I. INTRODUCTION
The first three months of the new millennium in the
region of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea basins were marked by two major
political determinants: first, the increasingly active and sophisticated Russian
policy towards its adjacent neighbors, mainly the CIS and GUUAM countries, and
secondly, the change of administration in Washington, DC, and the expected
shifts in US President George W. Bush's energy policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea
and Caspian regions.
A demonstrated rise in the EU's interest and
activity in this broader region is another significant development. By
finalizing the procedure of including Bulgaria in the Schengen visa regime
arrangements, the EU has emphasized that it is drawing closer to its neighboring
territories not just by words, but also by deeds.
The political developments in Russia (a more
assertive and active foreign and military policy), Ukraine (the plunging of the
country into a political crisis), and Moldova (the return to power of the
pro-CIS and pro-Russian Communist Party), as well as the new tendencies in the
Russian-Azeri, Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian relations bear a potential
for dramatic change concerning both the prospects of the CIS and GUUAM and the
multitude of conflicts in the Transcaucasian and Transdniester regions.
II.
PROFILE
BACKGROUND OF THE BLACK SEA – CASPIAN SEA AREA
1.
Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Tendencies
The visit to Iran in the last days of the year 2000
by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev marked an intensification of the
military-technical cooperation that will eventually reach US$7 billion – a
significant increase over the previous US$2 billion. The close relations with a
regional power such as Iran provide Russia with chances to assert its policy
both in the “adjacent neighborhood” and globally. Though the GUUAM group of
states (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) has tried to drift
away from its previous CIS ties, Russia is finding ways of utilizing
opportunities of diminishing their more independent policy options: relations
with Georgia are getting tense, and pressure is exerted on the small state by
Russia to remind Tbilisi how difficult life without Moscow is. Ukraine has been
slipping into a political crisis over the past weeks, while a visit by Russian
President Vladimir Putin to the once Soviet stronghold of the
military-industrial complex, Dniepropetrovsk, and pressure on Kiev over oil and
gas deliveries both hint at potential trade opportunities for Ukraine, if the
country develops closer ties to Russia than to any other power. Azerbaijan,
after Putin’s visit to Baku in the beginning of January, is definitely a
closer economic partner of Moscow and a promising dissident in the GUUAM
configuration. The elections in Moldova that brought the Communist Party back to
power will definitely lead to closer relations with Moscow and the CIS than with
GUUAM.
The US administration’s voice about regional
issues during the transition from the Clinton presidency is not clear and
powerful enough to constitute an alternative support for those countries trying
to embark upon an independent course from Moscow. However, US Secretary of State
Colin Powell has defined the US assessment of the evolving situation during his
Senate Confirmation Hearing on 17 January in a non-conciliatory way towards
Russia: “We have to make it clear to the Russians, even though they may have
concerns in the periphery of the old Soviet Union and now the periphery of
Russia, they cannot act in a heavy-handed way, and they cannot intimidate these
countries, and they cannot threaten these countries, and they should not think
about trying to recreate the old Soviet Union in some smaller way. This will not
further their interests in the West.… I think the Russians need to work with
us in the West, and we have leverage in this regard.”
There is no doubt that the area of the Black
Sea-Caspian Sea region is part of a broader US-Russian bargaining agenda, which
includes the US cooperative position of the need of meeting the interests of all
parties from the region, including Russia’s in the oil and gas energy sphere
– production and transportation
to the world markets. How the working formula will be defined is hard to predict
– the Clinton administration could not reach an agreement on this issue. What
Bush will be able to achieve from his point of view that “Russia is a threat
for us, but not an enemy” is also hard to predict. Russia and Putin are on the
march now.
2.
Sources of Conflict in the Black Sea-Caspian Region: the Delimitation of the
Caspian Sea, Oil and Gas Issues
Putin met with Azeri President Heidar Aliev in
Baku, Azerbaijan, on 9-10 January. They reached an agreement to de-limit the sea
bed and preserve the freedom of shipping on the surface. The two presidents also
agreed to convene a summit meeting of the littoral countries to deal with the
Caspian Sea delimitation issue.
The changed position of Azerbaijan towards Moscow
reflects the real state of the development of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project relative to the Baku-Novorossiysk and
Tengiz (Kazakhstan)-Novorossiysk oil pipelines. The situation regarding these
pipelines has developed favorably
for Russia, and this partly explains the assertive attitude of Russia in the
region. However, the recent signing of a gas purchase agreement between Turkey
and Azerbaijan on 12 March indicates that the Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
is also persisting. The new administration in Washington has already sent
signals to the effect that it supports all commercially viable routes for
Caspian basin hydrocarbons – the Baku-Ceyhan, the Baku-Supsa, the
Baku-Novorossiysk and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipelines. It is a more
conciliatory position that is probably aimed more at economic than at political
effects.
During the visit in mid-March of the Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow, Khatami and Putin signed a document
stipulating that all decisions and agreements concerning the legal status of
exploiting the Caspian Sea can enter into force only with the consent of all
five riparian Caspian states. An agreement between Russia and Iran to protect
the environment of the Caspian Sea, which rules out any project to construct
pipelines on the bottom of the Caspian Sea, appears directed against
Turkmenistan and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. In any case, the largest
potential source of discord in the area and the broader region – the oil and
gas reserves – is, at the same time, the largest potential asset for
cooperative and stable relations in this region.
III.
CONFLICT
AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
1.
Post-Conflict Issues in Chechnya
(1) On 22 January Putin announced the end of the
“army stage of the anti-terrorist operation” in Chechnya. The responsibility
and command of the operation has been transferred from Defense Minister Igor
Sergeev to the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolay
Patrushev. The participation of federal armed forces continues through carrying
out “surgical strikes” and special forces’ operations against the
terrorists and their leaders. The number of the armed forces contingent is
expected to reach about 15'000, while the number of interior forces personnel
will likely be around 7'000. The police force will be increased by 5'000
Chechens. In the meantime, attacks on the federal forces continued, and on 30
January the head of the Chechen civil administration backed by Moscow, Akhmad
Kadyrov, was slightly injured in an explosion, together with others. He is seen
by the separatists as a traitor to the Chechen cause. Chechen terrorists
hijacked a Russian plane with more than 120 hostages on board on 16 March. They
demanded a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The hijack ended
with the release of the hostages in Medina, Saudi Arabia, and the death of three
participants in the drama. (2) The Russian authorities are trying to restore
normal life in the republic. At the beginning of January a coordinator was
appointed to oversee reconstruction, and 22 judges were sent to administer
justice in Chechnya. Inquiries have begun into the disappearance or
misappropriation of large sums of money earmarked for rebuilding. Regular army
conscription is expected to start in the first half of this year. According to
South Russian federal district sources, young Chechen men will be assigned to
engineering troops and based on Chechen territory only. According to the Russian
information agency Novosti, the publication of 20'000 textbooks for pupils in
Chechen language is in process in Nizhni Novgorod, in the Russian Federation.
2.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
The process of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict entered a new phase after the two parties to the conflict, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, were admitted on 25 January as the 42nd and 43rd full members to the
Council of Europe (CE). The difficulties ahead were implicit in the declaration
of the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CE, Lord Russell Johnston,
that failure on behalf of the two new members to implement the commitments they
have made would lead to sanctions against them. In turn, Armenian Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian said that acceptance of the two countries into the CE
would not guarantee the non-use of force.
The following day, on 26 January, the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliev, had a meeting in
Paris that was mediated by French President Jacques Chirac. However, the second
round of mediated talks between the two presidents, in their fifteenth summit in
two years, ended on 5 March in Paris with no final result. The French side,
which is part of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, said there was a
chance that the conflict could be settled by
the end of the year. The three-year war that lasted from 1991 to 1994 took the
lives of 30'000 people and displaced more than a million. The parties have not
yet agreed upon a final peace treaty.
The World Bank announced on March 7 that it would
lead the international efforts to rebuild the Nagorno-Karabakh region once the
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is resolved. US Secretary of State Colin
Powell invited Aliev and Kocharian to the United States for peace talks towards
a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The talks are sponsored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will begin on 3
April in Key West, Florida. The consultations will be mediated by negotiating
teams from the US, Russia and France – members of the OSCE established Minsk
Group.
3.
The Abkhazian Conflict
The UN Security Council (UNSC) issued a resolution
on February 1 to the two sides of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict signaling that a
seven-year stalemate has to be ended and that the two sides should commit to
serious negotiations on the political status of Georgia's Abkhazia region. The
UNSC resolution was adopted unanimously and urged both sides to crack down on
armed gangs and rising crime.
Delegations from Georgia and Abkhazia, headed by
Georgian State Minister Gia Arsenishvili and Abkhazian Prime Minister Vyacheslav
Tsugba, met on 18 March for the third official session in the Crimean resort of
Yalta. They discussed the draft documents that are expected to serve as a basis
for the settlement of the conflict. Also participating in the negotiating
session were representatives of Germany, France, Russia, the US, Ukraine and the
OSCE. On 16 March the armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia was suspended,
though not settled. Russian peacekeepers deployed on the confrontation line
between the conflicting sides are ensuring that the armistice is respected.
IV.
THE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
1.
Azerbaijan
In an
effort to improve the flawed 5 November 2000 ballot, the parliamentary elections
in Azerbaijan were repeated in 11 constituencies on 7 January. OSCE observers
said there was some improvement, but the elections still did not meet a number
of international standards for democratic polls. Confidence in the election
process after 5 November remained low, and that was reflected in the atmosphere
of mistrust. Several opposition parties boycotted the elections.
2.
Moldova
Parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on 25
February. The elections were called after the parliament reached a deadlock in
December trying to elect a new president. Neither of the candidates (a communist
and a centrist) could attract sufficient votes in a series of polls. The
Moldavian Communist Party, after ten years in opposition, won a clear victory
with more than 60 of the 101 seats in parliament. Living in one of the poorest
countries in Europe, Moldavians have embraced the Communist Party's promises to
revert to the stability of Soviet times in view of the lagging reform process.
Vladimir Voronin, the Communist leader of Moldova, said soon after the election
results were announced that his country was "doomed" to enter the
Russian-Belarusian Union. This would mean a dramatic reversal of the country's
hitherto moderate pro-Western policy and would lead to Moldova's withdrawal from
the GUUAM federation, whose members currently enjoy good relations with the
West. The geopolitical re-configuration is inevitable in the region. Voronin,
who was nominated president by the collective leadership of his party, also
stressed the need to maintain economic relations with the West but pointed out
that gas and electricity are delivered to Moldova by Russia, and that 70 per
cent of the Moldavian exports go to CIS countries. The problems ahead for the
new ruling party (and most likely, the party of the future president of Moldova)
are in the social-economic area, where high hopes are awaiting fulfillment in an
environment of too scarce resources. The regulation of the Transdniester
conflict may be a good occasion for the Communist Party to prove its mettle. The
mostly Russian population has been promised equal status for the Russian
language, and the prospect of joining the Russian-Belarusian Union will lead to
convergence of the interests of both Chisinau and Tiraspol (the capital of the
rebel republic of Transdniester).
3.
Russia
(1) Russia launched a nation-wide week-long
strategic military exercise on 12 February, covering the area from the Norwegian
to the Japanese border. Conventional forces of the army, navy and air force were
also included. This was considered to be the largest demonstration of strength
by the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. Land-based,
submarine-based and strategic aviation long-range nuclear forces were activated
during the exercise. The missile launches were announced in advance to the US
counterparts from the new joint US-Russian Early Warning Center for missile
launches. During the Cold War, large-scale exercises of this kind were clearly
directed against the US and NATO. (2) The Russian government discussed on
February 15 the degrading demographic situation in Russia, which is considered a
major threat to the country’s national security. The increasing average age of
the population, the stable de-population and the low birth rate were mentioned
as major concerns for the government. The present tendencies may cause negative
effects on various segments of the economy and the society of the Russian
Federation. The Chukotka region and the northern regions in general are among
the most affected by the negative demographic trends. In 1999, the male life
expectancy dropped to below 60 years. The negative effect of the Aids virus will
be seen in the future, too. Putin has declared the fight against population
decline one of his priority tasks. (3) Indian and Russian officials announced a
US$700 million deal on 15 February on the sale of 310 Russian-made tanks to the
armed forces of India. Russia will provide 124 fully assembled T-90 tanks, with
a further 186 to be assembled in India’s facilities. India also plans to buy
the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. (4) The Deputy Chairman of the
Central Chinese Military Council, Zhang Wan-nian, began a four-day visit to
Moscow on 21 February. He was received by Putin, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov and Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev. Military-technical
cooperation, arms supplies for China and the US plans for a national missile
defense (NMD) system were at the top of the agenda. Following the talks, both
sides agreed that the strategic partnership is developing successfully. (5)
During his visit to Russia in the middle of March, Iranian President Mohammad
Khatami agreed to purchase from the Russian Federation weapons worth US$7
billion over the next few years and to complete Iran’s only nuclear reactor by
2003. The transaction includes personnel carriers, tanks, and anti-aircraft
missiles. While small neighboring countries are concerned by this trade
activity, Russia is satisfied at this fresh boost to its flagging defense
industries.
4.
Ukraine
Ukraine has entered a period of internal political
tensions and scandals after the brutal killing of a respected Ukrainian
journalist and the arrest of Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Timoshenko, who was
charged with fraud mid-January – a charge she denies. Specifically, Timoshenko
is charged with forgery, smuggling and tax evasion. The death of journalist
Georgy Gongadze is widely attributed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Calls
for Kuchma's resignation led on 19 March to the dismissal of Interior Minister
Yuri Kravchenko. Many analysts believe Ukraine is plunging into a political
crisis.
V.
THE
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
1.
Bilateral Relations
a) Georgia-Russia
(1) The Georgian government announced the cut-off
of natural gas supplies by Russia to the Georgian Gardabani power plant on
January 1. This resulted in a dramatic decline of electric power production
during the peak of the winter heating season. This act of the Russian
authorities violated a valid contract of a US company, AES, and the Russian firm
Inneftegazstroy (INGS), thereby substantially interfering in an international
commercial transaction. (2) At the close of the year 2000, Russia met the
deadline agreed to in Istanbul for the elimination of equipment in excess of one
basic temporary deployment under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
in Georgia. In all, Russia withdrew 35 tanks, 313 armored combat vehicles
(ACVs), and 27 artillery pieces, and destroyed an additional 24 tanks, 90 ACVs
and two artillery pieces in order to meet the deadline. Issues connected with
the future use by Russia of the Vaziani and Gudauta military bases remain to be
resolved, as do a range of issues pertaining to the longer-term presence of
Russian forces in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. (3) In the middle of February, a
Russian military delegation visited Tbilisi in an effort to ease the visa regime
for Russian military and their families stationed on Georgian territory. The
Georgian authorities had claimed a reciprocal measure starting 1 March in
response to the earlier imposition by Moscow of a visa requirement for citizens
of Georgia on 1 December 2000. Furthermore, the Georgian parliament decided to
suggest the imposition of a US$300 million tax per year for the Russian military
bases on the territory of the country. The Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze called the visa restrictions between the two countries “a
historical anomaly” and urged the diplomats of the two countries to find a
compromise to ease problems concerning the visa regime for certain categories of
citizens.
b)
Azerbaijan-Russia
(1) Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Baku
on 9-10 January and met with Azeri President Heidar Aliev. After Russia removed
its troops from bases in Georgia and Armenia – a rival of Azerbaijan in the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute – Baku agreed to enter into a military cooperation
with Moscow in the interests of the security of the two states. Russia appears
to be trying to compensate for the increasing influence of the US in Georgia and
Azerbaijan, and is ready to concede to certain claims by Azerbaijan to reach
that goal. One of Aliev's intentions is to provide a smooth transition of his
power to his son, and he sees Russia as being the right guarantor. (2) In the
second week of March, Baku extradited two prominent Chechen separatists, Ruslan
Akhmadov and Badrudin Murtazaev, to Russian authorities. Both are members of the
formation of the Chechen leader Shamil Basaev. Last autumn Azerbaijan handed
over five Chechen terrorists to Russia.
c) Russia-Armenia
Armenian Energy Minister Karen Galustian visited
Moscow in the last days of January in an effort to restructure his country’s
debt to Russia for energy deliveries worth US$25.2 million. Armenia’s total
debt is US$118 million.
d) Georgia-Turkey
A former Soviet military airbase east of Tbilisi
reopened at the end of January after Turkey granted US$1.27 million for
reconstruction and modernization. Georgian officials attribute special
significance to the bilateral relationship with Turkey and consider this avenue
to be the main path towards approaching NATO military standards, a priority for
Tbilisi.
e) Ukraine-Russia
The presidents of the two countries, Kuchma and
Putin, met in Dniepropetrovsk at the Yuzhmash rocket factory on 12 February.
They agreed to stimulate bilateral cooperation in the space industry. Putin
showed moral support for his Ukrainian counterpart during the period of
political and social pressure which the latter is currently experiencing in
Kiev. Thirteen bilateral documents for cooperation were signed during the visit.
One of them provides for conducting electric power through Ukraine to Western
Europe.
f)
Turkey-Azerbaijan
The Azeri President Heidar Aliev visited Turkey on
15-17 March and supported the Turkish proposal of building Turkish military
bases on Azeri territory. Azeri Defense Minister Safar Abiev was among the
delegates. Oil and gas supplies from Azerbaijan to Turkey were also discussed
during the visit.
2.
Multilateral Relations: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
(1) The CIS military coordination staff announced
plans on 22 January to invest US$1.65 million in an integrated air defense
system during 2001. The system is considered to be a priority project of
multilateral military cooperation. In 2000, the CIS coordination provided the
improvement of the air defense systems of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (2) Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking to the
leading diplomatic staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia at the end
of January, said that the CIS is the major priority of the country’s foreign
policy. He also said Moscow would remain the “natural integration nucleus of
the commonwealth”.
VI.
STATE
OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVES: THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE REGION
1.
Russia-Turkey
The Russian company Kamov won the contract for the
delivery of five Ka-62 medical helicopters to Turkey. Kamov acquired the US$31.5
million deal in competition with Italian manufacturer Augusta and the
French-German Eurocopter consortium.
2.
Ukraine-Russia
During Putin’s visit to Ukraine on 12 February,
he agreed with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to launch an old construction
project which was first proposed at the end of the 1940s: to build a bridge
connecting the Kuban wheat producing region with Crimea. The construction is
expected to start in May this year and to be finished in 2005. A Russian
construction company is expected to implement the project.
3.
Russia and the Paris Club of Creditors
The Russian government took the difficult political
decision in mid-February to pay back fully its debt to the Paris Club after a
few months of unsuccessful negotiations in which Russia tried to re-schedule its
obligations. This decision will lead either to a new economic and political
crisis or to an acceleration of the reform process, de-monopolization and
privatization. In March, the Russian government survived a no-confidence vote in
the Russian Duma initiated by the Communist Party.
4.
Georgia and the Paris Club of Creditors
The Paris Club decided In early March to postpone
payment of the larger part of the Georgian debt by 20 years.
5.
Ukraine-EU
On 26 March, the EU lifted all quotas on imports of
textile and clothing products from Ukraine. This followed confirmation that
Ukraine had brought down its tariffs for EU textile exports to the maximum rate
agreed by the EU in the World Trade Organization, implementing the textiles
agreement signed on 19 December 2000.
VII.
EXTERNAL
FACTORS (STATES AND INSTITUTIONS) INFLUENCING THE BLACK SEA REGION
1.
US
US-Georgia.
(1) The US has extended non-discriminatory treatment, which amounts to normal
trade relations, to products of the Republic of Georgia since the last days of
2000. A major reason for this step is Georgia’s economic progress. (2) A
delegation of the US Defense Department visited Tbilisi on 13 February. Two days
later, Jeffrey Star, assistant to the US secretary of defense, arrived in
Tbilisi to discuss concrete cooperative projects. (3) Georgian Foreign Minister
Irakli Menagharishvili visited US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz at
the Pentagon on 20 March. They discussed the Russian troop withdrawal from
Georgia, regional security issues and security relations between the US and
Georgia.
US-Russia.
(1) The Export-Import Bank of the US announced on 8 January it will provide a
US$91.5 million comprehensive loan guarantee to support US mine processing
equipment and services to the Russian mining company Alrosa Company Ltd. The
loan guarantee is for a Siberian diamond mine project. (2) US Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty began preparations in early February for broadcasting in
three North Caucasian languages: Avar, Chechen and Circassian. Access to
objective and balanced news and information is the foundation for building a
free and democratic society, according to the Radio Free Europe's director
Thomas Dine. (3) On the occasion of the arrest of a FBI agent charged with
espionage to Russia, FBI Director Louis Freeh said on 20 February he believes
this will not affect the cooperation between the FBI and the CIS. The FBI works
very closely with the Russian Ministry of the Interior in criminal matters, as
well as with the security agency, and with the internal security agency in
matters related to counter-terrorism. This cooperation is extremely important to
both countries.
US-Moldova.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty announced on February 19 that it would increase
Romanian language broadcasts to Moldova through its Romania-Moldova Service.
2.
NATO
NATO-Armenia/Azerbaijan.
NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson began his visit to Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on 15 January in an effort to stimulate confidence
and security in the relations between regional players. During a two-day visit
to Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, the Chairman of the Military Committee of
NATO, Guido Venturoni, met with Armenian President Robert Kocharian, Prime
Minister Andranik Margarian, Defense Minister Serge Sargisian and Chief of
General Staff of the armed forces Lieutenant-General Mikael Harutiunian. Armenia
declared its willingness to develop its relations within the Partnership for
Peace (PfP) context and to improve cooperation with NATO. Venturoni declared the
readiness of NATO to develop its relations with Armenia, despite the Russian
troops stationed on its territory. Azeri Defense Minister Safar Abiev called on
NATO on 26 March to set up bases in the Caucasus to help bring peace and
stability and to curb the influence of its rival Armenia in the volatile region.
NATO-Georgia.
An announcement was made on 23 January that military maneuvers involving navy,
land and air forces from 10 NATO countries and six partner states will be held
in Georgia in June this year. The maneuvers will take place near the town of
Poti in Western Georgia. The name of the exercise is Cooperative Partner 2001
and it will involve 2'000 troops, 40 ships and 15 airplanes and helicopters. The
aim of the exercise is to improve the coordination of forces within the PfP
context in humanitarian operations. Participants from the NATO countries will be
the US, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece
and Turkey. The PfP participants will be Sweden, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria,
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
NATO-Russia.
NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson began his visit to Moscow on 19
February. He met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and discussed with him
issues of strategic stability, the US plans for NMD, and the enlargement of NATO
to the East. Lord Robertson met also with Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev.
Lord Robertson said the perception of the enlargement of NATO as an encirclement
of Russia was completely wrong. The purpose of the enlargement was rather to
strengthen security. Lord Robertson was presented with the Russian theatre
defense plan for Europe – a counter-project to the US NMD.
3. EU
EU-Russia.
(1) The European
Parliament voted unanimously on 18 January to appeal to Russia to lift its visa
requirements to Georgian citizens. The Russian decision to free the citizens of
Abkhazia and of Southern Ossetia from the obligation to acquire visas to enter
the territory of the Russian Federation was considered by the EU members of
parliament to be a de facto annexation of Georgian territory. The same day, EC
Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten said this move of Moscow might
shed doubts on Russia’s role in the region as an unbiased broker. He
underlined the negative assessment of potential investors in Russia of such a
policy. (2) EU presidency representative Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind, EC
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, and EU High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana visited Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia on 20-21 February. Lind said on the eve of the visit that the EU had
substantial interests in the Southern Caucasus. The geopolitical meaning of this
visit is obvious: the progress of the three countries and of the region in
general are of interest to the EU.
VIII.
THE
SECURITY SITUATION AND THE REGION-BUILDING OPPORTUNITIES: CONCLUSIONS
1. The post-conflict security situation in Chechnya
is still tense. Efforts to shift the stalemate of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
were given active support by France and the US. The key to the escalation of the
Abkhazian conflict was demonstrated to be in Moscow.
2. The prospects for the military stabilization of
the CIS and the falling apart of GUUAM are the main tendencies of the regional
developments and a major result of a more assertive Russian policy in the area.
The Black Sea cooperation has been substantially reduced, though a more visible
presence of NATO and the EU can significantly catalyze the processes of the
extension of the Euro-Atlantic security and civic zone to the
Transcaucasian-Caspian Sea area. A clearer line of differentiation has been
drawn between the Western and the Eastern coastal states of the Black Sea.