| I.
INTRODUCTION
The
period from January to March was marked by the geopolitical, geo-economic,
and geo-strategic interplay of global centres of power such as the
US, the EU, China, Russia, Japan, and India in the Black Sea-Caspian
Sea region as well as in the broader region of the ‘Greater Middle
East’. All of these power centres were opposed to terrorism. However,
counter-terrorism is not a powerful and influential enough factor to
create a cohesiveness and unity of purpose among these global actors
and local regional powers that would consolidate their stance against
political violence movements. Terrorism with Chechen connections took
its toll again in Russia – this time in the Moscow metro, where 40
people were killed and 130 other wounded. Some cooperative steps were
registered in US-Russian counter-terrorist efforts, and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) demonstrated cooperation in the fight
against Muslim militants in Central Asia. While the EU increased its
efforts to support the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization
in Afghanistan, Japan, the UN, and Georgia took similar measures in
Iraq. The slow return to normal in this country a year after the US-led
invasion is creating great difficulties for the members of the coalition,
their governments, the people of Iraq, and for the “fight against terrorism”.
All calls for an end of the military occupation of Iraq, however, are
unhelpful, since the result could be similar to the destabilization
of Afghanistan after the Taliban took power there. Despite the slow
pace of improvement in Iraq and the growing number of lethal attacks
on occupation troops there, the success of the post-conflict rehabilitation
in this country is in the vital interest of all - both of those who
are directly involved in stabilization and a return to normal life
there, and of those who criticize the current US administration and
its policy of preemptive “regime change”. The gradual involvement of
the UN with civilian experts has been a very welcome sign in the last
three months.
Iran remained a big “question mark” in terms of nuclear proliferation.
Doubts remain that Tehran has an ongoing military nuclear program.
Caspian
Sea delimitation is still far from achieving the intended end result
– a negotiated convention on the legal status of maritime borders.
Transdniester and Nagorno Karabakh continued to be a burden for the
people of the respective regions, as well as for the international
organizations and states involved in conflict resolution and dealing
with the post-conflict problems.
The new Georgian president was able to overcome the first major challenge
of separatists in his country. Georgia is hoping to consolidate its
sovereignty despite an uneasy relationship with Russia, the former
imperial power in the Southern Caucasus. Russian voters re-elected
Vladimir Putin as president, and he continues to push for reforms in
a top-down fashion. In the EU and the US, Moscow is dealing with willing
and cooperative partners who, however, are not hiding their concerns
regarding undemocratic tendencies in the development of the Russian
society and state. Additionally, the EU insists on re-formulating a
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia that dates
from 1997 to reflect the changes since the enlargement to include 10
new members from 1 May this year.
II. Profile Background of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea Area
1. Geopolitical, Geoeconomic,
and Geostrategic Tendencies
1) US-China. General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff of the US armed forces, visited China on 14 January – three
years after an incident involving a US spy plane and a Chinese fighter
- and met with General Liang Guanglie, chief of general staff of the
People’s Liberation Army. Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited
the US in October last year. The restoration of military-to-military
relations is an important confidence-building measure in a period of
diplomatic efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issues. General
Myers also visited Japan and Mongolia. The US and China are maintaining
a dialog on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of the US.
The aim of the initiative is to prevent WMD proliferation.
2) Russia-India. India and Russia on 21 January finalized a US$1.5
billion deal on the purchase of a Russian aircraft carrier from the
mid-1980s, the “Admiral Gorshkov”. The firepower of the Indian navy
was strongly increased by the aircraft carrier, which brings China
– its neighbor and rival – into range. In addition, India bought a
squadron of MiG-29 multi-role fighters. The Russian side will refit
the aircraft carrier and give it the capacity to move task forces into
more distant areas. With the powerful “Gorshkov”, the military balance
in the Indian Ocean will be changed completely.
3) US-Russia. US Undersecretary of State John Bolton visited Moscow
from 29-30 January and discussed President Bush’s Proliferation Security
Initiative with Russian leaders. Like Russia, over 60 countries worldwide
have declared their support for the initiative. John Bolton met with
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff of
the Russian armed forces, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy. He discussed
with his Russian counterparts the nuclear program of Iran. An earlier
visit by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Moscow had confirmed
a joint interest in stability in Georgia. He assured his Russian hosts
that the US is not trying to surround Russia with bases of any kind.
He underlined the importance of continuing close collaboration and
cooperation with the Russian Federation to fight the “global war on
terrorism”.
4) Russia-China. China plans to build a 1’380-km railway that would
link the port of Dalian with the Russian port city of Vladivostok,
running along the coastline of Liaoning province and the border of
North Korea. The railway is expected to boost Chinese trade and economy.
5) EU-China. On 16 March, the EU announced that it was working to end
a 14-year-old arms embargo against Beijing, although Washington has
urged Brussels not to drop the ban because of China’s human rights
practices. The move would be a major political gesture and could further
open up trade with the world’s fastest-growing economic heavyweight.
Though France is urging the EU to end the embargo, supported by the
Netherlands and Spain, other EU states first want to see clear evidence
that China’s rights record has improved.
2. Terrorism/Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
in Afghanistan and Iraq, Other Security Threats
1) Terrorism
a. SCO. The foreign ministers of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan opened a regional anti-terrorism headquarters
on 15 January in Beijing in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Since 2001, the SCO has shifted its focus to combating
Islamic militants. It is reasonable to assume that Beijing is trying
to use the SCO to counter-balance the increased US military presence
in Central Asia, while the anti-terrorist aspect of the organization
has little substance as of yet.
b. Chechen Terrorism in Russia. On the morning of 6 February, Chechen
terrorists bombed the Moscow metro. Forty peaceful passengers were
killed and more than 130 others were injured. Many people are still
missing. This was the sixth terrorist blast in the Moscow metro since
1977. The terrorist attack was launched some five weeks before the
presidential elections in Russia. President Vladimir Putin said that
the authorities had no doubts as to the authors of the terrorist act,
whom they identified as Chechen separatists headed by Aslan Maskhadov.
US President George Bush condemned the terrorist act and extended his
condolences and support to the Russian president and the victims’ families.
Despite the high level of danger, stemming from terrorism the level
of solidarity among the societies of Russia, Europe, and the US is
not adequate to produce the necessary counter-terrorist political product
that would lead to more efficient struggle against terrorists. During
his visit to Moscow on 26 January, US Secretary of State Colin Powell
said that Russia’s fight against Chechen terrorism was an internal
affair of the Russian Federation. Washington hopes that Russia will
be able to find a political solution to the problem of terrorism while
at the same time respecting human rights. Reports from Iraq show that
Chechen terrorists are closely involved in the acts of violence in
the country, including in training local Iraqi fighters.
c. US-Russia. On 1 March, the US transferred seven Russian nationals
from Guantanamo Bay to the control of the Russian government to face
criminal charges relating to their terrorist activities during an armed
conflict. The US Department of State said it hoped the seven Russians
would be detained, investigated, and prosecuted as appropriate under
Russian law, and that they would be treated humanely in accordance
with Russian law and obligations. The US welcomes and appreciates the
cooperation of the Russian government in the war against terrorism
and looks forward to working closely in the future in that fight.
2) Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in Iraq
a. Georgia. 207 Georgian special forces joined the occupation forces
in Iraq in February. 70 Georgian mine-clearing experts and doctors
returned from Tikrit where they have been since August 2003. Georgian
President Michael Saakashvili said on 25 February in Washington, D.C.
that Tbilisi would further expand its involvement in Iraq (according
to US sources in Tbilisi, Georgia will increase its troops by 300 more
soldiers by the summer of this year).
b. Japan. In mid-January, Japan started its most risky overseas military
mission since World War II by sending 1’000 non-combat troops, including
100 from a Japanese air force team. The concept of “non-combat zones”
is hard to apply in Iraq. Japan relies on the Middle East for around
90 per cent of its oil imports. Japanese leaders understand well the
danger of Iraq turning into a failed state and a base for terrorist
activities as Afghanistan once was, threatening the region and the
world, including Japan. Tokyo wants to demonstrate how important the
reconstruction of Iraq and not giving in to violence is to the rest
of the world. However, Japanese public has serious concerns about the
security of the troops, though the base in Samawah, southern Iraq,
is relatively safe. Japanese soldiers will take part in purification
and distribution of water and rebuilding schools. Tokyo has pledged
a total of US$5.0 billion in reconstruction aid for Iraq, including
US$1.5 billion in grant aid. A majority of 54 per cent of the Japanese
public favor pulling out if there were casualties, and 35 per cent
think the mission should continue.
c. United Nations. After meeting on 19 January with top US, UK, and
Iraqi officials, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed to send a UN
expert team to Baghdad to study the conditions for holding elections.
US experts think there is not enough time to organize direct elections
by 30 June. Local Iraqi religious leaders insist on direct elections
for a government by that date. The UN Secretary-General removed his
organization’s international staff from Iraq in October last year after
attacks on relief workers and the bombing of the UN headquarters in
Baghdad in August 2003 that killed 22 people, including the mission
chief, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The transfer of sovereignty to an interim
Iraqi government could be a key test for UN’s involvement in the country.
The uneasy question of whether to achieve the transfer through caucuses
or elections is still pending. The “caucuses” option for choosing an
assembly that will elect a government would mean that direct elections
should be held in 2005 after the signing of a constitution. The US
administration in Iraq wants to prove to the Shi’ite cleric leaders
that direct general elections will not bring expected results. The
UN expertise is expected to help in this direction. The UN Secretary-General’s
special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi concluded that it would not be feasible
to hold elections before June. The UN suggested it might help, if asked,
with preparations for elections or in forming an interim government.
On 16 March, Brahimi restated the UN offer after receiving no response
from the Governing Council of Iraq. UN experts have estimated it would
take eight months after the legal framework was ready to prepare for
elections. Iraq’s provisional constitution, the Transitional Administrative
Law, stipulates that elections be held by January 2005. The US Administration
confirmed on 16 March that it wants the UN to play a vital role in
the future of Iraq, especially in monitoring the elections and in providing
expertise on the constitutional process, and UN authorities would very
probably agree to work for the preparation of elections by the end
of January 2005.
3) Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in Afghanistan
EU. The EU called on
the UN to hold a conference on Afghanistan to help its government in
the violent conditions ahead of the June presidential elections in
the country. The EU High Representative on foreign and security policy,
Javier Solana, had visited Afghanistan the week before in an effort
to revitalize the international community’s engagement. Only less than
400’000 out of 10 million voters have been registered so far due to
dangerous working conditions for UN experts.
4) Other Security Threats
Nuclear Proliferation (Iran). US Undersecretary of State John Bolton on 12 February directly accused
Iran of hiding
designs for centrifuges capable of producing nuclear-grade material
from the IAEA. The US had no doubt that Iran continued to pursue a
nuclear weapons program, said Bolton. Despite these accusations, Moscow
signed a deal with Tehran in March to ship nuclear fuel to Iran’s Bushehr
power plant. UN inspectors in Iran found undeclared high-tech enrichment
equipment at an Iranian air force base in mid-February. The discovery
is the first to show a link between the nuclear program and the military
of Iran. The Iranian side has strongly denounced the accusations, saying
Tehran does not have a military nuclear plans, but doubts remain.
3. Other Sources of Conflict in the Black
Sea-Caspian Sea Region
1) The Delimitation of the Caspian Sea.
A regular negotiation round
on the Convention of the legal status of the Caspian Sea area was convened
by Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan on 17 March
in Baku. Eleven out of 22 chapters of the convention have been already
been negotiated. The rest of the topics will be discussed after consultations
with the central authorities of the respective countries. Russia and
Iran do not accept any decision on oil and gas pipeline projects on
the sea floor that is anything else but consensus-based. Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and host nation Azerbaijan would prefer the construction
of such pipelines to be based on bilateral agreements without requiring
the consensus of the riparian states. Moscow and Tehran underline ecological
concerns, while the other three states stress the importance of economic
arguments and political stability for the transit territories. Kazakhstan
is eager to use alternative routes, such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum, to transport its oil and gas to the world markets.
2) Oil and Gas Issues: BTC.
The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) announced on 4 February that it would provide US$100 million
in political risk insurance for commercial bank loans being made for
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project that runs through Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Turkey. The project makes a significant contribution to
the integration of the Caucasus into the global economy and could provide
significant developmental benefits to the people of the three countries.
III.
CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA
Transdniester
Experts from Russia, Ukraine and OSCE discussed the Transdniester conflict
in Sofia on 26-27 January. The participants agreed to present to
the Bulgarian foreign minister, who is also acting as chairman of
the OSCE for 2004, a blueprint for the negotiations in Transdniester.
This includes tackling the issue between the two conflicting parties
in Moldova with the mediation of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. The
status of Transdniester and the withdrawal of Russia’s 14th Army
remain the key obstacles to the reconciliation process in the country.
On 24 February, Moldova’s Russian-speaking separatists warned of
a new war if NATO, EU, or OSCE forces intervened in the country.
IV.
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
1.
Georgia.
(1) Presidential elections were held in Georgia on 4 January, and Mikhail
Saakashvili won with 86 per cent of the votes. On 25 January, he formally
accepted his obligations as the country’s head of state. US Secretary
of State Colin Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov attended
the inauguration ceremony. Saakashvili’s ambition is to end corruption
and bring the country into the European mainstream. (2) Georgia lifted
an economic blockade against the rebellious Adjaria region on 18 March
after three and a half hours of negotiations between Saakashvili and
Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze in Batumi. The sanctions against Adjaria
were imposed on 15 March, when President Saakashvili was not allowed
to enter Adjaria ahead of the 28 March parliamentary elections to campaign
for the National Movement, which was running against Abashidze, a Russian
proxy. The president said after meeting with Abashidze that three principle
issues had been resolved: the free organization of the election campaign;
re-considering judicial cases against the opposition; and returning
arms illegally distributed to the population and the disbanding of
illegal armed groups. The Adjarian leader agreed that the Georgian
president would establish representative offices in the customs and
other institutions of Adjaria. Their major function would be monitoring
the financial situation in the region. The Georgian authorities have
the obligation to control the customs, borders, ports, and army of
the autonomous republic. Adjaria had previously flaunted these rules.
Georgia’s standing in geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic
terms would grow if the EU’s TRACECA infrastructure project were realized
and with the launch of the BTC pipeline project. Europe, the US, and
Russia have stakes in the future of the Southern Caucasus, where Georgia
plays a key role.
Apart from Adjaria, Georgia has to deal with other potential or current
domestic separatist movements: Abkhazia and SouthOssetia (dominated
by Russia); Samtskhe-Javakheti (with a dominant Armenian population);
Kakheti (bordering on Turkey); Mingrelia (the birthplace of former
president Zviad Gamsakhurdia); Svaneti (an inaccessible and ungovernable
mountainous region, where the Pankisi Gorge shelters Chechen fighters
from time to time). Solving the issue of separatism is the big challenge
for the young leaders of Georgia.
2. Russia.
(1) On 24 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed
the government of Russia. On 1 March he appointed Mikhail Fradkov as
new prime minister, replacing Mikhail Kasyanov. Experts said this unexpected
step showed Putin’s desire to appoint a more ‘presidential’ cabinet
ahead of the presidential elections. Sergei Lavrov was appointed as
the country’s new foreign minister, replacing Igor Ivanov, who joined
the president’s administration. (2) The Russian Navy on 18 February
failed three times to launch a SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile)
during exercises observed by Putin. The other two legs of the ‘strategic
triad’, namely ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles) and heavy
bombers, performed successfully. Russia’s military leaders must now
concentrate on the state of the nuclear forces based on sea, especially
the submarine fleet and its nuclear missiles. (3) Russia’s Central
Election Commission on 25 March announced the official results of the
14 March presidential elections. Vladimir Putin was re-elected with
71.2 per cent of the votes. US Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly
stated his concern at the level of authoritarianism that was coming
back to Russia. The president wields enormous power that has no adequate
democratic counterweight. The judicial power has lost much of its independence
while the ‘fourth’, unofficial power – the media - came under tight
state control. President Putin wants to show that he is already free
from the influence of the Yeltsin family. His ambition is to draft
the future course of a strong Russia.
V.
THE BILATERAL
AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION, STATE OF CIS AND
GUUAM
1.
Bilateral Relations
1. Bulgaria-Ukraine.
In the last days of January the Speaker of the
Ukrainian Parliament, Volodimir Litvin, visited Sofia and met with
his Bulgarian counterpart, Ognyan Gerdzhikov, President Georgi Parvanov,
and Prime Minister Simeon Coburgotski. They discussed bilateral political,
economic, and cultural issues as well as participation in peacekeeping
operations. Ukraine hosts a big Bulgarian national minority of 230’000,
which is treated well by the friendly neighboring country.
2. Russia-Azerbaijan.
In the beginning of February, Azeri President
Ilham Aliev visited Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir
Putin. Aliev promised to transport Russian oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline. He also said the quantity of oil transported by the Baku-Novorossiysk
pipeline (from the Azeri coast of the Caspian Sea to the Russian coast
of the Black Sea) should be increased. The two leaders agreed to intensify
their joint counter-terrorist activities.
3. Russia-Georgia.
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili visited Moscow
from 9-10 February and held talks with Russian President Putin. Tbilisi
would like to free itself from the Russian military bases on its territory.
The closure of these bases and the return of the Russian troops could
be subsidized by the US government, as US Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Lynn Pascoe said on 13 January. Russia holds the key elements
of Georgia’s energy security– oil, natural gas, and electricity. The
energy security of the small Caucasian nation is largely dependent
on Moscow’s goodwill. The young Georgian president needs good relationship
with Russia in a period when is trying to achieve political consolidation
and an end to separatist tendencies in Georgia. It will not be an easy
task to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic position of Georgia while peacefully
neutralizing Russia’s claims for ‘eternal’ presence in the small country
at the southern borders of the federation.
VI.
STATE OF THE BLACK SEA REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF EU AND NATO
1.
Economic Aspects of Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea: National
and Regional Perspectives
US-Moldova. On 3 February, the US Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) announced that GlobUS – part of the US
corporation International
Communications Systems – was planning to introduce prepaid telephone
cards to Moldova with the help of a US$150’000 loan from OPIC. The
project will “utilise state-of-the-art technology to provide both maximal
savings and quality service to Moldova’s citizens, and at the same
time give the country the flexibility to offer a seamless convergence
of Internet and other value-added services in the future”, OPIC President
and CEO Peter Watson said in a press release (http://www.opic.gov/PressReleases/2004/4-05.htm).
2.
Political and Security Aspects of the Black Sea Regional Cooperation
and EU and NATO/PfP Activities
a. EU-Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said
in March that the meeting of the EU „Troika“ (the foreign minister
of the rotating presiding country, EU High Representative on Foreign
and Security Policy Javier Solana, and EC External Relations Commissioner
Chris Patten) and Russia would be held in the first days of April.
Moscow will continue to insist on trade compensations from the EU after
the enlargement on 1 May. The calculations by Moscow of the losses
are between €250 million and €450 million. Russian experts said the
question was not about the arithmetic, but about the chemistry of Russia’s
multilateral trade relations with traditional partners. After the enlargement,
Russia’s trade with the EU will increase from 36 to 51 per cent. At
the same time, Russia thinks it is legitimate to claim compensation
for the losses incurred by the Russian economy. However, Moscow does
not mention the losses incurred by the small new EU members bordering
on Russia due to Moscow’s insistence on keeping high taxes on their
goods, and its refusal to apply the lower tariffs according to the
1997 PCA between EU and Russia. The EU foreign ministers have warned
Moscow that the EU will impose sanctions on Russia if the new members
are not treated as equals to the older ones. In addition, the EU and
Russia have diverging views on Moscow’s military bases in Georgia.
On 15 January, Solana visited Tbilisi and called on Russia to honor
its agreement to close its remaining military bases in Georgia. Furthermore,
EC Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen said at the end of
January that EU would make Russia’s accession to the WTO dependent
on Moscow’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. On 9 February, the
EU formally declared that it would press Moscow on human rights and
Chechnya while boosting ties with other former Soviet states. The EU
began a complete review of its Russia policy in December 2003 ahead
of the community’s enlargement on 1 May. The EU insists on concluding
a new bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Moscow
till the end of April. The EU signed a PCA with Russia in December
1997 setting out the political, economic, and trade frameworks of its
relationship for the next ten years. EU leaders are concerned over
the question of whether Russia can and will be a democratic neighbor
of an enlarged Europe. According to an EU study, bilateral ties are
close to a post-Soviet low.
b. NATO-Ukraine.
(1) Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Gryshchenko
said at the plenary meeting on the future of NATO at the Munich International
Security Conference on 8 February that partners such as Ukraine were
both willing and capable of reinforcing the NATO response to modern
threats and challenges. Ukraine participates in the occupation of Iraq
and in the peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Liberia. Gryshchenko
offered the use of Ukrainian military cargo planes for NATO shipments.
(2) The NATO-Ukraine Commission met at ambassadorial level on 17 March
in Brussels to discuss the status of the bilateral relations. “Allied
ambassadors expressed appreciation for the Ukrainian participation
in NATO-led and other peacekeeping operations and welcomed recent progress
in reforming its defence sector. At the same time they stressed Ukraine
must continue to implement the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, notably in
regards to independent media and this year’s presidential elections.”
The ambassadors added that Ukraine’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic
institutions required serious political commitment by Kiev.
c. NATO-Russia.
(1) Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told participants
at the Munich International Security Conference on 8 February that
Moscow was considering pulling out of the CFE Treaty. This would nullify
decisions that its troops must leave Georgia and Moldova. Russia argues
that under the expansion of NATO, military bases will be stationed
close to its borders in the Baltic republics and Poland. (2) From 8-12
March, NATO and Russian units carried out a joint antiballistic missile
exercise under the auspices of the Council NATO-Russia at the US space
center in Colorado Springs. Sixty Russian and NATO experts participated
in the exercise. It was the first wargame on anti-ballistic missile
defense and was designed to train the compatibility of equipment and
technical parameters.
VII.
OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS - STATES AND INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCING THE
BLACK
SEA REGION
1. US
a. US-Georgia. (1) US Secretary of State Colin Powell attended the
inauguration of the new president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili,
on 25 January in Tbilisi. Powell told his Georgian hosts that the US
would continue to stand by them as they worked “to form a new government
committed to economic and political reform, the protection of human
rights and the elimination of corruption.” (2) Saakashvili visited
Washington, D. C. from 23-25 February and vowed not to use military
force to unify his divided country. He praised the US for training
Georgian troops. On 25 February, he met with US President George Bush
and discussed terrorism and energy issues. President Saakashvili said
he wanted to improve relations with Russia as well, as long as Moscow
recognized Georgia’s national sovereignty. President Bush also urged
Georgia’s powerful neighbor, the Russian Federation, to leave its bases
on Georgian territory.
b. US-Russia. (1) US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Moscow
from 26-27 January and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He outlined US concerns about Russian
democracy and the Kremlin’s increasingly autocratic demeanor. He also
discussed trade issues, terrorism, and Iraq with his Russian hosts.
Powell told the press that a US-Russian partnership was under construction
and assured President Putin that the US was not trying to surround
Russia, despite seeking temporary military bases in former Warsaw Pact
countries. Russian sources said Moscow understood the need for bases
in Romania and Bulgaria for fighting “terrorism”, but not in the Baltic
republics and Poland. (2) Russian sources in mid-March announced a
meeting between the new Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, which is to take place in May.
It is also quite probable that the two leading diplomats will meet
at the beginning of April in Berlin on the occasion of a high-level
conference on Afghanistan.
c. US-Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage visited Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan from 24-27 March.
He met with senior government officials in the three countries, as
well as with other political leaders and groups that promote democracy
and civil society. All three countries have a democracy deficit, and
their civil societies are in their early stages of development.
2. OSCE
OSCE-Southern Caucasus. The chairman of the
OSCE for 2004, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, visited Georgia,
Azerbaijan,
and Armenia from 14-17 March. He tried to encourage bilateral talks
between Tbilisi and Batumi on the Adjarian issue and between Baku and
Yerevan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The latter is the main obstacle
for the progress of the EU-supported TRACECA strategic infrastructure
project, which aims to link Asia with Europe along the ‘Silk Highway’
of antiquity. The OSCE official met with the presidents of the three
republics.
3. Council of Europe (CE)
CE-Azerbaijan. On 16 March,
Azeri President Ilham Aliev freed 129 political prisoners, 26 of which
were on the
CE’s list of political prisoners in the country. The gesture by the
young and autocratic president of Azerbaijan was encouraged by pressure
applied during the visit of the OSCE chairman and foreign minister
of Bulgaria as well as the president of a leading Bulgarian NGO, the
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. One of the political prisoners on the CE
list was the counterpart of the Bulgarian NGO’s leader.
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS
The big opportunities for development in the Black Sea-Caspian
Sea area continue to be counter-balanced by the slow pace of democracy
in the region stretching eastwards from the eastern coast of the Black
Sea, by separatist tendencies, terrorism, and the geopolitical calculations
of local big powers. Both the EU and NATO will have to adapt to a neighborhood
in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region that will slowly shift to stability,
democracy, and better economic performance. The slow democratic progress
in Russia and Ukraine is an influential factor that needs to be tackled
together with the other huge problems of the Greater Middle East. Effective
partnership between both countries and the EU, NATO, and the US is
a long way off before it can become a vehicle for progress in the region
and beyond.
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