(A Background and October - December 1999 Issue in Brief)

© Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia

Research Study 4

Hard Copy: ISSN 1311 – 3259




1. Geopolitical and Geostrategic Tendencies
2. Sources of Conflict


1. Chechnya
2. The Armenia-Azerbijan Conflict
3. The Kurdish Issue in Turkey


1. Armenia
2. Bulgaria
3. Georgia
4. Romania
5. Russia
6. Ukraine



1. The Economic Situation in Black Sea Region Countries and Its Consequences on Black Sea Cooperation
2. Political and Security Aspects of the Cooperation


1. USA
3. EU


I   Introduction

The Russian military campaign in Chechnya dominated the October-December 1999 period in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region.  The military progress of the Russian forces against the Chechen terrorists and separatists facilitated the political consolidation of the ruling configuration of political forces in Moscow and raised the patriotic mood in Russian society, which has been frustrated by long economic hardships. However, the way the crisis in Chechnya is being handled is generating international criticism.  The tendency of continuing geopolitical shifts in the southern tier of states bordering Russia has evolved against the background and in the atmosphere of the ongoing crisis.  The drift away from Moscow and the strengthening of links with NATO makes up the bulk of this tendency.  Parallel to these processes, the now quiet clash of oil and gas interests in the context of different geoeconomic and geopolitical projects evolved.  A change of the regional military balance in violation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty due to the war in Chechnya, though defined by the Russian side as a temporary state of affairs, adds to the further complication of the security situation in the broader Black Sea-Transcaucasian area and to the decline of the constructive region-building opportunities for the countries between the Caspian and the Black Seas.


II   Profile Background of the Black Sea Basin

1.  Geopolitical and Geostrategic Tendencies

The emergence and gradual stabilisation of the grouping of states in GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) is already beginning to rival geopolitically the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), shaped by the end of 1993.  The term of the treaty ended on April 20, and the protocol of its prolongation has so far been signed by only six countries – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia and Tajikistan.  Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have decided to quit the treaty for a variety of national geopolitical interests and arguments about Russia’s ineffectiveness in helping them solve particular national security issues – inadequate assistance in solving the conflict in Abkhazia, a disproportionate increase of the Russian military might in Central Asia, and passivity in solving the issues of Nagorno Karabakh.  However, deeper economic, prospective transport routes (the Great Silk Road that is to be restored) and energy routes (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) align the countries in the two groupings, partly formed by the gradual disintegration of one of them – the CIS.  Evolving common political and military interests and aims have been bringing Georgia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova together for years, namely their affiliation with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council) and the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace Program (PfP).  Local military cooperation between the Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan has led to plans to set up a regular peacekeeping battalion of the three countries on a permanent basis.  Georgia and Moldova have intensified their efforts toward diminishing the importance and toward a final closure of the Russian military bases on their territories.  Both Georgia and Azerbaijan have declared their desire to have NATO military bases on their territories as a guarantee for the protection of their political and economic sovereignty.  At the Istanbul OSCE summit in November, Armenia, considered a loyal Russian ally in the region, also formulated a wish to get rid of foreign (Russian) military bases from the region, including those in Armenia.  Furthermore, Armenia displayed readiness to improve its relations with a historical enemy, namely Turkey.  Though the Nagorno Karabakh issue remains a source of discord between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it should not be overlooked that the involvement of third parties (Russia, the USA, the OSCE, the UN, etc.) may not necessarily become an instrument of polarising the relations of the southern Caucasus countries, but rather a tool for finding a solution in the interests of the two countries.

The states of GUUAM have set an alternative to CIS with an increasing reliance on NATO.  It is crucial for Russia, NATO and the GUUAM countries not to develop zero-sum images on the security of the broader Black Sea-Transcaucasia-Caspian Sea area.  If the evolution of GUUAM is perceived as a "NATO penetration in the post-Soviet region", and if the chances of cooperation of all actors within the PfP and the OSCE contexts are not utilised, many opportunities may be missed for striking deals on huge oil, gas and transport interests of Russia, the countries from the region and the wealthy providers of capital and technology from Europe, North America and Japan.  If the countries of the region experience imperial goals and methods for political and military influence by Russia in a period of her economic weakness, the possibility exists to polarise the opposition of the two blocs of countries, rather than to bring them to mutually advantageous terms.

2.  Sources of Conflict

Two sources of conflicts were of specific significance in this period:

1)  The State of Military Balance in the Region

The issue had two aspects during the period, first, the continuing violation of the CFE Treaty by Russia.  While the overall Russian compliance with the treaty has generally been good, the question of the flank region marked a departure from that positive practice.  The reasons Russia exceeded the flank limits in the North Caucasus are the events in Chechnya.  Russia has been transparent in not complying with the limits of the adapted CFE Treaty due to the situation in Chechnya.  However, on November 1 the Russian prime minister declared that Russia would come under the treaty limits, and the present situation of non-compliance should be viewed as a temporary one.

The second aspect of the issue is linked to the future of the Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova.  It matters, both from the perspective of compliance with the adapted CFE Treaty and from the sovereign will of the two independent states, that they be freed from the military presence of Russian troops.  During the OSCE summit in Istanbul, Russia and Georgia reached an agreement to cut Russian Federation bases on the Georgian territory.  By December 31, 2000, Russia has to reduce its armaments to 153 tanks, 241 armoured command vehicles (ACVs) and 140 artillery systems.  By July 1, 2001, two of the four Russian bases must be withdrawn from Georgia.

2)  The Competitive Interests Over the Oil and Gas Pipelines from Russia and the Caspian Region to World Markets

The prospects of a clash of interests or of reaching a compromise for the mutual benefit of the actors involved continue to be open options.

On November 18, in Istanbul, the state leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed four documents and in some of them were joined by the leaders of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.  This event marked the formal start of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, linking through alternative routes the East and the West.  The President of the USA, who attended the solemn ceremony, said these pipelines were an insurance for the whole world and would help energy sources to be conducted through various routes without being stopped.

The protocol between Russia and Turkey on the "Blue Stream" project for the transportation of natural gas through the Black Sea to Turkey was signed on November 27 in Moscow.  Less than two weeks later the Russian Duma ratified the agreement.  On December 2 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said the oil pipeline being built from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk was of crucial economic and geopolitical importance for Russia.  The pipeline will be the first to deliver oil from the Caspian Sea basin to a port from which it can be shipped to international markets.

Though the two oil pipeline projects and the two natural gas pipeline projects are considered to be competing in their aims to reach the world markets, in each of them one can observe the existence of overlapping interests of participants, either of the respective opposing projects or of the emerging shape of two politico-military blocs:  Italian companies are backing the Russian-Turkish Blue Stream project; Kazakhstan, a CIS Collective Security Treaty member, is sharing interests in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline; Russian companies are involved in the same oil pipeline route profits; Azerbaijan has significant interests linked to the success of the construction of the oil pipeline to the Russian port of Novorossiysk after the construction of the route that by-passes Chechnya through Dagestan to the Russian Black Sea coast; Turkey’s stakes are linked to the success of the four competing projects, etc.  The possibility of negotiating various economic, political and strategic interests is real and should not be discounted freely.


III   Conflicts and Post-Conflict Developments in the Black Sea Area

1. Chechnya

Central to the various conflicts in the Northern Caucasus in the period October-December was the one in Chechnya. 

Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus turned out to be the "moment of truth" for the Russian state, as US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said recently – very much, probably, a moment of truth for the future of the relations of the West with Russia, too.  The West is really at odds with the way Russia will get out of this conflict.  A major preoccupation of the West is that it would create more problems than it would solve.  The burning issues for the West are:  first, will there be a decent solution of the humanitarian situation and, second, will extremist Islamic groups become stronger as a result of this war?

As mentioned in the previous issue of the Black Sea Basin Regional Profile, the most difficult problems that face Russia in the Northern Caucasus in general are the lack of proper tools to counteract a sophisticated terrorist campaign, carried for years by Islamic extremists against Moscow, and the inadequate political and economic activity of the Russian Federation in this part of its huge territory.

It is widely accepted that the Chechen issue is about the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, provoked at a period when another, second Islamic extremist front has assumed anti-Russian shape in Central Asia, namely in Tajikistan and Kyrgystan.  Moscow does not have many reasons to complain about the state of the international environment for carrying out its military campaign for some five months.  The USA has officially admitted that there are major internal constitutional issues at stake in Chechnya that Russia has the legitimate right to defend by force.  On December 7 NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson was clear in saying: "We have to keep the Russians engaged in world affairs. They are serious players.  And the message we give to them is not of hostility; it is of constructive advice as to how we believe they could best deal with the serious situation that confronts them in Chechnya." At the December 10 EU summit meeting in Helsinki, European Commission (EC) President Romano Prodi said the cooperation of the EU with Russia was of a long-term nature, and the union must do everything possible to preserve it.  The NATO foreign ministers pointed out on December 15 that their aim remained to establish "a strong, stable and enduring partnership within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act".  They condemned terrorism in all its manifestations and acknowledged Russia’s right to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness.  What is contested at the same time by the USA, NATO, the EU, the CE, the UN and the OSCE is the escalating violence and the indiscriminate use of force suffered by innocent civilians, the disproportionate means of dealing with the existing situation.  The blocking of borders to prevent civilians from fleeing was a reason for sending strong protests to the Russian Government.  The fears of the West are that Russia may pay a heavy price for those actions and eventually sink into a morass that will intensify extremism and diminish its own standing in the world.

Thus this international environment of the Chechen conflict can hardly be labelled "operationally hostile".  This is why the words and acts of Russian leaders in the last months, as expressions of Russian perceptions of the foreign-political environment of the Chechen conflict, are rather inadequate. The demonstration of the Russian president, who, at the Istanbul OSCE summit, so quickly left the meeting of the organisation most highly valued in words for years by Russian foreign policy, was an overreaction.  Other events were also perceived as overplay and hypocrisy used for internal political, especially parliamentary, election campaign purposes: the show visit by the Russian president to Beijing in a demonstration of Russia’s possession of foreign-policy levers as mighty as those of the West; the undiplomatic reminder by Russian leaders that the Russian Federation is a nuclear power; the foreign minister's declaration of November 29 that the West is attempting to dislodge Russia from the Caucasus. The efforts of Norwegian Foreign Minster and OSCE Chairman in Office Knut Vollebaek fell victim to this same attitude of an unnecessarily over-flexed muscle.

The military campaign of the Russian forces was developing successfully, partly thanks to this generally favourable and internally comfortable international environment.  More than 90 per cent of the Chechen territory is under federal control; Grozny is unavoidably taken by the army and the special forces of the terrorists of Basaev and Khattab.  This campaign has nothing to do with the 1994-96 war against Chechnya.  Russian fighters in the fields, towns and mountains of Chechnya were strongly motivated by the lessons of the past; by the lessons of the NATO campaign in Kosovo; by the persistent need to crush one of the two Islamic fronts in the Russian South; by the social support and the patriotic mood of ordinary Russians; by the demonstration of might by the Russian leadership and armed forces – raising the nuclear image of Russia by making operational the second out of four "Topol-M" single-headed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) units.

The military aspect of the conflict in Chechnya will very probably be over in several weeks.  The open issues remain:  how politically the military victory will be continued and utilised; what political and constitutional formula will be implemented in the troubled region; how will the dramatic refugee issue be solved; how will the economy and social life be brought to normality to prevent further eruptions of the Chechen conflict?  A major Russian issue remains unsolved:  how can Russia become an attractive integration nucleus in a democratic way for the multitude of people and ethnic groups with their varying religions, cultures, customs and traditions.  As for the West in general and the countries of Europe, the question is: will they remain as tolerant as they were during the Chechen conflict toward Russia, if the follow-up of the war is undemocratic, chauvinistic and neglects the democratic control of the armed forces government?

2.  The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

The Council of Europe declared on December 9 that Azerbaijan and Armenia had to settle their long-running conflict over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region before they could become members of the oldest European organisation.  Both countries need to guarantee that the conflict is being regulated and peace is being strengthened before they can join the Council of Europe.

The third state of the Southern Caucasus, Georgia, is already a full member of the organisation.

3.  The Kurdish Issue in Turkey

The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld on November 25 the conviction of treason and the death sentence of Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.  The case is already complete in the Turkish judicial system.  The sentence needs to be approved by the cabinet, confirmed by a parliamentary vote and then approved by the president.  After that, the case also may be appealed to the European court of human rights.

The improved EU-Turkish relationship will probably not change the fate of the Kurdish leader in the short term.  Turkey preserves a bargaining chip in its accession to closer EU integration.  The life or death of Ocalan will be kept as a future show-case of the changing nature of the Turkish human rights record, parallel to the eventual adoption of more autonomous rights by the Kurdish population in Turkey.


IV   The National Perspectives:  Specific Developments

1.  Armenia

On October 27 Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian, Armenian Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchian and eight other members of parliament and government officials were brutally shot during a debate in the House of Parliament.  President Robert Kocharian appointed Aram Sarkisian, the younger brother of the assassinated prime minister, as new Head of the Government.  Armenia has demonstrated its readiness to improve its relationship with Turkey.

2.  Bulgaria

On December 21 the parliament approved a cabinet reshuffle proposed by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov to accelerate the reform process and to smooth negotiations with the EU for the full integration of Bulgaria in the union in the next years.  Kostov sacked 10 of the current 16 ministers.

3.  Georgia

On October 31 the Citizens Union of Georgia, the ruling party of Georgia and of President Edward Shevardnadze, won the parliamentary elections with a vote of 42 per cent.  This secures more than 50 per cent of the seats in parliament, the continuation of the reform process of the country, and the re-election of the country's 71-year-old president. Georgia is definitely promoting itself as the Eastern Black Sea coast gateway between Europe and Asia.  Tbilisi is trying to develop its working relations with both the EU and with NATO.  President Shevardnadze has told the Western press that his country will apply for NATO membership by 2005 and at the same time will continue to try to develop friendly relations with neighbouring Russia.  In the past few months Georgia has periodically reiterated its opposition to the use of its territory by the enemy sides in the Chechen conflict.  In the last eight years this small country has suffered two major ethnic conflicts (in Abkhazia and Adzharia autonomous republics) and two intensive internal civil clashes.

On November 8 Pope John-Paul II arrived in Georgia for a two-day visit.

4.  Romania

On December 17 Romanian President Emil Constantinescu designated Central Bank chief banker and non-party technocrat Migur Isarescu as prime minister. The latter takes over from Christian Democrat Radu Vassile, who was brought down by a revolt in his own party that reflected popular discontent over the inconsistent reforms and the fallen living standards.  Thus a political crisis was ended, and a strong signal was sent of commitment to EU and NATO integration.

5.  Russia

Prime Minister Putin's Unity party was victorious at the December 19 parliamentary elections for the lower house, the State Duma.  Other winners of the elections are the Communist Party, the Fatherland-All Russia movement, the Union of Right Forces, Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party and Yabloko. Putin said that Russia’s economic recovery would take decades.

6.  The Ukraine

On November 14, at the final round of the presidential elections, Leonid Kuchma won with ease.  Heavy manipulation of the mass media and playing on popular fear of a return to communism were significant factors of this victory.  Some of the political priorities of his new term in power are a referendum on constitutional changes giving more authority to parliament; radical economic reforms; fighting corruption; strategic partnership with Russia; developing the relations with the USA; and joining European organisations.  Macro-economic aid for the Ukraine by the West proved quite inefficient.  In 2000 the Ukraine is expected to repay $3 billion of its debt – an act that should be doubted, given the present state of its economic and financial system.  The "bridge" role played by the Ukraine between the West and Russia has the potential of turning the country and its people into a grey zone – a fate Ukrainians would not like to share.  More is needed from wealthy Western states to help individual Ukrainians solve their own problems and hence motivate their social activity for finding better solutions for their society and state.


V   The Bilateral Relations in the Black Sea Region

a)  Russia-the Ukraine

On December 6 President Kuchma of the Ukraine made his first state visit abroad after his re-election to Moscow and met with President Yeltsin.

b)  Russia-Georgia

Mid-December Russia announced its decision to introduce a visa regime with Georgia from March 2000.  The Russian Foreign Ministry will prepare countermeasures for the unilateral Georgian decision to withdraw from the bilateral agreement of a free trade area, signed in 1994. 

c)  Bulgaria- Moldova

A visa regime was introduced on November 15 between the two countries.  This act of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry is linked to the country’s efforts to harmonise its visa policy with that of the EU.

d)  Armenia-Russia

Armenian Prime Minister Aram Sarkisian visited Moscow on December 7.

e) Russia-Bulgaria

On October 12 the Russian company Lukoil became the biggest owner of Bulgaria's largest oil refinery, Neftochim of Burgas, after a privatisation deal.

 f)  Russia-Moldova

On December 15 Moscow threatened to cut its natural gas supplies to Moldova for not paying more than $600 million to Russian energy providers.

g)  Armenia-Bulgaria

On December 1-2 Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov visited Yerevan.  He signed eight bilateral agreements in the political and the economic fields with his counterpart Robert Kocharian.  TRACECA and INOGATE are the two EU sponsored international projects the two countries have a particular interest in cooperating with. Bulgaria and Armenia have long historical and spiritual ties that are preserved and that have prospects of evolving.

h)  Azerbaijan-Bulgaria

On December 2-3 President Stoyanov visited Azerbaijan and met with President Geydar Aliev.  If Bulgaria strongly insists an oil route, Baku-Burgas may be constructed, the Azerbaijan president said.  Bulgaria can receive oil from Azerbaijan via the Baku-Supsa and the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipelines. An eventual oil delivery from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea port of Burgas may turn Bulgaria into one of the transit centres of Azerbaijan oil to Europe.  The stabilisation of the security situation in Yugoslavia may add to the realisation of this project, mainly through the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlora.  The two countries agreed to extend their cooperation within the NATO's PfP program and within the GUUAM bloc of states.


VI   The State of Regional Initiatives

1.  The Economic Situation in Black Sea Region Countries and Its Consequences on Black Sea Cooperation

A meeting of CIS prime ministers and foreign ministers was convened in Yalta, the Ukraine, on October 8. It ended without substantial results.  It became clear that the project of creating a free trade area in the commonwealth would not be realised in the near future.  No agreement between CIS members was reached on the issue of value-added tax (VAT). Russia, considered to be the driving force of economic integration in the CIS, underlined its intentions to assess all decisions within the community from the point of view of its national interests.

2.  Political and Security Aspects of the Cooperation

(1) On October 28 six British Navy ships started a week-long visit to port Varna – the largest national navy visit to Bulgaria in 1999.  Three days of the visit were devoted to joint exercises.  (2)  The USA donated $240,000 to two Bulgarian navy ships for their participation in maritime exercises in the Mediterranean that started on October 30.  Together with US, Italian and Turkish navy ships they exercised embargo, rescue and combat operations.  (3)  On November 9-10 a joint Bulgarian-Italian naval rescue exercise took place near Varna.  (4) In an interview with the Financial Times at the end of October, President Edward Shevardnadze of Georgia said:  "I cannot say for certain but one thing I know is that if I am re-elected for my second term in next April’s elections, we will be knocking very hard on the door of NATO."  The president's party won the parliamentary elections with a large majority on October 31.  After that he made clear his medium-term plans for integrating Georgia into the alliance before the end of his second term in 2005.  (5)  Reza Ibadov, Head of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Parliament of Azerbaijan and a close collaborator of President Aliev, suggested on November 22 that NATO take the protection of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.  His major argument was that the three countries involved territorially with the project were closely linked to the alliance:  Turkey is a member of NATO, and Azerbaijan and Georgia are PfP members.


VII   External Factors (States and Institutions) Influencing the Black Sea Region

1.  USA

(1)  USA-Azerbaijan.  On October 26 the US Trade and Development Agency (TDA) announced a grant of $425,000 to Azerbaijan to help fund a natural gas master plan study for the Caspian region, including potential gas production, review of the domestic gas market, and the export potential through the Trans-Caspian pipeline.  After Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan the TDA provides Azerbaijan with technical assistance in the natural gas and oil sector.

(2)  USA- Ukraine.  The third plenary meeting of the US-Ukrainian Binational Commission was convened in Washington, DC, on December 8 with the participation of the President Kuchma of the Ukraine and US Vice-President Gore.  The meeting marked a further strengthening of the strategic partnership of the two countries.  On December 8 the US Export-Import Bank and the government of Ukraine signed an agreement to help finance Ukrainian purchases of US goods and services.

2.  NATO

On December 15 a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission was convened in Brussels, within the Ukraine’s distinctive partnership with the alliance.  The Ukraine is considered by NATO to be a strong participant in the PfP, an important contributor to KFOR in Kosovo, and a net contributor to European security, including through the Ukraine’s efforts to calm tensions in Crimea and Moldova.

3.  EU

On December 10 the EU decided to approve Turkey’s candidacy for membership by granting it "candidacy status".  There are now more opportunities to resolve disputes with Greece, including by facilitating Cyprus’s unconditional EU accession and by concentrating on economic projects and trade.  Social and legal adaptation to EU standards set significant new goals to Turkey, including the adoption of thousands of EU legal norms and regulations.  Adaptation and sacrifices of certain family and social norms and values are becoming a major challenge for the Turkish social and political elite.  Certain modest steps have already been undertaken by the Turkish foreign minister and by the Turkish prime minister.  On December 7, shortly before the EU Helsinki summit decision, Foreign Minister Ismaihl Cem said that every citizen in Turkey, in every televised broadcast, should be able to speak his own mother tongue.  Turkey does not recognise its Kurdish population as a distinct group, i. e. the Kurdish population does not enjoy minority rights extended to other groups such as Jews, Greeks and Armenian.

Soon after the EU Helsinki summit decision Prime Minister Ecevit said his government would do its utmost to solve territorial disputes with Greece ahead of the 2004 deadline set by the EU.  Turkey has already signalled that it would abolish the death penalty to bring its legal system in line with EU standards.  The issues of Cyprus and of the civilian democratic control over the military remain obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU that will also have to be dealt with and solved according to the EU criteria.


VIII   The Security Situation and Region-Building Opportunities:  Conclusions

1.  The conflict in Chechnya marked a drastic level of military escalation, creating a multitude of humanitarian problems.  The Russian forces are close to a military success in the operation against the terrorists and outlaws, but grave political, social and economic issues in the autonomous republic remain unsolved.  Meantime, this violent method of coping with a real issue in the Caucasian region polarised the intentions of the states of the GUUAM group to intensify their relations between each other and with NATO.

2.  Region-building opportunities in the basin of the Black Sea were linked to the progress of competing oil and gas pipeline projects.  A clear and undeniable overlap of interests of competing actors is a part of the economic reality, and this must be utilised politically and strategically for the sake of regional and global stability.  The second factor is closer engagement of the EU with Turkey, as well as with Romania and Bulgaria.





Dr. Plamen Pantev, Editor–in–Chief

ISSN 1311 – 3240

Dr. Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova

Address: ISIS, 1618 Sofia,

Mr. Valeri Rachev, M. A.

P. O. Box 231, Bulgaria

Dr. Sc. Venelin Tsachevsky

Phone/Fax: ++(359 - 2-) 551 828

Mr. Ivan Tsvetkov, M. A.

E-Mail Address:

Dr. Dinko Dinkov


Dr. Todor Tagarev



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