chances of joining
the EU. Bulgaria has accepted this
Pact of Stability initiative but still believes that such regimes will isolate
the country from integration into wider systems of free trade and hence will
slow down its accession to the EU.
1.
The United States
USA-FRY.
(1) Svilanovic visited the
US in the first week of January and met with US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright. This visit has opened a
new era in bilateral relations and it has provided an opportunity to close the
period connected with the leadership of the FRY by Slobodan Milosevic.
Albright underlined the position of the international community that
Milosevic and others indicted by the ICTY must be held accountable in The Hague
for their actions. From his side,
Svilanovic underlined the issues of the integrity of the FRY, the cooperation
with the ICTY, and economic cooperation between the two countries, especially
the need for lifting the sanctions regime against Yugoslavia.
(2)
The US formally announced the lifting of their economic sanctions on
Yugoslavia on 19 January. Sanctions
on 81 Serbs, including Milosevic, his family, and associates remain in place.
However, the US Administration will report to Congress by the end of
March on how the Yugoslav authorities have cooperated with the ICTY, and on how
this should be reflected in the aid that the US provides to the FRY.
USA-Romania.
The Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank of the US announced on 12 January that two
loan guarantees by the bank will support the export of US$ 59 million worth of
critically needed medical equipment by US suppliers to the Romanian Ministry of
Health for use by hospitals and clinics throughout Romania.
Some 18 US companies participate in the sale of sterilization modules,
electro-surgery units, patient monitoring displays, and echocardiography imaging
systems to help Romania modernize its health sector.
The Romanian government is expected to purchase substantial additional
medical equipment in the future for this modernization program.
USA-Bulgaria.
The chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, General Miho Mihov, met with
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US armed forces, General Henry
Shelton, in the Pentagon on 18 January. This
visit was an official one and marked the deepening of bilateral military
cooperation. The relations between Bulgaria and NATO and the country’s
cooperation with US experts within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program were
discussed by the two military leaders. General
Shelton made a visit to Sofia in November 2000.
2. NATO
NATO-USA-Southeastern
Europe. During the Senate
confirmation hearing on 17 January, the Secretary of State-designate, General
Colin Powell, said that the US will come up with a set of standards this year
that will be used to determine which nation applicants for NATO membership will
be admitted during the summit meeting in 2002.
A major standard is expected to be the strength that the candidate would
bring to NATO – not in terms of manpower and military strength, but in terms
of improvement to the strategic environment that is created when they are part
of NATO rather than remaining outside of NATO.
NATO-FRY.
Svilanovic visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels on 10 January.
He discussed with the NATO secretary general the measures that KFOR can
take in countering Albanian terrorism in the 5-km buffer zone between Serbia and
Kosovo. This was the first visit of
a high-ranking Yugoslav official since the NATO strike against the FRY in 1999.
The foreign minister told the NATO secretary general that the armed
forces of the FRY and NATO are no longer enemies.
NATO-Bulgaria.
(1) NATO plans its biggest
air exercise for 2001 to take place in Bulgaria.
The details of the “Cooperative Key – 2001” exercise were discussed
in Sofia on 12 January by the military command of the Bulgarian armed forces and
the NATO air force commander for Southern Europe, General Ronald Kees.
The exercise will be a PfP one and will be the first one to be held in
Bulgaria. Last year Romania hosted
the exercise. The exercise has
taken place eight times in NATO member states.
It is already known that US, Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian air-force
units will participate. The NATO
commander also met with the Bulgarian minister of defense, Boyko Noev, on 12
January.
(2)
A third Bulgarian engineering and construction squad arrived in the
German camp Suva reka in Kosovo on 18 January, as part of the KFOR.
Forty officers, sergeants, and soldiers were taught about working in a DU
environment.
(3)
The commander of the allied forces for Southern Europe, Admiral James
Ellies, arrived in Sofia on 23 January. He
met with the defense minister and with the chief of the General Staff of the
Bulgarian armed forces, and he praised the Bulgarian experience in constructing
a modern air defense. Future
cooperation of the Bulgarian armed forces and NATO were also discussed.
3.
EU
EU-Bulgaria.
At the Davos Economic Summit on 26 January, President Petar Stoyanov of
Bulgaria launched an idea of a ‘shock enlargement’ of the EU by all of the
applicant countries that are currently in accession negotiations with the Union.
On the next day the European Commissioner for EU enlargement, Günter
Ferheugen, replied negatively to the "big bang" idea, claiming that
the concrete procedures of the process are defined already and cannot be
altered. The idea of Stoyanov is
not new, but its actual meaning is that the political momentum of enlarging the
EU may be lost, due to the difficulties associated with the enlargement to the
East, especially for the republics in the EU member states.
That may cause dangerous Euro-skepticism, especially in Eastern, Central,
and Southeastern Europe, which is a development that should be prevented.
Furthermore, Central and Southeast European applicants for membership of
the EU are hurrying to confirm the geopolitical engagement of the EU with these
new democratic states.
4. OSCE
OSCE-Albania.
In connection with the sobering report by the head of the OSCE’s
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) presence in Albania,
Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, the Permanent Council confirmed on 18 January the
necessity of keeping the electoral area as the Organization’s priority.
A number of improvements must be made to Albania’s electoral process in
order to ensure that the parliamentary elections in Spring meet international
standards of conduct. For this
purpose the Central Elections Commission should be strengthened, and the voter
lists should be fixed and made accurate and acceptable to all participating
parties. Another issue is the development of a more constructive
opposition in the country.
5. Russia
Russia-Bulgaria.
Russia discarded Bulgaria’s proposal of signing a re-admission
agreement as a basis of negotiating an easier visa regime between the two
countries on 24 January. This negative reply from Russia leads to the introduction of
a visa regime for the citizens of the two countries from June 2001.
Bulgaria is joining the Schengen visa regime area from the Spring of this
year, and would not turn into a corridor of legal and illegal migration from
East to West because of bad regulation of bilateral visa relations with third
countries. Bulgaria did not receive
the Russian reply until more than one and a half years after the initial
notification of the proposal for signing a re-admission agreement.
Russia’s negative answer can only be interpreted as an unwillingness to
counter illegal migration in Europe. Bulgaria
agreed to accept Russia’s proposal of launching negotiations that would chart
the parameters of the classic visa regime between the two states.
Russia’s argument that it does not have re-admission agreements with
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and that Bulgaria cannot
pretend having such a regime in bilateral relations is indicative of two
Russia’s perspectives: first, that Bulgaria is a second-rate country compared
to the CIS countries; and second, Russia can press its own cases in
international relations because it is the more powerful country.
The second argument was additionally proved by the declaration of the
Russian ambassador to Sofia that Bulgaria will lose from the lower number of
Russian tourists to this country. To
many observers this sounded similar to the threats from previous periods of
European history. It is
inconsistent to accept that visas are needed for Italy or France but not for
Bulgaria; however, this treatment by Russia is consistent with earlier
declarations that re-admitting is a very expensive procedure, which is true, but
many feel that keeping legal order intact is worth investing in.
Furthermore, Ukraine and Yugoslavia have already agreed to sign such
re-admission agreements with Bulgaria, to build an easier visa exchange and to
demonstrate that Bulgaria has been implementing its solemn pledges to the
Schengen visa regime states. This
policy of the Russian government deprives millions of Russian citizens who would
like to visit – or having been visiting – Bulgarian resorts to which they
are attracted. This policy of
Russia is interpreted by the broader Bulgarian society, which is by tradition
fond of the Russian people, as an unacceptable pressure to change the
country’s course of integration in the EU and NATO.
1.
The upcoming elections in Kosovo and the future status of the province,
the progress towards shaping a centralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
tough relations between the FRY and the ICTY in The Hague, ecological security
issues, and acts of terrorism in Greece are the important issues in the security
agenda of the Balkans.
2.
Fixing the new pro-EU and pro-NATO geopolitical orientation of
Southeastern Europe is also part of the region-building orientations of the
region, as can be seen from Bulgaria’s relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia
over the past month.
|
EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
|
Dr. Todor Tagarev |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |