Reengineering the Defense Planning in Bulgaria

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Preface

With the end of the bi-polar opposition of the Cold War many countries face the challenge of adapting their defense establishments to changing international settings, lowering budgets, diversified security threats, changing roles and missions of the armed forces. Even countries with well developed and elaborated planning systems find it necessary to rethink the process of defense planning because of the assumptions, methods and images rooted in the Cold War. Balancing goals and resources, defense planners search for tradeoffs between existing force and modernization, between active and reserve forces, between combat forces and supporting structures. Commonly, the security and technological environment is so fluid that not the plan itself is important, but the capability to adapt it without sudden decline in military capabilities while minimizing inefficient spending.

Business practices provide helpful examples of dealing with change. The concept of reengineering appears particularly useful for reengineering defense planning in countries with limited experience in democratic defense and security decision-making.

This report describes results in reengineering the defense planning in Bulgaria. Although this is just a recent effort, the initial results allow to identify severe drawbacks of the existing planning practices, to identify key issues, and to design efficient sub-processes and supporting organizations.

Reengineering the defense planning is an ongoing effort, aimed at a critical nexus in the reform of the Bulgarian armed forces. The successful reengineering is expected to provide a missing link in the democratic control of the Bulgarian military, to allow for synchronization of plans, programs and budgets for the development of the Bulgarian armed forces, and to provide effective and efficient interface with the planning and review process of NATO and the Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program.

Slowly but surely, defense planning and reengineering are turning into major components of the new democratic national security decision-making process of Bulgaria.

I. INTRODUCTION: ON THE CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

The Bulgarian military, the political elite, as well as the society practically unanimously accept the democratic principle of civilian control over the armed forces. One example from the very beginning of the post-communist era convincingly shows the strength of the feelings of the people regarding the role of the military: A tape was distributed to media, containing a recording of the then President of the Republic of Bulgaria Peter Mladenov saying during a big demonstration in downtown Sofia "The tanks should better come". The quality of the recording did not allow to define whether these were the exact words. Nevertheless, given the societal reaction to a hypothetical use of the military against the people, the fact was sufficient for Mr. Mladenov's resignation.

In less than two years the popular feelings of promoting the democratic principles, including the principle of civilian control over the military, were turned into laws. In 1991, the Grand People's Assembly voted for a new democratic Constitution, followed by new laws on defense, the armed forces, and other security organizations. Roles and responsibilities of Parliament, President, Government, and General Staff were specified according to the principle of civilian control. The Minister of Defense is civilian. After a transparent discussion, the Parliament decides on the budget of the Ministry of Defense. In overseeing the armed forces, the civilian minister is assisted by Inspectorate - a body of highly professional and respected senior military officers.

Formally, the Bulgarian defense establishment meets three major requirements for democratic control over the military:

> Civilian Minister of the Ministry of Defense, to whom the senior military officer - the Chief of the General Staff - directly reports; Civilian oversight of all military activities through the Inspectorate;
>
> Established procedures for parliamentarian authorization of the defense budget;
>
> Definition of the mission of the armed forces (Constitution, 1991; National Security Concept, 1998).

Nevertheless, the fulfillment of these more or less formal requirements for civilian control is not sufficient for the achievement of *effective* democratic control.

This problem is not uniquely Bulgarian. In 1995, Jeffrey Simon concluded that if NATO adopts conditions for *effective* civilian oversight of the military, then "most of the Visegrad states would not currently qualify" (Simon, 1995, pp. 15-16). In 1997, examining the countries in transition from communism to democracy, Chris Donnelly concludes that there is no country in Central and Eastern Europe "that has the effective army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defense it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals" (Donnelly, 1997, p. 19).

Similar conclusions regarding Bulgaria specifically were drawn in a study on the parliamentary oversight and democratic control of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and MoD, performed by an UK team from the MoD Directorate of Consultancy and Management Services (Parliamentary oversight, 1998). The authors of the study, who worked in close cooperation with Bulgarian defense experts, concluded that "whilst most of the current policy, planning and control mechanisms within Bulgarian defence are effective, there is continuing room for improvement, particularly if the Government is to deal efficiently with the significant challenges that it faces in defence related issues". They implied that there is a lack of realism and coherence between budgets and defence plans. Furthermore, the credibility of the relation between plans and budgets is repeatedly undermined since "plans, once endorsed, are regularly found to be unaffordable within allocated budgets and if MOD has to adopt a significantly different force posture from that agreed by Parliament in order to meet affordability constraints".

These conclusions surprised part of the Bulgarian political and military leadership. Most of the defense and military professional assumed that once the formal requirements, listed above, are met, civilian control of the military will be guaranteed. Generally, it is not understood that effective civilian, including parliamentarian, control may be effective only if there is clear understading of the relation "*resources - forces - goals of the defense policy*".

The authors of the study summarized their findings in a recommendation to establish a rigorous system for defense planning (Parliamentary oversight, p. 23, art. 4.38):

> "The defence planning system must therefore be capable of reconciling the gap between desired roles and missions and available funding. There will undoubtedly be continued pressure within the MOD and Armed Forces as hard decisions arise as to how limited funds can be allocated to best effect. These decisions may need to be taken locally as matters of delegation, but to fully address these challenges a more coherent

> approach to planning is required than is apparent now. This should include a system for deciding, as the budget is being drawn up, how shortfalls in funding might be reflected in planning changes. At the highest decision-making level this will require more precise alignment between the National Security Concept and the Reform Programme. At lower levels it will require clearer decisions on the priorities to be allocated between personnel numbers, training, logistic sustainability, and force modernisation against the limited budget. The continued development of a resource allocation system such as the US Defence Resource Management model should assist with these difficult decisions but parallel work to define those standards (normatives) for the activities of the armed forces that have still to be determined will still be vital to success".

Undoubtfully, incremental improvements in the defense planning process may contribute to the efficiency of civilian oversight. The purpose of the current study, however, is to define the main sources for inefficiency of the civilian control and to design and propose new functions, processes, and organization to establish effective civilian control over the Bulgarian armed forces. In dealing with this problem, the authors found very beneficial the concept of process reengineering.

II. PROCESS REENGINEERING

Introducing the theory of reengineering is not among the goals of this report. The reader may find an excellent introduction to the subject in the book by Hammer and Stanton (1995). The authors of that book define reengineering as (Hammer and Stanton, 1995, p. 3):

> "The fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to bring about dramatic improvement in performance."

Reengineering does not aim at optimization of existing procedures or adaptation of organizational structures. The emphasis in this so-called official definition is on the profound change in the *processes* for accomplishing the mission of the organization. The ambition is to achieve not just good, but outstanding results. The old regulations change decisively. Although extensively used, modern information technology is just one of the tools of reengineering. As a rule, the resulting dramatic improvements come with a shift of organizational culture.

Theory and practice of reengineering are valid for organizations of any size. However, for big and complex organizations it is extremely important to

identify a critical process, a process which redesign may have a triggering effect for profound changes in the whole organization. In the same book Hammer and Stanton (1995, p. 225) provide the following example of a reengineering project for a big company which

> "... steeped in old culture for decades, had much inertia to overcome. While senior executives proclaimed decentralization and empowerment, the company continued to operate with the old, constrained top-down management system. Project Spring's sponsors came to view reengineering not only as the solution to the specific problems of budgeting and planning but also as a critical step toward reorienting the company's culture and a concrete demonstration of its commitment to undertake major change."

As a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the US Department of Defense initiated a defense reform with four main pillars:

> Reengineering for introduction of the best practices of the business world;
>
> Consolidation of activities;
>
> Introduction of competition in the performance of various functions;
>
> Elimination of the redundant infrastructure.

Studying the reform of the defense establishment in Bulgaria, the authors of the current report came to the conclusion that the reengineering effort should be focused on the process of defense planning.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DEFENSE PLANNING

Defense planning comprises several primary activities, usually thought of as proceeding in sequence, but more typically accomplished iteratively and with a good deal of parallel and intertwined effort. Davis and Khalilzad (1996) outline the following seven primary activities:

> 1. Assessing objectives;
>
> 2. Recognizing and conceptualizing challenges;
>
> 3. Conceptualizing and defining alternative response challenges;

4. Assessing and comparing the alternatives in terms of effectiveness versus cost and robustness to assumptions;

5. Integrating and choosing among alternatives to develop an overall plan;

6. Implementing the plan and monitoring events;

7. Adapting the plan over time.

There is no universally recognized system that incorporates efficiently the performance of these activities. The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense still needs to develop a system, or in reengineering terms - a process, that best suits its needs, traditions, and potential. However, before discussing the vision of such a system, we need to critically examine the current status of defense planning.

In our view, there are four major problems in the current system of defense planning:

lack of certain functions;

no holistic approach to defense planning;

no long-term thinking;

cultural challenges.

1. Missing functions

Studying the difficulties in the defense reform, the authors came to recognize that the link between national security objectives and the existing force structure is broken. Limited resources are spent to support armed forces, weapons and infrastructure, developed for entirely different security situation in the bipolar world. There is no single framework that links objectives-to-forces-to-resources.

Moreover, there are no organizations to which important components of the defense planning are designated. The prudent comparison between the elements on the left side of figure 1 (please refer to the hard copy for the figure) and the existing practices show that the Bulgarian MoD has some expertise in planning finances, human resources, armaments and logistics, but the assignment of responsibilities for C2 planning, and especially for force planning, is highly ambiguous and confusing. As a result, there is no agency responsible for force development or for development of the information infrastructure, and the decision making process is highly inconsistent and unpredictable.

2. Piecemeal approach

More serious, however, is the lack of holistic approach to defense planning. Currently, a type of 'down-up' planning is exercised, but without any rational mechanism for adaptation of resource requirements to force structure. As a rule, in the last several years the unit commanders get several time less money than they need for training the troops and sustaining the equipment and the infrastructure. The lack of holistic approach leads to increasing numbers of malfunctioning equipment, gradual destruction of the infrastructure, low training levels and, as a result, lowering combat potential and degrading morale.

Even the attempts to meet the requirements of the changing security environment, including the preparation for joining NATO in its military-technological aspects meet significant obstacles due mainly to organizational inertia. One example is the attempt for implementation of the so called *interoperability objectives*. The experience for the last two years shows that there is no connection between the accepted obligations and the plans for force development, no clear understanding of the required scope and depth of implementation, lack of relation between the importance of a particular objective and the resources allotted for its implementation. As a result there are several 'success stories' - more or less show cases - and considerable lag in the implementation of the rest of the interoperability objectives. Furthermore, one of the mechanisms for adaptation to the NATO procedures and requirements, outlined in figure 1, is far from effective.

3. Short-term horizon

Due mainly to high inflation rates in the recent years, there is no long-term thinking in the defense decision makers. They usually look for one step comprehensive solutions, and there is no experience in long-term planning and programming. Actually, there are two documents - "Plan for the development of the Armed forces until year 2010" and "Program for modernization of the weapon systems and rearmament until year 2015", but they are so far from any resource estimates that they are practically useless.

The lack of programming thinking may be examined as one of the cognitive and perceptual challenges. Another one stems from the traditional understanding of the term "planning".

4. Perceptual challenges

Traditionally, planning among the Bulgarian military is understood in its meaning of operational planning - a highly classified activity that is in the exclusive expertise of a few military officers, traditionally performed in the

General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. As a result, the initial reaction towards the studies in defense planning is one of suspicion. Although it is not very difficult to overcome these perceptions, the integration of long-term strategic planning through programming to operational planning in a comprehensive system will still be challenged, and the interaction between the civilian and military leadership will be hampered.

IV. PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO DEFENSE PLANNING

Defense planning is a complex set of interrelated processes of defining goals, missions, resources, and distribution of resources among tasks in time and space. The end result of the planning processes should represent a comprehensive and inherently consistent set of plans. Ideally, the set of plans should provide multiple variants, contingency alternatives, and opportunities for adaptation with the evolution of the security environment.

Key among the variables in the defense planning process are (Bartlett, *et.al.*, 1995):

Ends and objectives;

Security environment;

Strategies, or the game plan to achieve the desired goals within the limited means;

Means or tools to execute chosen strategies;

Constrained resources;

Risk of failure.

Several alternative approaches are used to balance the key variables in the defense planning process (Bartlett, *et.al.*, 1995, pp. 20-25):

Top-Down - driven by national interests and objectives;

Bottom-Up - driven by existing military capability;

Scenario - situationally-driven;

Threat - driven by the desired balance of capabilities between adversaries;

Mission - functionally based;

Hedging - driven by the need to fully prepare for any conceivable tasking;

Technology - driven by the belief that conflict can be deterred and aggression stopped by fielding systems, superior to those of potential enemies;

Fiscal - driven by the budget.

In any case, defense planning is an iterative multi-player process of estimation and decision-making on issues of national interests, objectives (what we want to achieve), strategy (how we plan to do it), threats and challenges (what do we face against us), own forces, friends and allies (what is available to do it), risk assessment (what are the deficiencies and mismatches). Conceptualizing the issues in reengineering defense planning processes, we found useful the strategy and force planning framework, proposed by Lloyd (Lloyd, 1995, p.3) and represented on figure 2. (please refer to the hard copy for the figure)

This framework is process-based and allows for analysis of existing practices, as well as for assessing the feasibility of applying various defense planning models in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense.

V. TOWARDS A MODERN SYSTEM FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

The redesign of the defense planning processes in Bulgaria is a complex task and immense intellectual challenge. It has no apparent, concise, easy to understand and unanimous solution. Furthermore, as in any reengineering effort, it has to overcome organizational inertia, perceptional roadblocks and, in some cases, overt or covert resistance. Finally, the pressing need for defense reform and the fluid changes do not allow for extensive dedicated studies, long-term test cases and cautious implementation steps.

Fortunately, there was a basis to launch the current study. Several overview studies with tailored recommendations have been completed in the following areas:

Changing international security situation and the role of the armed forces (Shalamanov, 1999; Tagarev and Shalamanov, 1995);

Changing missions of the armed forces (Mihov, 1997; Shalamanov, 1999);

Changing ways of using the armed forces (e.g., Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996; Mihov, 1998; Campen and Dearth, 1998);

Qualitative changes in the ways and means for using force due to the potential of advanced information technologies (Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996);

Specific problems of the civil-military relations in Bulgaria in the period of transition (Pantev, Ratchev and Tagarev, 1996; Tagarev, 1997);

The role of education, and the military education in particular, in the reform efforts (Tagarev, 1997; Tagarev, Shalamanov and Vatov, 1997);

The scientific support for the reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (Shalamanov and Tagarev, 1996; Shalamanov, 1996; Shalamanov, 1997).

Furthermore, the defense planning process should provide for:

Combining various horizons:

Long-term planning - 15-20 year horizon;

Programming - 5-6 year horizon;

Budgeting - 1-2 year horizon;

Integration of the strategic planning, programming and operational planning;

Incorporation of sound procedures for prioritization of defense requirements;

Streamlining processes;

Clear division of responsibilities;

Introduction of modern information technologies, including decision-support systems, GroupWare, etc.

The last of the listed issues is examined in detail by one of the authors (Shalamanov, 1998). Some of the other issues are addressed in this part of the report. It contains designs of organizational structures, processes, and educational activities to support the engineering effort.

1. Organizational changes in the Ministry of Defense

The purpose of the defense planning system is to produce plans, programs, and budgets with "the ultimate objective of furnishing the combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable

within fiscal constraints" (Joint Staff, 1993, p. 5-4). To achieve that objective we need to be able to define current, emerging, and future issues regarding changes in the strategic environment, threats, technologies, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions. The first two organizational designs are proposed accordingly.

Defense Planning Directorate

The Defense Planning Directorate will be an organizational structure in the Ministry of Defense - part of its specialized administration - with the following sections:

Strategy and analysis (risk assessment);

Force planning;

Scientific and Technological Policy;

Information Infrastructure Policy.

The directorate is designed in a way to allow the performance of the following main functions of the Minister of Defense:

Formulation of the policy on the development of strategies, concepts, and doctrines and oversight of the process of their implementation into field manuals and other regulative documents of the Bulgarian Armed Forces;

Coordination of the force development activities;

Formulation of the policy on the development of weapon systems, armaments and equipment, the defense information infrastructure and the system for command and control;

Assessments of the connection between formulated goals and planned forces, armaments and supporting infrastructure;

Coordination of scientific studies, research and development in the interest of defense planning and development of the armed forces;

Preparation, coordination and control of the execution of plans and programs for scientific and technological development, development of the command and control systems to guarantee interoperability with NATO and compatibility of the national information infrastructure.

Institute for Advanced Defense Research

The process of defense planning will be supported by a single *Institute for Advanced Defense Research* (IADR) that will unite practically all scientific, research and development activities conducted at the Ministry of Defense other than those, conducted at the service academies and the "G.S. Rakovsky" College in Sofia. The design of IADR is a straightforward consequence of reengineering and may be examined as an example of streamlining, consolidation of activities, and flattening of the organization.

Currently, military scientific organizations (MSO) and research units (RU) have various status and subordination that leads to inefficient interaction. Some MSO and RU are controlled by structures which have primarily operational tasks, i.e. the General Staff of the Bulgarian armed forces. MSO and RU management is decentralized and there is no coordination among them.

The necessity for consolidation is defined by the changes in the security environment and the tendency towards reduced military budgets, the need to preserve the MoD highly qualified scientific and research personnel, the upcoming structural changes in the MoD and the Bulgarian armed forces and the new normative regulations.

The process redesign started with definition of the mission of the research - providing scientific support for the formulation and implementation of the defense policy and planning and the development of the armed forces.

The IADR activity will be focused on analyses, forecasts, system design and prototype development of technological-engineering, communications and information systems, economic, historical, sociological and behavioral studies to provide effective force development, doctrinal synergism and interoperability with NATO.

The basic tasks of IADR are:

Scientific support for defense planning;

Development of conceptual issues of the defense reengineering and the reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces;

Development of models of forces, armaments, equipment and materiel;

Preparation of analyses, expert assessment and concepts on military planning of combat innovations,

rearmament and the defense potential of alternative models of the armed forces;

Analytic-informational work on the development of armaments, equipment, materiel and human resources;

Preparation of economic and sociological analyses and forecasts for the defense;

Studies on military history and military policy issues as a base for the development of the contemporary military policy, theory and practice;

Education of scientific staff for the defense of the country on the second and third level of education (master's/doctorate);

Research on the historic and contemporary experience of the Bulgarian and foreign militaries for the organizational development of the armed forces and their combat application;

Publishing and dissemination of scientific information in the interest of MoD and the armed forces;

Participation in research and technology programs and international co-operation with the respective structures of NATO, NATO and PfP member-countries.

The structure for the future Institute for Advanced Defense Research is presented on figure 3 (please refer to the hard copy for the figure).

Interoperability Center

Major component of the Bulgarian security and defense policy is the preparation for NATO integration (Ananiev, 1998). Bulgaria has been steadily enhancing its capabilities for participation in peace support operations, humanitarian and search and rescue missions with NATO and partner countries. To increase the effectiveness of this preparation within the fiscal constraints and the overall development of the armed forces, the Interoperability Center was established. Its mission is to support the process of expanding the interoperability of units and headquarters through analyses of combat and training experience, teaching specialized short-term courses and increasing English language proficiency and certification. Supporting the "Security Policy and NATO Integration" directorate in the Ministry of Defense, the Interoperability Center should play a major role in linking Bulgarian and NATO defense planning (see figure 1), at this stage through the implementation of the individual partnership program, the

interoperability objectives, the planning and review process, and the initial partnership goals.

Programming Council

The previous three organizations are designed as bodies in the Ministry of Defense with permanently appointed staff. The fourth one - the Programming Council - is designed as an advisory board to the Minister of Defense with participation on high (deputy ministerial) level and no permanent staff. Its main purpose is to recommend to the Minister of Defense programs for development of particular capabilities and projects for modernization or procurement of weapon systems, equipment, or command and control systems.

Currently, we study the potential of expanding the mission of the Programming Council to include the function of prioritization.

2. Streamlining and Division of Responsibilities

The biggest challenge in reengineering defense planning is to design and implement an effective mechanism for linking long-term plans with budgets, that allow to incorporate procedures for estimation of mission requirements, desired capabilities and for prioritization through rigorous risk assessment. We examine the programming approach as the linkage between plans and budget. However, in view of existing practices and perceptions, it cannot be accomplished with a single act.

Currently, the focus of the introducing the programming approach is in the decision making and execution of projects for modernization and acquisition of command and control systems and armaments. For this reason we shall examine the design of a new model of the life-cycle of command and control systems and armaments as an example of reengineering.

As of this moment, a number of regulations and standards define the requirements towards the development and acquisition of such systems. Furthermore, organizations at various subordination and hierarchical level are involved in the process. Therefore, the process of reengineering involves considerable streamlining of the acquisition process, flattening the respective organizations, limiting the number of documents, regulating similar types of activities, and dividing responsibilities.

As an example, figure 4 represents the process of weapon systems acquisition (please refer to the hard copy for the figure). It clearly divides the responsibilities of the user, the definition of operational and technical requirements, and the acquisition per se. Compared with the existing system,

this process allows for elimination of two to three levels of organizational hierarchy, early involvement of high level decision makers, and incorporation of the programming approach.

3. Educating the people

One of the first issues to be widely recognized from the very beginning of the transition of the defense establishments of the post-communist countries was the paramount importance of the education for the civilian control in the emerging democracies and the role of military education for the success of the reform effort (see, for example Gilman and Herold, 1993). Similarly, the reengineering of defense planning cannot be successful without educating the people both about the need to reengineer and the techniques to do it.

The authors consider that the minimal needs include a university level course, potentially in the settings of a military academy, of about forty to sixty academic hours. The course may have the structure represented in Table 1 (Shalamanov, 1998).

Table 1. Academic course in defense planning reengineering

#	Topic
1	Reasons and environment for reengineering the defense planning
2	Basics of the reengineering
3	Participants and reengineering leadership
4	Organization of the reengineering team
5	Basic principles of reengineering
6	Main causes for reengineering failures
7	Role of the information technologies in process reengineering. Information management
8	Methods and tools for reengineering support
9	Rethinking the planning process and the execution of the plan. Life cycle of the plan
10	Models of defense planning processes
11	Planning through mission capabilities modules
12	Institutionalizing the adaptive planning

13 Process integration in distributed and multi-staged planning

14 Information environment for defense planning support

15 *Seminar*: Defense planning models - reasons and conditions for reengineering the defense planning

16 *Seminar*: Process reengineering - principles and organization

17 *Seminar*: Information environment to support the defense planning reengineering

18 Essay on a topic in reengineering the defense planning

VI. CONCLUSION: AN ONGOING EFFORT

Reengineering the defense planning is an ongoing effort, aimed at a critical nexus in the reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. The successful reengineering is expected to:

provide a missing link in the democratic control of the Bulgarian military

synchronize plans, programs and budgets for the development of the Bulgarian Armed Forces

provide effective and efficient interface with planning and review process of NATO and the Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program.

In the not too distant future, the results of the reengineering of the defense planning will affect indirectly all aspects of the activity of the Ministry of Defense. Hopefully, it will introduce the culture of process oriented thinking, will streamline activities, will bring better understanding of what is the product of the defense establishment, who are the 'customer', what they want and how to meet their requirements.

To create a constructive relationship among various civilian and military planners, the planning process may include two rather independent parts:

PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting - type of system; and

JSPS - Joint Strategic Planning - type of system.

Taken together, the two systems will have the combined purpose of "furnishing the best possible mix of missions, forces, equipment, and support to the combatant commanders" (see, for example, The Joint Staff, 1993, p.5-5).

Studying reengineering, the authors of this report found the concept of *mission capability packages* (Alberts, 1995) useful both as a framework for defining *ends* in the new security environment and as an example of reengineering.

Two more concepts deserve special consideration, but were not elaborated in this report. The first one is the "discipline gap" (Davis, 1995), that is the gap between the recommendations, resulting from rigorous analysis and optimized allocation of resources, and the what emerges as a result of political compromises, organizational inertia, and other factors that hamper implementation of the plans. The second one is on the implementation of the potential information technologies, and the need for much better decision support systems to ensure more efficient and adaptive use of the limited resources for the defense.

Although supplementary to the concepts examined in the report, they may define and decide the difference between success and failure not only of reengineering the defense planning, but of the entire defense reform.

From Theory to Practice

After several years of hibernation, the Bulgarian defense establishment undergoes fluid changes. Even the time to prepare this report for publication appeared significant compared to the speed of change in the field of defense planning. In a period of just a few months the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense went through major conceptual, organizational, personnel, and perceptual changes. The study by the UK team, mentioned in part I of this report, was followed by a comprehensive and in-depth study of the "reform of the Bulgarian armed forces using US methodological support". Known in the Central and East European countries as one of "the Kievenaar studies", named after Major General Henry Kievenaar, Deputy-Director of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, US Department of Defense, this study provided for a rigorous evaluation of Bulgarian security environment, national security concepts, missions and tasks of the military, force structure, armaments, and infrastructure, available and forecasted resources. For the first time mission, forces and resources were tied up in a holistic picture. Furthermore, a realistic program framework was designed, outlining the path of the Bulgarian military in the years to come. A new military doctrine was developed. It states the maximum peacetime personnel strength of the armed forces to 45,000

people - a straightforward result from the conducted study. And finally, a "Defense Planning" Directorate was established and one of the authors (TT) was appointed as its first Director.

But this is only the beginning of a challenging way to the effective democratic control of the Bulgarian armed forces. In the authors' opinion, the institutionalization of a modern defense planning system is the critical nexus of civilian control in the transition of Bulgaria to democracy.

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