

Bulgaria and the European Union in the Process of Building a Common European Defence

Plamen PANTEV, Valeri RATCHEV, Tilcho IVANOV

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Preface

During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU) for reviewing the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty once again public and experts around the world realize the dramatic improvement of the security situation of the old continent that European integration led to. Few would doubt about the impact IGC will have on the security of the broader area of the Northern Hemisphere and the world in general. This is even more true considering the coincidental interaction of the EU with the evolutionary developments of the Western European Union (WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and of the internal national adaptations in the once divided into East and West parts of the Euroatlantic social, economic, political and defence space. Important outlines of a new design for the Euroatlantic security architecture with stronger European security and defence identity are already drawn. One should soberly admit that whatever political decisions are taken in the next two years, some more time would be needed to give a better shape and clarity of the new security design and its defence component.

Bulgaria's structured dialogue with and pre-accession strategy to the EU as well as her formal submission of an application for full membership of the Union and the intensified dialogue that stemmed from it logically bring the country to the need of taking decisions for practical adaptation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the future Common European Defence (CED) of the EU. These evolutionary developments importantly coincide in a non contradictory manner with the deepening involvement of the country in the activities of the WEU, NATO's instruments - the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, with the efforts of the governments of the Balkan and the Black Sea regions to improve their stability and strengthen regional peace and with the procedures of formulating a concept for the European security in the 21 century by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Institute for Security and International Studies in Sofia continues its efforts to study and to conceptualize the relations and events in the security, foreign political and defence fields during the post-Cold War period. The

gratitude of the Institute and the authors of this Research Study goes mostly to the people responsible for the Phare Information Programme of the EU and to the Delegation of the European Commission (EC) of the EU in Sofia, especially to Ambassador Thomas C. O'Sullivan and Mr. Sergei Makarinov, whose support made possible the study and the publication.

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The responsibility for the statements, opinions and conclusions is entirely of the authors of the respective parts of the Study in their capacity of Associates of the Institute for Security and International Studies.

List of Abbreviations

ACCEE - Associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe

ACE - Allied Command for Europe

ACLANT - Allied Command for the Atlantic

ACOM - Atlantic Command (of the USA)

BMD - Ballistic Missile Defence

CED - Common European Defence

CEDP - Common European Defence Policy

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

CJTF - Combined Joint Task Forces

EAA - European Armaments Agency

EC - European Commission

EUCOM - European Command (of the USA)

ESDI - European Security and Defence Identity

EU - European Union

IEPG - Independent European Programme Group

IFOR - Implementation Force

IGC - Intergovernmental Conference

NAC - North Atlantic Council

NACC - North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PFP - Partnership for Peace

SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander for Europe of NATO

WEAG - Western European Armaments Group
WEU - Western European Union

Introduction

The participants of the IGC of the EU, which started on 29 March during the Turin (Italy) Council Meeting of the Union have been recommended by the EC on the issues of European security and defence identity (ESDI) to:

- (i) allow Union commitments to missions aimed at restoring or keeping peace to be written into the treaty ('Petersberg' missions);
- (ii) reinforce the Union's security capability by providing for Defence ministers to play an appropriate role in the Council;
- (iii) review the role of the Western European Union with a view to incorporating it into the Union according to a settled timetable" [1].

The fundamental argument of the recommendations is that: "the Union's foreign policy suffers from its inability to project credible military force...A genuine European identity in the security and defence field is indispensable. It requires clear political will on the part of Member States." [2] The argument and the recommendations are conditioned by the statement that: "NATO remains at the centre of Europe's defence arrangements, and a European pillar should be developed within it. In this context, the WEU plays a key role as already set out in the Treaty. As matters stand, Member States do not, however, have the same defence commitments in relation to NATO and the WEU." [3] Another important condition of developing an ESDI is "better integration of the armaments industry into the general Treaty rules, greater solidarity and cooperation including the establishment of an armaments agency, and a consistent approach to foreign trade" [4].

Basing our considerations on a research of the Institute for Security and International Studies of 1995 - "*Bulgaria and the Balkans in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*" [5], we are convinced that CFSP, ESDI and CED are all at an early stage of a process of developing the indispensable elements of a political union and their completion would be rather at the final stage. The Commission's recommendations to the IGC reflect a need to move on, progress and clarify a universe of details as well as to forge a consensus on defining CED and its objectives.

The authors of the present Study think this process requires more clarity and unity of the purpose to construct an efficient European security system that reinforces the transatlantic link and interlocks with a cooperative Russia as

prerequisites of an efficient and rational CED. The various aspects of the security policy in Europe have changed and there is an opportunity to develop a more sophisticated pattern of it for the benefit of the whole OSCE zone. Political efforts and patience as well as intensive intellectual activity and consultations are needed for utilizing the chances. Part of our considerations will try to add positively to this important research task.

The associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (ACCEE) with Europe Agreements with the EU seek membership in the EU and NATO. They are deeply interested in the developments in the Union the IGC will chart and how their security concerns and problems will be affected. Bulgaria is situated in Southeastern Europe - an important market, communication and strategic crossroad of interest for the EU. How the broader Euroatlantic and the regional security framework would influence the country's participation in the process of building CED is another research task of this Study.

There is an understanding that enlargement of the EU is not and cannot be 'one way street' of providing security by NATO and WEU for the prospective members of these organisations. That is why devoting resources for military cooperation, including for attaining compatible or equal standards, needs particular conceptual attention. Obviously these questions are variously perceived and tackled by the individual nations of the ACCEE. Studying and assessing the Bulgarian motivation and reactions is a particular research task of the authors.

Concentrating our attention on four major issues is of key importance to cope with the research objectives mentioned above and the most important one - how to progress towards ESDI and CED:

First, outlining our notion of CED - its basic security conceptual background, characteristics, peculiarities, scope, limit, main building blocks.

Second, what are the operational requirements of the CED to back-up militarily the CFSP of the EU, what is the meaning of the traditional nuclear and territorial defence issues relative to the 'Petersberg' contingencies and tasks and how all these problems relate to the UN Charter and the OSCE norms and principles.

Third, which are the issues in the process of clarification of the institutional foundations of CED, mainly - what is the evolving dialectic of the relationship between EU, WEU and NATO.

Fourth, what should be done to rationalize the industrial, trade, scientific and technological base of the CED, what are the steps leading to closer

cooperation in the area of armaments, where are the ACCEE in the cooperation framework, what should be done to both diminish the fierce competitive pressure from the US counterparts and preserve the transatlantic connection and the effective market choices - all these questions need their answers. Duplication in weapon systems is no longer acceptable for both threat perceptions and for economic reasons.

II CED: the Concept and the Problem Areas

1. Conceptual Issues of the Process of Building CED

The post-Cold War concepts of security preserved the importance, sometimes crucial, of the defence dimension of the activities for coping with existing concerns, risks, challenges, threats or dangers for peace and stability.

Another fundamental understanding of this Study is that security starts at home, depends on the democratic political and social system, on a sound economy, tolerance towards neighbouring countries and internal political opponents, on the active participation in the integration and cooperation in Europe and her regions.

The concepts of a "Common European Defence Policy" (CEDP) and CED, that were compromised during the Maastricht negotiation processes, are linked to the evolution and the broader framework of the CFSP of the EU. However, their implementation in the following years showed their efficiency depends largely on the notion and structure of the larger European security system or architecture - a complex issue, that is still in shaping. It comprises three major players - the United States, the EU and Russia and presently faces the additional challenges of settling various security problems of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (ACCEE) as well as of the neutral countries of the European continent.

Another set of no less harder issues is the definition of the scope of the functions of the CED and their linkage to logically corresponding defence scenarios of dealing with respective contingencies. These problems very much influence the notion of the scope of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War period and on the scope and content of CED of the EU.

Next in that order are evolving the operational, institutional and armaments production and trading questions of the CED.

Presently the EU members are absorbed in the construction of their CFSP and CDP. However, *any valid European security architecture needs intensive and sound relations that transcend the EU boundaries, involve*

the ACCEE, include the US and Canada, do not create new dividing lines and do not isolate or exclude Russia. The development of CED may turn to be one of the most inefficient and expensive exercises of the EU unless the geographic scope, participants and political objectives are not fixed for the longer term. Correct roles and functions for the armed forces of the CED are possible only on such a basis.

There are sound arguments to return to these basic questions of the CED. Several intellectual and political efforts in the last year show there are promising ways for a perspective solution of the formulated issues[6].

While there is a growing awareness the most vital ingredients of the future encompassing European security architecture - EU, USA, NATO, WEU, and to a lesser extent - the neutral states and the ACCEE, are in a process to fix their appropriate places and roles, though not easily or fast, there is a disproportionate retardation in the adaptation and development of Russia's compatibility to the processes in question.

We are still witnessing an unfavourable level of communication and right perception. There is a tendency of vetoing or blocking some processes that, if assessed in a more cooperative and agreed theoretic and political framework, would display constructiveness and positivism towards a future European security system. This holds true both for the Russian reactions to the enlargement of NATO to the East and for the American refusal to endorse WEU membership for the present and future EU members without full NATO membership. These positions of the two powers reflect at least three deficiencies in their post-Cold War psychology:

First, a zero-sum threat assessment - rather outdated in the present situation;

Second, a will to keep a geopolitical and geoeconomic leverage over Central European countries and,

Third, insufficient political will to support the broad security framework, in which cooperative efforts of developing CED may be mutually reinforced.

Undoubtedly this is reflected on the processes of creating CED in the CFSP framework of the EU. We witness a contradiction and inconsistency that hinders the fixation of an already existing broad zone of security for Europe - the one of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

On the one side we see an insisting Russia for an intensified role of the OSCE in security matters for Europe and diminishing unfairly the potential

for cooperative security construction of NATO - a vital organisation in the post-Cold War era, while acknowledging this role for the EU and the WEU.

On the other side, as Karl Kaiser writes - "the West shortsightedly rejected Russian proposals for strengthening the CSCE (now ... OSCE), which would have accorded Russia an all-European framework in which Moscow could play a dignified security role." [7]

A very probable conceptual source of the misperceptions in that field of knowledge is the contradiction between the objective of "cooperative security" and the instrument of reaching it and most often discussed - a military alliance for "collective defence" for which NATO has been conceived.

There should be no doubt a range of politicians and thinkers in both Western Europe and the United States approaches the issues in an open and broad way. Daniel Nelson suggests a 'security commission' - an expanded version of the NACC apart of NATO and a true partner for peace of the Alliance [8]. Charles Kupchan has proposed merging of NATO and the EU into an Atlantic Union that offers the prospect of inclusion of the Central European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union [9]. Robert Hunter, the US Ambassador to NATO suggests bringing the nations of Central Europe into the "European Civil Space" of the EU, that has abolished war from the relations with one another [10]. The United States are trying to construct a new Europe-wide Security Architecture which fleshes out President Clinton's vision of a Europe that is integrated from the Atlantic to the Urals [11].

The vision of extending the NATO security community to the other half of Europe might be traced both in the Study on NATO Enlargement (especially Chapter 2) [12] and in the NATO Secretary General's objectives [13].

Tom Kuperus and Willem van Eekelen from the Centre for European Policy Studies both write about the importance of the expansion of the European peace zone eastward [14]. Similarly Karl Kaiser writes about the European Security Zone and its evolution and defence [15].

Gebhardt von Moltke, deputy to the Secretary General of NATO, said recently in an interview for the Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper 'Krasnaya zvezda': "NATO's expansion will take place sooner or later. And if not directly - then through the European Union. These countries have chosen integration in the West European structures. Furthermore, neither NATO, nor the East European countries would like to create new tensions." [16]

One can hardly agree with what then Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, said to the Secretary General of NATO during his visit to Moscow: "since it is possible to cooperate with Russia then NATO's expansion is not worth." [17] Neither the most successful defence organisation in history - NATO, nor an effectively functioning NATO-Russian cooperative arrangement alone can provide genuine European security without utilizing also the mechanisms of the EU, WEU and OSCE. A European security and defence structure with no new dividing lines that does not provide an adequate role and participation of Russia will be invalid.

How do the EU, the United States, Russia, the European "neutrals" and the ACCEE view the process of building CED and what are the consequences of that?

First, the EU. The economic might of the Union logically leads it to a greater role both in neighbouring regional affairs and in the world. EU objectives are still promoted through economic, financial and political means - the so called 'soft power'. A realistic application of the strategy of differentiated integration is to use it unless it cannot be shared for specific reasons by all Member States as in the case of CEDP and CED of the EU [18]. Obviously in this situation the ideas of Karl Kaiser of not allowing the formation of an impression that future member countries are a second-rate security area in the de facto security zone with which the EU is connected through links of solidarity, interests, common values and political and economic factors [19] requires, according to differentiated integration strategists - until full membership is achieved, signing of separate treaties for a defence union.

Many questions of the CED project of the EU are still open: the obligations of the CED for the overseas territories of Union member states; the role and place of nuclear weapons in the CED of the EU; rationalization of the duplicating national defence capabilities, including small and often not competitive national defence industries; the attitudes of five EU members that are not WEU members. In the same order of thoughts there is a realization that neither NATO nor the European Union are sufficient to bear the weight of the relationship with Russia alone. Full implementation of the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, better access to the single European market for Russian goods and higher European investment in Russia may improve the economic aspect of security and a free trade area may evolve in the future. These efforts of the EU are paralleled by the purposeful policy of the Alliance to develop qualitatively new relations with Russia.

At the same time there are certain conceptual and political breakthroughs as to the establishment of a viable and efficient CED of the EU. Though it

might seem the project of building CED is slipping beyond the control of the EU, the practical results of the developments in that field bring realism and economy to the issue. Though CED will serve the objectives of CFSP of the EU it is becoming clear that any defence issue will hardly become part of a system separated with a Chinese Wall from NATO, the USA and very probably in the future - from Russia and the OSCE.

A very important and really creative political step was US President Clinton's endorsement of ESDI at the NATO Summit in January 1994. It was followed by no less brave and wise decisions of France. First, to work together with her EU/WEU partners for building an ESDI in the Alliance. France even drifted away from the idea of a distinct European pillar within NATO because it gives the appearance of a split. Second, to require from all the Allies to reform NATO as to reflect the emerging ESDI and to give in this way the needed visibility to the European capacity to act. Whether this is or not a French desire to change the Alliance, learn from the NATO battlefield command and control experience or benefit from trading with NATO-compatible electronic, communication and other military equipment is not as important for the CED of the EU as the unlocking of the concepts and projects that make CED a practical issue through which stability is maintained and spread in a wider Europe.

Outside observers cannot be quite sure where the limit of equal burden and equal power sharing lies in the big countries' relationships in the Alliance. One cannot be also sure beyond what the French interest will be lost in developing common European defence structures. The net effect is reassurance for many small countries in Europe France is not trying to develop a French-led defence system. For the foreseeable future the development of European defence in conjunction with the USA and trying to establish a long-term security relationship with Russia seems to be the pragmatic way towards more security in Europe.

Second, the United States. For the USA Europe remains a major economic (with larger economy than the US one) and security interest as one of the great economic and technological centres of the world. This American interest is reassured through NATO - at least for the short- and for the mid-term. Backing away from NATO is considered by then US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Dr. Joseph Nye, as "shooting ourselves in the foot." [20]

There is a growing understanding in both the EU and the USA that the narrow confines of the Alliance will not be sufficient for resolving the challenges of the 21 century world. A kind of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community, that encompasses, but does not replace NATO - the framework for transatlantic defence cooperation, is looming after the adoption of "The

New Transatlantic Agenda" by the USA and the EU in Madrid, December 1995 [21].

The American policy has chosen very clearly a broad and long-term objective: the development of a European security system that features an effective synthesis of existing organisations - the OSCE, NATO, EU/WEU and coordinated efficiently at the UN global level. This approach is reflected in the US Comprehensive Regional Security Strategy for Europe and NATO. It aims to develop a new interlocking security architecture that builds on the success and enduring value of NATO while also working to strengthen other institutions with a critical role to play in European integration. The key elements of this strategy include: "- accelerating NATO's transformation; - enhancing the Partnership for Peace; - developing a gradual, deliberate, and transparent process of NATO enlargement; - enhancing the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia; - supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU), and - strengthening the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)" [22].

One of the elements - enhancing the cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, has earned the special US attention. The permanent American representative on the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, said in an address to the London School of Economics, that "involving and not isolating Russia will likely prove to be the keystone of European security" [23]. Jack Matlock, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1987-91) writes in the 'Foreign Affairs': "Washington must assure Moscow that it places a high priority on creating a European security structure to which Russia is a party. Whether that is done through a treaty relationship between Russia and NATO, an augmentation of the authority of the OSCE, or some other mechanism is less important than the commitment to include Russia. NATO expansion to the east should be deferred while these arrangements are under active negotiation, provided Russia does not threaten other countries or seriously violate its OSCE obligations" [24].

The effective functioning of a European security architecture is one of the greatest challenges for the US policy. Jonathan Dean believes such a functioning cooperative security system in Europe is crucial for her future. The lack of success could easily lead to "a more dangerous, nuclearized multipolar world system rather than one based on increasing resort to multinational cooperative security..." [25].

Third, Russia. In the post-Cold War period this great country has not been the most active player in the construction of the new European security architecture, but it never caused by now a major international turmoil because of its internal problems. The importance of Russia in the global and regional security, including in Europe, is understood both in the West and in

Moscow. 'The partnership model' with the West is not yet fixed. There are still ambiguities of considering Russia as either a security risk or a cooperation partner and even future member of the Western security structures. The reasons, probably, are: the unfinished conceptual orientation of the Russian society; the doubts that Russia will not accept borders it has not stayed within for 400 years; the uncertainty of the forms of the Russian claims for political room to manoeuvre (not re-establishing hegemony) in Central Europe, etc.

There are no doubts at all that the Russian energy supplies are critical for Europe and that the integration of the armed forces in the Commonwealth of the Independent States around the Russian nucleus is a crucial factor for the Eurasian stability. Russia is an important partner because of her status of a Permanent Member of the Security Council of the United Nations, her possession of a huge nuclear and missile potential and a good position for active role in the nuclear disarmament process. Russia's specific Eurasian geopolitical position and foreign-political experience make her an influential factor in the relationships with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran. Russia is a really needed partner of the West in coping with the issues of the ballistic missile defence (BMD), fighting of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and drugs' traffic.

Russia's attitude towards the European security institutions is developing, though not fast. While strengthening of the OSCE remains a Russian priority, the ambitious claims of turning it into the bedrock of the European security architecture have been dismissed. According to Russian experts the OSCE may become in an evolutionary way the leading European security organisation with the development of the process of de-militarizing Russia's relations with the West - only in case confrontation with the West is prevented. A positive relationship with NATO is conceived as a way of diminishing the anti-Russian effect of the expansion of the Alliance to Central Europe. Russia-NATO relations are assessed as pivotal for the evolving European security system and eventually leading to the prototype of the military instrument of the OSCE for preserving peace and preventing conflicts [26].

The practice of cooperation of the peacekeeping structures of NATO and Russia on all levels would require stationing of Russian representatives on a permanent basis both in the NATO Headquarters and in the main command structures of the Alliance throughout Europe. This, according to the leading Russian politico-military authorities, may turn to be the basis of further development of the cooperation of the armed forces of Russia and NATO as components of a single deterring force reserve against common threats and for reassuring the common security [27]. The Russian Foreign Minister Primakov has often underlined Russia's concerns over NATO's extension to

the East is not a dead-lock situation and it may be solved if solution is sought [28].

Russia's evolving relations with NATO and the WEU [29], the joint peace-keeping operation in Bosnia, the joint Russian-American tactical ballistic missile defence exercise on 3-7 June 1996 in Colorado, the continuing exchange of army experience and political-military culture between Russia and NATO, the revived ideas of joint research and development as well as armaments sales programmes of Russia and NATO, the continuing cooperation in everyday space activity between Russia and her American and other Western partners are the best way of tackling the following open issues of military hardware and psychological character: what is the meaning in security and strategic terms of the nearing to the Russian borders of the military infrastructure of NATO, i. e. the joint command structures, communication systems, air defence, space satellite intelligence and exchange of its information, using airfields, etc. The question is not only to admit the important role of Russia in the world today but rather to make operational and institutionalize her functions on security and CED issues after discarding her threat perceptions from the Alliance.

Fourth, the neutral countries in Europe, and Denmark - an EU and NATO member, but an observer in the WEU. Their security policies in the post-Cold War Europe matter in terms of geopolitical power, as an example of the conceptual ways ahead for the ACCEE and all the countries of the OSCE area and for the practical steps in developing ESDI and CED. The domestic discussions in these countries are continuing several years and such a discussion is gathering momentum even in Switzerland [30].

The 'European neutrals' are in favour of a more mature CFSP. This does not mean they are not reluctant in joining the European and the Transatlantic military community. Their negativism towards the nuclear weapons strategy and policy of this community has not changed qualitatively. But, at the same time, there is a realization, according to Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, then Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, that "as the pace of history accelerates and our involvement with the rest of Europe deepens, the policy we pursue could no longer be labeled neutrality. With the implosion of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, there are no longer two alliances to be neutral between" [31].

The 'European neutrals' are showing keen interest in eventual European-only peacekeeping missions. The Irish position is similar but more cautious. Switzerland is also contributing to the peacekeeping effort of the Atlantic Alliance. The Swiss Confederation granted in the end of 1995 passage on a case by case basis to troops and material for the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia - the first time the neutral state has allowed NATO forces through its

territory. Austria, Finland and Sweden are part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.

Insisting on full WEU membership for the five EU member states not in the WEU - Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden so soon after the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the Union is not very appropriate. The internal debates in these countries also highlight the contradiction in their behaviour of contributing fully to the CFSP but not doing the same for the common military effort in support of it.

One can expect a closer position of the neutral countries in Europe to the ideas of CED and ESDI within the EU/WEU and NATO, especially on the questions of peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions, and their linkage to the long-term project of the OSCE. But there will hardly be a dramatic change - at least in the short to mid-term, of their state tradition of military non-alignment on the issues of national and collective defence and on nuclear arms. One should expect some differentiation of their neutral status in an eventual war situation. Finland, for example, is changing her older Soviet fighter-planes for 64 US F-18C "Hornet".

Fifth, and last - the ACCEE.

They very much link the need of the framing of their national security and defence organisation within the broader CED architecture with an eventual attraction of Western investment and support of the process of raising the effectiveness of their market economies. The accession of the ACCEE to the EU inherently bears the requirement of a qualitatively new organisation of their national security and defence systems with the evolution of the very integration process.

The need of CED with ACCEE participation is of the long-term interest of the EU and NATO. In a speech in 1993 the Federal Defence Minister of Germany, Mr. Volker Rühle, said: "Without our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, the strategic unity of Europe would remain a torso and an illusion" [32]. This basic judgment has not changed and would hardly be changed in the foreseeable future.

In all the ACCEE there is an understanding of the high security value of the "Russian factor". The difference is that some of the ACCEE perceive it as a source of risks and dangers and others - as a society which suffers a deep conceptual crisis and bears many uncertainties but also opportunities for the good of the European security system and the world in general. These varying perceptions motivate the ACCEE for different approaches and attitudes to the "Russian factor" in the Euroatlantic political, security and defence world.

All the ACCEE would not like to be 'a no man's land', 'a buffer' or 'a grey area' relative to Russia and EU/NATO. Both EU/NATO and Russia have the responsibility to establish an acceptable for the ACCEE positive relationship with the latter and between themselves.

The ACCEE have started in different degrees but with no major discrepancies devoting their resources to the nascent military cooperation in the framework of an evolving CED concept. The crucial issues at the beginning of the process are the mutual compatibility and interoperability of the armed forces of the ACCEE and the EU/WEU/NATO configuration of countries. The main focus is on the questions of equipment, procedures and communication. By now the accent is on the process of shifting to the NATO/WEU standards. The evolving process and the perspective approach require the adaptation of these issues to the cooperative involvement, though very careful by now, of Russia.

If a practical and working framework of relations within the CED concept is to be attained all participants in the process - the EU, US, Russia, the European 'neutrals' and the ACCEE should concentrate on such arrangements in which the quality of the cooperative arrangements would matter more than the membership status. What is needed now is a new set of practical and effective relationships in the field of security and defence on which to build on the new institutional solutions.

The experience of the post-Cold War period will probably concentrate the expert community's attention on the **European security framework formula derived from three main factors**: first, a strong and unified EU; second, a new and re-balanced NATO, and, third, a broadened security organisation that includes Russia. Any separate security organisation or combination of influential countries is not adequate. Only the interlocking of evolved and mutually reinforcing security institutions and the respective organisation of the security interrelationships in the large OSCE zone [33] can be a reliable foundation for the broad defence arrangements of the Northern part of the Northern Hemisphere as well as of the specific EU obligations for the CED.

No doubt, the defence organisation of the OSCE zone in general will influence and be influenced by the practical arrangements of both NATO and the CED of the EU - because of the specific role nuclear arms play in the defence doctrines of the next century and of the need for economic organisation of the defence of the Union in light of the new threats, contingencies, scenarios of military activities and configuration of eventual participants in the armed forces of the common defence.

One of the fundamental features of the CED , the zone and the national participants it would comprise will be that war and any form of military violence are presumed to be banished in their interrelationships. The historic civilization asset of the security communities is the driving motive of the efforts to find the best formula of CED in the transitional post-Cold War Europe at large - from the Pacific coast of North America through the Atlantic region, Eurasia and back to Alaska. The solution of the issues of ***the common assessment of security risks or threats, of a common defence doctrine, including its nuclear aspect, the operational strategies, armaments policy, defence industrial policy, intelligence and the financial sponsorship of these activities*** is the prerequisite for an adequate institutional decision for Europe.

It would be premature to say there exist the needed political and organisational conditions for a common, detailed and streamlined defence of the foregoing geographical area and the respective states within its scope. Defence is always very concrete and connected with the practice of the only dominating establishments in that field by now - the national ones. But it would be wrong conceptually and not motivated economically not to provide the CED system with adequate compatibility and adaptation potential for the relations with those players who will not have standardized features and behaviour but can work for common security interests in Europe and in the neighbouring regions.

As the experience in the recent years of adopting national and international security concepts shows, there is virtually no difference in the perceptions of the ***security risks and threats*** in Europe in its OSCE, EU/WEU and NATO context. The differences in the EU/ACCEE countries are so minor, of no principal importance that they may be easily neglected. There is a wide agreement on the meaning and the need to cope with such risks as the potential armed conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, international terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration [34].

The defence framework of dealing with the risks, challenges and contingencies is a ***combination of national instruments and international ones***: ad hoc coalitions and interlocking European security institutions and the UN. There is no big enthusiasm to act in multilateral structures except to legitimize national preferences - probably a natural state of the affairs of a nascent CED organisation. That is why long and persistent efforts of identifying permanent common European security interests and the respective political will to act will be needed. This aspect of the process of building a CED requires preventing the emergence of traditional, pre-Cold War rivalries among the European states, especially among the major powers in the OSCE region. Realism and the need of efficiency calls also

for defining balanced roles for the national and the international factors in the CED.

Another essential building block of CED, linking it importantly to the CFSP of the EU and the foreign-policy and defence organisations of the national members of the system of interlocking security institutions in Europe (OSCE-NATO-WEU) and the institutions themselves while structuring the practical reactions to relevant contingencies and utilizing particular functions of CED is the *scenario planning approach for potential crises*. Willem van Eekelen suggests to "define the options available, identify probable force contributors and compose force packages, including their command arrangements, transport, logistics and communications. When as expected NATO agrees the CJTF concept during its June ministerial meeting in Berlin the scenario planning could extend to the assets needed from NATO to enable quick action while avoiding duplication in building them up" [35].

This approach very much corresponds with John Roper's idea of a 'weaker version' of CED and may turn to be the practical instrument of gathering experience that will give the necessary orientation for a 'stronger version' of CED [36] in the longer term.

Another important issue is of the *functions of CED* through which particular defence scenarios of dealing with relevant challenges and contingencies are exercised and realized eventually in the field.

In the post-Cold War period *the traditional function and the stemming from it tasks of territorial defence remain crucial* but gradually the emphasis is shifting to crisis management, peacekeeping, peacemaking, to humanitarian and rescue tasks. The general security orientation of the EU/WEU/NATO countries, the ACCEE, the neutral countries and of Russia/CIS is shifting from collective defence towards collective security [37].

The objective of the military deterrence strategies is not predominantly the adversary (adversaries) but rather the combination of factors that might trigger or hold the dynamics of a conflicting situation escalate into an unfavourable development, a crisis or violent actions.

One should care also of the changing nature of warfare with high technologies and new information capabilities being the essential factors for the processes of restructuring, reorganising and rearming the national and the alliance military complexes.

A new concept of the arms control in Europe is emerging with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) being considered as an open

and developing system to which the new solutions in that sphere would importantly be added [38].

A nascent CED should necessarily reflect all these trends in the security, military, arms control and armaments production fields.

The Final Communiqué of the meeting of the NAC in Defence Ministers Session on 13th June, 1996 in Brussels reminds that "collective defence remains the core function of the Alliance; but today's challenges to our security and to the stability of Europe as a whole are more diverse and more complex than those NATO faced during its first four decades. To meet these challenges we require forces, structures and procedures that can respond effectively to contingencies ranging from collective defence to crisis management and peacekeeping, and contribute to the Alliance's broader approach to security issues" [39].

It is only through the transformation of NATO into an instrument of collective security, with respective institutional support of the interlocking multilateral institutions - UN, NATO, EU/WEU and the OSCE, and with adequate military capabilities - as the established CJTF that the Alliance can respond to the present security challenges, the development of a cooperative relationship with Russia and involve in a more attractive way the non-Alliance members.

Apart of the two functions of the CED - territorial defence and the new missions: peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, humanitarian and rescue tasks, a new reading of the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War period is needed to find the right place for the latter in the new defence system of Europe. This is hardly possible to do in depth in this short study, but despite the various concepts and suggestions of the last few years [40] some additional ideas will be shared briefly.

The global issues of nuclear weapons, deterrence and strategic interrelationships will continue to matter as one of the functions of CED. Obviously the difficult problem to be solved is what niche will it assume in the structure of CED.

The Study on NATO Enlargement, the very Alliance Strategic Concept, the final Communiqué of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Committee of NATO of 13th June 1996 outline the Alliance's position: the main purpose of the nuclear forces of the Alliance is political; NATO has cut down 80 per cent of its European based nuclear forces; they, like the Russian nuclear forces, are not targeted against anyone; NATO's current nuclear posture meets the requirements of the Alliance and in the foreseeable future will not change. The nuclear forces continue to be

indispensable for the Alliance and the US nuclear forces committed to NATO provide a vital link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance.

The logic of the recent development of CED, the French attitude to NATO and to the USA give some grounds to think that the thinking in that field moves in the direction of establishing a European nuclear deterrent ("concerted deterrence")- French organised, backed by Britain, under NATO command and most probably - under American leadership. As on the issue of NATO enlargement the USA will have to make its mind and take the decision how to fix the nuclear issue in the CED construct.

It will be an oversimplification of the complex nuclear arms issues in an evolving CED project if their solution stops by the eventual US/EU/French/British arrangement in a NATO context. Neglecting Russia's arguments on the future nuclear postures in the Euroatlantic and Euroasiatic areas will inevitably diminish the stability and effectiveness of deterrence - especially in a period when the nuclear strategic interrelationship is clearly cooperative [41].

Any arrangement in the nuclear arms sphere in the post-Cold War era should be globally aimed: to bring satisfaction to the nuclear powers, but also to the small countries -the majority of the states in the world which are also non-nuclear, to the neutral countries - already joining the CED project, to the big 'third world' powers India and Pakistan and to give incentives to eventual 'wrong doers' to stick to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Wolfgang Panofsky and George Bunn wrote in 1994: "The problem with the weapons-of-last resort mission, publicly proclaimed, is that it legitimizes nuclear weapons for military use in conventional conflicts and constitutes an open-ended prescription to nuclear proliferation: Many small countries that do not currently possess nuclear weapons have a much stronger reason to worry about their ultimate survival as sovereign states than do Britain, France, Russia or the United States.

Thus, the weapons-of-last-resort argument, when used by these nuclear-weapon states, is counterproductive to the cause of non-proliferation. These proliferation risks outweigh any possible security value of such a doctrine" [42].

It is no secret the European neutrals are very sceptical about a nuclear ingredient of the CED and the CFSP with which they associate their states for almost two years. After all their persistent efforts for the last four decades have been aiming a 'nuclear-free Europe'. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden - participants of the Common Concept of the 27 WEU countries

on European security, are not party to the decisions in paragraph 158. of the concept that refers to the role of nuclear forces in deterrence [43].

The nuclear component of the CED project will be probably best placed in the OSCE context. Its creative structuring and regulation with four participants in charge - the four nuclear states: Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States, may, probably make a breakthrough in a field where, as Fred Ikle says, "the current nuclear powers remain entrenched in Cold War modes of thought..." [44]. A next stage in the process of more effective regulation of the strategic nuclear interrelationships is the linkage of the OSCE four nuclear powers with China - the official fifth one. The period of fixing the appropriate roles of the countries for the new, 'Petersberg' type of missions may be a good opportunity to solve the 'nuclear' part of the CED puzzle.

So, in order to retain and further develop their political role, the nuclear weapons will need a perspective political regulation in the broadest possible geographic scope and an arrangement of all the 'nuclear arms' details. Their 'umbrella' role should assume a new purpose, becoming the pillar of military and political confidence, the grand strategic background of the new, multilateral missions of the armed forces, and the still needed reassurance for the already less probable role of the territorial defence function in both its national and CED contexts.

2. Problem Areas: Operational, Institutional, Armaments Production and Market Aspects of the CED

a. Operational Issues of the CED

Europe is no longer the probable theatre of a global military confrontation. After the post-Yugoslav experience the continent is more homogeneous politically, economically and in civilization terms. The defence of that new system of states, fundamentally influenced by the European integration, is obviously a real need - including with armed forces. The CED has a traditional 'Atlantic extension' and presently needs an Eastern, 'Euroasiatic continuation'. The traditional state territorial defence systems need to adapt themselves to the new, transboundary 'Petersberg defence' tasks. The very territorial defence is no longer questioning "defence from whom?" but rather "defence of what?".

Karl Kaiser has outlined the range of challenges and contingencies for the CED: 1) defence of the European security zone against an outside aggression; 2) crisis prevention and management within the EU security zone; 3) contingencies outside the EU security zone (actions in the event of military aggression between countries outside the EU security zone, EU

crisis prevention and management outside the EU security zone); 4) other security challenges that may require military responses (the collapse of political authority, a serious threat to the safety of existing nuclear weapons, nuclear storage sites, nuclear power stations, and other potential sources of large-scale environmental risks, protecting European citizens, protecting the security of sea lanes, etc.) [45].

A real issue of the operational capabilities of the CED is the will of the individual participants to use force for reaching ends which do not always affect them directly. The impulse to go together for peacekeeping, for example, depends on the common realization of the meaning of the European security interests. If this will and the respective impulse are missing that may turn itself into a threat to European security.

If the European defence is "common" it needs to possess a centralized military structure, capable of leadership and control of the armed forces involved to carry out various missions. At this stage of European integration the European own command structure will be subjected to the overall supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) of NATO, who is and will be an American.

The armed forces of the CED will need to cope with three complex functions: 1) to guarantee national defence and share the burden of collective defence; 2) to defend the continent from a common outside threat and simultaneously to guarantee the internal continental security system; 3) to deal with both the military and the non-military types of threats.

The analysis of the worst-case scenario of deployment of armed forces leads to the conclusion that the CED needs to cope with a military adversary whose armed forces vary between 300,000 to 700,000 soldiers, 1,000-3,500 tanks, the same number of artillery systems, 500-750 war planes, up to 150 navy ships, as well as several hundred short-range missiles, including loaded with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The maximum average distance of the armed forces from their national territories and permanent bases should be 750 to 1,200 km.

The strategy of the armed forces of the CED may be implemented in four stages: 1) Stopping the invasion through hindering the acquisition of territory by the aggressor, diminishing the rate of his movement up to his final blocking; 2) Blocking the activity of the armed units of the aggressor, changing the balance of forces at the theatre of military activity and preparing for a counter-offensive; 3) Exerting an effort for a peaceful solution of the conflict; 4) Preventing the re-escalation of the conflict during the post-conflict period until a stable peace is established.

The formation of the armed forces of the CED depends on the requirements, stemming from the different stages of implementing their strategy. The two basic realistic functions of the armed forces of the CED - territorial defence and crisis management, will be carried out:

1) *By the military system of NATO* - reforming, enlarging, with a practical arrangement for the ESDI - including in time of peace, in planning and preparing the military operations, in the politico-military decision process. The European led operations will be in the Alliance framework but will take place independently under WEU political control without NATO interference. This is why the WEU is strengthening its operational capabilities by: participating in the finalizing of the CJTF concept; setting up of a permanent Situation Centre and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell at the WEU Headquarters; carries out crisis management exercises; develops a WEU concept for Strategic Mobility to facilitate the conduct of Petersberg missions; refines the concept of "Forces Answerable to WEU", etc. The WEU has concluded a Security Agreement with NATO, resumed the meetings of its Permanent Council with the SACEUR, and coordinate their respective dialogues on Mediterranean security and exchange information in the field of their respective relations with Russia and Ukraine [46] - thus insuring the vitality of the concept for the forces of the ESDI as 'separable but not separate' from those of NATO.

2) *By the concept of the CJTF and its practical implementation.*

The CJTF [47] is a broader formula that will include the structures of: the European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain); EUROFOR - an army joint rapid reaction force, and EUROMARFOR - a European maritime force (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal); the Dutch-British amphibious force; the Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps - ARRC (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States); the Dutch-German army corps; Headquarters allied land forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland - LANDJUT (in peacetime - Denmark and Germany, in times of war - Denmark, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States); the cooperation initiatives in Belgium and the Netherlands - Belgian-Netherlands naval cooperation, the Belgian-Netherlands deployable air task force; the Franco-British Euro air group; the affiliation of the Danish reaction brigade and the 1st United Kingdom armoured division; the two German-American corps [48].

The advantages of the CJTF concept are linked with: a) a new flexibility of the Alliance missions coupled with a timely response to various contingencies; b) a strengthened ESDI within NATO and a greater practical role of the WEU by facilitating the use of NATO military capabilities in

European operations; c) bringing together the NATO nations which are not in the Alliance's integrated force structures and those which are part of them and stimulates even the process of their complete integration with these structures; d) helping forces and staffs of non-NATO members which as Partners for Peace have decided to join Alliance operations.

A major requirement of the CJTF concept is that its forces can be deployed for both Article 5 contingencies (defence of NATO territory) and for crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions. The issue of peacetime European planning in the CJTF context still needs a US/Europe's arrangement.

The CJTF concept is expected to change the very vision of the eventual wars NATO is to be confronted with and the way the Alliance activity should be planned for. This concept is one of the most compelling demonstrations of the organisation's post-Cold War restructuring, providing a new balance in the Transatlantic area with a new formula of burdensharing, capability of dealing with a wide range of contingencies - from peacekeeping to border fighting and even a major war.

According to the CJTF concept the USA are supposed to lend major military assets, including heavy airlift, satellite intelligence and communications to European coalitions without American ground forces. The USA keeps the right of refusal for European-only ventures if they do not agree with them, i. e. a kind of veto for each particular case. A new concept of training and exercising within the CJTF emerges with an emphasis on joint airborne manoeuvres, amphibious landings and peacekeeping by troops from allied and non-NATO countries.

The command and control concept of the CJTF (disregarding the dispute of the peacetime European command lines) may be presented by the following functional schematic diagram [49]:

Figure 1. COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPT OF THE CJTF

Please, refer to the hard copy.

The CJTF concept was verified during the IFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina by assembling troops from 32 nations - from PFP states, including from neutral countries and Russia, and non-Europeans too. The

IFOR experience is particularly important for the WEU led operations in the future when using Alliance assets.

b. Institutional Issues of the CED

The institutional aspects of the CED are influenced by the process of seeking adequate operational solutions of a new defence organisation for Europe and have the potential to influence the developments in the latter's operational dimension.

The process of European integration is a driving political factor that stimulates the adjustments in the system of the interlocking security and defence organisations in Europe. One would dare say the difficulties in the institutional arrangements for the CED press the need for deeper European integration both in the security and defence as well as in all other sectors.

The development of two complex problem areas would determine the further course of the institutional architecture of the CED:

First, the need to have a European defence identity and NATO's support for it. It turned to be one of the major factors of NATO's internal transformation and continuation of its vitality as an effective security and defence institution. The psychological climate of dealing with this issue is different than it used to be two, even one year ago and is characterised mostly by consensus in the NATO/EU/WEU ranks. The internal adaptation of NATO has led to developing the European defence identity without weakening NATO.

The EU, which has a more coherent and structured relations with NATO - since the beginning of 1996, and the WEU have discovered they can contribute to their own security from inside the Atlantic Alliance and not by competing with it [50]. Still many uncertainties are linked to NATO's further own reorganisation in the next months and , probably, years. The WEU, for this reason, cannot envisage all details of its role relative to NATO and the EU. What has been made clear for the organisation is that there might be no doubt of the American presence in Europe and continuation of the defence system and deterrent provided by NATO.

The WEU becomes responsible for the political control and the strategic direction of operations that European NATO members would undertake and, after agreement with the NAC, can draw on the Alliance's assets and capabilities. Thus the WEU becomes really separable but not separate from NATO. The details of that new interrelationship between NATO and the WEU need to be further worked out.

All these developments are importantly reflected on the EU/WEU relationship. The missing congruence of EU, WEU and NATO memberships is a reason to introduce priorities in the harmonisation of the enlargements of NATO, EU and the WEU. Most probably the problems of NATO and EU enlargement will be dealt first and the WEU will have to wait and see what will follow for it.

While remaining for the time being an intergovernmental organisation dragged in the NATO orbit and politically - in the EU, the WEU will need to expect the results of a better articulated EU-US relationship through NATO - probably till the Alliance summit meeting in the first half of 1997. The WEU will also have to see the effect of suggestions coming from Germany and France for the inclusion of a "solidarity clause" or a formula of an "enhanced solidarity" in the new Treaty on the Union - similar to the mutual assistance guarantees in the WEU and NATO Treaties. So the 15 members of the EU will decide what they are prepared to do together and only then the 10 parties of the modified Brussels Treaty will have to consider how they might strengthen solidarity among them. Most probably the formula the IGC will reach will include an important claim on the side of Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Finland and Denmark not to "militarise" the European Union. While declaring a wish to stay out of a 'defence Europe' some of the European neutrals are ready to cooperate as EU members with the WEU.

This style of arranging the various interests within a working EU/WEU interrelationship in the security and defence field differs from the clear call for full participation and responsibilities for the present and future NATO members. It is hard to expect that the neutral countries will change their basic views on the role of nuclear weapons and on territorial defence, for WEU and NATO membership. At the same time there is a clear mobilisation of their efforts in preparing to participate in the Petersberg missions and a readiness to assume obligations for that.

Second, NATO enlargement and the enhanced role of the PFP.

The enlargement of NATO has many arguments "for" and "against". In the first group fall: the doubts and eventual risks that Russia may create; the need for the Central/Eastern European countries to get some kind of guarantee cover, and the need to keep the United States engaged with Europe. In the second group are mainly: the need to support good relations with Russia, and the risk of undermining NATO as a strong and cohesive security organisation.

Joining NATO will be a matter of free choice. The realities of the present political and strategic situation demonstrate some countries are in more

favourable positions for NATO membership than others. The process will not be a cheap one - both for the contending countries and for the present members of the Alliance. An enhanced dialogue on bilateral "16+1" basis is dealing with the details of each particular case between NATO and the eleven contending states.

Despite the different arguments "for" and "against" NATO enlargement most often Russia is considered. Where the deal between NATO and Russia is to be struck is still in a process of shaping. Nuclear weapons, NATO troops, CFE are major factors in the on-going discussion between the two sides. The international status of Russia and her room for political manoeuvring in Central Europe are also issues of no less importance in that debate.

In light of the continuing democratic process in Russia as proved by the last parliamentary and presidential elections an eventual compromise seems to be at a closer range for both parties. Michael Portillo, the British Secretary of State for Defence, presents a very interesting criterion for the enlargement process relative to the 'Russian factor': "The Alliance must adjust, to admit new members, where the challenge will be to extend European security in a way which is sensitive to Russian concerns" [51].

That is why a high value is attributed to the vision of the Defence Ministers of NATO with Defence Ministers of co-operation partner nations in an effort to understand the newly forming institutional architecture of the CED. In the Chairman's Summary of their June 1996 meeting is said: "Building on the Berlin Ministerial discussions, Ministers exchanged views on the evolution of NACC/PfP as a permanent element of the European security architecture. They discussed the scope for the further enhancement of PfP" [52]. In the Final Communiqué of the meeting of the NAC in Defence Ministers Session on 13th June, 1996 is written: "The IFOR experience has highlighted the need to expand the scope of PfP missions beyond peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and search and rescue to include the full range of Alliance new missions" [53].

US Secretary of Defense Perry said in 1995: "... those countries focusing on participation in NATO security should focus their primary energies on the Partnership for Peace. The enlargement is coming, but it is many more years in the future. And in any event, the enlargement is not instead of Partnership for Peace, it is something that could be in addition to it" [54].

It is not difficult to deduce that many of the CED's practical solutions will be in the PFP institutionalised arrangements' context. Some of these solutions may even assume a more permanent character. For example, in the case of the Baltic and the Balkan countries, due to the uneasy relations with

the Russian neighbour, in the first case, and the need to stabilize the region with a broader outside participation, including Russia's - in the second, for some time PFP guaranteed security zones may turn to be the adequate institutional arrangements for CED activities.

Institutional arrangements of the CED are important, but creative solutions should not be blocked because of a narrow normative approach to the complex issues of security in the different subregions of Central and Eastern Europe.

c. Armaments Production and Market Issues of the CED [55]

The operational and the institutional aspects of the CED would not be well defined without the respective links and dependencies with the defence-related industries and the market realization of their goods. It is logical to expect the interests of all operational and institutional national components of the CED, stemming from the armaments production and the trade with its goods, to be satisfied. The defence-related industries and the markets they are linked with are parts of a vital national defence, political and economic interest.

The present zone of security in North America, the North Atlantic area and Western Europe and the would-be zone of permanent peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe in the field of CED are and will be functionally connected with the national defence industries. The historical inertia, the new operational and institutional demands of a developing CED outline three major arms production and market centres: the US, the EU and the Russian. The European neutrals and the ACCEE have individually specific arrangements that need to be addressed and readjusted accordingly to the level of their integration in the CED and the phase of the integration itself. Obviously the long-term defence-industry arrangements of a wider CED will cover all these centres. Some very initial defence research, development, production and trade projects are discussed by the USA, NATO, WEU and Russia [56].

Enhancement of the European defence industrial base is provided also by the Common concept of the 27 WEU countries for European security. New and different kinds of defence equipment, meeting the requirements for interoperability necessitate adaptation of the various segments of the European defence industry. Other important defence industry requirements are: reliable long-term access to leading-edge technology, reliable and responsive suppliers, competitiveness and commercial soundness [57].

In the end of January 1996 the European Commission adopted a strategy for building an efficient and cost-effective defence industry in Europe. The title

of the document is: "The Challenges Facing the European Defence-Related Industry, A Contribution for Action at European Level" [58]. This is the most persuading EU document calling for action in the field of defence-industry policy. It is in tact with the CFSP and ESDI, stimulates them and suggests practical steps of reaching cost-effectiveness of the CED by avoiding duplication of the national capabilities of the EU member states. If the measures suggested are implemented the eventual savings could vary between 5 to 11 billion ECUs a year. Various challenges need to be overcome: economic and industrial (for example, overcoming some industrial structures and trends, making restructuring and coping with competitiveness issues, dealing with market fragmentation and rationalizing cross-border industrial integration, exploiting civil-defence technological synergism to reach more integrated technology and industrial base); political and security - mainly giving substance to the ESDI.

The end of the Cold War has made it possible to cut drastically defence budgets. The defence-related industries of the EU member countries faced the harsh issue of unemployment. If a rational reconstructing is not put in place there is also arising the danger of impoverishment of the production base and the innovation capability of the European industry. The strategic document of the EC states: "Maintenance and reinforcement of the sufficiently competitive industrial and technology base which Europe needs in order to implement its common defence policy inevitably entails integration of the defence-related industries. This rationalization will allow more efficient cooperation for both the development and the production of military hardware. European undertakings will become all the more efficient and competitive if they develop synergism, cooperation and even restructuring on the single market.

The EU must foster the development of its own base for technologies and products essential for defence in Europe. Consequently, it must endeavour to secure comparable, effective access to markets in third countries, which would reduce the one-way dependence on the third countries" [59].

The formation of a European market in defence-related products is not an easy job. Most importantly it should offer products that are in line with the duties assigned to their armed forces. Special equipment for the Petersberg type of missions will be needed. The industrial facilities of the EU/WEU countries, of the United States and the other NATO members with their established and institutionalized methods of acquiring armaments, of Russia and the ACCEE can contribute to the production of effective equipment for the peacekeeping, peace restoring, rescue and humanitarian tasks within a broadly interpreted CED. Rigid EU/WEU arrangements in arms procurement should also be avoided to prevent alienation of the USA. The latter on their side should learn to "buy European". A balanced cooperation

and competition with US and in the mid-term - Russian participation, are healthy for the avoidance of both duplication and damaging protectionism. One should also not forget the various forms of self-organisation and production integration of the arms producers themselves - not necessarily channeled through the national governments and the international institutions.

The armaments production and market tasks of the CED need a closer cooperation between the EU and the WEU. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), set up in 1976, transferred its functions to the WEU in 1992 to bring to existence the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) - the WEU body responsible for cooperation on armaments issues. The Declaration on WEU, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, sets the aim of creating a European Armaments Agency (EAA). Questions of the principles and the priorities of the EAA still remain unsettled which has delayed the WEAG's decision to establish the Agency. The agreement between Germany and France to establish a joint armaments structure in 1996 to allow more rational cooperation and contribute to the establishment of an efficient and appropriate industrial base is a significant step towards the establishment of the EAA. The CJTF concept and the obligations for the WEU stemming from it in the field of the operational requirements for the European forces will stimulate the common European armaments policy. A common demand from the WEU for armaments would place the EU in a position to define more closely the rules governing the internal market, imports and supplies of military equipment.

III The Integration of Bulgaria in the CED

1. Bulgaria's Foreign and Security Policy: Stabilizing the Balkans, Integrating in the CFSP of the EU and in the New Euroatlantic Security Architecture

The integration of Bulgaria in the CED of the EU as a significant component of the common security and defence in the OSCE zone is just one aspect of the country's more general drive towards full integration in the Union. The application for membership in the EU by Bulgaria on 16 December 1995 is a formal proof of the country's readiness to be integrated in all functional sectors of the Union, including the security and defence one. This application gives a moral ground to participate in the very discussion for the evolution of the CED, of its operational, institutional and defence-industry and trade dimensions.

The political basis of the country's involvement in the CED of the EU is compatible with the Union members' one. Here a special accent is made on

the foreign and security policy of Bulgaria and how it practically contributes to the objectives of the EU's defence build-up.

First, after six years of active interaction with the EU Bulgaria's self-perception is of an important part of Europe without which the Union will not be whole and successful in reaching its aims. This optimistic self-assessment stems from the particular role the EU devotes to individual regional actors in stabilizing the security situation on the continent and the constructive part Bulgaria plays for many years in Southeastern Europe. The ambition of both the EU and NATO to extend the Civil European Space as a new zone of stability to the East of the continent is overlapping with Bulgaria's philosophic and strategic political orientation of building the prerequisites of a 'Balkan security community' [60].

The country's foreign and security policy succeeded to bring to the attention of all neighbours in the Balkans the necessity to come together and give start to a process of cooperation on a regional basis for stability and security in a broader European context. After years of hot conflict and embargo the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan countries met in Sofia on 6 July 1996 to mark together with representatives of the EU, OSCE, CE, Russia and the United States the beginning of joint regional initiatives that are supposed in the mid- to long-term to lead to the self-emancipation of the area to the status of a normal and peaceful region of Europe. This demonstration of regional thinking and approach to the various political, social, economic and security issues is not just Bulgaria's achievement but rather a common asset that needs to be further nurtured and educated. A lot of ideas for cooperation, including in the defence and confidence-building areas are coming with the start of this authentic and encompassing regional process.

Second, Bulgaria demonstrates a similar adequate behaviour as a partner in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and within the Central European Initiative fora. The eventual extension of EU membership to the Black Sea states of Bulgaria and Romania would improve the Union's capability to deal with the security challenges arising from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

Third, Russia, Ukraine and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are long-term strategic partners of the EU with which Bulgaria - an ACCEE, is developing constructive and substantive bilateral relationships. The energy supplies, the spare parts for the armed forces and a huge and receptive market are the economic motives behind Bulgaria's position. A positive cultural heritage in the bilateral relations and an appropriate no-threat-perception psychological atmosphere add to this position.

However, any calculations of Bulgaria becoming part of a Russia-West deal for spheres of influence or declarations of Bulgaria's integration in the CIS are not part of the practical political process of the country in the last 7 years, do not have serious social support and are counter-productive for the Bulgarian-Russian relations.

Fourth, similarly to the Bulgarian-Russian relationship the Bulgarian-American links have both a value of their own and a conceptual linkage to a broader interrelationship between the EU and the USA. After the US-EU agreement for "The New Transatlantic Agenda" this relationship is also conceived as a major component of Bulgaria's involvement in the CFSP of the Union.

The EU-US collaboration introduces certainly a significant explanatory potential for the evolutionary transformations of NATO and for the development of the security order in Europe [61]. Bulgarian-American-EU partnership in the Balkan security community construction is a very meaningful aspect of Bulgaria's integration in the CED and a solid political background for the process. Bulgaria participates in this process with a clear understanding each country in the region has its own responsibility for improving the security situation and no outside power should be expected to do the job for us. Rather we are expected to work hard ourselves.

Fifth, Bulgaria's interaction with both the WEU and NATO is the most dynamic driving factor in outlining the country's participation in the CED.

As an Associate Partner of the WEU Bulgaria is part of the security concept of the organisation, agreed by the Foreign and the Defence Ministers from all the 27 WEU countries in November 1995 in Madrid and contributes to the operational improvement of her capabilities for the Petersberg missions. Though Bulgaria is party to the decisions referred to in paragraph 158 of the Common concept of the 27 WEU countries concerning the role of nuclear forces in deterrence [62] this is neither an obligation confirmed by a ratification process of the Parliament (the National Assembly) nor it has been discussed by society, the MPs and by the experts in the country. Furthermore, this engagement of the Government contradicts the very governmental Concept for National Security's non-nuclear defence stance [63].

For less than two years the country turned to be one of the most active Partners for Peace of NATO. The public opinion is divided on the issue of the official declaration for membership in NATO. The opposition political parties in the National Assembly have stated their readiness for joining NATO. The President of the Republic has officially declared his support for full Bulgarian membership in NATO. The political majority in the

Parliament and the Government have displayed a dubious - according to some, and flexible - according to others, position for the country's involvement and eventual membership in the Alliance.

Obviously the complexity of the internal social and political situation, the dynamism of the institutional adaptations in the field of European and Euroatlantic security, the unsettled structure of strategic interrelationships in the post-Cold War period between the USA and NATO, on one side, and Russia - on the other, as well as the compelling reality of the Balkan/Black Sea situation and the role of the different international actors in shaping the stability of the region are factors that are reflected in the varying political and institutional positions in Bulgaria. A process of learning and education on NATO is taking place in the Bulgarian society on the grounds that nothing should alienate the country from the positive post-Cold War tendencies in the field of security, especially in the region of Southeastern Europe.

It would be unfair to blame the small country for trying to integrate in its position the interests of the influential international actors in the field of security, to amalgamate them with its own while remaining an effective contributor to the regional security and keeping high respect by these same powerful neighbouring or more distant factors for the country's foreign and security policy. Though joining NATO is mostly a national issue the perception of the Bulgarian society is the country is not of priority interest for the Alliance and the West among the contenders and is treated as a second-rate or a second-tier partner in general.

It is not a question of sympathy or antipathy for NATO but of interest for the country to preserve and develop the relationship with the most dynamic component of the interlocking security institutions in Europe in the OSCE context. The Bulgarian position towards NATO is also a developing one and in the late summer of 1996 the country's interest may be characterised in this way:

1. Bulgaria is still on the level of Partnership for Peace participation. PFP is conceived as a serious Euroatlantic *institution* with which the country is interested to develop an intensified form of relationship. It is through the PFP that an adequate level of compatibility and interoperability is to be achieved with NATO. The technical transitional period will most probably coincide in time with the evolution of the political and strategic interrelationships in the OSCE area that are still unresolved and with the country's adaptation to the EU. By continuing to produce security Bulgaria will contribute to finding an agreeable solution of these issues. At the first appropriate opportunity the PFP structure is to be crossed in the direction of full NATO membership in a situation which will not be characterized by

drawing new dividing lines in Europe because of membership in the Alliance. The engagement with NATO for the time being will be real for Bulgaria even without the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty obligation of the Alliance and the actual membership in the integrated military structure. For Bulgaria - a signatory of the NPT, the nuclear option for achieving defence is not acceptable even theoretically.

2. While this is acceptable for the national security in peace-time in case of an escalating war threat it is in the country's interest to choose among four possibilities or a combination of them: full membership in NATO; bilateral military agreement with the USA; bilateral military agreement with Russia; military neutrality.

In the process of building Balkan stability Bulgaria is hosting in the autumn of 1996 the first meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the countries in the region plus their counterparts of Russia, the United States, as well as representatives of the EU and OSCE Presidencies, and NATO. Bulgaria hopes that gradually it will be possible to give European politics a clear and decent Southeastern European dimension.

2. The Integration of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the CED

The process of integration of the Bulgarian armed forces in the CED is guided by principles, derived from a new internal and foreign political philosophy:

1) equal security, no participation in the development of zones of unbalanced security in Europe and no acceptance of such imbalanced military areas in the region of vital importance for Bulgaria - the Balkans; 2) equal and mutually advantageous defence cooperation with all states respecting the rules of international law; 3) an active and constructive participation in the arms control, disarmament and security and confidence-building measures; 4) deepening the cooperation with NATO, PFP states, the WEU, Russia, Ukraine and the other Central/Eastern European countries as a needed stage in the construction of a new European security and defence architecture; 5) developing the military cooperation with the Balkan countries on both the bilateral and the multilateral level - the latter as a part of the evolving new European security and defence structure; 6) civilian and democratic monitoring over the security institutions of the country.

Bulgaria has signed military cooperation and confidence-building agreements with all Balkan neighbouring countries thus underlining the importance confidence in the defence sector has for a broader regional cooperation.

The hardships of the present transitional economic situation in the country influence negatively the build-up and the functioning of the armed forces. Nevertheless, they are not diverted from their two basic missions: the defence of the national territory and the participation in the process of building the CED. This is best reflected in the concept and the activity of reforming the Bulgarian armed forces [64]. The reform is also using the experience collected along the implementation of the PFP.

The armed forces will consist of rapid reaction forces and basic defence forces. The former will have a 70 per cent peace-time organisation in personnel and 100 per cent in fighting equipment. They will be the main defence tool in case of an unexpected attack on the national territory, in coping with natural disasters and industrial damages and in implementing the country's international conflict prevention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution engagements. The basic defence forces will be exclusively engaged with the defence of the national territory and will consist of 'cover forces' and 'defence forces'. It is supposed by the year 2010 to complete the processes of re-structuring, dislocation, modernization and re-armament of the armed forces.

Since the beginning of 1996 in the Bulgarian town of Karlovo functions the 'Specialized Training Centre of the Armed Forces for Participation in Peacekeeping Operations of the UNO and in Joint Partnership for Peace Exercises'. It has been established after studying the experience of similar Danish, Dutch, Czech and especially Finnish organisations. The Centre will train four mobile infantry companies with the respective support squads: communication, mine-cleaning, technical, rear, radiation and chemical reconnaissance and medical support. Special criteria are introduced for the selection of the personnel: self-discipline and control, physical strength, psychological stability and English language proficiency. The basic training programme is of the infantry with additional courses for peacekeeping [65], which might be utilized for the qualification of military observers and other experts of special missions.

Parallel to the effort of improving the communication compatibility the Bulgarian Government has provided the WEU for future humanitarian missions with: one armoured battalion, one air-transport detachment of AN-24 and YK-34, two aircraft for command and communication TU-134, four helicopters, one navy frigate and one supply ship, two medical support groups and one topographic detachment. The decision for participating in the WEU missions will be taken by the Parliament upon Government's proposal [66]. After the Birmingham meeting of the 27 WEU nations in May 1996 Bulgaria joined the plans of the organisation to build a political and military centre for organising missions and training programmes. The

Danube embargo-imposition operation is certainly a positive joint WEU/Bulgarian experience that needs to be studied and assessed.

Bulgaria has participated in 11 NATO/PFP exercises in 1995 - 2 maritime of them in the country, for 3 others it has sent troops, and for 6 - staff officers . National exercises tend to assume the characteristics of the NATO/PFP exercises. Western military culture and theoretic experience are intensively studied by hundreds of Bulgarian command officers in the NATO/PFP context. Bulgaria organized the first multinational infantry PFP exercise on its territory in July 1996 - not big, proportionate to the funds the country could provide. Participants were military units from Romania, Moldova, Greece, Turkey, Malta, the United States and Bulgaria. For the IFOR operation Bulgaria has provided hospital and medical facilities as well as a company of guards for the Headquarters of the forces.

The principle of 'economy of organisation' will motivate Bulgaria's national efforts for the country's integration in the CED. There will not be separate units for the different security and defence formats - the WEU, NATO/PFP, UNO, OSCE. This should not be at the expense of the operational efficiency of the Bulgarian participation.

3. Adapting Bulgaria's Armaments Production and Market Behaviour to the Country's Integration in the CED

Bulgaria, as many other European countries, has a good historical record of a defence industrial production of its own, providing weapons for the national defence and being long a source of national pride. Now, as everywhere in Europe after the end of the Cold War, the country faces the pressing needs to limit quantitatively her armed forces, to improve them qualitatively by increasing the professional ingredient and by rearming with advanced weapon systems. The eventually freed funds are to be directed for the acquisition of technologically developed armaments - either by national production or through the armaments market of Europe, Russia or the USA. A significant part of the financial effort in the defence-related industry area should be for meeting the requirements of the country's integration in the CED, including for the development of a joint defence industrial base.

In the meantime Bulgaria will have to continue to produce competitive defence industrial products for the needs of its own army and for market purposes. Being a regular member of neo-COCOM - the Coordination Committee on Multilateral Export Controls from Wassenaar, Bulgaria bears a special obligation of keeping to the rules of international law in the field of arms exports. The market realization of national production is especially needed to compensate the expenses for the import of armaments from other countries that the army needs and are not produced in Bulgaria. A basic

principle in the production and trade of armaments is the equality of the value of the imported and the exported goods from and to the European countries. This will assure a moderate dependence on other producers and will not mobilise huge resources for defence.

The country's involvement in and cooperation with the CED industrial production is expected to improve the Bulgarian arms' technological competitiveness. The national armaments industrial production will continue to have, for the time being, the following priorities: 1) light weapons and the ammunitions for them; 2) anti-tank and air-defence arms and the ammunitions for them; 3) anti-tank and air-defence guided missiles and unguided reactive shells; 4) hand-grenade dischargers and grenades, mine-throwers and mines for them; 5) artillery equipment and conventional shells from 100 to 152 mm; 6) chain and wheel light armoured vehicles with various purposes; 7) flying targets and light airplanes; 8) navigation radar facilities and systems; 9) radio-communication systems; 10) radioactive and chemical defence systems.

For the other needed items Bulgaria may rely on foreign producers. The country could also try to establish cooperative relations with EU producers: a) with the purpose to find markets for the enlisted products (1-10) and sustain in this way 50,000 employees in the defence production sector; b) for research and development, for technological innovation; c) for purchasing licenses and know-how in high-tech and infrastructure; d) for attracting investments for or participation in joint defence production in advanced technological areas; e) for joining already established cooperative European programmes.

The defence production and market cooperation with the USA is motivated from the country's practical involvement with the PFP and NATO. The way of realization could be direct - either through the governments' or through the industrial units' interaction, and indirect - as a joint EU-US project.

The links with Russia are existing - there is already a defence production based on Russian licenses. Bulgaria alone is in no position to carry out thoroughly the next stage of the technological innovation of her production base and defence products. Certain modifications are the only acts that are in Bulgaria's reach. There exist practical difficulties to harmonize the management of the processes of change taking place in the defence production organisations of the two countries and there are efforts on the Bulgarian side to keep the relationship.

Bulgaria is re-assessing the strategy of her defence industrial development in a situation of heavy pressure by budget cuts for military purposes. This is both a difficult period and an open opportunity for fixing the whole new set

of national and international cooperative projects. Meeting the defence requirements of the Bulgarian armed forces, converting traditional production capacity, trying to stay competitive by stabilizing the research and development capacity of the country in this field, carrying out a reform in the management, procurement and budget allocation policies, transformation of the standardization principles, strategy, tactics, operation and the technical means for defence [67] - these are questions the country needs to cope with for achieving a better adaptation potential for the developments within the CED arms production and market issues of the EU.

IV Conclusion

Bulgaria's specific geopolitical situation and the conflicts the Balkans are burdened with press the country to give through her behaviour the conceptual answer to the parametres of an appropriate security policy that would guarantee the process of extending the Euroatlantic security community to the East with an adequate Southeastern European answer while not allowing the drawing of new dividing lines in Europe.

The Bulgarian Government is in a process of an intensified dialogue with the EU after the country's formal application for membership in the Union. The questions of the CFSP, stability and CED will certainly be important discussion points.

This process coincides with the country's practical involvement in the intensifying operational capabilities of the WEU of which it is an associated partner, with the country's enhanced dialogue with NATO on the provisions of the Alliance's Study on Enlargement, with the ongoing PFP activities, with the drafting of the OSCE concept of security for the 21st century and the Bulgarian cooperation, stability and security initiatives in the Balkan and in the Black Sea regions.

The creation of a new European defence identity by the European Union under the umbrella of an expanded NATO will obviously not be an easy exercise with Russia and other, mainly neutral, countries not ready to support by now all the details of the project. 1996 and the first half of 1997 may possibly be not the time for far-reaching decisions on this issue, but very probably much important planning will take place in that period as well as some final readjustments of the project. Bulgaria's own acts and her participation in the cooperative efforts to bring the CED sooner to reality can contribute to the process as well as to the country's integration in the EU.

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About the authors

Plamen Ilarionov Pantev - (b. 1952), Senior Research Fellow, Ph. D. and Associate Professor in International Relations and International Law. Expert in security, foreign-policy forecasting and international negotiations. Founder and Director of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS).

Valeri Ratchev Ratchev - (b. 1953), Lieutenant Colonel in the Bulgarian Armed Forces and Deputy Director of the Centre for National Security Studies of the Ministry of Defence. Expert in security, defence and management of conflicts. Associate of ISIS.

Tilcho Kolev Ivanov - (b. 1942), Associate Professor and Ph. D. in Branch Economics and Management. Expert in defence economics, conversion of the defence industries and restructuring of central-planned to the market economy. Associate of ISIS.

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