BALKAN REGIONAL PROFILE:
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION OF
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
(A Background and May 2001 Issue in Brief)
Research Study 5, 2001
Hard copy: ISSN 1311 - 3240
AN
I S N-SPONSORED MONTHLY
ELECTRONIC PERIODICAL
I. INTRODUCTION
II.
CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS
1.
The Conflict in Macedonia and Southern Serbia and the Post-Conflict Situation
in Kosovo
2. Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
III.
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES: SPECIFIC ISSUES
1. Bulgaria
2. Croatia
3. Greece
4. Romania
IV.
THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS: REGIONAL
INITIATIVES
1.
Bilateral Relations
2. Multilateral Relations
3. Regional Initiatives
V.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AND IN THE REGION
1. Turkey-IMF
2. Bulgaria
3. FRY-Bulgaria
4. FRY-World Bank
VI.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE REGION: NATIONAL GREAT POWERS
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. The
United States
2. NATO
3. EU
VII.
THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING EVOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS
The
inability of the Macedonian politicians and military to deal with Albanian
extremist discontent over the last three months is indicative of the extent of
ethnic intolerance before the eruption of the armed clashes. The
“Macedonian” aspect of the Albanian question has reminded the international
community of a national question that remains unsolved in Europe at the
beginning of the 21st century. It is similar to the Serb national question of
the last decade in that it tends to develop in two directions – a political
one and a military one. . Both the Serb leaders in Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia,
and the Albanian political leaders in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia have missed
an opportunity to adopt the lessons learned in other Balkan countries coping
with similar issues and have neglected the specific features of solving a
national question in the era of globalization and integration. At the same time,
the events in Macedonia demonstrated that the political forces have followed an
inadequate or wrong political agenda since the formation of the new state in
1992. The persisting old Yugoslav mentality, characterized by a residual
anti-Albanian bias, was ill equipped to inform the emerging Macedonian national
mind-set, though the provisions of the country’s constitution for a unitary
state very much called for ethnic tolerance, reconciliation and rapprochement.
Notwithstanding this, the ethnic groups – both the dominant Macedonian and the
Albanian population – still have the chance to adjust to the peculiarities of
the processes of integration and globalization in the context of a young
nation-state and to provide a different political framework for coping with the
tasks of the new century, as well as with the difficult past.
A
general perspective of southeastern Europe as a region evolving towards European
integration should not be obscured by the clouds of the fifth Balkan war. During
the past month, Croatia has made a step closer to the EU after concluding a
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the Union. Bulgaria has continued
to prove that it is possible for the late starters to catch up with those who
experienced better external conditions during the 1990s in their accession to
the EU. The Balkan countries' dominating political objectives are joining the EU
and NATO, which would guarantee an end to the fighting in Macedonia and prepare
the ground for new ethnic relations. The only realistic option of breaking the
cycle of violence is the positive involvement of the parties of the region in
constructive region-building activities. Any dreams or plans for ethnically
homogenous states are hardly appropriate for an integrated Europe in a global
world. This is why the opposition to extremist trends in the policy of the
ethnic leaders should continue until they adjust to the expectations of the
international community and of their own people or are pressed to leave their
positions.
1.
The Conflict in Macedonia and Southern Serbia and the Post-Conflict Situation in
Kosovo
The
situations evolving in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and Kosovo in May continued to
be strategically and politically inter-connected. Though the Macedonian forces'
military operation last month was considered successfully completed, the
Albanian rebels maintained their potential for destabilizing the young state
through terrorist activities. After the killing of eight Macedonian commandos by
ethnic Albanian insurgents, a wave of riots on 1 May left one Albanian dead and
many shops demolished in the town of Bitola, 170 km southwest of Skopje. The
Albanian diplomatic mission in the capital was attacked on 2 May by unidentified
Macedonian gunmen. On 3 May, the armed forces of Macedonia began a new offensive
against the Albanian extremists in the Kumanovo area. The Albanian fighters
allegedly used 3'500 women and children as “human shields” in the towns of
Vaksince and Slupcane. The security forces were supported by tanks and
helicopters.
The
Macedonian government and state leaders were considering declaring a state of
war when they were strongly advised to drop this option by the leaders of the EU
and NATO, who feared that the bloodshed and ethnic hatred would be intensified.
After holding off the declaration of war, a new political coalition was formed
in Skopje in an effort to deny the Albanian extremists any political support
within the country’s political establishment, to isolate them and to put an
end to the crisis. What were the stakes in this internal political bargaining?
Before reaching the compromise of a broad coalition government of
national unity, comprising the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party, the Social Democratic
Party of Macedonia (SDPM) (both dominated by Macedonian Slavs), the Democratic
Party of the Albanians (DPA) (already a coalition member) and the opposition
Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the negotiating parties agreed
to convene general elections on 27 January 2002. VMRO-DPMNE kept the prime
minister's slot. The pro-Serb SDPM was given the cabinet ministries of Defense
(Vlado Buchkovsky) and Foreign Affairs (Ilinka Mitreva). The SDPM also secured
the positions of the national chief of security and the head of
counter-intelligence. The DPA's cabinet positions were shared with the PDP. This
agreement was reached on 8 May. However, the extremists of the Army for National
Liberation (ANL), led by commander Alia Ahmeti, pledged to intensify their
attacks if they were not involved in the negotiation process. As a result, two
weeks later the new government was still working ineffectively, because the two
Albanian parties did not cooperate fully. The regions around Tetovo, Kumanovo
and north of the capital remained the frontlines of a still low-intensity civil
war. Late on 21 May, the worst clashes for weeks between the conflicting parties
took place. The government forces used tanks and helicopters.
The
continuing fighting has already created a
disastrous humanitarian situation for thousands of Macedonian Albanians
and Slavs, despite the occasional cease-fire to allow civilians trapped by the
fighting around the towns and villages to flee. For weeks, the inhabitants of
Slupcane, Lipkovo and Vaksince remained trapped by the on-going battles,
huddling in their basements. In some instances, the Red Cross was able to escort
civilians to Skopje, but often this was impossible. A few Albanians volunteered
to stay with the fighters of the ANL. Preliminary estimates show that around
30'000 Albanians have already moved from their homes in Macedonia to Kosovo and
other areas.
The
political situation escalated dramatically once again on 23 May when the
Albanian leaders of the government parties, Arben Xhaferi of the DPA and Imer
Imeri of the PDP, met with the leader of the rebels, Alia Ahmeti, and reached an
agreement on bringing to an end the present crisis. There was a strong
discrepancy between the positions held by the Albanian government members and by
the prime minister. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski said the two Albanian
leaders had to cease their negotiations with the terrorists, otherwise the grand
coalition would be jeopardized. According to Georgievski, the main task facing
Macedonia remains the military victory over the terrorists and re-gaining
control over the whole territory of the country. The Albanian leaders stressed
that the international community, in particular the OSCE representative, had
been informed in advance of the meeting. More importantly, the result of the
negotiations and of the agreement was a decision by Ahmeti to demobilize his
forces. The latter do not represent the ANL and do not speak for the fighters
but used the meeting and the negotiations to persuade the ANL to stop their
military activity. The backbone of the agreement with the rebels is the
preservation of the integrity of Macedonia as a state.
What
are the positions of the Macedonian and Albanian political leaders in this
situation?
The
Albanians are calling for a change to the constitution that will lead to an
affirmation of the equality of the two ethnic groups and their respective
languages.
The
Macedonian counter-position is that ten years of democracy in the country
invalidate the rebels' portrayal of the government in Skopje as akin to that of
Milosevic. Any armed protest by indignant and possibly neglected ethnic
minorities is unacceptable, and negotiations with terrorists are out of the
question, according to the administration of President Boris Trajkovski.
Much
external political pressure has been brought to bear on the escalating crisis in
Macedonia throughout the month. Traikovski's meeting with US President George W.
Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
on 2 May in Washington, DC, underscored the political, economic and security
support that the US is providing to the Macedonian government. Bush stressed his
desire to work with the Macedonian government to promote freedom and to combat
extremism. The US together with NATO will continue to work to strengthen border
security. The US encouraged the political dialogue and on 19 May congratulated
Skopje on the formation of the broad coalition government and the efforts of the
armed forces to prevent civilian casualties in their fight against the
extremists. US$55 million in aid will be provided by the US this year, with more
to follow in 2002. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and High Representative
of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana visited Skopje on 7 May
and endorsed the government’s decision to refrain from declaring a state of
war. Lord Robertson said that a downward spiral of violence into another Balkans
bloodbath would produce only misery. A unity coalition, he said, was the best
way to isolate the rebels. The heads of state of the North Atlantic Council will
discuss the situation in Macedonia and the status of Kosovo at an extraordinary
meeting in Brussels on 13 June. The EU presidency representative (the foreign
minister of Sweden) Anna Lindh and
the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, also visited Skopje
the same week in support of the government. The OSCE chairman, Romanian Foreign
Minister Mircea Geoana, also strongly urged the citizens of Macedonia to show
restraint and not to allow the spiral of violence to continue. The Russian
Foreign Ministry encouraged contacts between Belgrade and Skopje in their fight
against terrorism, which reminds Russians of their engagement in Chechnya.
Moscow declared on 26 May that negotiations with the Albanian rebels were
inadmissible. According to the statement, “international terrorism” should
be fought, and Russia fully supports the Macedonian government's efforts against
the insurgents. Solana made his fifth and sixth visit in two months to Skopje on
28-30 May in an effort to defuse tensions and preserve the national unity
government. The Macedonian Slav leaders are infuriated with their political
allies from the two Albanian parties who met for negotiations with ANL leader
Ahmeti on 23 May in Prizren. The EU and the US also disapprove of any talks with
terrorists. Both Xhaferi and Imeri, however, claim these were talks to promote
peace and prevent armed clashes, which cause deaths, suffering, misery and
hatred. They also claim they are in political control of the Albanian
population.
In
an interview with German TV channel ARD on 9 May, the Chairman of the
Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission of Macedonia, Jordan Bozkov, said that
his country relies more on the support provided by Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia and
Ukraine than on the EU. He also said the national unity government will hardly
solve the persistent problems.
Georgievski
met with his Yugoslav counterpart Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in Skopje on 10
May. They agreed to exchange security information, because Kosovo has turned
into a center of tensions in the region. They discussed the eventual
establishment of a joint group that will fight terrorism and organized crime.
Bulgarian
Prime Minister Ivan Kostov made a one-day visit to Skopje on 25 May, a day after
the Albanian leaders met with rebel commander Ahmeti. He met with the Macedonian
president, the prime minister and with the ethnic Albanian party leaders Xhaferi
and Imeri. In an interview with one of the Bulgarian national TV channels,
Kostov said on 27 May that there were chances of getting the crisis in Macedonia
under control in the following two days – a conclusion he reached after his
meetings in Skopje two days earlier and in light of the developing situation in
the region. On 10 May the Consultative Council for National Security had
discussed the situation in the neighboring country with the Bulgarian President
Petar Stoyanov. Stoyanov confirmed Sofia's position that the neutralization of
the extremists should be performed by international forces and not by the forces
of the neighboring countries. He warned Skopje not to emulate Russia’s Chechen
model of trying to crush resistance through military means. This, he said, could
involve the armed forces in a protracted guerrilla war and cause significant
casualties. An international presence could prevent a worsening of the ethnic
tensions. The Consultative Council agreed there was an imminent threat of
refugees from Macedonia flowing into Bulgaria if the situation continued to
worsen. The party leaders in Bulgaria agreed that the issue of Macedonia would
not be exploited during the pre-election campaign. The Defense Minister of
Bulgaria, Boyko Noev, told the press on 22 May that a unilateral engagement of
Bulgaria in the conflict was out of the question. As for the Multinational Peace
Force for South-East Europe (MPFSEE), the question is a political one and will
be debated at the 5-6 June South-East Europe Defense Ministerial Meeting in
Thessaloniki, Greece. Bulgaria has reservations concerning the involvement of
the MPFSEE in the events in Macedonia. Analysts consider Tirana's unwillingness
the major factor limiting the deployment of the MPFSEE in post-Yugoslav conflict
areas.
The
crisis in Macedonia can only be understood in the context of the developing
situation in Southern Serbia and Kosovo.
The
transfer of the five-kilometer wide buffer zone, established in 1999, from KFOR
to Serb police and armed forces was completed by 24 May. The Yugoslav military
and the Albanian commanders of the Army for Liberation of Presevo, Medvedja and
Bujanovac (ALPMB), in coordination with KFOR, had agreed earlier on the details
of the withdrawal. KFOR granted an amnesty to all Albanian fighters who had
surrendered by 24 May. One of the popular commanders of the ALPMB who went by
the nom de guerre of "Leshi", was shot dead on 25 May. The commander
of the ALPMB, Shefket Musliu, surrendered on 26 May. In a signed declaration
dated 21 May, he said the rebels would be demilitarized, demobilized and
disbanded by the end of May. The Yugoslav government launched a training program
for an inter-ethnic police force based near the boundary with Kosovo on 21 May;
the measure was seen as a confidence-building measure between ethnic Albanians
and Serbs. There are indications that disbanded fighters of the ALPMB are
joining the ranks of the ANL in northern Macedonia.
Hans
Haekkerup, the UNMIK chief, unveiled plans on 14 May for civilian rule in Kosovo
and announced that general elections would be convened on 17 November. The UNMIK
chief retains a right to veto according to the proposed constitutional
arrangement. The province will remain within FRY, but will have a substantial
degree of self-rule. The form of self-rule is expected to be an elected
120-member assembly, which will in turn elect a president and approve a prime
minister nominated by the president. Ten seats in the assembly are reserved for
Serbs and ten for representatives of other minority groups. This proportion is
slightly higher than their proportion among the electorate. The arrangement has
been discussed over the past ten weeks by the UN, UNMIK and local
representatives. The lack of satisfaction among the Albanians is obvious –
their wish was to have a constitution with provisions for a referendum to
determine the future status of Kosovo. A referendum would clearly lead to
independence, which is in contradiction with the agreement with FRY. The
Albanian indignation is also directed at the power of Haekkerup to exercise a
veto over decisions of the elected institutions if they are in conflict with the
UN resolutions. They are unhappy because UNMIK and KFOR will keep control of law
enforcement and security. In their turn, the Kosovo Serbs perceive this
constitution as a first step towards Kosovo’s future independence. UNMIK is
hopeful that after the elections, representatives from Pristina and Belgrade
will be in a position to negotiate the longer-term future of the province.
In
the evolving situation of conflict pitting Albanians against Serbs and
Macedonians in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia, the persistent will of the
government in Skopje to reach a military victory at any cost does not seem very
wise. There is a real chance that an eventual stop to the fighting can be
reached if the Albanian political leaders, as part of the Macedonian government,
can prove themselves without the involvement of the extremists as an equal
party. The pacification of Southern Serbia and the increasing chances of finding
a lasting, peaceful solution in Kosovo must not be blocked by a stubborn will to
drive away the rebels and proclaim a military victory over them. The Macedonian
armed forces at present are dependent on foreign help. The Macedonian leadership
still has an obligation to end the existing forms of discrimination against
ethnic Albanians in the areas of employment, education and language rights. A
peaceful political solution of the crisis, supported by new legislation that
recognizes the Albanian minority, their language and contribution to the
Macedonian state, should be sought. . The strength of the young Macedonian state
can be proved by an effective policy of coming to terms with the different
ethnic groups in the country, not by demonstrating the military strength of the
recently formed armed forces. Any chance of stopping the fighting, disarming the
rebels and taking forward-minded political decisions should be seized by the
young political and state leaders of Macedonia. If this policy trend does not
prevail in Skopje soon, there is little chance the present grand coalition of
national unity can survive until the planned elections in January 2002. The
last-minute compromise, reached on 29 May with the decisive involvement of
Solana on the eve of the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Budapest, is very
much in line with this trend. The salient points, as suggested by Solana and
accepted by the Macedonian leaders and the Albanian political representatives in
the government, are the preservation of the grand national unity government, a
withdrawal on behalf of Albanian leaders Xhaferi and Imeri of their signatures
from the Prizren Declaration with the rebel leader Alia Ahmeti, and a restart of
the political dialogue with the Albanian leaders on the issue of the rights of
the ethnic Albanians. The compromise is very delicate, and it can survive only
if rational and sober attitudes are adopted by both sides, and if the will of
the international community to solve the issues by political means rather than
arms is respected.
2.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1)
The moderate Croat, Mijo Anic, Bosnian Defense Minister of the multiethnic,
pro-Western coalition, charged three Croat nationalist leaders with treason over
a mutiny in the Croat part of the joint army. Nearly 7'000 soldiers of this
contingent of the federation army left their barracks in support of the
separatist movement in April this year. Soon after these allegations, two of the
offices of the ruling alliance were destroyed by explosions – two in Vitez on
1 and 7 May and one in Novi Travnik on 7 May. The UN mission in Bosnia condemned
the blasts as organized terrorism. A deal between the defense minister of the
Croat-Muslim Federation and the generals who led the mutiny on 16 May will allow
the 7'000 soldiers to return to their barracks by the end of the first week of
June this year. The deal was struck as a preventive effort of both sides to
block the nationalists from using the soldiers to destabilize the country after
the loss of the general elections by the hard-line HDZ (Croat Democratic Union).
(2) On 8 May, Bosnian and Western officials accused indicted war criminal
Radovan Karadzic and his nationalist party of orchestrating the recent Serb
riots against the reconstruction of mosques in the Republika Srpska. The mosques
were destroyed during the 1992-1995 war. Some 30 people were injured during the
riots. (3) The chief UN war crimes prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, said on 23 May
that a team of 15 policemen could be sent to pursue former Bosnian Serb leaders
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, wanted by the Hague war crimes tribunal. Thirty-eight
accused are still at large, and 12 of them are under sealed indictments. The
prosecution believes 12 of the fugitives are in FRY and the rest in the
Republika Srpska. Not all of those indicted are Serbs. Investigations are under
way against Albanians, Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, said Del Ponte.
1. Bulgaria
(1)
The pre-election public opinion polls in May show declining support for the
National Movement for Simeon II (NDS II) – from about 40 per cent to 29 per
cent. There is around 14-15 per cent support for the ruling Union of the
Democratic Forces (UDF) and a drop from about 15 to 10 per cent support for the
opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and its coalition partners from the
left. The period until the elections on 17 June will most probably witness more
shifts, particularly among the 24 per cent undecided voters. Some 9-10 per cent
are sure they will not vote at all. All major contending coalitions support the
stable regional policy of Bulgaria and the country’s integration into the EU
and NATO. (2) The National Employment Service announced on 17 May that the total
number of unemployed Bulgarians is 707'793, comprising 18.51 per cent of the
economically active population of the country.
2. Croatia
(1)
The Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia, Goran Granic, said on 9 May that his
country would help its ethnic Serbs, thousands of who fled during the 1991-1995
war of independence, to return to their homes by the end of next year. (2) The
results of the local elections on 20 May show a low turnout, an improved
political position of the opposition HDZ, and lower performance of the ruling
Social Democrats, despite their lead in the capital Zagreb.
3. Greece
(1)
The ruling Socialist government of Greece proposed substantial changes to
the criminal legislation on 2 May in an effort to improve the country’s widely
criticized record on terrorism. Greece will host the 2004 Olympic Games and has
been under pressure to improve its anti-terrorism capabilities since the
assassination of British military attaché Brigadier Stephen Saunders last year.
Though the 17 November terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the
killings of 22 people since 1975, including four Americans, none of its members
have ever been arrested. (2) Pope John Paul II arrived in Greece on 4 May and
asked God to forgive Roman Catholics for sins committed during the 1'000 years
of schism between the Western and the Eastern Churches. His statements came in
an address to Greece’s Orthodox leader, Archbishop Christodoulos. This was the
first visit of a pope in more than 1'000 years.
4. Romania
The
Romanian government decided on 10 May to impose strict border controls in an
effort to meet the requirements of the European Union. Romania will focus on its
borders with “risk” countries, including Russia. This may improve the
country’s chances of getting non-visa status within the Schengen visa regime
area.
1.
Bilateral Relations
Bulgaria-Macedonia
(1)
The Bulgarian government approved on 23 May a project for training police from
Macedonia in Bulgarian education centers. After graduation, they will receive
one of three degrees, a BA, MA or PhD. . (2) The new Macedonian Defense
Minister, Vlado Buchkovsky, visited Sofia on 27 May and met with his Bulgarian
counterpart, Boyko Noev.
2.
Multilateral Relations
a) South East Europe Defense Ministers Meeting (SEEDM)
The
defense ministers from the SEEDM will meet in Thessaloniki, Greece from 5-6
June. The main topics will be the security situation in the Balkans and the
employment of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE).
b) Balkan Political Club
Former
and current state leaders and high-profile politicians founded a “Balkan
Political Club” in Sofia on 27 May. Its rationale is united action in favor of
the common interests towards Europeanising the Balkans. Former Bulgarian
president Zhelyu Zhelev was elected as the club's first president. Among the
founders of the club were the present and former Romanian presidents, Ion
Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu, the former Turkish president, Suleiman Demirel,
the former president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, the Prime Minister of
Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mladen Ivanic, and the leader of the
ruling party in Albania, Fatos Nano.
3.
Regional Initiatives
a) The Pact for Stability
Pact
Coordinator Bodo Hombach dismissed accusations on 3 May in a radio interview
with Deutsche Welle that the pact had not activated the projects. He also said
that though some misunderstandings with Bulgaria have been overcome, the
practice of Bulgaria’s passivity concerning the pact remains. The Bulgarian
side has underlined in past months that it has the right to propose discussions
on the pact, and this is also the position of the neighboring countries.
b) The Process of Stability and Cooperation in South-East Europe
A regular meeting of the foreign ministers within the Process of Stability and
Cooperation in South-East Europe was convened in Tirana on 16 May. For the first
time in ten years the foreign minister of FRY visited Tirana and joined his
colleagues from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,
Greece, Romania and Turkey. Issues related to security and the fight against
organized crime were discussed at the meeting.
c) Regional
Conference of the Ministers of the Interior Against Human Trafficking
A
conference of ministers of the interior from 12 countries from Southeast and
Eastern Europe was convened on 22 May in Bucharest. The ministers discussed
illegal human trafficking and immigration. The chief of the US FBI, Louis Freeh,
also participated in the meeting and labeled the practice of human trafficking
from and through the region as modern slave trade and called for regional
cooperation in fighting it. Up to 120'000 women are smuggled into Western Europe every
year, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, and forced into prostitution. In
some countries this practice is not qualified as a crime, and in several
countries, poorly paid border officials are often bribed to turn a blind eye to
the trade.
1. Turkey-IMF. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) may delay a loan of US$8 billion in support of
the Turkish economic reform after the crucial privatization of Turk Telekom
stalled due to army opposition and political wrangling. Senior military
officials are urging the government to limit to 45 per cent the stake in Turk
Telekom to be sold to foreign investors and to retain Turkish communication
satellites for national security reasons.
2. Bulgaria. (1)
The Bulgarian economy has grown by 5.8 per cent in 2000. The largest increase
was in the services sector (57.7 per cent), followed by industrial output (27.8
per cent) and agriculture (14.5 per cent). (2) A new air traffic control center
was opened at Sofia airport on 15 May. It will be fully operational by 2004 and
has the capability of managing air traffic control tasks over the whole of the
Balkans. Similar centers are under construction in Bucharest, Romania and
Thessaloniki, Greece. (3) The international credit rating agency Moody’s
stated at the end of May that it was maintaining its “stable” credit rating
for Bulgaria, despite the unknown results of the upcoming general elections on
17 June.
3. FRY-Bulgaria. The Yugoslav
government declared in May it would promote the construction of the Sofia-Nis
highway as a project of fundamental priority at the upcoming donors’
conference for Yugoslavia in June.
4. FRY-World
Bank. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia rejoined the World Bank on 8 May, eight years after it was expelled.
This will give FRY access to the foreign loans needed to rebuild the country’s
ruined economy.
1. The
United States
US-Bulgaria.
(1) Thirty-four US helicopters – Apache AH-64s, Black Hawk UH-60As,
Chinook CH-58Ds and Kiowa Warrior OH-58Ds – arrived at the Bulgarian Black Sea
port of Burgas on 7 May. Soon after, they flew to US bases in Kosovo. US
military equipment arrived earlier this month in Burgas for the same
destination. (2) US congressmen from the Foreign Policy Commission arrived in
Bulgaria on 30 May to study the country’s preparations for joining the
Alliance.
US-FRY.
Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica made an informal visit to the US in
the second week of May and also met with US officials such as the
vice-president, the secretary of state and the national security adviser to the
president. The US demanded Yugoslav cooperation with the war crimes tribunal in
the Hague as well as encouragement of Kosovo Serbs to participate in the interim
governance of the province.
2. NATO
NATO-Applicant
countries for NATO membership. The prime ministers of nine applicant
countries for NATO membership met in Bratislava, Slovakia, on 11 May and called
for a bold approach to expansion next year after the Prague summit. A similar
meeting took place for the first time last year in Lithuania. The Bratislava
meeting was the first time Croatia was invited to join the Vilnius Nine,
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Croatia has not yet applied formally for membership and is cooperating
with the Alliance within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) format only.
NATO-FRY.
As a sign of improving relations between NATO and Yugoslavia, Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic addressed the foreign ministers of NATO and
the other Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries on 30 May in
Budapest, Hungary.
3.
EU
EU-Croatia.
Croatian Foreign Minister Tonino Picula initialized the Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (SAA) on 14 May, which is aimed at promoting stability
in the Balkans and preparing the country for future EU membership. Croatia hopes
to be ready to join the Union in 2006.
EU-Bulgaria.
The last round of the accession negotiations ended on 17 May in Brussels.
Bulgaria concluded talks on fisheries and initiated the next round of talks on
financial control and the free movement of goods. Discussions continued on the
topic of corporate law, and they are expected to be completed in time for the
next session in Luxembourg in June. So far, Bulgaria has initiated 16 of a total
of 31 chapters on convergence. Nine have already been closed. The Swedish
presidency has pointed out that Bulgaria is an excellent example of a country
catching up with the other member states.
EU-Turkey.
On 22 May, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem warned the EU not to accept
Cyprus as a Union member, threatening Brussels with serious repercussions.
Turkey is a candidate for EU membership but supports the breakaway Turkish
Cypriot administration in the north of the island and says the internationally
recognized government in the south has no right to negotiate EU entry for the
whole island. Turkey keeps 35'000 troops in northern Cyprus, which it invaded in
1974 after a coup by militant Greek Cypriots seeking union with Greece.
Despite
the persisting conflict in Macedonia, the whole Balkan region is nearing a state
of homogeneity and stability that has never existed throughout its history. The
accession to the EU and the serious process of approaching NATO membership are
the dominant political tendencies that militants obsessed with solving the
Albanian question through violent means are hardly in a position to stop. The
issues in Macedonia are a reflection of a fundamentally wrong approach to
state-building in the new republic – of a chauvinistic Serbian nature and of
an artificially invented philosophy of “Makedonism”. That the Albanian
extremists are provoking the authorities can hardly be doubted, but the
treatment of the Albanians as second-rate citizens throughout the history of
former Yugoslavia – both in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and under the Socialist
Federation of Yugoslavia – is common to all post-Yugoslav states. Macedonia is
no different. The only lasting solution is not in creating new boundaries and
new states, but in the formation of societies based on clear democratic
principles, with stable institutions and demonstrating tolerance towards the
different ethnicities and religions. This kind of solution is not possible when
political dialogue is replaced with armed struggle or a desire to reach a
military victory over the opponent at any cost. The art of self-restraint and
respecting different ethnic groups has yet to be learned by the former Yugoslav
societies, including by the Macedonian Slavic and Albanian people. Whatever the
antecedents, however, there is now a clear limit to unrestrained behavior in the
Balkans, enforced by most of the Balkan countries on the periphery of the
conflict as well as by the EU, NATO and OSCE countries. International pressure
is the overwhelming factor that will influence the solution of the Macedonian
conflict. The quicker the Macedonian elite is able to overcome the
above-mentioned deficits of Macedonian statehood, the quicker this young state
can be stabilized.
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EDITORIAL STAFF: |
CONTACT AND REFERENCE |
|
Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief |
ISSN 1311 – 3240 |
|
Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova |
Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia, |
|
Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A. |
P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria |
|
Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A. |
Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828 |
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Dr. Todor Tagarev |
E-Mail Address: isis@cserv.mgu.bg |