I.
Introduction
II.
Profile Background of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Area
1. Geopolitical and
Geoeconomic Tendencies
2. Sources of Conflict in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Region: the Military Balance
III.
CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
1. Post-Conflict Issues in
Chechnya
2. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
3. The Transdniester Conflict
IV.
The National Perspectives: Specific Development
1. Georgia
2. Moldova
3. Russia
4. Ukraine
V.
THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN HE BLACK SEA REGION AND THE STATE OF
CIS AND OF GUUAM
1. Bilateral Relations
2. CIS
3. GUUAM
VI.
THE STATE OF THE BLACK SEA REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO
1. Economic Aspects of the Black Sea Cooperation: National and Regional
Perspectives
2. Political and Security Aspects of
the Black Sea Regional Cooperation and EU and PfP Activities
VII.
OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS, STATESAND INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCING THE BLACK SEA REGION:
THE US
1. US-Russia
2. US-Ukraine
3. US-Georgia
VIII.
Conclusions
I.
Introduction
A
tendency that could be observed during the first quarter of 2001 persisted in
the period April-June: Russia, making efforts to achieve a decisive improvement
in its economic revival, continued its assertive policy both among its immediate
neighbors and globally. Russia's policy towards China and India showed a
significant shift towards strengthening the Russian presence and influence in
the Eurasian landmass, and especially in the Transcaucasian-Caspian Sea area.
Both the military presence of Russia and the country’s influence on the oil
and gas routes were improved. This tendency was reinforced by an increased
interest of the EU in developing its relations with Russia and by a
rapprochement between the US and Russia, marked by the first meeting of US
President George Bush and Russian President Putin. A continuing US-Russian
concerted effort to meet the advance of extremist Islamic terrorism in Central
Asia and world-wide was further evidence of this tendency.
The
conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester as well as the post-conflict
developments in Chechnya had significant impact on the security situation of the
Black Sea-Caspian Sea area. The former two marked a trend towards lasting
solutions, while the latter continued to mar Russian social and political life.
Major
domestic and international events shaped the national political developments in
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the second quarter of this year. The mounting
shifts in the Ukraine-Russian relations as well as in the CIS-GUUAM balance
further characterized the ongoing geopolitical tendencies in the region.
Finally, the security situation in the Black Sea area was influenced and will
continue to be influenced by the launch of a cooperative arrangement of the
coastal states called the Black Sea Force, and by the continuing activity of the
PfP programme.
II.
Profile Background of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Area
1.
Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Tendencies
Opinion
polls in Russia from mid-April show that 72 per cent of Russians regret the
dissolution of the USSR. The so-called Euro-Asiatic Economic Community is an
attempt to stimulate the CIS, which came as a sort of replacement to the Soviet
Union and has not been performing effectively. It was created at the end of
April through the signing of a treaty between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and Tajikistan. The biggest challenge to the community is its ability to
shape the required governing institutions – the legislative, executive and
judiciary branches – within a confederation arrangement. This is still to come
and is not the strength of the management elite in that part of the world.
However, it is clear that Russia as the dominating state is resolved to lead
back its former brother nations to a common future.
No
less ambitious, though more difficult, was the effort to engage China in a
multilateral arrangement that would strengthen the global profile of both Moscow
and Beijing. The two countries, together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and a new member of the group, Uzbekistan, joined forces on 15 June in Shanghai
against terrorism and extremism in the region and against the US plans to build
a National Missile Defense system (NMD). They adopted the “Shanghai Convention
for Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism”. The second document they
agreed on was the “Declaration for the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization” (SCO). The Shanghai Five group was originally established in
1996 as a security mechanism, but evolved in the direction of trade relations
and as a counterbalance to growing American investment in the region.
Earlier,
on 27 April, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met in Moscow with his
Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov and discussed the issues of the upcoming
Shanghai summit of the “Shanghai Five”. On 28 April, the group of five
discussed the common efforts against separatism in Central Asia at the level of
foreign ministers and gave a positive assessment of the joint military
monitoring group. The military monitoring group was set up in 1996-1997 to
oversee the scaling-down of military strength in border areas. The foreign
ministers chose economic cooperation as the main topic for discussion at the
first meeting of the heads of government of the Shanghai group due to take place
in Kazakhstan in the fall of 2001.
The
meeting of the heads of state on 14-15 June in Shanghai was a direct reflection
of the increasingly perceived threat of Islamic militancy in the region, and of
their need for deepened economic ties. Geopolitical interests in the region are
very much linked to the oil, gas and mineral resources in Central Asia. In the
case of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, there is a growing
need to attract foreign investments both for rebuilding the failed economies and
bring some hope to the dissatisfied populations. The four Central Asian
countries believe the Sino-Russian security relationship may turn into a working
axis that will be powerful enough to attract much-needed revenue. Chinese
investments of US$2.4 billion in the energy sector are expected for the
construction of the oil pipeline from northeast Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang
region in north-east China. Beijing's hopes of reducing its dependence on oil
from the Gulf States, which are under strong US influence, have been understood
correctly in Moscow. This is why Russia arranged a meeting in Kazakhstan in
September of the prime ministers of the six states, who are expected to set an
economic agenda; utilizing energy resources will most likely be at the top of
their list of priorities. China already has a 60 per cent stake in the Kazakh
oil fields. However, in this upcoming task, all actors involved will need to
abolish the remnants of their command economy backgrounds and, in the case of
China, to solve the issues of monopolist energy industries, outmoded equipment
and armies of workers. Furthermore, China has to be sure of the commercial
reality in its deals with Russia as well as of the return on the investments it
will make.
This
was the atmosphere between Russia and China before the Russian president’s
first meeting with the US president in Slovenia on 16 June. Putin achieved a
diplomatic success in Ljubljana, but did not necessarily bring about a strategic
shift of weight in Russia’s favor. This situation will hardly change after the
upcoming visit of the Chinese President in Moscow in July to sign the so-called
“treaty of the century” between Russia and China. The only clear message was
the common opposition against the US NMD plans – an issue that continues to be
negotiated between Moscow and Washington.
The
most intriguing aspects of the geo-economic tendencies in the area and the
long-term construction of the Silk Road of the 21st century are connected with
the oil and gas issues and their solution.
The
first major oil pipeline to be built in the Caspian Sea region for a decade will
be fully operational in August. The Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline will boost
Russian revenues from transport tariffs and increase Moscow’s influence in the
region. The 979-mile Kazakh-Russian pipeline will have a capacity of 600'000
barrels a day. Russia has a 24 per cent stake in the construction consortium,
Kazakhstan holds 19 per cent, and Oman holds 7 per cent. Eight oil companies are
involved in the US$2.6 billion project, including Chevron and Exxon-Mobil.
The
USA has strongly backed the Baku-Ceyhan project in an effort to limit Russia’s
control over Caspian petroleum exports. More importantly, however, a tendency
that loomed during the Clinton administration acquired momentum during the first
months of the new president's term of office. During their meeting in Ljubliana
on 16 June, Bush and Putin discussed Caspian energy issues and the common
interests of the two countries in developing the energy resources of the Caspian
Basin in a way that benefits all the countries of the region. For the US and
Russia, the upcoming Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) will be a special
occasion, marking as it does the largest joint investment between the two
nations. The US government has been also encouraging the cooperative involvement
of Turkey and Greece. The linking of their gas pipeline systems will allow
European consumers to diversify their supplies by purchasing Caspian gas.
This
undoubtedly cooperative approach in a very contentious area by Russia and the US
marks a new prospect for other relationships in this region too. The balancing
of various and diverging interests is the best way of dealing with the multitude
of conflicts in the region and the various existing threats and sources of
tensions in the broader area of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea basins.
2.
Sources of Conflict in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Region: the Military Balance
Russia
continued to improve its navy’s capabilities by starting the production of a
new anti-submarine torpedo system, capable of hitting targets 2.7 miles (4.3km)
away and up to 3'200 feet (975m) underwater. Current torpedoes reach a depth of
about 2'500 feet (760m). The system will be on sale at international markets.
The Russian navy also plans to increase its overseas deployment. The Pacific and
the Indian Oceans as well as the Mediterranean are the navy’s priority
operational areas.
Russia
is intensifying its military relations with India. At the beginning of June, the
countries announced they would sign a US$10 billion defense deal that will
include air defense systems, submarines, ships and the joint development of a
fifth- generation fighter jet. The timeframe for the joint development and
purchase by India will run until 2010. The emerging Indo-Russian cooperation may
also include the development of a missile defense shield. The proposed system
will be probably based on the existing mobile S-300 anti-aircraft and missile
complexes. The final agreement will in all likelihood fully comply with the 1972
ABM Treaty. On 12 June, the successful launch of a cruise missile in India
marked the first collaboration between the two countries on missile technology.
The test took place in the eastern state of Orissa. Thus Russia is gradually
trying to turn its military exports into a significant source of revenue. India
and China are the two biggest buyers of Russian hardware. More than 70 per cent
of India’s military hardware is of Soviet or Russian origin.
Russia
has also activated its military ties with Armenia: in the beginning of April,
the two countries decided to establish a joint military grouping on the
territory of Armenia. This step, together with the opening of a Russian military
base in Armenia in May, is considered a countermeasure to the Turkish overtures
of building NATO bases in Azerbaijan.
A
no less interesting addition to the mounting military buildup in the broader
Black Sea-Caspian Sea area was the agreement on improved defense cooperation
between Turkey and China that was reached after the Chief of General Staff,
General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, paid a ten-day visit to the Far East, including
Beijing. China will eventually supply the Turkish armed forces with unmanned
aircraft to patrol the south-eastern border of the country.
Russia
significantly improved its military posture in the broader post-Soviet strategic
arena after concluding negotiations with the members of the Treaty for
Collective Security (TCS) – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia – on 27 May in Yerevan. The outcome was an agreement on
the formation of rapid reaction forces in the Central Asian region, with a
planned manpower of up to 150'000. The rapid reaction force will be activated if
called upon by a member country, and with the agreement of the presidents of all
members of the TCS, but without the approval of the national parliaments. This
permanent military force of the TCS members is perceived as a potential threat
by Azerbaijan, which left the pact at an early stage of the negotiations. The
leaders in Baku feel they are being pressured to join the TCS.
As for the European theatre of military balance, the Second Review Conference of
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna from 28 May to
1 June called for a timely fulfillment of Russia’s Treaty-related agreements
to withdraw its forces and installations from Georgia and Moldova. The three
parties to the Istanbul Final Act and Summit Declaration of 1999, Russia,
Georgia and Moldova, reaffirmed their determination to achieve timely
fulfillment of their commitments.
III.
CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
1.
Post-Conflict Issues in Chechnya
Though
this Russian territory is claimed to be under the full control of the federal
forces, Russian servicemen are killed almost daily in rebel attacks, while tens
of thousands of refugees still live in tent camps near the border, unwilling to
return home. The insurgents are using varying tactics such as mining, ambushes,
and bombings. The rising number of killed and wounded Russian soldiers in
Chechnya prevents any kind of significant post-conflict reconstruction project.
The plight of the refugees and the violent treatment of innocent civilians in a
semi-war situation by the Russian federal forces continue to spoil Russia’s
human rights image. UN and EU criticism, fuelled by Russian atrocities, continue
to loom. The hunger strike of Chechen refugees at the border with neighboring
Ingushetia in late June, with the participation mainly of women, further added
tension to the already volatile situation created by the killing of Chechen
special forces commander Arby Baraev by Russian troops.
Clearly,
under the circumstances, the Russian president’s demands for higher efficiency
in promoting post-conflict rehabilitation efforts can hardly be realized. The
restoration of Chechen society is considered by the Russian leaders to be one of
the most important elements of the operation. However, it is difficult to
preserve the rationality of the approach and to see an appropriate return on
federal money spent in the atmosphere of continuing attacks and destruction by
the Chechen guerilla. In this situation, Russia has periodically delayed its
plans for a troop withdrawal and for transferring defense responsibility for
security to interior troops. Post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya still
remains distant in view of the continuing low-intensity conflict.
2.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
The
key conflict to the whole Southern Caucasus region centers on the enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh. This dispute was the subject of a well-prepared meeting in Key
West, Florida on 3 April between the Azeri and Armenian presidents, Heydar Aliev
and Robert Kocharian, and the OSCE Minsk Group, which undertook to negotiate
between the conflict parties under the patronage of Russia, France and the US.
The confidential negotiations will require a long-term diplomatic effort to sort
out the results of the 1992-1994 war that left 30'000 dead and 800'000 refugees.
The talks are characterized by a strong commitment of the two leaders to
contribute to a lasting solution of the conflict, and by the cooperation among
the three parties of the Minsk Group in facilitating the talks. After the end of
the talks the two presidents met separately with Bush in the White House.
Armenian media ascribed the American activism to the close ties of several Bush
administration officials with oil companies having interests in the Caspian
basin. A major issue is that the peoples of the two countries have been
inadequately prepared to support the progress of the talks. Though the two
countries were recently admitted to the Council of Europe, the national elites
are not yet involved in a reconciliation and rapprochement process. Overcoming
the legacy of ingrained emotions will not be easy. Furthermore, the internal
economic and political problems as well as the exclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh
leaders from the talks add to the difficulties of the negotiation process. The
role of the mediators and their specific interests in the conflict-torn and
oil-rich region is another factor that demands attention as well as a dose of
skepticism. More time, as well as courageous leadership and skilful diplomacy,
will certainly be needed to reach positive results. In this situation, deadlines
will not necessarily have a positive effect.
After
the Key West meeting, the next steps of the two countries influenced the
negotiation process in different ways: the Armenians publicly discussed certain
territorial trade-offs that Yerevan would favor in exchange for a self-governed
status of Nagorno-Karabakh; at the same time, Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh held
military exercises on their borders. On 22-23 June in Valletta, Malta, the
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group announced their intention to visit the region
in the first half of July and to meet with all parties. The three co-chairs are
French Ambassador Philippe de Suremain, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Troubnikov, and US Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh.
3.
The Transdniester Conflict
Moldovan
President Vladimir Voronin and the president of the separatist Transdniester
region, Igor Smirnov, on 16 May announced the signing of four cooperation
agreements reached at a meeting on 9 April. The agreements concern economic
cooperation, free access for journalists to cover news on both banks of the
Dniestr river, coordination of taxation, removal of customs checkpoints,
guarantees for foreign investors, and mutual recognition of official documents.
Furthermore, Chisinau unilaterally removed its border checkpoints at the end of
June. The Transdniester republic has not reciprocated yet. While the Moldovan
president and the country's new government, headed by Vasil Tarlev of the local
Bulgarian national minority, are proposing a broad autonomy to the Transdniester
capital of Tiraspol, Smirnov insists on an independent status.
At
the end of May, the Russian State Duma addressed the Presidents of Russia,
Belarus, Moldova and the separatist Transdniester republic with a proposal for
holding multilateral consultations and studying the conditions for the accession
of both Chisinau and Tiraspol to the Russian-Belarusian Union. This proposal
echoes earlier talks between the Russian and the Moldovan presidents and the
ideas of former prime minister Evgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Russian Federal
Commission for the regulation of the Transdniester issue. On 23-24 May, Primakov
held talks with separatist leader Smirnov in Moscow. In mid-April, he held
similar talks with the leaders from Chisinau and Tiraspol in Moldova.
IV.
The National Perspectives: Specific Development
1.
Georgia
1.
On 25 May, on the eve of the celebration of Georgian independence, a National
Guard battalion withdrew from a planned exercise and marched to a base of the
Interior Ministry forces at Mukhrovani, 40km from Tbilisi. There, the soldiers
were joined by a unit of the Interior Ministry forces, resulting in a force of
1'000. The government did not want to interpret the event as a mutiny, but as a
‘strike’ in protest against service conditions. The most embarrassing aspect
of the incident was that it coincided with a much-touted three-day manoeuvre on
the Black Sea that occupied most of the country’s land and naval forces.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze himself negotiated the end of the protest
and promised there would be no legal proceedings, a decision that was backed by
the prosecutor’s office, as there was no use of force. However, more realistic
analyses were provided by the Security Minister, Vakhtang Kutateladze, who spoke
of "an attempted coup d’état" and by Defense Minister Davit
Tevzadze, who qualified the event as a deliberate attempt to destabilize the
country on the eve of NATO-PfP exercises.
2.
The Shevardnadze suggested to the parliament and the broader public to discuss
the possibility of transforming Georgia into a “multi-subject federation”,
including Georgia, Ajaria, Abkhasia and Ossetia, with the other state
institutions. The Abkhasian separatists, however, discarded the idea of any
relationship with Georgia other than independent status.
2.
Moldova
The
Parliament of Moldova elected Communist leader Voronin as the new president on 4
April. He and the Communist-led government of Moldova set themselves the task of
ending the Transdniester conflict and re-establishing economic and political
relations with Russia. Joining the Russian-Belarusian Union is part of their
political platform.
3.
Russia
1.
The Russian Duma ratified the Open Skies Treaty in mid-April. Russia joined the
Treaty in 1992, together with 27 European states, the USA and Canada. The number
of flights will increase tenfold after Russia has ratified it. Before
ratification, Russia allowed only three overflights per year.
2.
At a seminar in Moscow during the first days of May, the Chairman of the
Spiritual Board of Muslims in the European Part of Russia, and Head of the
Council of Mullahs, Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin quoted a study of the Board,
according to which 1.5-2 million Muslims live in Moscow. This makes the capital
the largest Muslim city in Russia.
3.
On 18 April, the Russian Duma allowed the import of 20'000 tons of spent nuclear
fuel over the next 10 years. The expected revenue from the deal will be US$20
billion. Environmental activists said the country has moved closer to becoming
an international nuclear dumping ground.
4.
Ukraine
1.
After a non-confidence vote on 24 May, instigated by President Leonid Kuchma,
Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, the Prime-Minister was relieved of his office.
He was soon replaced by Kuchma’s nominee Anatoli Kinakh. The appointment of
“state secretaries” for five-year terms of office, in accordance with a
presidential decree, will relieve government ministers of their day-to-day
activities. They will form a kind of a shadow cabinet functioning under the
President’s guidance.
2.
In the last days of June, Pope John Paul II visited Ukraine, extending both
support for the Catholics in the country and an apology for wrongdoings against
the Orthodox Christians in the region. While he received a warm reception by
many Ukrainians, including the president, the Russian Orthodox Church has been
extremely critical of reconciliation between the two branches of the Christian
religion. This would definitely fuel resentment among the opposing religions in
Ukraine and in neighboring Russia.
V.
THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN HE BLACK SEA REGION AND THE STATE OF
CIS AND OF GUUAM
1.
Bilateral Relations
a)
Russia-Moldova
The
newly elected Moldovan President Voronin visited Moscow and met with Russian
President Vladimir Putin in mid-April. The issues related to accession to the
Russian-Belarusian Union, the status of the Russian language in Moldova,
economic relations and the separatist region of Transdniester were discussed.
Russia is the only energy supplier of Moldova, the poorest European country.
Russia agreed to guarantee a smooth solution to the Transdniester issue and
repeated that Chisinau is Moscow’s “strategic partner”.
b)
Russia-Turkey
The Russian Foreign Ministry
officially protested to Turkey on 25 April over the pro-Chechen hostage drama in
Istanbul's luxurious Swissotel. Russia issues another warning against extremist
groups based in Turkey. Russia has previously alerted Turkish officials to the
provision of various forms of support to Chechen terrorists by Turkish nationals
and groups.
c)
Ukraine-Russia
Putin appointed Viktor
Chernomyrdin, the former Prime Minister of Russia, as the country’s ambassador
to Ukraine on 10 May. The ambassador will also serve as the Russian
president’s representative in Kiev on economic affairs. Chernomyrdin's wife is
an ethnic Ukrainian and Kuchma has been his friend for many years. He has been
styled “the General Governor of Ukraine” in the Russian and Ukrainian press.
Russia supplies 80 per cent of the required natural gas to Ukraine, as well as
67 per cent of its oil and 100 per cent of its nuclear fuel. According to
Russian figures, Ukraine owes US$ 2.2 billion for gas, while Ukraine the debt is
only US$ 1.4 billion. Moscow expects an increase of its influence in Kiev after
Chernomyrdin's nomination for the job.
d)
Georgia-Russia
At the end of May, Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov promised the removal of all Russian military bases
from Georgia. A week earlier, Shevardnadze had urged the Russian side to
accelerate the withdrawal. Moscow has evacuated two of its four bases in Georgia
and is asking for a 14-year period to leave the other two (Akhalkalaki and
Batumi). Tbilisi will only agree to a three-year extension at the most. An
agreement with the OSCE stipulates that an agreement between the two countries
should be reached by 31 December 2001.
2.
CIS
1.
The joint CIS command post exercise “Commonwealth Southern Shield 2001”
ended in Moscow on 6 April. The object of this exercise was to coordinate
anti-terrorist activities of CIS countries. The Heads of Main Operational
Divisions at the General Staffs of the Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajiki armed
forces participated. The other members of CIS participated with observers.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to join the exercise. The exercise was
computer-simulated. A previous manoeuvre took place on the ground in Central
Asia.
2.
The Georgian Foreign Ministry announced in early April that Georgia would not
leave the CIS, despite proposals to the contrary which were discussed in
parliament. Shevardnadze continues to favor the country’s participation in the
CIS.
3.
The 10th regular meeting of the Heads of the Intelligence Agencies of the 11 CIS
states was convened at the end of May in Minsk (Belarus),. They discussed
avenues of cooperation in the struggles against terrorism, illegal migration and
drugs trafficking. A central topic was the improvement of information exchange
among the agencies.
4.
A CIS summit was held in Minsk from 31 May to 1 June; eleven heads of states
used the opportunity for many bilateral meetings. The illness of Turkmen
President Saparmurad Niyazov prevented him from participating. Less productive
were the meetings in multilateral formats. Putin stated the need to raise the
effectiveness of the CIS. The next meeting will be on 21 December this year in
Moscow. Russia displayed a new attitude towards GUUAM: unlike at previous
occasions, Putin called GUUAM an institution that strengthens the cooperation of
the CIS itself. During the summit a new geopolitical structure was
institutionalized: the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth (EEC), consisting of
Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
3.
GUUAM
The
first annual summit of GUUAM, an organization involving Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, was convened in Yalta (Ukraine) on 6 and 7
June. The summit had previously been postponed three times. One reason for the
postponement was the instability in Ukraine in the early spring of this year. It
should be noted that GUUAM is the only international association on CIS
territory in which Russia does not participate. The newly elected Moldovan
president had mentioned in April that his country’s participation in the GUUAM
is contingent on the organization's evolution as an economic entity. He
suggested before the Yalta summit to invite Russia to the forum as an observer.
The
summit adopted the GUUAM Charter, signed by the presidents of the member states.
The Charter states economic, social and transport goals and aims at
strengthening regional security in all spheres. Cooperation with international
institutions and fighting international terrorism, organized crime and drugs
trafficking are also goals of the Charter signatories. The organization is open
to new participants. The Charter also provides a better structure and management
such as annual summits or thebi-annual assembly of Foreign Ministers. The
participants in Yalta failed to sign a free trade agreement, as proposed by
Ukraine. The biggest challenge to the new international organization remains its
effective participation in the construction of the new “Silk Road”
Europe-Asia transport corridor. And, of course, another challenge lies in the
future development of its relations with Russia, the EU and NATO.
VI.
THE STATE OF THE BLACK SEA REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO
1.
Economic Aspects of the Black Sea Cooperation: National and Regional
Perspectives
a)
The Black Sea Bank
Since its creation in 1998, the
Black Sea Bank has awarded credits worth US$140 million to its 11 members.
b)
Ukraine-Turkmenistan
In mid-May, the conclusion of a
deal for supplying Turkmen gas to Ukraine was announced under which 250 billion
cubic meters will be delivered over the next 5 years, and 30 billion cubic
meters until the end of 2001. The agreed price was US$42 per 1'000 cubic meters.
Both countries are seeking ways of moving out of Russia’s sphere of influence.
c)
Russia-WTO
Russian Prime-Minister Mikhail
Kassyanov met with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany during the Hannover
Fair in the second half of April and discussed ways of accelerating accession to
the WTO for Russia.
2.
Political and Security Aspects of the Black Sea Regional Cooperation and EU and
PfP Activities
a)
Black Sea Force (BSFOR)
Diplomatic and military
representatives of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (the
six coastal Black Sea states) signed an agreement for the creation of a joint
navy unit, called Black Sea Force (BSFOR), on 2 April in Istanbul, Turkey. The
Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Georgia, the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Russia,
Romania and Ukraine and the commander of the Bulgarian navy put their signatures
to the document. The unit will help resolve various contingencies of
humanitarian, rescue and ecological character. BSFOR may be involved also in
de-mining tasks. The force will not participate in military activity against any
of the member states. The command of BSFOR will be rotated among all
participating states and each participant remains in charge of its own national
command. The decisive principle is the consensus of the participants. The first
annual exercise is planned for this summer. A second working meeting was held in
the end of April in Georgia.
b)
Georgia-Bulgaria.
The chiefs of the general staffs
of the armed forces of Georgia and Bulgaria, Gen. Johnny Pirzhalaishvili and
Gen. Miho Mihov signed a bilateral program of military cooperation on 19 April
in Tbilisi. Bulgaria will sell Georgia two transport airplanes, each capable of
carrying 200 personnel. Georgian officers will be accepted for education in
Bulgaria. The two military leaders discussed their cooperation under the PfP
program. The Bulgarian chief of the general staff told the press in Tbilisi that
the two countries have the same objective – they want to join NATO.
c)
OBSEC
The Council of Foreign Ministers
of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC) met on 27 April
in Moscow. The Council agreed to accept the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as full members.
d)
Armenia-Romania
The Defense Ministers of the two
countries, Serzh Sarkisian and Ioan Mircea Pascu, signed a bilateral program of
military cooperation for 2001 on 9 April in Yerevan. The PfP framework was best
suited for the development of the bilateral relations, said the two ministers.
e)
NATO-PfP Exercise in Georgia
From 11 to 22 June, Georgia
hosted a naval-amphibious and humanitarian exercise in Black Sea, close to the
port of Poti. Nine NATO and six PfP partners trained together in the annual
exercise “Cooperative Partner 01” the first to be hosted by Georgia. The
exercise demonstrated the partners’ determination to further develop their
naval and amphibious interoperability with NATO in the conduct of peace support
operations and provision of humanitarian assistance. The exercise was controlled
by staff deployed from the headquarters of the commander Allied Naval Forces
South and the Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, both
based in Naples, Italy with full integration of partner nations into the NATO
command and control structure.
f) EU-Russia
1. EU High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana visited Moscow on 5 April in
preparation for the May EU-Russia summit in the Russian capital. EU enlargement
requires regulation of the future common border as well as shaping common
interests. Solana said the EU needed Russia as a permanent partner to form a
prosperous economic and political space on the continent.
2. The EU Presidency, European
Commission President Romano Prodi, Solana and Kassyanov participated in the 7th
EU-Russia summit. Economic issues, trade, air transport, Kaliningrad, the
conflict in Chechnya, joint crisis management, the environment and EU
enlargement were on the agenda of the summit. Energy supplies were a special
topic of the talks since Russia provides 21 per cent of the EU's oil and 41 per
cent of its gas imports. Russia is asking the EU for US$588 billion to modernize
its energy infrastructure by 2020. If this request is granted, the EU will be
more deeply involved in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region where energy resources
are of major interest to Russia and Europe.
g)
NATO-Russia
The
regular meeting of the Joint NATO-Russia Council was convened in Brussels on 28
April. Russia’s ideas on a common European missile defense were suggested for
discussion.
VII.
OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS, STATESAND INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCING THE BLACK SEA REGION:
THE US
1.
US-Russia
A
mid-air collision of a US EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter over
the South China Sea led to a U-turn in the Bush administration’s attitude
towards Russia. Leading American politicians even called Russia ‘our natural
ally’. The South China Sea incident is a good occasion for Russia to consider
its future role in the eventual arms race close to its eastern frontiers. A
dialogue was launched after a few meetings between US Secretary of State Colin
Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov and was continued at the presidential
level in Ljubljana, Slovenia on 16 June. The most contentious issue in the
bilateral relations, the US NMD program and the possible violation of the 1972
ABM treaty, may be solved diplomatically between the two countries before its
technical feasibility and financial efficiency are proven. An eventual
compromise on this issue will clear the way for new relations among Russia, NATO
and the EU on various security and defense questions. Russiawill probably adopt
a more positive stance towards NATO enlargement. NATO and the EU will reach
better agreements among themselves on the issue of using NATO assets. Probably,
Russia will find a clearer format of involvement with both the EU and NATO in
crisis-management contingencies.
2.
US-Ukraine
On
5 June, US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld visited Ukraine and met with
Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk, Prime Minister Anatoli Kinakh and President
Leonid Kuchma. A protocol on bilateral military cooperation was signed during
the visit. Rumsfeld underlined the importance of a stable and prosperous Ukraine
that is oriented to the West, towards Europe and the Atlantic community.
3.
US-Georgia
Shevardnadze
voiced his support for US plans for a National Missile Defense on 25 June, his
declaration being directed more towards Moscow than the US. According to
Shevardnadze, the US NMD system will make the world a safer place.
VIII.
Conclusions
1.
The post-conflict tensions in Chechnya continue to hinder the reconstruction
efforts in the area. At the same time, the Nagorno-Karabakh and the
Transdniester conflicts were, for different reasons, de-escalated in the last
three months.
2. The assertive Russian policy in the CIS area led to
the geopolitical stabilization of the Russian Federation and to the diminished
significance of the GUUAM community of states. The strengthened strategic
relations with India and China provide Russia with temporary advantageous
geopolitical positions, but Moscow realizes the importance of its relations with
both the EU and the USA for the future stability of the country. The cooperative
American position on the transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian-Black
Sea region to world markets provides a solid foundation for a lasting
cooperative arrangement among a multitude of political and economic actors in
this troubled area. The closer economic involvement between the EU and Russia
will definitely have an impact on the Black Sea-Caspian Sea regions as well.
NATO is continuing its persistent campaign of clearing the relations with Russia
from the “threat perception” invented by Moscow in the midst of many other
different, but real threats to the country’s security.